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Abstract 
Academic and public policy interest in the role of local resource users in the management of 
forests has grown in recent decades. While much attention has focused on the self-organisation 
of user groups, with autonomy as a precondition for successful collective action, there has been 
relatively little research into the influence of external factors on the role of so-called induced 
grassroots organisations – organisations created through donor or government funding – in 
natural resource management (NRM). Nonetheless, it is evident that external influences are of 
critical importance to these organisations in authoritarian countries, and the establishment of 
grassroots organisations is a common approach to encouraging local participation in NRM. 
Moreover, in studies on NRM devolution policies, community property rights are often seen as a 
potential option. What these studies do not bring to light, however, is how different types of 
property rights can be mixed and arranged through different layers in the organisational 
structures of grassroots organisations.  
This study responds to these gaps in the literature, and drawing on learning from three case 
studies in Quang Tri province, Vietnam. It employs a qualitative and participatory approach, 
involving semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, seasonal calendars, natural 
resource mapping and transect walks. The study’s findings highlight the dominance of the 
technocratic position in the roles played by induced forest-based grassroots groups. This results 
from the ambition of the Party-state to keep the rural population dependent on it, and the 
reluctance of international donors and INGOs, while operating within the current state structures, 
to use their leverage to effectively support grassroots organisations. The findings of the research 
also emphasise the need for induced grassroots organisational structures and property rights that 
combine village-wide, household-group and individual arrangements.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
International development discourse advocating for the participation of local resource users in 
the natural resource sector seems to be based on the assumption that, to sustain long-term use of 
renewable resource systems, like forests, collective action is needed to overcome uncoordinated 
behaviours (Lise, 2000; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). Also, in forest management, policy makers 
and scholars alike increasingly acknowledge that state mismanagement and ignorance of local 
participation have been a primary cause of the degradation of forests (see Sikor and Tran, 2007). 
The participation of local people in the natural resource management (NRM) in general and 
forest management in particular, has increased significantly in Vietnam since the 1990s. In part, 
this is attributable to the Government of Vietnam’s decisive steps to transfer the responsibility 
for managing forests from state-owned forestry enterprises (SFEs) to individual households 
(Sikor and Apel, 1998). In this context, increased participation of local people in NRM has often 
been attempted through the creation of grassroots organisations – referred to as induced 
grassroots organisations in this thesis – mainly with international donor funding. The broad aim 
of this study is to assess the effectiveness of these organisations in facilitating local resource 
users’ participation in forest management and factors influencing their effectiveness, as well as 
to identify the mechanisms through which these organisations can be strengthened. This 
introductory chapter sets out the context within which this study is placed. In this regard, an 
analysis is carried out of the state of NRM, highlighting the need for the participation of local 
people. The perceived need for increased participation of local people triggers, in turn, the 
induction of grassroots organisations for NRM, which is discussed in the following section. The 
last section of this chapter frames the study: its research questions; study sites; and research 
approach.  
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1.2. Setting the Context: the State of NRM 
Forests are facing grave dangers on a global scale. Globally, almost three billion hectares of 
forest have been lost over the last three decades (Siry et al., 2005). About half of the world’s 
original forest cover has already been cleared for agriculture and forest products, while another 
30% has become degraded or fragmented (United Nations Population Fund, 2004). The findings 
of the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO)’s Forest Resources Assessment (FAO, 2006) 
reveal that about 13 million hectares of the world’s forests are lost due to deforestation1 each 
year. In turn, habitat loss has detrimental impacts upon biological diversity around the world. 
The 2007 International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List contains 16,306 
species threatened with extinction, up from 16,118 the year before. Further, the number of 
species classified by IUCN as ‘extinct’ has reached 785, with a further 65 being only found in 
captivity or in cultivation (IUCN, 2007a).  
Southeast Asia, one of the regions with the highest levels of species richness and endemism in 
the world (see Mittermeier et al., 1999; Myers et al., 2000), is not excluded from this global 
trend of deforestation and degradation. Deforestation rates in Southeast Asia are at least two 
times higher than those in other tropical areas around the world (Sodhi et al., 2004). The region 
experienced the largest decline in forest area in the 2000s, with an average loss of more than 2.8 
million hectares (or 2% of the total) per year (Rosander, 2008). One projection is that, by 2100, 
three-quarters of the region’s original forests will have disappeared, taking with them up to 42% 
of the region’s biodiversity (Achard et al., 2002). Another study suggests that more than 40% of 
the animal and plant species in Southeast Asia could be wiped out this century, with at least half 
representing global extinctions (Young, 2003).  
Vietnam has followed these global and regional trends of deforestation and biodiversity loss. 
From 1943 to 1993, 50% of the natural forest in Vietnam disappeared (Morrison and Dubois, 
1998; de Jong et al., 2006; Dang, 2010). Despite the government of Vietnam’s claim of 
increasing forest cover to nearly 13 million hectares, of which about 10 million hectares is 
natural forest (SRV, 2007), nearly all of this increase was in the form of forest plantations, and 
natural forest continued to decline or was degraded and fragmented (World Bank, 2005; de Jong 
et al., 2006; Clementa and Amezagab, 2009). Consequently, forest quality has not necessarily 
                                                          
1 Forest degradation and deforestation are distinctly different processes. While deforestation involves the conversion 
of forests to other land cover types, degradation results when forests lose their ability to provide ecosystem services 
or suffer major changes in species composition due to overexploitation, invasion by exotic species, pollution, fires 
or other factors (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
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increased and the biodiversity values of the expanded forests are limited, especially as forest 
plantations are mostly composed of alien, fast-growing trees adapted to the needs of the pulp and 
paper industry (Tordoff, 2005; de Jong et al., 2006; Clementa and Amezagab, 2009). Due to 
habitat loss and over-exploitation, the number of globally threatened plant and animal species in 
Vietnam increased by 402 (a 65% increase) between 2000 and 2009 (IUCN, 2000, 2009). As 
Vietnam, in common with the region as a whole, continues to witness rapid economic and 
population growth, this trend of biodiversity loss is expected to continue.  
In leading to these losses, the protected area approach to NRM was often seen. Under this 
approach, states acted as resource managers on behalf of their citizens, to decide when and where 
resources could be used. Nation states established protected areas, used laws, fines and large 
bureaucracies, to control offences with regard to natural resource use. In turn, local people were 
regarded as culprits responsible for the destruction of resources, and in need of constant 
surveillance by large bureaucracies to keep them from those resources (see Bryant and Wilson, 
1998). As a result, people living within protected area boundaries were increasingly excluded 
from accessing natural resources on which they had previously depended (see Grimble and 
Laidlaw, 2002; Agrawal and Gibson, 2004; Hjortsø et al., 2006). This stoked the hostility of 
local people towards states and the resources under their management, making sustainable NRM, 
including sustainable forest management2, a near-impossible task (see Grimble and Laidlaw, 
2002; Hjortsø et al., 2006).  
In face of massive destruction of ecological systems worldwide, decision makers and scientists 
were forced to re-evaluate the way in which natural resources systems were studied and managed 
(Brugnach et al., 2011). Since the late 1980s, governments around the world have made greater 
efforts to address the negative effects of ignoring local people’s participation in NRM. In this 
light, new approaches to NRM, such as the Outreach Protected Area Approach, Collaborative 
Management and Community-based Natural Resource Management, have been developed, 
stressing the necessity of collective action, favouring the consultation and engagement of 
multiple actors in decision-making processes, and emphasising the importance of livelihood 
improvement in achieving conservation goals (Ostrom, 1992; Barrow and Murphree, 2001; 
Vedeld, 2002; Pérez-Cirera and Lovett, 2006; Ingram and Lejano, 2010). Indeed, as Sikor and 
                                                          
2 The sustainability of management of any area of forest can be assessed from two different points of view: on the 
presence of the desired product(s); or on the state of the forest. As such, sustainable forest management aims to 
maintain either the potential of the forest to deliver a sustained harvest of a desired forest product(s) or the forest 
ecosystem in a certain desired condition (Poore, 2003). 
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Muller (2009) argue, every major policy document now endorses a community-based approach 
to NRM. 
In this context, devolution policies in NRM have been formulated to transfer some of the power 
for decision making on NRM to local resource users and grassroots organisations. In fact, the 
majority of developing countries, even those under authoritarian political regimes, are now 
engaged in some form of devolution to give local communities a greater role in NRM (Bryant 
1996; Edmunds et al., 2003b; Jones and Carswell, 2004; Moelionon et al., 2009). Major donors, 
such as the World Bank, have also advocated for devolution of forests and recognition of 
customary land rights held by local communities (e.g. World Bank, 2002a).  
In part, the imperative for increased participation of non-state actors, especially local resource 
users, in NRM through devolution policies has come from global institutions and frameworks, 
which have highlighted both the importance of sustainable development and the need to engage 
non-state actors in issues previously considered the domain of the state (Visseren-Hamakers and 
Blasbergen, 2007). For example, Agenda 21, one of the major outcomes of the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (the so-called ‘Earth 
Summit’), highlighted that fulfilment of the basic needs of local communities had to be an 
official part of the integration of environmental concerns into the development process. In 
addition, governments of the 178 signatory countries of Agenda 21 agreed that environmental 
issues were best handled with the participation of all concerned citizens, as stated in Principle 10, 
which was later widely accepted as an integral part of NRM and the sustainable development3 
process (United Nations, 1997; Dearden et al., 1999). As a result, outside professionals and 
states no longer attempted to control the development process solely on their own terms (Zarsky 
and Simon, 2001; Eversole, 2003). For example, donor agencies like World Bank advocated for 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) to be prepared by governments through a 
participatory process involving civil society and development partners (World Bank, 2002c). 
                                                          
3 A popular definition of sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). There are different interpretations of sustainable development, which place different emphasis 
on stocks of assets for future generations. Under the wealth approach, natural capital is simply another form of 
capital (Turner et al., 1994). Therefore, it can be compensated by built capital. In this light, the approach is not 
necessarily consistent with environmental protection. Also, it does not recognise that the source of most 
environmental problems is the failure of the economic system to take account of valuable services provided to 
humans by the natural environment (Pearce et al., 1989). For the mosaic approach, sustainable development exits 
only when biological, economic and social systems achieve sustainability simultaneously: biological sustainability 
requires development to be compatible with the maintenance of ecological processes, economic sustainability 
requires development to be economically feasible, while social sustainability requires development to be socially 
accepted (Smith and McDonald cited in Akinbami et al., 2003).  
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In its turn, recognition for devolution of NRM to local resource users and local governments has 
been influenced by increasing acknowledgement of the negative effects of natural resource loss 
on poor people. Research in many developing countries has highlighted the fact that loss of 
forest has grave impacts upon human being. Deforestation and the degradation of forest has often 
been associated with climate change around the world, which has been implicated in a doubling 
of the number of major natural disasters from an average of 200 a year to 400 a year over the 
past two decades. Climate change has also caused declines in productivity for many crops, which 
together with other factors, such as soaring oil prices, has contributed to food scarcity, raising 
concerns about food insecurity across the globe (Adams, 2008).  
Globally, people rely heavily on forest resources for their livelihoods. For instance, a World 
Bank (2005) report illustrates that as many as 50% of the population in the world, mostly in rural 
areas, depend upon natural resources in one way or another for their livelihoods. In addition, 
forest resources contribute to keeping the world’s population, especially the poor, healthier. 
More than 80% of the world’s population rely for their primary healthcare on traditional 
medicines provided by various plant materials or animal products (IUCN, 2007b). Furthermore, 
biodiversity is important for food production, with 75% of the world’s staple crops relying on 
wild animal species for pollination (Margoluis et al., 2001). Given that many poor people in 
developing countries cannot access medical care or alternative livelihoods (IUCN, 2007b), forest 
clearance, with the associated loss of ecosystem goods and services, affects the poor the most; a 
fact that is often neglected in rural development programmes (Grimble and Laidlaw, 2002). 
These facts support the argument that local livelihood security is more likely to be secured 
through increasing local people’s share in resource management (Edmunds et al., 2003a; Potter, 
2008). 
There is also increasing recognition that enabling wider participation of local people and their 
organisations can help NRM to be undertaken more effectively, with greater support, better 
incentives and more effective instruments (e.g. Blaikie, 1985; Banuri and Holmberg, 1992; 
Lapham and Livermore, 2003; World Bank, 2005). This is because, thanks to attributes such as 
local knowledge and socio-cultural cohesiveness, local people’s participation can potentially 
catalyze the development of new NRM policies that are more responsive to local people’s needs 
and concerns (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; Salamon et al., 
2003; Economic Commission for Africa, 2004). In this light, environmentalists painted images 
of sustainable NRM based on intimate economic and cultural connection between local people 
and natural resources (Edmunds et al., 2003a). In addition, there is a widespread perception that 
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local people have better knowledge of their environment and are better placed to carry out NRM 
than outsiders (i.e. government staff and outside experts) and therefore should have more say in 
how natural resources are managed (Chambers, 1983; Warren, 1992; Baker, 1993; Alcorn et al., 
2002; Article 8(j) of Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) - CBD Secretariat, 2000; Briggs 
and Sharp, 2004). In this way, the governance of natural resources with wider participation of 
local people can become more conducive to people’s needs, and thus more likely to contribute to 
improvement of their wellbeing (see Fowler, 2000; Roe et al., 2006). In addition, through 
citizens’ participation in environmental governance, green theorists hope that they will become 
attached to the community and aware of imperatives for urgent action for sustainable use of 
natural resources (Carter, 2001). This is the case for local resource users, argue Bryant and 
Bailey (1997: 160): 
“Not so much because these actors necessarily have a greater ‘respect’ for the 
environment, but rather because their livelihoods depend on the maintenance of 
those resources in a way that is usually not the case for more powerful actors”. 
In addition, several pressures have mounted in favour of opening up opportunities for the 
participation of non-state actors in decision-making processes since the 1990s (Goodwin, 2009; 
Yang et al., 2010). During the 1970s, ‘top down’, ‘technocratic’ and ‘blueprint’ approaches to 
development received increasing criticism as they failed to deliver the economic growth and 
social benefits that had been promised (Turner and Hulme, 1997). Also, under the traditional 
approach to NRM, government bureaucracies were overextended, in terms of the personnel and 
budget needed to maintain a ‘fence-and-fine’ approach, which became increasingly burdensome 
(Woodcock, 2002; Edmunds et al., 2003a). In addition, there had been the fiscal crisis of the 
post-war Keynesian welfare state, and its associated modes of economic and political 
coordination. As a result, by the 1980s, governments across Western Europe, North America, 
and Australasia were reducing their spending and cutting their welfare budgets. As a result, the 
ability of states to perform their traditional roles, such as provision of public services and social 
security, seemed to diminish (Pierre and Peters, 2000). 
Also, in many countries – especially the UK, USA, Australia, and New Zealand – neoliberal 
governments were elected. Once in power, however, the ideology turned from a ‘rolling back’ of 
the state to a search for new forms of intervention and control, with the emergence of both 
autonomous and quasi-autonomous non-governmental agencies and institutions (Goodwin, 
2009). This was reinforced by developments at the local level, whereby political actors 
themselves formed a range of coalitions and partnerships. Some of these were funded and 
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promoted by higher tiers of government but others were the result of local decisions and 
arrangements to involve non-state actors from both the private and voluntary sectors (Edmunds 
et al., 2003a; Goodwin, 2009). However, it is important to note that, for neo-liberal advocates, 
the state still plays a significant role in all aspects of decision-making. In that sense, state 
interventions in the market and society is promoted to ensure the efficiency of the market and 
protect private property (Turner, 2008). In that context, although non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and grassroots organisations are given renewed prominence in 
implementing poverty alleviation and social welfare programmes, their roles in policy advocacy 
remained limited across different sectors (see Robinson, 1993; MacIlwaine, 1998a,b; Edmunds 
and Wollenberg, 2003).  
Moreover, compelling evidence emerged that the forces driving the degradation of natural 
resources were multifaceted and needed responses that went beyond the technological solutions 
to NRM and control of population growth commonly espoused in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 
(Bryant and Parnwell, 1996; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Castree, 2001; Watts, 2003). Increasing 
evidence supported the finding that forest resources have been used to fuel economic 
development for decades, which has exhausted them substantially (see Sunderlin, 2006). For 
example, the demand from developed countries for timber and forest products has been a major 
force for forest exploitation in developing countries (Humphreys, 2006). Research on the 
forestry sector in Southeast Asia and elsewhere also highlighted the fact that exploitation of 
tropical forests is politically driven and, thus, a governance issue (see Hurst, 1990; Bryant et al., 
1993; Bryant and Parnwell, 1996; Brosius, 1999; Barrett et al., 2005; Weatherbee et al., 2005; 
Sunderlin, 2006). 
Another factor influencing the promotion of local people’s participation in development process 
is the emerging theoretical accounts of post-development and post-colonialism. Criticism by 
post-development and post-colonialism against the Western-dominated development paradigm 
greatly influences the way in which local people’s knowledge and livelihoods are perceived and 
judged. In the view of post-development scholars, such as Escobar (1995, 2000, 2007) and 
Esteva and Prakash (1998), the perspectives and wishes of the marginalised should be central to 
the development process, enabling them to control the production of the knowledge they need for 
their lives, and the subsequent activities to improve them. In this line of argument, actions by the 
poor to influence decision making through direct and informal means (in the form of community 
participation) are considered as an alternative way by which they can gain access to decision-
making processes, which influence whether support for their livelihoods are included in 
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development planning (Desai, 2008). In this regard, local people have been seen as a solution to 
hegemonic development paradigms (Jakimow, 2008). 
Against these backdrops, devolution is expected to enhance participation of local resource users 
in decision making process, which is often seen as an important contribution to poverty 
alleviation, and improved distribution of benefits from NRM, thus leading to more sustainable 
NRM over time (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Sundar, 2001; Ribot, 2002a; Edmunds et al., 
2003a). However, in many cases, governments may undertake devolution to achieve greater 
managerial and financial efficiency (Agrawal et al., 1999). In this light, devolution has been used 
as an excuse to transfer the cost of forest management to local communities (Edmunds and 
Wollenberg, 2003). Consequently, devolution as a form of empowering non-state participants in 
NRM remains limited in many places.  
1.3. Induced Grassroots Organisations in NRM 
Given the received wisdom about their importance in the resource management process, 
grassroots organisations have been promoted as an important means of ensuring local resource 
users’ participation in NRM. In fact, grassroots organisations are not a new phenomenon in 
forest management. Groups of local resource users have been present in NRM for long periods in 
various contexts, to help villagers organise collaborative activities (whether legal or illegal, overt 
or covert) related to forest exploitation and management (see Peluso, 1995; Wollenberg et al., 
2009).  
What is new about grassroots organisations is that many have been recently ‘induced’ by 
outsiders. Since the 1970s, there has been growing recognition among scholars and government 
officials of the importance of grassroots organisations in any broad-based strategy for rural 
development, which is exemplified by an increasing emphasis on community participation 
through group formation in all forms of development intervention (Uphoff, 1986; Adhikari and 
Goldey, 2010). Indeed, in the context of NRM, rural community forestry groups represent one of 
the most widespread and rapidly expanding attempts at participatory development (Agrawal, 
2001a). Yet, many grassroots organisations have been created only recently, partly in response to 
the intensified social and environmental problems facing poor grassroots actors in many parts of 
the world. In Southeast Asia, for example, grassroots organisations have been induced by both 
governments and civil society organisations, with funding from international donors, as a means 
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to help villagers fight for social justice and local control over environmental resources (Bryant 
and Bailey, 1997; Mahanty et al., 2006).  
In spite of its wide use, there is no single definition of the term ‘grassroots organisation’, which 
is synonymous with community-based organisation (CBO) (Kindness and Gordon, 2001; 
Norlund et al., 2003). Having said that, the most commonly used definition (including in 
Vietnam) is to describe it as any type of formal or informal group of local people (e.g., a user 
group, local cooperative, village council or residents’ association) established to support the 
socio-economic and environmental interests of their individual members or of the community as 
a whole (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2000). Although grassroots organisations can be created by 
various organisations, such as central and local government institutions or a non-governmental 
bodies (Uphoff, 1982), for this thesis, international organisations are the only creators of the 
induced grassroots groups at the case study sites, as further explained in Chapter 4. Therefore, 
drawing upon Holloway’s (2001) definition4 of induced CBOs and Uphoff’s (1986, 1993) 
discussion5 on the varying spatial levels at which grassroots organisations operate, this thesis 
uses the term ‘induced grassroots organisations’ to refer to groups set up by international 
organisations with the aim of increasing local people’s participation in the NRM process at the 
group, community and/or locality levels6. 
In recent decades, the state of Vietnam has experimented with a variety of policies to make forest 
management more effective with greater participation of local resource users. The period from 
1975 to the mid-1980s was characterised by state-centred forest policies, with all forests being 
under the control of state-led institutions, such as Protected Area Management Boards (for 
forests within National Parks and Nature Reserves) and SFEs (for exploiting timber for national 
consumption and export). The period from the late 1980s onwards has witnessed a broader shift 
towards people-centred forestry policies. Important national policies promulgated during this 
                                                          
4 Holloway (2001) proposes two definitions for CBOs, depending on who established them. Indigenous CBOs are 
ones formed by the original inhabitants of a specific geographical location to deal with issues of immediate 
importance or common concern to their communities. These organisations can be temporary, or permanent with 
strong political and cultural roots. Induced CBOs are usually set up and funded by outsiders, such as a donor agency, 
the state or an NGO, and are endorsed or participated in by local people. The aim of setting up induced CBOs is to 
bring a new structure to a location and make it as accepted and, hopefully, ‘mainstreamed’ into local life as an 
indigenous one. 
5  Uphoff (1986, 1993) holds that grassroots organisations refer to membership or voluntary organizations at the 
following levels: (i) the group (i.e. a self-identified set of persons with some common interest, such as occupational, 
age, gender, ethnic or persons in a small residential area like a neighbourhood); (ii) the community (i.e. an 
established socio-economic residential unit, such as a village); or (iii) the locality (i.e. a set of communities having 
social and economic relations, usually with interactions centred around a market town). 
6 Following this definition, the distinction between grassroots organisations and NGOs can be seen when the former 
undertake the implementation of community-level project components while the latter work with them to channel 
resources from outside the community or provide technical assistance (see Salamon et al., 2003). 
23 
 
period, which opened a framework for reform in the forestry sector, including for example the 
1988 Land Law and the 1991 and 2004 (revised) Forest Protection and Development Laws7 
(National Assembly Office, 1988, 1991, 2004). Under these policies, for the first time, local 
people and non-state organisations began to share authority over forest resources, such as 
ownership of forests for restoration, replanting and harvesting. 
Under the influence of international and national trends in both development and NRM, 
grassroots groups were induced and subsidised by international donors and international NGOs 
(INGOs) as a means of increasing local people’s participation at the village level in decision-
making in Vietnam (Fritzen, 2003). This is also evident in the forest sector, where the 
implementation of a community-based forest management policy that emphasises the 
participation of household groups or villages was facilitated by multilateral and bilateral donors 
and INGOs (Sunderlin, 2006). The overall aim of these efforts was to demonstrate to Vietnamese 
government partners a new approach to local participation that could make a positive 
contribution to Vietnam’s economic development, enhance local governance for poverty 
reduction, and engender rural socio-economic transformation in Vietnam (Fritzen, 2003; 
McElwee and Ha, 2006).  
In spite of the proliferation of induced grassroots organisations as a means of increasing people’s 
participation in NRM, research on this new form of civil society organisation remains limited. 
Some efforts have been made to empirically examine the conditions under which user groups 
organise and the impacts of such local organisational presence on the management of 
community-based natural resources (Pender and Scherr, 1999; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). 
However, most studies in literature have focused on variables influencing the ability of local 
resource users to self-organise for managing common pool resources (see Olson, 1965, Ostrom, 
1990; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Gibson et al., 2000; Gibson and Becker, 2000; Brown et al., 
2007). These studies often assume that local autonomy is necessary for successful self-
organisation of user groups, which marginalises the influences of external actors. However, 
grassroots groups are widely created by national governments and international donors to take 
                                                          
7 According to the revised 2004 Forest Protection and Development Law (National Assembly’s Office, 2004), 
forests in Vietnam are classified into three types: (1) Special-use forests (Rừng đặc dụng in Vietnamese), intended 
for the conservation of nature and of plant and animal species; scientific research; and the protection of historic, 
cultural and tourist sites; (2) Protection forests (Rừng phòng hộ), for the preservation of water resources, the 
prevention of erosion, natural disasters, and climatic risks, and the overall protection of the environment; and (3) 
Production forests (Rừng sản xuất), used primarily for the production of timber and other forest products, and 
associated with the other types of forest to protect the environment. 
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part in decision-making processes, which challenges the common assumption about autonomy as 
a precondition for success of collective action8.  
Likewise, research on induced grassroots organisations in Vietnam have concentrated more on 
the impact of donor-funded projects than on the roles and impacts of the organisations 
themselves (i.e. Bach, 2001, on water-user groups; Fritzen, 2003, on local development groups). 
In addition, as seen elsewhere in the world where focusing on local factors leaves the effects of 
larger economic and political forces on forest management unchecked (see Agrawal, 2001c), 
research on the roles of grassroots groups created to take part in community forest management 
(CFM)9 in Vietnam often focuses mainly on local factors. For example, in Do (2007)’s study on 
CFM structures in five villages in Hoa Binh province, although offering interesting insights on 
governance structures and their influences on forest management, the study seemed to focus on 
the attributes of forests and groups and their influences on group performance. It did not explore 
the influence of these groups’ organisational structures on their own performance, nor did it 
sufficiently analyse power relations within these groups and between them and local 
governments. Moreover, the participation of these groups into policy-making processes as part of 
their roles in forest management did not receive attention in the study.  
1.4. The Study  
In view of the above discussion and accepting the importance of local resource users’ 
participation in NRM, there is great value in studying induced grassroots organisations, which 
have been widely adopted to facilitate sustainable NRM. This study investigates roles played by 
induced forest-based grassroots organisations and factors influencing their operations in the 
management of natural forest in Quang Tri province, Vietnam. In so doing, it aims to contribute 
to an improved understanding of the influence of external factors on shaping collective action in 
forest devolution, and the ways in which different types of property rights can be mixed and 
arranged through the channel of induced grassroots groups to support the sustainable 
management of natural forests in authoritarian political systems like the one in Vietnam.  
                                                          
8 Following Barsimantov et al. (2011), for the purposes of this thesis, ‘successful’ collective action in forest 
management is understood as that which leads to maintenance of forest cover and benefits (either spiritual or 
material) for people who take part. With this definition, the author acknowledges that other definitions of success 
exist and that many programs do not achieve these expected outcomes (see Pagdee et al., 2006).  
9 CFM is also known as co-management of forest or JFM (Matose, 2006), community-based forestry (McDermott, 
2009), community forestry (see Bowcutt, 1999; Alemagi, 2010; Barsimantov et al., 2011), social forestry, and 
watershed management (Bowcutt, 1999). Co-management initiatives reflect participatory and populist development 
paradigms that have been given impetus from the drive for community-based sustainable development since the late 
1980s (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). 
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Arising from this broad aim, the research has the following three main objectives:  
(1) To investigate the contextual foundations for the establishment of induced forest-based 
grassroots organisations in the forest sector.  
The starting point for this study is to investigate the local contexts within which induced 
grassroots organisations have been induced. As such, the study begins with an examination of 
the changing relationships between local resource users and forest over a period of time, the 
extent to which local livelihoods depend on forests, the contrast between contemporary and past 
forest management practices, and the operation of indigenous (largely agriculture-based) 
grassroots organisations. In so doing, the analysis aims to shed light on conditions influencing 
operations of grassroots groups in the local contexts. An understanding of these contexts also 
guides the development of strategies aimed at strengthening the participation of induced forest-
based grassroots organisations in forest management in Vietnam. 
(2) To critically evaluate the roles played by induced forest-based grassroots organisations and 
factors influencing them 
While induced grassroots groups are expected to play a role in facilitating local people’s 
participation in forest management, it could be argued that there will be significant 
differentiation in what roles they can take up, depending on institutional and structural factors 
influencing their performance. Depending on what roles induced grassroots organisations play, 
assessments of how much power has been transferred to them in forest management. The results 
enable the development of a mechanism to work with them more effectively.  
(3) To identify mechanisms by which induced grassroots organisations can be strengthened 
Different stakeholders think differently about how these organisations can be improved. 
Approaching this research objective from the perspectives of local people, members of induced 
grassroots organisations, government officials and staff members of international organisations 
suggests different options for improving these groups. As a result, a foundation for a practical 
strategy to improve the performance of these groups can be built. To improve the performance of 
induced grassroots organisations, stakeholders from different sections of society might think 
differently about whether or not working within the existing political system of Vietnam is a 
good option. Therefore, through the analysis of different stakeholders’ perspectives, it is 
important to find out where differences and similarities come from, so that a strategy for working 
more effectively with these organisations benefits from diversified perspectives.  
26 
 
In order to achieve these objectives, the study focused on three case study villages (referred to as 
Villages A, B and C throughout the dissertation) located in Quang Tri province, in central 
Vietnam (see Map 1.1), and employed a qualitative methodological framework using 
participatory and qualitative tools. Quang Tri was selected for the study for a number of reasons. 
First, the existence of induced grassroots groups involved in forest devolution was observed 
during a preparatory visit to the province in April 2007. Second, Quang Tri’s forests are very 
important in terms of their biodiversity, because they form part of the Annamite Mountain 
ecosystem, which was brought to the attention of the international scientific community in the 
1990s and 2000s by the discovery of several mammal species new to science (e.g. Sterling et al., 
2006). Nonetheless, forest destruction in Quang Tri has been taking place on a large scale, 
despite the existence of devolution policies in this province (Le et al., 1999; BirdLife in 
Indochina, 2008). As a result, finding a strategy to engage more effectively with local 
communities through induced forest-based grassroots groups could contribute positively to the 
improved implementation of devolution policies and the conservation of the forest biodiversity 
in Quang Tri. Third, I received substantial support from the provincial forest protection 
department to carry out the research, which was important to gain both administrative and 
political access to research sites.  
Within Quang Tri province, selection of case study villages was informed primarily by the 
existence of induced grassroots organisations active in the forest sector. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
at each of the research sites, these organisations were supported by international donors 
(including the Dutch, British and other European governments), BirdLife and United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), who were interested in promoting wider participation of 
local resource users in forest management. BirdLife International, created a community-level 
group whose members were drawn from Village A’s government or ex-government posts; and a 
locality-level group whose members were drawn from both commune-level and village-level 
governments covering Village B. Meanwhile, in Village C, an UNDP initiative developed a 
community-level organisation mobilising the whole village and consisting of four sub-groups, 
based on the previously government-established forest management structure. These three types 
of group broadly represent the typology of induced grassroots organisations in Vietnam. Besides 
covering a range of organisational structures, the selection of the three study villages was also 
determined by their locations, their social and economic conditions, and the forest resource types 
available for use as common pool resources. Although having formal protected status at two out 
of three sites (namely Villages A and B) and being under community forest management at the 
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third site, the forest resources at all three sites had de facto open-access property rights, due to 
weak enforcement mechanisms, widespread corruption, and perceived lack of benefits from 
forest protection. 
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Map 1.1: Map of Vietnam Showing Location of Quang Tri Province 
 
 (Source: Yale Vietnamese Studies Group, 2009) 
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As noted earlier, the study aims to address both conceptual and empirical concerns about the 
roles of and influencing factors to induced grassroots organisations in the management of natural 
forest in authoritarian political contexts, which remains under-researched. Therefore, the study 
had to deal with a lot of unknown factors, which made the choice of qualitative approaches 
(including participatory and qualitative tools) particularly applicable. In addition, the use of 
quantitative approaches, such as surveys and questionnaires was ruled out, after they proved to 
be ineffective in trials at villages both inside and outside the case study sites. Through a 
combination of qualitative approaches and tools, I was particularly keen to provide my research 
as a space where the knowledge of local men and women could be articulated in ways that 
permitted them to reflect on their relationship with forests, existing forest management practises, 
and attitudes towards induced forest-based grassroots organisations.  
The research used a variety of participatory tools to answer the research questions, such as 
natural resource mapping exercises, seasonal calendars and transect walks. At the same time, 
qualitative tools were also employed to facilitate structured discussion on issues of forest 
management and the roles of grassroots groups in it. In this light, in-depth household interviews 
and focus group discussion were held with villagers and influential figures at each of the study 
sites, as well as with induced grassroots group members and leaders. Throughout the research, 
between September 2007 and August 2008, 185 villagers in three villages in Quang Tri were 
interviewed, either in their home context (in groups or individually) or during transect walks. In 
each village, through living with local people over extended periods of time, I also conducted 
numerous informal conversations with villagers, observed their use of forest resources, and 
listened to their discussions about their traditional and current practices of forest management 
and of managing commune affairs and power relations with their local governments and within 
their villages and households. Outside these villages, I conducted 48 semi-structured interviews 
with staff of Vietnamese government and international donor organisations and VNGOs and 
INGOs, to learn more comprehensively about their forest management policies and initiatives, 
particularly those related to grassroots organisations (the full list of organisations interviewed 
can be found in Appendix 1). I also collected secondary data on socio-economic conditions in 
the case study villages from the relevant government agencies at commune, district and 
provincial levels.  
This thesis is structured into nine chapters. Chapter 2 sets out the conceptual framework adopted 
for the study, derived from an interaction between devolved NRM and related discourses on 
power, participation, political ecology, post-development and post-colonialism. The 
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methodological framework and approach are set out in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 critically analyses 
state and society relations that shape people’s participation in the development process, and 
NRM specifically, in Vietnam. The following four chapters then present the main empirical 
findings of the study. Chapter 5 concentrates on the history of people’s forest uses, livelihood 
practices and contemporary forest governance practices at the study sites. Chapter 6 examines 
the formation, operations and outcomes of indigenous grassroots groups in forest and agricultural 
sectors. Chapter 7 interrogates the role played by induced forest-based grassroots organisations 
and factors at micro-level influencing their work in the forest management process. This 
interrogation is reflected through the perspectives of various stakeholders and highlights the 
successes and failures of induced forest-based grassroots organisations and their underlying 
causes in forest management. Chapter 8 critically assess macro-level factors such as the Party-
state policies and techniques, and international donors and INGOs that influence induced 
addresses. In both chapters 7 and 8, analysis on how the role of induced forest-based grassroots 
organisations could be strengthened is also carried out by drawing on the opinions of local 
communities, members of induced forest-based grassroots organisations, local government, 
INGOs and international donors on. Chapter 9 brings the thesis to a close, and highlights the key 
contributions of this study. 
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Chapter 2: Understanding Grassroots Organisations in 
Devolution of Natural Resources Management 
2.1. Introduction  
Following on from the ‘lost decade of development’ of the 1980s, the 1990s saw the emergence 
of the ‘post-development’ school, which was critical of a process that was seen to be, at best, 
failing and, at worst, disempowering the very people it purported to help (Jakimow, 2008). 
Under the influence of this school, the failure of centralised NRM systems was increasingly 
recognised, and the assertion that rural people can collectively manage natural resources in a 
sustainable manner was received with more enthusiasm (Matta and Alavalapati, 2006). In this 
context, a paradigm shift away from state-centred control towards approaches in which local 
people play a much more active role has been witnessed, especially in the Global South, where 
natural resource degradation has a significant impact on rural livelihoods (Baland and Platteau, 
1996; Shackleton et al., 2002; Edmunds et al., 2003a). As the result of the aforementioned 
trends, grassroots organisations have become an important mechanism for initiating and 
coordinating participatory management of natural resources. The establishment of community 
groups for the management of common-pool resources, such as fish, forests, wildlife and 
watersheds, is a worldwide phenomenon (Pretty, 2003).  
In response to this phenomenon, this chapter aims to improve understanding on induced 
grassroots organisations by setting out a conceptual framework for analysing induced grassroots 
organisations’ participation in devolution of NRM, focusing specifically on the management of 
natural forests. It does so by engaging with discourses on devolution, and the related issues of 
sustainable livelihoods, power, political ecology, feminism and participation in Section 2.2. In 
Section 2.3, a review of induced grassroots organisations, as one aspect of forest devolution 
initiatives, is carried out. To enable a thorough understanding of these organisations’ strengths 
and weakness in practice, the theoretical background on their roles is also reviewed. Sections 2.4 
and 2.5 investigate two other aspects of devolution initiatives, namely rights and responsibilities 
transferred, and the relationship between devolution interventions and existing NRM practices. 
In assessing all three aspects of devolution policies, relevant discourses on power, participation, 
feminism, political ecology, post-development, and post-colonialism are also reflected on, to 
articulate how these latter discourses improve understanding of the former. The analysis of three 
aspects of devolution policies is complemented, in Section 2.6, by an examination of variables 
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influencing collective action in NRM, which illuminates ways to improve devolution 
interventions. This chapter concludes, in Section 2.7, by highlighting some weaknesses in the 
current literature on self-organising that studies, such as this one, on induced grassroots 
organisations can help address.  
2.2. Unfolding Devolution and its Interactions with Discourses on 
Sustainable Livelihoods, Power, Political Ecology, Feminism and 
Participation 
The trends outlined in Section 2.1 have generated momentum to encourage policy makers and 
practitioners to think more about the participation of local people in the development process. As 
such, devolution policies have been introduced widely around the world, including in the Asia 
Pacific region, where devolution of forest management authority to local communities has 
become a widespread phenomenon (Edmunds et al., 2003a: Potter, 2003). In this context, this 
section aims to disentangle devolution and establish concrete links between it and other 
discourses that help improve analysis of different aspects of devolution discussed in the 
following sections.  
Devolution, in the context of NRM, refers to the transfer of decision-making authority over 
natural resources from central government to local civil society actors, such as forest users and 
their organisations, which are not created or controlled by the government10 (Fisher, 2000). As 
such, devolution is distinct from decentralisation, which is defined as the relocation of 
administrative functions away from a central government (Fisher et al., 2000). Some authors, 
however, use a broad definition of the term ‘devolution’ to embrace decentralisation (e.g. 
Casson, 2001; Larson, 2002; Andersson, 2003; Gibson and Lehoucq, 2003), while others include 
in their definition of decentralisation the transfer of control over resources from the state to local 
communities, which is here viewed as one kind of devolution (e.g. World Bank, 2000; Ribot, 
2002a,b; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Moelionon et al., 2009). Regarding Edmunds et al.’s 
(2003a) analysis of devolution policies (see below), by including actors like local government 
(as recipients of devolved authority) in their analysis, they included aspects of decentralisation in 
their analysis of devolution policies.  
                                                          
10 This definition is not directly applicable to the Vietnamese political context, where strong State-Party control of 
civil society organisations is the norm (to be discussed further in Chapter 3). 
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Devolution has several widely accepted attributes that make it popular. One of them is to 
enhance participation of local people in the governance process, which is often seen as a good 
thing in itself (Sundar, 2001). This is partly because previous forest management structures 
based on the ‘fence-and-fine’ approach did not work and caused a lot of concerns for social 
inequity and disempowerment of local people (Bryant and Wilson, 1998; Grimble and Laidlaw, 
2002; Woodcock, 2002; Agrawal and Gibson, 2004; Hjortsø et al., 2006). In addition, devolution 
is considered as a good policy option by governments, to improve their efficiency, both in 
managerial and financial term (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983; Agrawal et al., 1999). Moreover, 
devolution is expected to bring about more sustainable livelihoods and social justice when local 
resource users have a say in what they need and how natural resources should be managed to 
deliver benefits to them (Fisher et al., 2000). As a result, even if devolution policies fail to 
deliver on many of their expected goals (see Section 2.3), they are still encouraged on the basis 
that they are a better policy alternative than centralised management (Edmunds et al., 2003a).  
In spite of their popularity, devolution policies also encounter opposition. One of the key 
arguments against devolution originates from a belief that communities do not have the ability to 
carry out their rights and responsibilities. Additionally, some argue that communities have 
neither the will nor the interest to manage forests because their livelihood strategies have 
changed significantly under new socio-economic conditions, thus either their appreciation for 
forests has reduced or they use forest resources more commercially (see Fisher et al., 2000). 
What these two arguments highlight is the need to provide local people with capacity building 
opportunities and appropriate institutional arrangements to encourage them to manage forests 
sustainably instead of excluding them from the forest management process, because the benefits 
of their participation outweigh their exclusion, as discussed earlier in this chapter and in Chapter 
1. Apart from these arguments against devolution, another obstacle to the proliferation of 
devolution policies is their effectiveness in the implementation stage (see Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 
2.5). As Potter (2003) pointed out, if the goal of devolution is about decisions being made by and 
consensus being reached among local communities, the extent to which powers of decision 
making and enforcement are really being devolved to forest communities remains questionable.  
Having discussed the definition of devolution, this section now establishes links between 
devolution, sustainable livelihoods, participation and power discourses. As devolution 
purportedly aims to increase resource-user participation in NRM decisions and benefits, which 
ultimately supports their livelihoods, by restructuring the power relations between central state 
and communities through transfer of management authority to local-level organisations 
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(Shackleton et al., 2002), it is inextricably linked to these discourses. For a start, this section now 
turns attention to sustainable livelihoods approach. 
Ellis (2000) described livelihoods as being a combination of: (i) the assets (natural, physical, 
human, financial and social capital); (ii) the activities; and (iii) the access to these (mediated by 
institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by an individual or 
household. A sustainable livelihood is a livelihood that can cope with and recover from stresses 
and shocks, and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while 
not undermining the natural resource base (Farrington et al., 1999). These ideas of livelihoods 
and sustainable livelihoods have been incorporated into the sustainable livelihood framework 
(see Figure 2.1) that practitioners and policy makers can use in planning new development 
activities and in assessing the contribution that existing activities have made to sustaining 
livelihoods (see IFAD, 2012). As a result, improved understanding on sustainable livelihoods 
through the use of the framework enhances the depth of the analysis of impacts of devolution 
policies on local resource users’ livelihoods especially when the conceptual roots of sustainable 
livelihood approaches originated from evolving thinking about poverty reduction, the way the 
poor live, the core focus on the community as a prominent feature to natural resource 
management, and the importance of structural and institutional issues at both the macro and 
micro level (Ashley and Carney, 1999). In this regard, the sustainable livelihoods framework can 
be used as a checklist of issues and a way of structuring analysis to understand different aspects 
of poverty, vulnerability and livelihood strategies in relation to local resource users under the 
influence of devolution policies. 
 
 
  
35
 
 
F
ig
ur
e 
2.
1:
 S
us
ta
in
ab
le
 L
iv
el
ih
oo
ds
 F
ra
m
ew
or
k 
(S
ou
rc
e:
 a
ft
er
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t f
or
 I
nt
er
na
ti
on
al
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t (
D
fI
D
), 
19
97
) 
             
H
 
S 
F 
N
 
P 
Ke
y 
H
= 
H
um
an
 C
ap
ita
l 
S=
 S
oc
ia
l C
ap
ita
l 
N
= 
N
at
ur
al
 C
ap
ita
l 
P=
 P
hy
si
ca
l C
ap
ita
l 
F 
= 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l C
ap
ita
l 
 
Vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 
Co
nt
ex
t 
• 
Sh
oc
ks
 
• 
Tr
en
ds
 
• 
Se
as
on
al
ity
 
Li
ve
lih
oo
d 
As
se
ts
 
T
ra
ns
fo
rm
in
g 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
ce
ss
: 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t, 
Po
lic
ie
s,
 
In
st
itu
tio
ns
  
Li
ve
lih
oo
d 
 
St
ra
te
gi
es
 
Li
ve
lih
oo
d 
O
ut
co
m
es
 
• 
M
or
e 
in
co
m
e 
• 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
w
el
l-
be
in
g 
• 
Re
du
ce
d 
vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 
• 
Im
pr
ov
ed
 fo
od
 
se
cu
rit
y 
• 
M
or
e 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
us
e 
of
 N
R 
ba
se
 
36 
 
The use of livelihood approaches in development is influenced by the current postcolonial and 
post-development debates in several ways. In fact, enthusiasm for work from the bottom up, 
involving the target populations in development projects encourages policy makers and 
practitioners to think of a solution to the development impasse that post-development scholars 
advocate demolishing (see Chapter 1 and Sharp et al., 2003). For both postcolonial and post-
development scholars, such as Escobar (1995, 2000), Sardar (1999) and McEwan (2001), top-
down and intrusive development interventions enhance the power and knowledge of the already 
powerful through the process of knowledge production. Currently, these scholars argue that 
knowledge is validated by a few Northern countries, and pushed down to Southern countries 
through development aid to the latter. As such, a postcolonial approach advocates for a radical 
reconstruction of history and knowledge production, demanding attention to a diversity of 
perspectives and priorities (McEwan, 2008). In this regard, perspectives of those who are weak 
and poor have been central to postcolonial theory, particularly in examinations of the process 
that deprives them of a position from which to speak and be heard in dominant modes of 
narrative production (McEwan, 2009b). As a result, thinking of livelihoods inspired by the 
sustainable livelihood framework becomes more pro-poor and people centred (Ashley and 
Carney, 1999; Scoones, 2009). 
Building on the analysis on how the use of the sustainable livelihood framework might improve 
analysis on devolution impacts on poverty, vulnerability and livelihood strategies of local 
resource users, this section explores how power concept can inform the exploration of 
vulnerability of local resource users and their livelihoods in devolution process. In addition, 
depending upon whether devolution is inclusive or exclusive11, different assumptions need to be 
made about the link between devolution and power. Research also supports the claim that the 
contribution of many community-based NRM programmes to poverty reduction and equity 
advancement (thus, reduction in vulnerability of the poor) is dependent on whether and what 
power is devolved to local communities, and to whom within them (Agrawal and Gibson, 2001; 
Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; Charnley and Poe, 2007; Ribot and Larson, 2005).  
Power is an everyday notion that people use in a variety of ways, and there is little consensus 
about how it should be understood (Blackler, 2011). Power can be seen in various forms, such as 
authority, coercion, manipulation, force, domination, resistance, inducement, manipulation, 
                                                          
11 Inclusive devolution is built on overlapping authority relations between customary and state institutions; and the 
exclusive devolution largely relies on the authority of the state institutions to impose their devolution interventions 
on local communities (Sikor and Tran, 2007). 
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seduction, status, persuasion, and influence (Allen, 2003a; Blackler, 2011). Although it is used 
variously, the term is not used arbitrarily (Blackler, 2011). Broadly speaking, when defining the 
term, authors seem to emphasise power as a form of mobilised, spatialised social interaction and 
negotiation (Faulconbridge and Hall, 2009). In this light, power is also seen as a relational effect, 
an outcome of social interactions, not as a property of someone (Allen, 2003a). 
Power establishes itself through two forms of relational tie: instrumental; and associational. 
Through instrumental ties, power establishes itself as leverage to constrain and exclude 
somebody from doing something (Allen, 2003a). Extending this line of argument to NRM, this 
type of relational tie produces exclusive devolution and result in forest closure against the wishes 
of local resource users, as seen in community forestry initiatives in Nepal (see Section 2.3.2) or 
Vietnam (see Chapter 7). When exclusive devolution happens, agencies like forest departments, 
donors and international NGOs fail to recognise the nature of the customary rights of local 
people to natural resources at the grassroots level (see Sikor and Tran, 2007). From the 
perspective of postcolonialism (see Section 2.2.1), the former actors have imposed their 
knowledge of NRM on the latter who will have little opportunities to deliberate their concerns 
and needs. In this regard, their livelihoods are less likely to be included in the former actors’ 
agendas especially if these agendas are driven by technical concerns for forest protection (see 
Section 7.3 in Chapter 7). 
Meanwhile, through associational ties, power acts like a medium for those who take part to 
improve or protect their benefits (Allen, 2003a). From cost and benefit perspectives (to be 
discussed in Section 2.6), this type of power presents a benefit that encourage collective action 
among indigenous grassroots groups at the study sites (to be discussed in greater details in 
Chapter 6). In devolution, this type of relational ties produces inclusive approaches to 
devolution, which acknowledge customary rights to natural resources (see Sikor and Tran, 2007). 
Recognising customary rights, when developing devolution policies, might increase the 
opportunities of de jure and de facto rights (see Section 2.4) to resources to overlap, which 
supports the development of more harmonious relationships between the state and local resource 
users. In that regard, power emerged from associational ties might strengthen grassroots 
organisations and enable them to take a more meaningful part in decision making process. 
Ideally, this kind of power should follow the induction of grassroots groups at the case study 
sites, which will be examined in Chapter 7 and 8. 
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Nevertheless, power established through associational ties might be used as instrument to serve 
the interests of certain actors associating with each other. This is the point that Allen (2003a) 
raised when he articulated that powerful groups may exercise their power in ways that exclude or 
check the freedom of movement of others. This occurred when inducing grassroots organisations 
at the case study sites to encourage participation of local forest users in forest management 
process was hijacked for the purpose of controlling the rural population and transferring the cost 
of forest protection to them (see Chapter 8). In this regard, the division between instrumental and 
associational ties can become blurred. As such, in studying grassroots organisations and 
analysing the power relations within these organisations and between them and the state through 
the lens of relational ties, it is important to acknowledge the blurred boundary in classifying 
instrumental and associational ties. 
To understand power as a relational effect, it should be analysed in close connection with actors 
and the structures influencing these actors (Clegg, 1989). For example, local resource users are 
influenced by a forest department that sets boundaries and environments for their manoeuvres in 
forest management. At the same time, both local people and the department are constrained or 
encouraged by institutional and societal conditions that inform their behaviours and practices. 
This approach to power analysis can be seen in the analysis of devolution policies by Edmunds 
et al. (2003a). Following their approach, power relations between the state and local 
communities can be analysed more thoroughly and in greater detail by considering such aspects 
of devolution as the recipients of transferred authority (i.e. actors; see Section 2.3); the rights and 
responsibilities transferred (i.e. institutional structures influencing local behaviours; see Section 
2.4); and the relationship between devolution interventions (i.e. legal structures) and local 
management practices (i.e. customary structures; see Section 2.5).  
Political ecology is ultimately about power relations and resource-use struggle between 
governments and local resource users, which revolves around the multiple issues that devolution 
also focuses on, such as property rights, distribution of benefits derived from forests, protection 
of forest resources over time, and the shape of strategies of domination and resistance (Watts, 
2003; Robbins, 2004; Moelionan et al., 2009; Elmhirst, 2011). For this reason, this section now 
assesses how the perspective of political ecology helps arrive at an understanding of power and 
vulnerability within devolution policies. In this regard, by highlighting external pressures for 
greater production that encourage local resource users to extract surpluses from natural systems, 
leading to their degradation (Blaikie 1985; Hecht 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987), political 
ecology stress the need to analyse power relations revolving around NRM at the grassroots level 
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in line with wider political and economic contexts (Bryant, 1998), as well as from the angles of 
access and control over resources and their implications for sustainable NRM and livelihoods 
(Elmhist, 2011). In doing so, power, the vulnerability and livelihoods of local resource users in 
the face of stronger external economic and political pressures can be explored more thoroughly.  
Moreover, by focusing on roles and significance of different actors at different levels in causing 
and resolving ecological-political conflicts over forest use and management, political ecology 
moves towards more fundamental questions about who produces nature and with what social and 
ecological outcomes (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). As a result, the application of this approach to 
the analysis of devolution highlights the central importance of politics and power struggles as 
important driving force for the sustainability of NRM practices (see Bryant and Bailey, 1997; 
Forsyth, 2003; Page, 2003, Watts, 20003; Robbins, 2004). 
Power and vulnerability analysis can also be deepened through the lens of feminist political 
ecology. In this regard, feminist political ecology offers a framework that sees gender as a 
critical variable that shapes power relations between women and men in the context of class, 
caste, race, culture and ethnicity in the NRM process at household, village, national and 
international levels (Rowlands, 1995; Elmhirst, 2011). As such, employing feminist political 
ecology reveals the vulnerability of women and the poor in access and control of natural 
resources (Momsen and Kinnaird, 1993; Townsend, 1993). At the same time, it helps shift the 
focus of analysis of power relations away from linear or simple vertical hierarchies (i.e. chains of 
explanation; see Blaikie, 1985) towards a more complex web of gendered hierarchical relations 
and networks within and outside concerned communities (Rocheleau and Roth, 2007; Rocheleau, 
2001; Escobar, 2000, 2007). Moreover, power and vulnerability can also greater examined 
through extending the scale of analysis to include the household (Rocheleau, 2008). 
In addition, considering the power dynamics of gender, various feminist writers have extended 
power analysis by examining the way in which people are systematically denied power and 
influence in the dominant society. For example, Rowlands (1995) analysed how people 
internalise the message that they have no power and influence, and gradually come to believe 
that they cannot do anything to influence the world around them. This is the process of 
internalised oppression, when the power-over paradigm dominates with the capacity of some 
actors to override needs of others through, for example, the exercise of authority or the use of 
coercion (Kabeer, 1991, 2005; Rowlands, 1995).  
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The above analysis of power from the views of feminism and political ecology suggests that the 
extent to which an actor practises his or her power is strongly influenced by the extent to which 
he or she can participate in decision-making processes (i.e. the capacity to influence outcomes of 
social interaction). In this regard, power and participation are strongly inter-related. In other 
words, participation is ultimately about power and control (Cornwall, 2008). As a result, 
engaging with discourses on participation can help demystify how level of participation helps to 
determine how much power an actor has to influence devolution policies. Accepting this, this 
section now engages with the literature on participation. 
An increasingly powerful argument has been articulated that development goals can only be 
achieved by ‘bottom up planning’, ‘decentralisation’, ‘process approaches’, ‘participation’ or 
‘community organisation’ (Schumacher, 1973; Korten, 1980; Chambers, 1983), which is one of 
factors influencing the proliferation of discourse on sustainable livelihood discussed earlier this 
chapter. Holding out the promise of making people central to development by encouraging local 
involvement in interventions that affect them and over which they previously had limited control 
and influence, participation would appear to offer much to those struggling to bring about more 
equitable development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). In this regard, participation is seen as a 
reassertion of the poor against more powerful actors in power relationships in development 
(Chambers, 1997; Sanderson and Kindon, 2004). Participation has, therefore, come to be seen as 
a development theory and practice that promotes the power and knowledge of the marginalised 
in developing countries (Sanderson and Kindon, 2004). By bringing the marginalised closer to 
the centre of knowledge production (thus power), this argument echoes the articulation of 
postcolonialism that encourages a break away from the notion of a single path to development 
(see McEwan, 2008). This influence of postcolonialism can be seen clearly in different 
definitions and goals of participation. 
Participation’s meaning and use are highly contested. Cooke and Kothari, 2001), for instance, 
point out that participation is an exceedingly difficult objective to define and implement. The 
World Bank Learning Group on Participation defined participation as a process through which 
stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and 
resources that affect them (World Bank, 1995). This definition stresses the importance of power 
sharing between state agencies and local communities in achieving development success, which 
ultimately influences the livelihood options of the latter. In this regard, participation without 
redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for local communities (Arnstein, 
1969). There is a danger, however, that participation is reduced to a token input, as is the case 
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with participation by consultation, for example, which does not imply any share in decision-
making; those who undertake this kind of participation are under no obligation to take on board 
people’s views (Pretty, 1995; Fisher, 2000; Chapter 7). 
Over recent decades, there have been several attempts to classify participation. Arnstein (1969) 
focused on recipients of participation initiatives, and suggested eight levels of participation in a 
ladder pattern, with each rung corresponding to the extent of citizens’ power in influencing an 
output (Figure 2.2).  
Figure 2.2: Eight Rungs on the Ladder of Citizen Participation (Source: Arnstein, 1969) 
 
While Arnstein's ladder looks at forms of participation from the perspective of those on the 
receiving end, Pretty's typology of participation focuses on the motivations of those who adopt 
and practise participatory approaches (Corwall, 2008). In this regard, Pretty (1995) classifies 
participation as a continuum, with manipulation at one end, where local participation is only a 
pretence, and self-motivation at the other, where community obtain their power. Under 
participation as passive participation and functional participation, external agencies hold full 
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power in deciding how to use resources and how problems are defined and solved. From the 
perspective of post-colonialism, local people are excluded from the knowledge production 
process, and development interventions reflect only the views of the more powerful. As such, 
chances for livelihood improvements that reflect wishes of the poorest are very little (see 
Chapter 5 and 7). In addition, even at the highest level of participation (i.e. self-mobilisation), 
Pretty also made clear that participation does not necessarily lead to challenges against existing 
distributions of wealth and power that are under the influences of wider socio-political contexts 
and structures.  
Apart from the aforementioned typologies, another form of participation, namely invited 
participation is currently discussed in the literature. Under this type of participation, people are 
enlisted to take part in the planning and implementation of service delivery. Within this tradition 
of participation, two types of participation are often mentioned, namely participation for capacity 
enhancement and participation as right to development (Cornwall, 2000). With the aim of 
enhancing their capabilities, participation helps people advocate for their entitlements in their 
interactions with those who are charged with service provision. However, as invited participation 
is limited to service delivery, improved capacity might be aimed not to challenge any power 
status quo. As right to development, participation is used to stress the importance of those 
invited to actively take part in different stages of service delivery, so as to shape those services. 
In this regard, participation is used to create aware citizens who become more assertive in 
claiming their rights, holding government accountable, and organising themselves more 
effectively (Cornwall, 2000). In doing so, participation is closer to self-mobilisation, and voices 
of local people are more likely to be heard.  
This introduction to the concepts of devolution, sustainable livelihoods, power, political ecology, 
feminism and participation highlights the benefits of analysing devolution while critically 
reflecting on these discourses. The subsequent section follows this line of inquiry, by examining 
different aspects of devolution and how these discourses inform the exploration of power 
struggles, vulnerability and gender inequality in different aspects of NRM devolution and their 
influence on forest management.  
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2.3. Recipients of Transferred Management Authority  
In examining devolution policies, Edmunds et al. (2003a) identified three main dimensions, 
namely: recipients of transferred management authority; the set of rights and responsibilities 
devolved; and the relationship between existing local management practices and devolution 
interventions. What is distinct about Edmunds et al.’s (2003a) analysis of devolution policies is 
the inclusion of the different layers of transferred authority as well as different actors involved in 
these layers, which ultimately involves different relational ties and level of participation of local 
communities and government in decision-making processes. Taking each in turn, the following 
sections examine these three aspects of devolution and critically assess influences from related 
discourses on these aspects. 
Devolution policies can target a wide range of recipients of transferred management authority. In 
Vietnam and China, for example, forest use rights are allocated mainly to households and 
individuals (Dachang and Edmunds, 2003; Tran and Sikor, 2006). In India, on the other hand, 
the government promises to devolve, through JFM programmes, everyday forest use and 
management rights and responsibilities to village-level participatory committees (Behera and 
Engel, 2006). At the same time, district-level organisations and legally registered organisations 
are also encouraged to take part in devolution (see below). Taking them in turn, this section 
investigates the different types of actors involved in the transfer of forest management authority, 
focusing on how grassroots organisations are created and to whom they are accountable. This is 
to determine what authority is transferred to whom. 
Recipients of authority transferred in devolution policies in this thesis are approached from the 
analysis of grassroots organisations induced in different devolution initiatives especially, in CFM 
programmes. This is because inducing the formation of organisations or groups has been a 
popular strategy to create new recipients of authority under devolution policies in NRM and 
other development fields in many parts of the world (Korten, 1980; Uphoff, 1986, Esman and 
Uphoff, 1984; Agrawal, 2001a; Adhikari and Goldey, 2010). There are many different 
definitions of CFM but common to all definitions is explicit socio-economic, ecological and 
cultural benefits to communities arising from the cooperative or joint management of forests 
between user communities and governments (Jones and Carswell, 2004; Moelionon et al., 2009; 
Alemagi, 2010). 
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Before analysing induced grassroots organisations in devolution initiatives, it is important to 
understand the theoretical roles assigned for grassroots organisations in general. In doing so, a 
comparative foundation for the analysis of induced organisations as recipients of transferred 
authority in devolution policies can be established. For that reason the following section 
examines different theoretical discourses on roles played by grassroots organisations in the 
development process. 
2.3.1. Theoretical Discussions of Roles Played by Grassroots Organisations 
Grassroots organisations or groups have not always been centred in the development process in 
general and in NRM in particular. In the 1950s and 1960s, under the technocratic school of 
thought, development interventions were strongly rooted in the fields of engineering and 
construction, in the sense that development goals and interventions were prescribed and designed 
by experts without attempting to understand the socio-economic and political conditions of the 
intended beneficiaries (Chambers, 1983). Social problems, including ecological ones, were often 
blamed on inadequate economic and technological techniques. Therefore, it was believed that the 
solution to these problems rested on the dual processes of getting market instruments (such as the 
price of natural resources) and techniques for their management (i.e. modern technology) right 
(see Robbins, 2004).  
Under this prevailing mindset, it was thought that enhanced technical capacity of professionals in 
forest management would be much more important to guarantee better forest conditions. As a 
result, ensuring people’s participation in decision-making was not given priority, and natural 
resources were often managed to protect their aesthetic beauty and biological values, not 
necessarily in the interests of people living around them (Woodcock, 2002). In this context, local 
people were regarded as culprits responsible for the destruction of natural resources. As a result, 
they were often bypassed if they were perceived as having inadequate capacity compared to that 
of the experts (Chambers, 1983; Bond and Hulme, 1999). In that regard, people’s participation in 
the development process was not a question of the time. In addition, proponents of the 
technocratic school did not view collective actions at the grassroots level as important in helping 
local people solve problems, such as poverty or degradation of natural resources (Esman and 
Uphoff, 1984). As a result of these factors, grassroots organisations typically played minor roles 
in the development process.  
Instead, under the technocratic school of thoughts the primary concern was for the state to 
provide public services for the whole of society, including the rural population. Since rural 
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people were viewed as technologically backward, technocrats believed that they would benefit 
more if the state provided better public services especially technology that could improve rural 
population’s quality of life. While advocating for the state to provide better public services (in 
the same way as adherents to the neo-liberal school; see below), technocrats aimed to avoid 
institutional and structural changes that could upset the provision of such services. Any 
collective actions by these organisations or groups that distorted the market or placed constraints 
on technological modernisation were unwelcome (Esman and Uphoff, 1984).  
In contrast to the technocratic school of thought, local communities were afforded more attention 
under Marxist views of development. According to this way of thinking, non-socialist states 
function to exploit the working classes. As such, it was posited that local rural elites, including 
traditional landholding families, middle-class peasants in Asia, and multi-national agribusiness 
firms in Latin America and parts of Africa, support the state’s exploitation of the rural 
population, including the very poorest (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). In such a situation, both the 
state and local elites are unwilling to let civil society organisations in general, and grassroots 
organisations established by the excluded rural population in particular, to act autonomously on 
behalf of their members to bring in any change that may challenge their exploitation. Therefore, 
any grassroots organisations or groups that emerge will be suppressed, neutralised or annexed to 
the state system (Esman and Uphoff, 1984).  
In this context, according to scholars of this school of thought, the rural poor and their 
organisations can obtain their fair share in society only by revolutionary acts (i.e. by toppling the 
ruling class to set up their own system of government). This point of view was illustrated in the 
work of Antonio Gramsci, whose theories occupy a unique place in the history of Marxist 
thought (Kann, 1980). In Prison Notebooks (studied by Hoare and Smith, 1971), Gramsci’s 
strategy particularly emphasised on the creation of autonomous class organisations of the 
peasantry (and proletariat) as a means for emancipation of the repressed rural poor. In this 
regard, grassroots organisations were seen as an important tool to bring positive changes to local 
people’s lives. However, even in communist countries like Vietnam, the idea of emancipation of 
the rural population was strictly prohibited, and, thus, grassroots organisations were tightly 
controlled as discussed in Chapters 4 and 8. Furthermore, not all revolutionary acts are forged by 
local resource users themselves. Local resource users these days might employ direct, but not 
necessarily violent and confrontational, approaches to challenge existing power relations and 
coercive measures imposed on them by the government (Bryant, 1992; also see Chapter 6). This 
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raises questions about the practicality of this ideology to promote grassroots organisations as an 
emancipatory front in NRM contexts.  
A change in theoretical discussions about roles of civil society organisations has occurred with 
the proliferation of liberalism. Accordingly, civil society organisations act as a counterweight to 
the state and as independent participants who can hold the government accountable for its 
decisions (Thomas-Slayter, 1994; Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Being separate from the state, 
liberals argue, civil society organisations can promote democratic norms, tolerance for 
contrasting opinions and respect for laws protecting minority rights (see Hadenius and Uggla, 
1996; White, 2002; Gaventa, 2006). With regard to grassroots organisations, liberal advocates 
argue that, although the state may tolerate some non-revolutionary local organisations in rural 
areas, these organisations must not associate with the state at all costs. (This liberal approach 
might not work in Vietnam because the state involves in all aspects of life and the separation 
from the state is not accepted (see more in Chapter 4)). Following this line of argument, liberals 
stipulate that, in order to improve their lives and keep the state in check, the rural poor must 
organise themselves into organisations outside the established political and economic institutions 
of the state (Esman and Uphoff, 1984). To this end, grassroots organisations, in the view of 
liberals, need to take several steps, including realising their own strength as a collective body and 
employing confrontational (but non-revolutionary) strategies towards established institutions, 
which will eventually lead to their own emancipation. In implementing these steps, although 
outsiders, such as donors and other civil society organisations can help grassroots organisations 
to learn about their strengths and improve their skills, the drive for grassroots organisations’ 
strategies and operations must come from the local people themselves (Esman and Uphoff, 
1984).  
In contrast to the demand by liberalism for strict separation of state and civil society 
organisations, for authors influenced by the structural-reformist position, which emerged in the 
mid-1980s, such as Esman and Uphoff (1984), grassroots organisations need to work in 
partnership with the state. In the view of proponents of this school, governments in most 
developing countries do not necessarily serve the interests of local elites at the expense of the 
poor, and their bureaucracies are not invariably corrupt or exploitative (Esman and Uphoff, 
1984). Because governments in these countries are often composed of coalitions of varying and 
sometimes conflicting ideological interests, they tend to protect the social and political status 
quo. In this regard, providing that grassroots organisations do not threaten the existing system, 
the government’s attitude towards them might be flexible. These associations may even be 
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encouraged or sponsored by a certain faction of the ruling regime for various political reasons. 
One example of this school of thought at work comes from Himachal Pradesh state in India, 
where local people were supported by the local government (which, in turn, was supported by 
provincial legislators) in their struggles against the Forest Department’s attempts to limit local 
people’s access to the Great Himalayan National Park for their livelihoods. In their struggle to 
protect their livelihoods, local people even received support from assembly members, although 
this support was premised upon securing gains for their respective parties and their own future 
re-election (Chhatre in Ribot, 2008).  
The example in India supports one of the major arguments of the structural reformists that, in 
any political framework of any regime, there are opportunities for grassroots associations to take 
part in the existing political systems to serve the interests of their members (Esman and Uphoff, 
1984). However, the challenge for advocates of this position is to identify these opportunities 
within the existing socio-political contexts that the rural poor and disadvantaged are facing. Also, 
it is important to find the right combination of institutional and organisational set ups through 
which local peoples can gear their efforts towards a common goal. Further, ensuring gender 
equality and access to decision-making institutions must form part of these set ups, while 
capacity building is needed to help local populations to realise opportunities that emerge from 
existing political systems. These points will be reflected in recommendations for more effective 
induced forest – based organisations in Chapter 9. 
In fact, the structural reformists’ position on co-existence between civil society organisations 
(including grassroots organisations) and states in the development process can be linked to the 
rise of neo-liberalism in development discourses. The state is strongly advocated by neo-
liberalism as a facilitator in the policy process. This is expressed in the way that, while neo-
liberalism recognises the necessity of a reduced state, it also supports the return of the state to 
enforce private property rights, introduce market-based disciplines to new areas, control conflicts 
and regulate inequalities arising from different economic and political interests among different 
sections of society, and eliminate disparities created and promoted by the market (Howell and 
Pearce, 2001; White, 2002, Humphreys, 2009). In this regard, stipulations for civil society 
organisations (including grassroots ones) not to associate with the state at any cost do not stand 
strong in the thinking of neo-liberalism. Also, many researchers argue that natural resource 
problems or community-led strategies can be more effective if supported by the state, given that 
the latter often has a wealth of resources, capacities and skills that are not available at the local 
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level to coordinate efforts across sectors and regions (Smith, 2003; Sneddon and Fox, 2007; 
Sikor and Muller, 2009). 
In reviewing the aforementioned schools of thought on grassroots organisations’ roles in the 
development process and their implications for NRM, it becomes clear that the roles of local 
people and grassroots organisations have become increasingly appreciated. From having a 
limited role to play under the technocratic school of thought, local people and grassroots 
organisations have been promoted to become a counterpart to government, under liberalism, or a 
partner with the government, under neo-liberal and structural reformists positions. However, it is 
necessary to recognise that they always have to operate in a limited space. When they are 
encouraged to take revolutionary actions to assert their rights (as stipulated by Marxists), states 
will find different means, such as suppression, seduction or annexing, to frustrate local 
organisations’ ambitions to liberate their rural fellows. If not revolutionary, local organisations 
are not considered as a priority in the thinking of technocrats and are not encouraged to 
challenge the power status quo in society in the thinking of the liberals and structural-reformists). 
This highlights the fact that theoretically, grassroots organisations are not given priority in 
decision making process. Whether this observation expresses itself in the operation of induced 
forest-based grassroots organisations will be compared and contrasted in the empirical chapters. 
Also, in authoritarian countries like Vietnam (see Chapters 4 and 8) and China (see Saich, 2001; 
Gadsden, 2008; Baogang, 2003), to exist non-government participants’ understanding of where 
is the boundary lies plays an important role in what they can do. In this context, how grassroots 
organisations under any kind of structural arrangements can make use of existing structures to 
survive, develop and serve the interests of their members is discussed in Chapter 9. 
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2.3.2. Induced Grassroots Organisations in Devolution Policies 
Having analysed theoretical discourses on the roles of civil society organisations including 
grassroots organisations in the development process, this section now examines the role of 
induced grassroots organisations in the devolution policies, with reflections on how the 
theoretical discourses are reflected in the practices of these organisations. 
In implementing devolution policies, several types of organisations have been created. 
According to Campbell and Shackleton (2001), Shackleton and Campbell (2001) and Shackleton 
et al. (2002), four main types of organisation can be identified, namely district level, village 
level, outside-the-state-system and corporate organisations. In this section although the first and 
fourth types of organisation are also discussed to provide a fuller picture of the structural 
arrangements for implementing devolution policies, the main focus is on the second and third 
types of organisation so as to build comparative foundation for analysis of induced grassroots 
organisations at the case studies of this research.  
District-level organisations are set up by the government at district level and serve as extensions 
of the local government system. They are either annexed to local government structures, such as 
in the case of ‘Rural District Councils’ established under the Communal Areas Management 
Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) programme in Zimbabwe, or affiliated to 
line ministries, such as in the cases of multi-stakeholder forums in Zambia and forest farms in 
China. In this regard, decentralisation of NRM (not devolution; following the definition adopted 
by this thesis) has taken place and resulted in the formation of district organisations as a new 
locus of government authority. Consequently, few people on the ground have a clear 
understanding of purpose and objectives of these organisations (Campbell and Shackleton, 
2001). Under the arrangements for district-level organisations, according to Campbell and 
Shackleton (2001), Shackleton and Campbell (2001) and Shackleton et al. (2002), local 
communities play a limited role in planning or decision-making processes; decision-making 
power remains in the hands of government departments. Grassroots organisations are not given 
priority in decision making process especially when negotiating with other actors. This is 
because, within these structures, it is government agencies and not the newly created grassroots 
organisations that are central to the NRM process. In the view of Weber et al. (2000), this type of 
organisational structure keeps communities dependent on the government’s willingness to share 
its power in NRM. This can pose a great challenge to communities, especially when the 
government is unwilling to share its power (as discussed in Section 2.5). Whether this is the case 
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at the case study sites will revisited in Chapter 7. The above discussion suggests that the 
philosophy behind district level organisations such as increasing the control of the government 
over resources, minor priorities given to local people and their needs puts these type of 
organisations under the influence of technocratic school of thoughts.  
The second type of grassroots organisation taking part in devolved NRM policies is village-level 
organisations. These are set up by responsible government departments in the form of 
participatory committees, such as Forest Protection Committees, Village Forest Committees (in 
Kumar, 2002; Behera and Engel, 2006; Matta and Alavalapati, 2006; Sundar, 2007) or JFM 
Committees (Bhattacharya et al., 2010), to mobilise support from local communities. These 
organisations operate at the village level and are not annexed in the government system. Their 
organisational structure often includes a general assembly or similar body, which consists of all 
members of the village, to make major forest management decisions, such as rules for forest use, 
enforcement measures and sanctions, plans for silviculture, and rules for using the organisations 
fund. Village-level organisations also typically include an executive committee or similar body, 
which consists of elected village members in charge of organising activities to implement 
decisions made by the general assembly. Government officers from the Forest Department or 
other agency may sits on the executive committee. Sometimes, village-level organisations have a 
strong network for mutual support, such as the Federation of Community Forestry Users in 
Nepal (see Kumar, 2002; Thoms, 2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2010).  
Under this organisational structure, the government still maintains a certain level of control over 
these organisations. Not surprisingly then, this leads to a situation where, although not annexed 
to the state structure, induced grassroots organisations with this form of institutional 
arrangements are not independent. In many parts of Asia, village-level organisations exist under 
the constant surveillance of government. For example, the government of China maintains strong 
controls over the operations of grassroots organisations through administrative means, such as 
requiring government approval for elected members to grassroots organisations’ executive 
committees (Dachang and Edmunds, 2003). In this regard, the formation and operation processes 
for JFM committees and other community-based forest management organisations in China takes 
place within a highly bureaucratic context, under strong surveillance by government officials, 
which effectively excludes large sections of forest users from using forests (Dachang and 
Edmunds, 2003; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003). In India, participatory committees have little 
power in decision-making processes; studies show that they are often completely dependent on 
the Forest Department for day-to-day activities and decision-making processes (Kumar, 2002; 
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Behera and Engel, 2006). For instance, the Forest Department has final say in allocation and 
demarcation of forest land, in micro plans for the management and use of allocated forest and 
forest land, and in the disposal of forest produce (Bhattacharya et al., 2010). The Forest 
Department also often has unilateral power to cancel JFM agreements and, in most cases, even to 
dissolve Forest Protection Committees (Behera and Engel, 2006). These issues are also relevant 
in other countries, including the Philippines (see Braganza, 1996; Bacalla, 2006) and Vietnam 
(see Chapter 7 and 8). In view of the above, the formation of village level organisations has been 
not much different from the district level organisations in term of their strong links to the 
technocratic position in forest management. In both cases, local people and their organisations 
are dominated by the government departments and their power in decision making is minor. 
With Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) in Nepal, in spite of the intended power of the 
general assembly to decide on all aspects of forest management in a concerned community, 
Pokharel (2008) found that it is increasingly common for the executive committee to make 
decisions and simply forward their decisions to the general assembly for their unquestioning 
endorsement. In this regard, the powerbase of whole community has been replaced by a 
powerbase of some. Because of over-representation of elite castes and wealthier households on 
CFUG executive committees, the assumption of power by executive committees inevitably leads 
to unequal benefit sharing. This is because decision-makers on executive committees tend to 
make decisions that favour their own interests, and thus the interests of others in their same 
status group (Thoms, 2008). This brings attention to the fact that formation and operation of 
CFUGs without a functioning general assembly may actually help reinforce existing local power 
disparities and elite domination. In this light some suggest a role for the government as a 
countervailing power to local elites to ensure social equity (Sundar, 2001). However, this 
suggestion has to be followed with caution to avoid a situation where induced grassroots 
organisations are strongly influenced by outside actors, such as forest departments and donors, 
and thus held more accountable to them than to community members (see Edmunds et al., 
2003a). In the case of Vietnam, malfunctioning general assemblies made the proliferation of the 
technocratic position in forest management easier (see Chapter 7). 
The examples discussed above raise doubts about the feasibility of the goal of power sharing 
with grassroots organisations as one recipient in the devolution process. Researchers find that the 
contributions of participatory NRM to poverty reduction and social equity depend upon which 
powers over natural resources are devolved to local communities, and to whom within them 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 2001; Charnley and Poe, 2007; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; Ribot 
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and Larson, 2005; McDermott, 2009). In contrast to rhetoric goal of power sharing, results of 
devolution policies show how little power has been transferred to grassroots organisations. For 
instance, forest devolution with the creation of village-level participatory committees as 
recipients of devolved authority has often served merely to reduce costs and responsibilities for 
the state while extending the reach of the administration and donors to new areas (Sundar, 2001), 
which is seen at the case study sites (see Chapters 7 and 8). Many villagers who take part in 
these committees could not indicate appropriate reasons for their joining JFM programmes 
(Matta and Alavalapati, 2006). In other cases, the only driving force for local people’s 
involvement in JFM programmes is the employment that they get from the Forest Department 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2010). This indicates an absence of support among local people for these 
organisations and their objectives. 
Having reviewed two well documented types of grassroots organisation induced under forest 
devolution in different parts of the world, namely district-level and village-level organisations, 
this section only briefly introduces grassroots organisations outside of the state system. In doing 
so, it focuses on organisation types relevant to those at the study sites. More information on 
organisations outside the state system can be found at Appendix 2. Village forest associations 
and village level corporate are common forms of organisations outside the state system. It is 
often assumed that this type of organisations tends to make NRM more accountable to 
communities and, especially, to disadvantaged local people (Shackleton et al., 2002). In this 
regard, knowledge plays an important role in the success of these organisations. However, when 
analysing the use of traditional knowledge in NRM, it is important to bear in mind some of its 
criticism. The use of this knowledge by local people might not automatically lead to better NRM. 
Combing indigenous knowledge with science for successful co-management of natural resource 
is a difficult process and a skill that is still emerging (Reid et al., 2006). Using science together 
with indigenous knowledge requires, not a synthesis of the two kinds of knowledge, but an 
ability to develop mutual respect and trust, a task that can easily take a decade (Singleton, 1998; 
Eamer, 2006) and does not always succeed (Spak, 2005). Furthermore, many indigenous systems 
of practicing NRM have yet to be tested under new socio-economic conditions. Nongkynrih’s 
(2006) research in Mawphlang in north-eastern India, for example, shows that traditional 
practices are often not written down, so confusion or different interpretations of traditional rules 
can emerge in the face of new socio-economic contexts, causing conflicts among villagers and 
within their organisations.  
53 
 
This review of different organisational structures of grassroots organisations induced under 
devolution policies shows that differences in organisational structures have not yet influenced 
the freedom of these organisations to produce knowledge for NRM. District-level and village-
level organisations are strongly influenced by government agencies while organisations 
operating outside the state system, such as village forest associations do not necessarily have 
more freedom to decide how they manage forests (see Appendix 2). The state often finds 
different means to exert its control over induced grassroots organisations, which highlights the 
disparity between policy promises for devolving authority to grassroots organisation, and the 
reality of the implementation process. In addition, the limited role of these induced grassroots 
organisations (in any structural arrangements) in forest management reinforces the observation 
that theoretically grassroots organisations have assigned minor roles in the development process 
in different schools of thoughts as discussed Section 2.3.1.    
From the perspective of discourses on power, this analysis of different forms of induced 
grassroots organisation taking part in forest devolution highlights the dominance of instrumental 
relational ties between the state and local resource users in the devolution process, with the state 
trying to force through its purported superior knowledge of NRM. In doing so, the state tries to 
maintain a tight grip on power while espousing the principles of devolution. In a context that 
expects to see high profile being given to rural populations in the development process, it seems 
that states must been seen to follow the mainstream development paradigm, even if this is only 
by paying lip service to the importance of grassroots organisations. As a result, grassroots 
organisations are often created in response to global trends in development practice but in ways 
that enable the state to maintain the upper hand in dealing with vital resources, such as forests. In 
this regard, participation of induced grassroots organisations in devolution can be seen as merely 
functional, to reduce the cost of forest management, leaving the idea of devolution to share 
decision-making power with local resource users a remote goal. Participatory development in 
this regard has turned into a cosmetic means for governments to maintain their life-as-usual 
approach to development (i.e. development by the state and for the state interests). This increase 
the vulnerability of the poor when their basic needs (such as access to forest resources for 
livelihoods) are not addressed but being disguised under the promotion of sustainable NRM that 
seen the forest protection (i.e. the closure of forest resources to local use) taking precedence over 
forest use for local livelihoods. These points will be compared and contrasted in empirical 
chapters. 
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Social equity has not yet been advanced by these organisations. Despite good intentions to bring 
gender equality to decision-making processes, such as requiring two representatives (a man and 
woman) from a household, research shows that community forestry groups in India and Nepal 
exclude women from forest benefits and participation in decision making (Agrawal and Ostrom, 
2001; Matta and Alavalapati, 2006; Bhattacharya et al., 2010). Even taking part in CFUG 
discussions, disadvantaged groups, such as women and poor households, rarely have a role in 
decision-making (Thoms, 2008; Pokharel, 2008). In other parts of Asia, the meaningful 
participation of women in the devolution process is also rare, in spite of evidence of their 
positive contributions to forest management and poverty reduction (Edmunds et al., 2003; 
Agrawal et al., 2006). In this regard, devolution initiatives turn into enclosures, notwithstanding 
inclusive intentions motivating the original policies. As a result of the lack of participation of 
women in devolution policies, implementation-related inefficiencies are seen, such as problems 
with rule enforcement, communication flow, resource assessments and conflict resolution 
(Agarwal, 2000). When excluded from decision-making processes, women face increased 
vulnerability such as spending more time and effort collecting fuel wood and other subsistence 
products for their families outside of the communal forests (Edmunds et al., 2003; Thoms, 
2008). Efforts to increase women and the poor’s participation should, however, be made with 
caution. Simply adding women, or other marginalised groups, into grassroots organisations can 
increase their vulnerability by increasing their workload, and can exacerbate existing gender and 
power relationships within villages as shown at the case study sites and discussed in Section 7.4.  
The problem of elite domination can also be seen in these organisations. For example, local elites 
have manipulated local organisations to at least some degree at the majority of study sites in 
China, India and the Philippines (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003). Taken to the extreme, the 
Zambézia Community Association for Environmental Protection and Sanitation in Mozambique 
is perceived as an elite-dominated organisation, whose membership fees and nepotism pose 
obstacles to the poorest joining (see Nhantumbo et al. 2003).  
The aforementioned evidence of slow advancement towards equity echoes some often-asked 
questions by post-colonialism authors (i.e. McEwan, 2001, 2008, 2009a), such as who voices 
development concerns, how do participants’ identities and structural roles in local and global 
societies shape their priorities and which voices are excluded as a result? The functional 
participation of these organisations in decision-making processes shows the dominance of voices 
and priorities of the more powerful state agencies. This point will be revisited in Chapters 7 and 
8. 
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2.4. Rights and Responsibilities Devolved 
Having explored formation, operation and outcomes of grassroots organisations as recipients of 
forest devolution, this section now turns to the second aspect of devolution policies, namely 
rights and responsibilities transferred. By looking at different types of transferred management 
authority, the classification of Edmunds et al. (2003a) overlaps with that of Sikor and Tran 
(2007), who classify devolution based on the governance relations that devolution programmes 
seek to set in place, such as how rights are divided between central government and the 
recipients of devolved management authority. Devolved rights and responsibilities involve the 
management of either specific forest products (e.g., non-timber forest products (NTFPs)) or 
forest as a whole (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003).  
Property rights lie at the heart of debates about rights and responsibility of local resource users in 
the devolution process (Knox and Meinzen-Dick, 2001; Edmunds et al., 2003a). Property rights, 
in this sense, refer to the authority acknowledged and supported by law, custom and/or 
convention to undertake a particular action relating to a resource (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) divide property rights into five types, namely: rights of access (i.e. 
rights to enter a resource); rights of withdrawal (i.e. rights to obtain a product from a resource); 
rights of management (i.e. rights to regulate internal use of a resource); rights of exclusion 
(i.e. rights to decide who can and cannot access a resource); and rights of alienation (i.e. rights to 
sell or lease the last two rights). When all five rights are bundled together, a full property right is 
seen. When this full right is shared by a group of people, a complete common property right is 
allocated (Barsimantov et al., 2011).  
In addition to the above typology, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) further differentiate property 
rights into de jure and de facto rights. They consider de jure property rights to be rights enforced 
by government departments, who grant lawful recognition to resource users to use and manage 
concerned resources. In contrast, de facto property rights are often recognised among resource 
users but not by government authorities. De jure rights granted to local people under devolution 
policies are often curtailed in practice, because of users’ uncertainty regarding their rights, local 
elite domination, or de facto control by the government (Thoms, 2008). This is one of the factors 
that obstruct the success and sustainability of induced grassroots organisations at the case study 
sites and will be revisited in Chapter 6 and 7. Furthermore, de jure property rights may or may 
not match de facto rights. This often depends on whether or not communities accept state 
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attempts to define tenure and whether state definitions of tenure align with existing local tenure 
arrangements (Barsimantov et al., 2011; Chapter 6).  
This classification of property rights characterises the typical power struggle between states and 
their citizens over control of natural resources. This occurs when different resistance strategies 
by local resource users are employed to claim resources from the state, especially in areas where 
state and customary authorities overlap (more on resistance strategies: see Section 2.5). Often in 
these situations, claims for customary (de facto) rights by some local actors are ignored by 
devolution policies. Even when devolution policies recognise the customary rights of some local 
actors, it is done in such a way that it weakens the customary rights of other actors by failing to 
acknowledge them (Sikor and Tran, 2007). 
A common property regime is defined as institutional arrangements for the cooperative (shared, 
joint and collective) use, management and, sometimes, ownership of natural resources (McKean 
cited in Humphreys, 2006). This regime allows an identifiable group of interdependent users to 
exclude outsiders and regulate use by its members, and rights are often recognised by customary 
law (Jones and Carswell, 2004). Co-management or joint management models (to be discussed 
further) restrict the property rights of local actors to use rights (Agrawal, 2001b). The common 
property regime under community-based NRM (CBNRM) is, in fact, a form of shared private 
property, where access and rights to resources are reserved for a specific community or 
communities. This is markedly different from an open-access common property regime, where 
rights to resources are not regulated, and they can be exploited by anyone (Bromley, 1989). The 
communities at the case study sites of this study suggest using individual rights of access and 
withdrawal in combination with collective management structure to manage natural forests (see 
Section 7.5), which is different from both common property and shared private property.  
Property rights are widely recognised as important components of sustainable NRM because the 
manner in which people use natural resources depends upon the property rights regimes 
governing these resources (Behera and Engel, 2006). Studies show that, where community 
conservation initiatives are implemented with local people enjoying legal ownership of the area 
and tenurial security through rights over resources, it is more likely that these resources will be 
managed sustainably (see Bigg and Satterthwaite, 2005). This is because, by holding full 
property rights, local people are allowed to control the benefits and cost of protecting a natural 
resource. This encourages them to manage it for the long term, especially if they can see how 
these costs and benefits can enhance their livelihoods (Barrow et al., 2000; Gibson and Becker, 
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2000; Bigg and Satterthwaite, 2005; Fisher et al., 2005; Brown et al., 2007). This is the case for 
the success of CBNRM programmes in India (see Nongkynrih, 2006) and the Philippines (see 
Potter, 2008), especially because national laws in these two countries recognise traditional 
ownership (and practices and customs) of local people over natural resources as legitimate 
institutions for NRM. However, full property rights cannot always been secured for local 
resource users especially in protected areas or in countries like Vietnam where state owns all 
natural resources (see Chapter 4). As a result, it is important to explore a flexible arrangement 
for property rights that work in these contexts. This is one of the objectives of this study and 
discussed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9.  
Having discussed property rights to highlight core issues relating to rights and responsibilities 
transferred under devolution policies, this section now examines rights and responsibilities 
towards specific forest products, or forest as a whole, in the context of JFM and CBNRM 
initiatives. In Nepal, Thoms (2008) observed that rights and responsibilities given to CFUGs 
have been extensive. According to law, CFUGs are permitted to sell and set prices for forest 
products, and enforce rules governing access and withdrawal (Thoms, 2008). Generally, each 
member household of a user group is allowed to harvest an equal amount of a given forest 
product, regardless of household size or income. Those members who do not need the product 
are allowed to sell their surplus to other users or other people in nearby communities (Thoms, 
2008). In addition, the government does not take a share in the income generated by CFUGs 
from sale of forest products, membership fees and fines for rule violations (Pokharel, 2008).  
In theory, with comprehensive transference of rights, some improvements to local livelihoods 
should be expected. In Nepal, Dev et al., 2003 and Yadav et al., 2003 argue that community 
forestry has both direct and indirect livelihoods impacts, including improved natural capital (in 
terms of regenerated forests) and social, physical, financial and human capital (in terms of sale of 
forest products, and empowerment of women and low caste groups). In other Asian countries, 
devolution policies have been observed to provide direct benefits to at least some local forest 
users in almost every case (see Edmunds et al., 2003). These benefits include improved access to 
forest products, support for alternative livelihoods and access to outside financial support, which 
(with some caveats) contribute to the improvement of livelihoods of some forest users (Edmunds 
and Wollenberg, 2003). 
Despite being characterised, in theory, by the sharing of property rights over natural resources 
(either forest products or forest as a whole) between communities and the state, the reality of 
58 
 
transference of rights under participatory NRM models, such as JFM and CBNRM, tells a 
different story. In China, for example, under reforms of the state forest sector, administrative 
villages and individual households have been granted increased responsibilities and rights 
regarding forest management under various tenure arrangements and forest management 
institutions. However, the central government still maintains considerable control over forests 
through taxes and state regulations on harvest and sale of timber products, which constrain the 
ability of farmers to make realistic decisions about the forests they purportedly own (Dachang 
and Edmunds, 2003). Elsewhere in Asia, local people’s property rights over natural resources are 
often limited to the use of certain natural products (i.e. rights of access and withdrawal), and do 
not extend to authority in deciding what management mechanism should be in place for those 
products (i.e. rights of management) (Agrawal, 2001b; Woodcock, 2002). In India, rights 
transferred under JFM are only administrative, not legal rights, and as such can be withdrawn at 
any time (Behera and Engel, 2006). Other types of rights, such as withdrawal rights, alienation 
rights and power for enforcement have been transferred to communities only to a very limited 
degree (by powerful forest departments) (TERI, 2004; Behera and Engel, 2006).  
In addition, devolution of right and responsibilities do not often advance livelihood 
improvements for local resource users. In many JFM initiatives, livelihood opportunities are not 
considered together with transference of rights and responsibilities, thus raising vulnerability for 
local people living near forests (see Gibson and Marks, 1995; Oates, 1995, 1999; Fisher et al., 
2000; Kumar, 2002; Holmes, 2003; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; Wollenberg et al., 2008; 
Pulhin and Dressler, 2009; Bhattacharya et al., 2010). Also, forests that are under the 
management of local people in JFM or CBNRM programmes are not often in good condition, 
with strong presence or growth of subsistence products (Banerjee, 2000; Edmunds and 
Wollenberg, 2003). In this regard, legal access to these forests does not guarantee benefits to 
right-holding villages, which is also seen at one of the case study sites (see Section 7.3 in 
Chapter 7). In other cases, where access to forest products are transferred to local people in JFM, 
they are usually limited to non-commercial products (see Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; 
Edmunds et al., 2003b; Thoms, 2008). In addition, in places where biodiversity is robust (e.g. in 
many parts of Africa), governments often do not trust local people to devolve rights and 
responsibilities to them (see Wily, 1999 cited in Woodcock, 2002), or more powerful resource 
users (such as SFEs in the case of Vietnam; see Chapter 4) are given first priority to forest 
resources. In this regard, benefits emerging from devolution policies for local people often 
remain limited (Edmunds et al., 2003a), with the poor being most affected. This is because poor 
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households tend to be the most dependent on forest and other common resources (at least in 
relative, if not absolute terms), especially in the case of crop failure or family distress (Beck and 
Nesmith, 2001; Arnold, 2003; Dev et al., 2003; Sunderlina et al., 2005; International Fund for 
Agriculture Development, 2007; Shackleton et al. in Thoms, 2008; see also Chapter 5). For this 
reason, for transference of rights and responsibilities to be effective, they should form part of 
sustainable livelihood strategies that also aim to protect natural assets (see Chambers and 
Conway, 1991; Scoones, 1998; Farrington et al., 1999; Sunderlina et al., 2005). These aspects of 
rights devolution are also observed at the case study sites and discussed in Section 7.3 in Chapter 
7. 
Improvements to livelihoods notwithstanding, transference of rights and responsibilities has not 
yet contributed significantly to the advancement of equity. In a review of 30 case-study 
publications in India and West Africa, Beck and Nesmith (2001) find a gradual but systematic 
exclusion of the poor from accessing common property resources, including forests, which 
increases the vulnerability of their livelihoods. In the case of CBNRM in Nepal, although 
communities are given rights and responsibilities over forest as a whole, these forests are often 
closed immediately after being handed over to communities (on the advice of forest departments 
for the objective of maintaining and conserving forest resources). This forces the poorest out of 
communal forest resources that they previously depended on for their subsistence needs 
(Springate-Baginski et al., 2003). In its turn, this likely results in reduced incentives for 
sustainable resource management and even provides incentives for over-exploitation of forests 
for quick economic benefits (Behera and Engel, 2006; Bhattacharya et al., 2010; Chapter 6). 
In summary, when devolution policies aim to enhance participation of local resource users 
through transferring them rights and responsibilities over forest management, they are expected 
to contribute to poverty alleviation, improved distribution of benefits, and realisation of more 
sustainable use of natural resources over time (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Sundar, 2001; Ribot, 
2002b, Edmunds et al., 2003a). In contrast to this aim, the review of rights and responsibilities 
transferred under devolution policies presented here reveals considerable scepticism about the 
extent to which powers of decision making and enforcement are really being devolved. Very 
often, there is discrepancy between the responsibilities that people are given and the rights and 
powers they have (including the power to act on their responsibilities) (Fisher, 2000).  
In this line of argument, many attempts at devolution exhibit a common pattern in which the 
local level actors are expected to implement objectives set at a central level (Fisher, 2000). This 
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effectively shows the participation of local resource users as tokenism. This might explain recent 
observations that CBNRM has largely failed to deliver the expected and theoretically predicted 
benefits to local communities (Blaikie, 2006) and that forest devolution in general is merely “a 
shift in the manner in which central governments control forest, rather than a genuine shift in 
authority to the poorest resource users” (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003:158). In this regard, 
motivation of states to encourage functional participation of people (Pretty, 1995) in 
implementing centrally set objectives simply reduces NRM costs they otherwise have to bear in 
full. As such, it is not surprising that the rights and responsibilities that are transferred tend to be 
those of restoration, protection and monitoring rather than those of empowerment of local 
communities or power sharing between state and non-state actors (see Potter, 2003). This pattern 
is also seen at the study sites and discussed in Section 7.3 in Chapter 7). 
2.5. The Relationship between Existing Local Management Practices 
and Devolution Interventions 
Having reviewed different aspects of devolution policies in NRM, it appears that, in spite of 
widespread adoption of devolution policies around the world, the impacts of these policies 
towards increased people’s power in decision making, livelihoods and more sustainable NRM 
have remained limited in most cases. This has led to discussion of the third (and final) aspects of 
devolution policies in Edmunds et al.’s (2003a) analysis: the relationship between existing local 
management practices and devolution interventions. Studying this relationship also helps assess 
the contribution of devolution to improving local people’s position in decision-making 
processes.  
The relationship can be conflicting, mutually supportive or neutral. Mutually supportive 
relationships have been observed under the influence of the joint management model. For 
instance, local people participating in collaborative management programmes have received 
legal recognition of their customary access and withdrawal rights to natural resources, as well as 
development assistance to improve their livelihoods. In addition, as a result of their enhanced 
legal status in NRM processes, local people have become more politically visible and inclined to 
speak out to protect their rights (Wollenberg et al., 2008). In general, however, as Edmunds et al. 
(2003a) found in their research, examples of mutually supportive policies are hard to come by in 
the literature on devolution of natural resource management.  
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In fact, the relationship between existing local management practices and devolution 
interventions is often conflicting. Without a proper understanding of local contexts, institutions, 
customs and norms, it has been observed that community forest management programmes are 
often in conflict with existing systems at particular localities. For instance, in setting up 
committees for forest protection under JFM in India or implementing many JFM schemes, there 
has been little effort to build upon or formalise traditional and/or existing methods and 
institutions (Behera and Engel, 2006; Matose, 2006; Springate-Baginski and Blaikie, 2008; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2010, Chapter 7 and 8). In this regard, spaces for local people to deliberate 
their knowledge as postcolonial scholars advocate remain limited. Even if spaces are created for 
local people (e.g., rights to certain forest products, rights and responsibilities to develop a 
management plan, or the creation of grassroots organisations for forest management), they are 
done so on the terms of the Forest Department, as shown by various studies (e.g., Fisher, 2000; 
Dachang and Edmunds, 2003; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; Edmunds et al., 2003b; Behera 
and Engel, 2006; Thoms, 2008; Chapter 7 and 8).  
When local institutions have been created without considerations to local practices, local-level 
politics of control have been ignored in new resource management systems (as seen at the study 
sites – see Chapters 7 and 8). This, in turn, has created substantial conflicts with the existing 
NRM practices and decision-making processes that had previously regulated the use of local 
forest resources (Ribot, 1998; Mandondo, 2000; Malla, 2001; Vedeld and Rao, 2001; Medina et 
al., 2008). Forest departments and states frequently take on co-management without the 
necessary changes to their views about the way forest environments operate, and without 
distancing themselves from their assumed positions of control (Matose, 2006; Chapter 8). As a 
result, relations between the state and local people in co-management initiatives are still 
characterised by inequality, with local people having little power on which to protect their access 
to natural resources (see Gibson and Marks, 1995; Oates, 1995, 1999; Holmes, 2003; Matso, 
2006, Chapters 7 and 8).  
In view of the above, the author supports the argument put forward by Barrow et al. (2000) that 
governments, NGOs, donors may have pushed the establishment of community institutions too 
fast at the cost of community understanding and ownership, which is analysed in Chapter 7 and 
8. This highlights the fragility of induced grassroots organisations to protect their own benefits in 
the face of coercive power from the state. At the same time, they also raise an opposite question 
about how to help induced grassroots organisations exist successfully within state system to 
62 
 
protect rights of their serving communities. This is the area that this thesis tries to address and 
discussed in Chapter 7, 8 and 9.  
Moreover, the evidence in Sections 2.3, 2.4 and the above highlights the feminism and 
postcolonialism argument that NRM decisions are evoked and embedded in contestations over 
gender, class, race and other social relations on the subject of defining and satisfying needs (see 
Rocheleau et al., 1996; McEwan, 2001). In this context, stronger and wealthier actors will 
impose their knowledge over others’ to realise their agenda (as seen in India and elsewhere; see 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3). Therefore, in the view of post-colonial feminists, such as Spivak (1988, 
1999), the problem does not lie in the inability of local people to speak for themselves but in the 
unwillingness of the more powerful to listen.  
Following this line of argument, states are often seen as being ambivalent towards handing more 
power to rural communities. In Asia NRM devolution processes are still dominated by 
government (Thomas-Slayter, 1994; Edmunds et al., 2003a; Bacalla, 2006; Springate-Baginski 
and Blaikie, 2008; Pulhin and Dressler, 2009). In fact, the state prefers to allocate tasks to civil 
society organisations that they cannot afford to do financially or do not want to be involved in 
politically (Bebbington and Farrington, 1993). That is why states may promote devolution 
policies for their own benefits such as a means of reducing conflict with local communities, 
strengthening their authority over people and natural resources or reducing costs and 
responsibilities for the state, or because they are under pressure to give away some of their 
decision-making power (Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Sundar, 2001; 
Banuri and Najam, 2002; Shackleton et al., 2002; Woodcock, 2002; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 
2003; Nhantumbo et al., 2003; Vandergeest, 2003; George and Kirkpatrick, 2006; Chapter 4). 
This leads to a situation in which the power relations between the state and local resource users 
remain unchanged although devolution programmes are implemented.  
Furthermore, the analysis in the previous sections of this chapter shows that co-management 
initiatives do not necessarily solve problems of inequality in state–people relations around 
natural resources. Instead, they lock into complex socio-political dynamics revolving around 
interactions on unequal terms by different groups of people, which are, in turn, embedded of 
these in broader power struggles over resource control and access between various actors, in 
particular between state actors and villagers and between men and women (Matose, 2006; Sikor, 
2006). In the view of political ecologists, the power struggles over resource access and control 
can be seen through the resistance strategies that local people employ to influence state policies 
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on natural resources. Resistance strategies have been classified by Biot et al. (in Jones and 
Carswell, 2004) into confrontation, compliance, adaptation and evasion. Confrontation (i.e. 
direct but not necessarily violent conflict to challenge power relations) is a familiar response to 
coercive measures imposed on local people by the state. Compliance, which appears when the 
parties involved share social norms and structures in natural resource use, is the opposite of 
confrontation and serves as a reinforcing mechanism for the status quo power structure. 
Adaptation appears when local people comply with constraints imposed by government and 
adjust their objectives accordingly. Finally, a strategy of evasion is in use when local 
community, in face of coercion by the more powerful state, accepts the formal or ritual aspects 
of the state’s demands but leaves the state’s overall objectives unachieved. 
Resistance strategies can also be in the form of “everyday form resistance” (Scott, 1985) that is 
the false compliance and feigned ignorance of ‘illegal’ activities of local people in state-control 
natural resources areas, in order to, for instance, ‘counter-map’ states’ efforts to claim the 
ownership of their traditionally used resources (Peluso, 1993, 1995). They are means by which 
local people avoid provoking more powerful state into any retaliatory action that might 
exacerbate their socio-economic and political difficulties (Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Holmes, 
2007). 
2.6. Key Variables Influencing Collective Action of Local Resource 
Users  
Having examined different aspects of devolution policies and theories articulating roles played 
by grassroots organisations and their interactions with the state, this section now discusses 
variables influencing the motivations of local resource users as recipients of transferred 
management authority to take part in collective actions to manage natural resources successfully. 
Collective actions (i.e. working in groups, such as grassroots organisations), together with 
property rights, lie at the heart of the devolution process (see Sekher, 2001). In addition, many 
constraints on the success of devolution interventions can also be attributed to collective action 
(Knox and Meinzen-Dick, 2001) that is complex and doesn’t happen everywhere (Meinzen-Dick 
et al., 2002). In this regard, studying different variables influencing collective action helps build 
foundations for analysis and recommendations on how to improve the success of grassroots 
organisations in devolution, as discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.  
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In explaining why some communities successfully organise themselves in collective actions (i.e. 
establishing and taking part in grassroots organisations or groups) while others do not, Ostrom 
(in Gibson et al., 2000) mobilised a set of cost and benefit factors as driving forces for resource 
users to decide whether the benefits of organising are worth the costs. Cost and benefit factors 
can be determined by attributes of the resource itself (such as possibility to improve the resource 
with acceptable costs for reasonable benefits, predictable and stable improvement in the resource 
after investments, and clear and manageable boundaries of the resource) and attributes of the 
resource users (such as dependence on the resource, shared understandings of the resource 
attributes, agreement to contribute towards short-term costs, level of mutual trust, autonomy 
from the resource, and organisational and leadership experience in local associations) (see 
Gibson et al., 2000; Sekher, 2001; Matta and Alavalapati, 2006). In this regard, Barsimantov et 
al. (2011) rightly argue that, even though user groups possess characteristics that can facilitate 
collective action, the characteristics of available resources influence the cost of collective action 
for managing that resource. As a result, both sets of attributes mentioned above interact and 
affect the costs and benefits that individuals bear, which, in turn, decide whether or not local 
resource users invest their time and resources working together under one organisation to 
manage the resource (see Gibson et al., 2000). The following section analyses in greater detail 
the cost and benefit factors. 
Some common issues that affect cost of collective action emerge from recent studies. First, 
clearly defined boundaries of a common-pool resource are an important factor encouraging local 
resource users to combine their efforts, because they help to reduce uncertainty about who pays 
the costs of managing the resource and who gains benefits from it (Barrow and Murphree, 2006). 
For example, if a block of forest has a steep escarpment on one side (thus being natural fence 
against illegal intrusion), less time is required for monitoring and preventing illicit exploitation. 
As a result, the prospect of higher benefits becomes more obvious if local people decide to work 
together. Without clearly defined borders that are mutually acceptable to all concerned parties, 
local people might not find it worthwhile to work together to manage an area of forest, especially 
in face of overlapping claims for de facto property rights by multiple communities of forest 
resource users (McKean and Ostrom, 1995; Dietz et al., 2003; Barrow and Murphree, 2006; see 
also Chapters 6, 7 and 9). 
Second, the location of the users relative to the resource upon which they rely also determines 
how much effort (i.e. cost) is required to protect the resource from outside exploitation. For 
instance, if local people can combine the patrolling and tending of a natural resource en route to 
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their daily tasks, such as working in their field or collecting forest products, the cost for 
protection is also reduced. In this regard, considerable discussion has focused on issues of spatial 
location, extent and terrain of natural resources in determining the success of grassroots groups 
or organisations guarding common pool resources (e.g., Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; 2007; 
Baland and Platteau, 1996; Gibson and Becker, 2000, Gibson et al., 2005; Schnier, 2009). 
However, the location factor by itself does not necessarily make NRM more effective, as shown 
by one of the case study sites (Village C) of this study (see Chapter 7). 
Related to this cost-benefit calculation, effective self-organising also rests on how much value is 
attached to the resource being managed. On reviewing requirements for successful resource 
management by local people, Gibson and Becker (2000) and Brown et al. (2007) argue that local 
communities must highly value a natural resource in order to have sufficient incentive to manage 
it sustainably. This value could be in terms of contribution to their livelihoods or in terms of 
ethical, spiritual and cultural appreciation, which in fact decides the length and depth of their 
commitment to the sustainable use of resources. (Chapter 5 of this thesis elaborates how changes 
in these values influenced patterns of forest use at the case study sites). In this view, grassroots 
organisations will fail if they lack clear plans to provide tangible benefits for their members and 
if the formation of these organisations does not respond to gaps and needs perceived as important 
by local people (Ali and Bass, 2004; Chapter 7). All the same, appreciation of a resource is only 
a pre-condition for local people to work together in groups. Without other enabling physical, 
cultural, political conditions under which NRM takes place and prevailing market pressures, the 
value of the resource alone may not necessarily translate into concrete action by local people to 
protect it (see Bryant and Parnwell, 1996; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Benda-Beckmann and 
Benda-Beckmann, 1999; Gibson et al., 2000; Castree, 2001; Edmunds et al., 2003a; Watts, 
2003; Barrett et al., 2005; Humphreys, 2006; Barrow and Murphree, 2006).  
 In their turn, cost and benefit factors are driven strongly by self-interests. For a person to take 
part in any collective action, his or her self-interest plays an important role. Ostrom (in Herzberg, 
2005) articulated that human beings come together in the social arena not because of their good 
nature or capabilities to form social bonds. Instead, motivations for individuals to take part in 
collective action come out of a more sophisticated view of their own self-interest. In this light, 
Ostrom argues that, when joining in a collective action, individuals seek their own gain, on the 
basis that gain comes through a long-term commitment with other self-interested individuals. 
This mentality was prevalent at the case study sites and further discussed in Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7. 
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The size of grassroots groups is another attribute of resource users that has attracted the attention 
of, and stimulated disputes among, researchers interested in the effectiveness of self-organising 
for common pool resource management (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004). There used to be a widely 
held assumption that smaller groups were more successful than larger groups, as expressed in the 
work by Olson (1965). In his research, Olson focused on the internal dynamics of groups, such 
as the motivations of group members to act together, and suggested that conditions for groups to 
achieve a collective goal were more likely to be met in small rather than large groups. This, 
according to Olson, was because, with fewer members to negotiate among, smaller groups faced 
lower transaction costs and were thus more likely to overcome problems requiring a collective 
response. This conclusion was supported by Baland and Platteau (1998), who articulated that, the 
smaller the group, the stronger its ability to perform collectively.  
However, Varughese (2000) did not find a significant correlation between the number of group 
members per hectare of forest and the organisation or performance of collective action. Along a 
similar line, Agrawal (2000) questioned Olson’s assumption when examining nine forest 
councils in the middle Himalayas of India on their ability to protect their forests. Agrawal argued 
that smaller forest councils find it more difficult to organise successful collective actions than 
larger groups. It is especially challenging for small groups, when it comes to mobilising 
resources sufficient to monitor forest usage and enforce rules established by local groups, if their 
group size does not match the size of the ecosystem under their management. In that regard, 
what Agrawal’s study adds to understanding of group size and its influence to collective action is 
that, if a small and relatively poor village has a relatively large forest to patrol, it faces much 
higher continuing costs of monitoring and enforcement than a larger village with similar levels 
of household income (Gibson et al., 2000).  
Leaving aside the advantages and disadvantages of purely small and purely large groups, several 
middle ways for organising collective action exist. For instance, in her studies on large common-
pool resources in Spain, the Philippines and Sri Lanka, Ostrom (1990) found that appropriators 
often started to organise themselves in small groups to build up their capacity in solving small-
scale problems that could be dealt with through ad hoc cooperation before developing into a 
larger and more formal group. In these cases, use of multiple layers in the organisational 
structure of these groups was often seen. For this study, both Agrawal’s and Ostrom’s findings 
on the influence of group size on grassroots organisations’ performance were incorporated into 
the development of an organisational structure for induced forest-based grassroots organisations 
in the forest sector in Vietnam, proposed in Chapter 9.  
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For successful self-organising, trust among members of grassroots organisations to act together 
plays an important part in mobilising collective efforts towards a shared objective (see Warner 
and Jones, 1998; Cortner and Moote, 1999; Barrow and Murphree, 2006). It is also argued that, 
through joining a group, members learn to work together and build trust through creating, 
changing, bargaining and controlling the internal institutional settings of their organisation. In 
addition, trust engendered by the development of these internal institutions is necessary to 
strengthen rules and deter free riders from exploiting a natural resource (as discussed later in this 
section), to cut costs of membership, and, more generally, to increase organisational efficiency 
(Ostrom, 1990). However, trust should be built upon costs and benefits mutually agreed and 
fairly shared among group members (McKean, 2000). Lack of trust at one of the study sites 
proved detrimental to the ability of local people to come together for collective action (see 
Section 8.2 in Chapter 8). 
Related to both attributes, for self-organising to be successful, local resource users also have to 
effectively address the issue of benefit sharing (i.e. the collective action dilemma12). One of the 
major obstacles to collective action in managing a common pool resource, according to Olson 
(1965), is that individuals can easily trick the system and benefit from others’ efforts in 
managing the resource without making efforts of their own. At the same time, as a community 
effort, it is difficult to monitor individuals’ contributions to addressing a collective matter. In 
particular, it is difficult to assign rewards and sanctions that provide individual group members 
with incentives to provide effort towards the management of the common pool resource. To 
prevent the collective action dilemma local people have suggested the combination of individual 
household’s ownership over a forest block with collective activities (i.e. in a group of household 
or a village level organisation) for forest management (see Chapter 7). Moreover, without a fair 
system for benefit sharing in place, cooperation and harmony in a community is very likely to be 
replaced by envies and mistrust, as discussed in Section 8.2 in Chapter 8.  
In summary, in studying theoretical explanations of factors that determine whether people work 
together in grassroots groups to manage common-pool resources, it is important to acknowledge 
the wide range of reasons that are applicable in various contexts. For example, studies have 
identified more than 30 potential explanatory factors that influence local resource users’ 
decisions about whether or not to work together to manage a natural resource (see Poteete and 
                                                          
12 The collective action dilemma is a setting in which individuals, as a group, share a common output but have 
choices for actions based on their own expectation for maximum short-term individual benefits (Yang and Wu, 
2009). 
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Ostrom, 2008). By focusing on the aforementioned factors, this research in no way intends to 
exclude other variables potentially influencing forest management by grassroots organisations at 
the case study sites. Rather, by analysing these factors in more detail, the study draws attention 
to those issues that are most relevant to the political and socio-economic context of Vietnam, in 
order that suitable arrangements to improve induced grassroots organisation’s operations in 
forest management in this and other authoritarian countries can be explored.  
2.7. Weaknesses in Current Literature on Induced Grassroots 
Organisations 
The previous sections set out a theoretical framework for the study that is based on three aspects 
of devolution policies and supported by various related discourses on roles of grassroots 
organisations, sustainable livelihood framework, power, participation, post-development, 
postcolonialism, political ecology and feminism. By way of a summary and a means to focus the 
analysis in following chapters, this final section identifies weaknesses in the current literature on 
induced grassroots organisations.  
In reviewing the wider literature associated with the theme of NRM and devolution, the 
difficulty of uncovering literature that explicitly refers to induced grassroots organisations is 
striking. This is not to say that there is limited literature on substantive themes related to induced 
grassroots organisations, such as invited participation, participatory committees in JFM 
programmes, or the dynamics of community participation in collective action. However, in the 
literature if induced grassroots groups are mentioned, these types of organisations are often seen 
from a structural point of view and in an abstract way. Also, it is not clear from the review on 
grassroots organisations induced in JFM and CFM how these organisations interact with external 
actors and the influence of these actors on the functioning of these organisations, as 
demonstrated in Section 2.3.2.  
Major studies about local resource users and their motivations to take part in NRM focus on key 
variables conducive to self-organisation of user groups in resource management, such as physical 
and technical attributes of resources, characteristics of user groups, and attributes of institutional 
arrangements (see Section 2.6). In these studies it is common to assume that local people require 
autonomy to self-organise for NRM effectively (Laerhoven, 2010). For example, in studying the 
political conditions under which NRM takes place, scholars argue that common property regimes 
under the management of local people and their organisations tend to be more successful if 
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autonomy be given to local people (Ostrom, 1990, 1999), or with the non-existence of the 
external interventions (Sabatier, 1992, Yang, 2007). In line with this argument, research by 
Gibson et al. (2000) also highlighted that case studies in Nepal, India and Bolivia, for example, 
show that many forest users successfully overcame challenges to achieve more sustainable forest 
management because they were able to debate freely and had sufficient autonomy to develop 
their own rules and experiment with them over time. This is also the case for Chhatre and 
Agrawal (2008), who found a link between greater local autonomy in the design of governance 
arrangements and higher probability of forest management being classified as sustainable.  
In focusing on local factors, scholars focus upon the locality and the importance of local factors 
(Sikor, 2006; Barsimantov et al., 2011) and tend to overlook the effects of larger economic and 
political forces on forest management (Agrawal, 2001c). In reviewing the three most 
comprehensive attempts (i.e. Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; and Baland and Platteau, 1996) to 
produce theoretically informed generalisations about the conditions under which groups of self-
organised users are successful at managing their common pool resources, Agrawal (2001c) 
observed that the influences of external factors have been neglected. This is particularly 
inaccurate when grassroots organisations in the devolution process are widely induced by outside 
agencies as a means to increase local resource users’ participation in devolution process. In that 
regard, influences from these agencies over the way these organisations operate (as shown in 
JFM in India and CBNRM in Nepal; see Section 2.3.2) are unavoidable. In addition, in 
authoritarian contexts, granting local autonomy to local populations is a near-impossible option 
(see Chapter 4). This presents the need to go beyond autonomy and investigate influences by 
external factors in shaping effective collective action.  
In addition, in the view of political ecology, postcolonialism and post-development scholars, 
external factors, such as consumption patterns of rich societies, the ability of Northern donors to 
impose their knowledge on NRM in Southern countries or collusion of state officers with local 
elites, can influence the way in which local resource users manage natural resources (see Section 
2.2 and 2.5). As such, missing these factors in analysing forest devolution might give wrong 
impressions on forest devolution at grassroots level. Moreover, states can also bring positive 
influences to communities through providing institutions for conflict resolution, supportive 
external sanctioning institutions, or compensation for the costs associated with conservation 
(Baland and Platteau, 1996; Agrawal, 2001a,b). As a result, mobilising their (positive) influences 
to the meaningful participation of grassroots organisations in devolution becomes an important 
consideration.  
70 
 
Additionally, in association with groups of local resource users, in studies on NRM devolution 
policies, community property rights are often seen as a potential option for NRM (Smajal and 
Larson, 2007). What is missing from these studies is that they do not bring to light how different 
types of property rights can be mixed and arranged through the channel of induced grassroots 
organisations, so that induced grassroots organisations can take advantage of these different 
property rights to improve local people’s benefits, and thus their meaningful participation in 
these organisations and decision-making processes. This is particularly important to attempts to 
use separate (not full) property rights to encourage effective participation of local resource users 
in induced grassroots organisations in protected areas and in Vietnam where the state still holds 
ultimate ownership of natural resources.  
From the above critical review, it can be concluded that local people’s participation in forest 
governance in general and grassroots organisations in particular is not a one-size-fits-all 
management prescription. In the context of the widespread use of induced grassroots 
organisations to promote collective action /self-organising for sustainable NRM, the premise that 
local people require autonomy to organise effectively does not stand firm. This means that there 
is a need to improve theories of how external factors influence grassroots organisations, in order 
that an enabling framework for more effective participation of local people and their designated 
organisations can be identified. This is what this study aims to address, in order to improve 
knowledge on roles played by induced grassroots organisations in forest management in general 
and understanding of the political feasibility (for these induced grassroots organisations to take 
part) in forest devolution in authoritarian contexts like Vietnam.  
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Chapter 3: The Research Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out the methodological framework adopted for this study. Given the study’s 
aim of investigating the roles played by induced grassroots groups in forest management so as to 
develop a framework to strengthen their participation in that process, a Participatory Action 
Research (PAR) approach was adopted. This enabled an investigation of, and engagement with, 
local people to understand their lives, perspectives and experiences in relation to forest 
management and their participation in forest management processes. The chapter begins by 
detailing the key strengths and weaknesses of adopting a PAR framework. This is followed by a 
discussion of the suitability of case studies as a context for PAR. After these theoretical 
discussions, the research settings are described, to explain the practical application of the case 
study approach. A range of tools are then presented, such as overt participant observation, 
natural resource mapping, transect walks, semi-structured interviews, seasonal calendars, and 
focus group discussions, to explain how the research was conducted. The chapter then critically 
discusses ethical considerations to show how people take part in the research and how their 
identities are protected. A discussion of how the data were analysed, which helps clarify how the 
findings were arrived at, precedes the conclusion of the chapter. 
3.2. Research Framework: Participatory Research and 
Participatory Action Research  
Participatory research is increasingly employed in understanding social phenomena across the 
globe. The emphasis of participatory research is on a “bottom-up” approach to answer a research 
question according to locally defined priorities and local perspectives, which help local people 
both to solve their own problems and to secure resources for problem solving either from within 
or outside their communities (Rahman and Fals-Borda, 1991; Chambers, 1992). This has come 
from a widespread recognition that involving local people as participants in research and 
planning can both enhance the effectiveness of research findings and save time and money in 
implementation in the long term, which helps to address concerns regarding the empowerment of 
disadvantaged groups and the need to focus attention on local knowledge and management 
capacity in the face of formal bureaucratic planning processes (Chambers, 1983; Martin and 
Sherington, 1997; Chambers and Mayoux, 2005). In addition, what is distinctive about 
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participatory research is not so much the methods but the attitudes of researchers, which in turn 
determine how, by and for whom the research is conceptualised and conducted (Cornwall and 
Jewkes, 1995). In this regard, participatory methodologies are often characterised as being 
reflexive, flexible and iterative, in contrast to the rigid linear designs of most conventional 
science (Chambers, 1983, 1997). 
PAR is an approach to action research that focuses specifically on the creation of social change, 
and emphasises the participation of the researched. To create social change that is rooted in local 
knowledge, PAR focuses on the perspectives and experiences of ‘ordinary’ people and, in so 
doing, potentially ensures that recommendations for policy change are more responsive to local 
needs (Esterberg, 2002; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb, 2005). This approach has been widely used 
to formulate solutions to many practical problems in NRM, including generating compelling 
evidence and brokering broad-based social consensus for passing a new irrigation law in Bolivia 
(International Development Research Centre [IDRC], 2007). Furthermore, it has also been used 
to empower local communities through more efficient, sustainable use of pastures and other 
resources, while testing several alternative pastureland management practices and helping to 
revise the national land law in Mongolia (see IDRC, 2007). 
PAR was selected for this study from the suite of available participatory approaches for two 
main reasons. First, as the definition of PAR indicates, it aims to identify practical actions to 
bring about changes to problematic issues. In this regard, PAR converges with the broader 
ambition of this study to create social change regarding the low participation of local people and 
their dedicated organisations in forest management. Through a strategy to improve grassroots 
participation, this study aims to bring meaningful changes in the way induced grassroots 
organisations take part in forest management in authoritarian political systems like the one in 
Vietnam. PAR’s application to creating social change makes this research framework more 
suitable for this study than broader qualitative research, although both research frameworks 
emphasise participation of the researched. 
Second, the action research tradition, including PAR, focuses on the importance of local research 
participants in identifying actions required to bring about change to problematic situations 
(Wadsworth, 1998). Participation in the research process allows the researched to voice issues 
that are of importance to them, and to come up with suggestions to deal with problems that are 
practical in their contexts. This empowers the researched because they become more 
knowledgeable about their problems and are aware of how to go about addressing them (see 
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Kindon, 2005; Burgess, 2006). Again, this approach suited the study, with regard to the way in 
which the research outcomes were arrived at. In NRM in Vietnam, where traditional and 
independent forms of grassroots organisations have long been over-shadowed by state-controlled 
organisations, such as SFEs, cooperatives and mass organisations (see Chapter 4), the 
participation of local people in research is essential for exploring traditional norms and patterns 
that local people own and are confident in using. As a result, the framework to work more 
effectively with induced grassroots groups in forest management that this study aims to develop 
can start from local people’s strengths, and thus encourage them and their organisations to be 
more confident in dealing with difficulties encountered during their struggle to claim their rights 
to natural resources.  
Bearing these two reasons in mind, when commencing my research, I only had a broad idea of 
investigating participatory NRM at the village level, to improve both NRM and local livelihoods. 
In April 2007, prior to beginning my fieldwork, I travelled to Vietnam to present my research 
ideas and seek institutional support. During the visit, I gave several presentations to United 
Nations’ organisation and INGO staff working on strengthening participatory NRM, in the 
tourism, fisheries, forestry and water sectors. E-mail exchanges and telephone conversations 
were also used to consult with staff of protected areas, consultancy companies and VNGOs 
involved in participatory NRM. The purpose of these discussions was to understand the current 
situation regarding initiatives to strengthen the participation of local people in NRM. During this 
visit, I explored the possibility of conducting fieldwork in various parts of Vietnam and in 
natural resource sectors other than forestry. For that reason, I either visited or met with staff 
working in several provinces, including Bac Kan, Thua Thien Hue, Quang Tri and Ninh Thuan, 
to identify where my research would be most feasible, in terms of local interest and support. The 
forestry sector was finally selected for the study as it became apparent that there had been more 
experiments with grassroots participation in this sector compared with other natural resource 
sectors. At this point, no consultations with local people could be made, due to complicated 
permission arrangements for holding meetings with local people (discussed below). In this way, I 
narrowed down my research area to forest management in Quang Tri province, leaving 
identification of specific topics and sites until more detailed consultations with local people and 
other relevant stakeholders could be undertaken at the start of fieldwork in September 2007. 
Complementary to the two aforementioned aims of PAR, I was interested in my research 
findings being applied to improving local people’s lives. Action research presented an 
opportunity to do this, given that “action should come about as a result of researchers’ work. 
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Research results shouldn’t gather dust in the library, to be used only by people with advanced 
degrees. Research must be relevant to those who are affected by it” (Esterberg, 2002: 137). In 
this spirit, the initial research findings were fed back to both concerned local communities and 
government authorities. At the end of the data collection at each case study site, findings that 
came up through the participatory analytical strategy (see later) were displayed in the form of 
charts, tables and pictures and discussed with local people and Forest Protection Department 
(FPD) officers.  
Findings from the research were used at different levels. During follow-up visits in September 
2008, after the initial research findings had been fed back, I learnt that local people used this 
information to discuss with government officers about possibilities for them to participate more 
meaningfully in forest management, such as through more effective structures for forest 
protection groups and benefit packages for community participation. In Village A, for example, 
people started to discuss with their relatives from surrounding villages about how and whether 
forest protect groups could function better to help them to secure user rights to forest from the 
local government. This should have been beneficial for them when a new project implemented 
by WWF began (in 2009), with the aim of encouraging more effective local participation in the 
protection of the nature reserve in the area. Meanwhile, the initial findings that I presented to 
provincial FPD officers at the end of data collection process helped them reflect on their on-
going efforts, and decide how and what to do when expanding the participatory forest 
management model under the new project with WWF. Additionally, upon completion, I plan to 
condense this thesis into a shortened version and prepare a Vietnamese translation, which I will 
then pass to Quang Tri FPD officers and village heads. In doing so, I hope that the knowledge 
generated from my research can stay with local people and they can choose how to use it in 
future, for example as baseline data on past and current forest management practices.  
In spite of the significant advantages outlined above, there are significant challenges associated 
with the use of PAR methodologies. First, the design and implementation of participatory 
research is usually very flexible, to make it more adaptable to local contexts. However, the need 
for flexibility should not outweigh the need for structure, if semi-structured interviews (SSIs) 
and focus group discussions (see later in this chapter) are to remain focused on the research 
questions. To this end, for this study, different sets of topic areas were designed to guide 
interviews with different participants (see Appendix 4).  
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Second, PAR is intrinsically political in its nature. It stresses the active and equal participation of 
those being researched. In addition, it seeks solutions to problematic issues, which might 
threaten those with vested interests and previously established ways of doing things (Burgess, 
2006). Therefore, carrying out PAR can encounter opposition from those in powerful positions. 
For this study, in order to avoid conflicts and promote discussion among different groups within 
society as much as possible, I often placed people into groups based on shared gender, interests 
and social status, and met with each group separately before meeting them all together. This 
allowed me to develop an understanding of the perspectives of different social groups prior to 
meetings, which, in turn, helped me to moderate discussion among the different groups. 
Further criticisms levelled against PAR include that it lacks scientific rigour, by confusing social 
activism and community development with research, and that it is politically motivated 
outsiders, not the poor, who take the initiative in identifying problems to be investigated 
(Kemmis and McTaggart, 2000). This study was planned carefully to mitigate the shortcomings 
of PAR pointed out by these criticisms. Fieldwork was planned through extensive consultation 
with practitioners in the field to identify case studies that were responsive to the needs of the 
poor. In this regard, the study was affiliated with agencies whose objectives overlapped with the 
aim of the study. At the same time, to maintain its validity, the study was kept financially and 
institutionally independent from those agencies it was affiliated with, so that it was not subject to 
deadlines or pressures from either funding agencies or local authorities. This also helped to avoid 
the criticism that, in most action research (including PAR), researchers make sacrifices in 
methodological or technical rigor in exchange for timely evidence that can be used and further 
developed in the field (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2000).  
Most of the PAR tools utilised in the study had strong participatory characteristics. While there 
are many advantages to using such tools, such as their ability to bring the perspectives of 
marginalised groups to the fore and actively challenge social exclusion  (Chambers, 1997), it is 
also important to pay attention to their shortcomings so as to make best use of them. The strong 
public orientation of certain participatory exercises can cause researchers to neglect groups of 
disadvantaged people, such as women, who may not necessarily attend or talk in community 
meetings or discussions. This, as Brown et al. (2002) state, might weaken the ability of 
participatory exercises to reach women and, therefore, the study may fail to access all potential 
participants equally. In addition, the generation of knowledge in public spaces tends to reflect 
dominant power relations in society, because powerful people are usually more visible and vocal 
in public areas (see Henkel and Stirrat, 2001; Kindon, 2005), while poor people are often 
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marginalised (see Narayan et al., 2000). To mitigate these shortcomings, as further discussed 
later in this chapter, I held focus group discussions with single-gender groups, and through 
transect walks took part in various work-related activities, including forest patrolling and 
planting seeds (in Village B), harvesting vegetables in the forest and grazing cows (in Village C), 
and collecting firewood (in Village A), with different households to understand better their 
perspectives. These activities shed an alternative light on the mainstream thinking of dominant 
groups at each case study site, which I had been exposed to during natural resources mapping 
and men-only focus group discussions. 
Furthermore, many researchers argue that the behaviour and attitudes of researchers in 
participatory research are much more important than the methods themselves (Chambers, 2007). 
This is because academics often have most input and retain overall control in research because 
they see the use of the research findings differently from the researched (Pain and Francis, 2003). 
For this reason, researchers might have certain mindsets on how local people should take part in 
the research, which might lead them to dominate the research process. In this regard, my prior 
experience of working on income generation and forest management initiatives in remote areas 
of Vietnam with highly marginalised groups, including ethnic minorities, women and poor 
people, was valuable in helping to reduce bias and increase the chances for power sharing. In 
addition, paying strict attention to ethical considerations throughout the research process (see 
below) also helped to protect the poor from being disadvantaged by the research. 
Overall, reflecting on Pretty’s (1995) classification of participation, the level at which local 
people took part in this research process was between interactive participation and self-
mobilisation. More specifically, local people participated at different levels at different stages of 
the research. For example, during Stage One, village participants joined in the analysis of their 
past and current natural resource use management practices and institutions through resource 
mapping or transect walks (see Section 3.8). This initial level of participation rose to self-
mobilisation during Stage Three, when fresh discussions were opened up among each 
community about how forest could be better managed (see Chapter 7). As a result of this 
process, a strategy on how to strengthen induced grassroots groups was put forward by and with 
village participants, which helped them to focus their discussions with the concerned local 
government agencies when and if they need, as discussed in Section 3.2.  
Although I tried to make the research as participatory as possible, some short-comings still 
existed. For example, in Village A, the (male) communist party leader tried to attend all focus 
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group discussions, including women-only ones, even though I organised these meetings in one of 
participants’ houses, not where village meetings typically took place. Furthermore, he often 
interrupted group discussions or generalised group opinions. I could not ask him to leave 
because, if I did, it would have been considered rude. As a result, I often had to ask him to speak 
last. Still, because of his political position within the government system, participants in these 
group discussions might have been able to take part more freely if he had not been present. In 
addition, although villagers participating in the research used the research findings to support 
their requests for more meaningful participation in forest management (see Section 3.2), it is not 
certain how far these effort will go. In the context of Vietnam, where the state strongly controls 
the rural population and associational life, and nationalisation of natural resources undermines 
self-organisation at the grassroots level (see Chapter 4), local people do not have much 
experience of working independently from external institutions to exert changes to the current 
system. In this regard, for their self-motivation to be sustained, extra time and effort is required 
to maintain consensus and trust among themselves, and put their demands forward. 
Moreover, in Vietnam, conducting PAR can be very challenging. First of all, it is strongly 
influenced by the administrative procedures to obtain permission to conduct research in the field. 
To obtain permission to work at the three case study sites and live with local people, I was 
fortunate to have some personal contacts who were able to introduce me to relevant government 
officers in Quang Tri province, who in turn referred me to commune-level officers. Armed with 
letters of introduction from various organisations, commune leaders agreed to meet me and, 
later, either prepared another set of introduction letters or introduced me in person to the 
administrative heads of different villages, who in their turn introduced me to their fellow 
villagers. This process could stop both researchers and potential participants from freely 
“choosing” each other, and might cause villagers to take part in the research because I was 
introduced to them by their village and commune leaders. To mitigate the impacts of these 
limitations, I spent extra time explaining to local people (during dedicated consensus-building 
sessions) that they did not have to participate in the research if they did not wish to. 
Secondly, because the concept and aim of PAR are generally not in line with the orthodoxy of 
authoritarian political systems, which protect the power of those in power, using PAR is possible 
only if both researchers and participants understand how far they can push for change (see 
Chapters 4, 7 and 8). The administrative procedures mentioned above stop researchers from 
“provoking” direct change that is undesirable to the government. In my case, I was also bound 
by the trust and confidence that my contacts had placed in me by recommending me to the 
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provincial authorities. This reinforces other research on state-society relation in Vietnam. For 
example, Shanks et al. (2004) point out that, in Vietnam, an important part of state-society 
relations takes place through indirect dialogue channelled outside Communist Party of Vietnam 
(CPV)-sponsored structures. This approach helps the society avoid confrontation (when it can) 
with the state. In this regard, PAR in countries like Vietnam cannot be undertaken without 
approval from relevant government agencies. In this case, although I tried to challenge the 
normative production of knowledge by including excluded perspectives and engaging those most 
affected by the research in the research process, the recommendations emerging from my 
research have no radical aspects, such as changes in state ownership over natural resources or 
handing over authority to arrest violators to village level protection groups (see Chapter 9). In 
addition, my research was not sufficiently extensive, in terms of geography or timeframe, to 
mobilise the wider participation that is needed to address institutional causes of deforestation, 
such as corruption in forest management and default open access to forest resources (see Chapter 
6). As such, my PAR research (within the timeframe of a PhD study) was only able to deal with 
a subset of the problems in forest governance present at the case study sites, such as property 
arrangements, inclusion of livelihood activities and capacity building (see Chapter 9).  
Thirdly, to be able to conduct a PAR in Vietnam, apart from being well connected, one should 
first be able to persuade gatekeepers that one does not present a threat (by using PAR) to the 
existing system (see Chapter 4). For this research, I participated in countless tea-drinking 
sessions at commune and village government offices to explain my research and build rapport 
with government officers (see extracts from the research diary in Appendix 5). Once their trust 
and confidence had been gained, I was left “free” (on the unwritten condition of not “provoking” 
unwanted changes) to conduct research with disadvantaged people (in this case members of the 
Van Kieu ethnic minority) without any interference from local government. Such freedom could 
by no means be taken for granted, given that I intended to work in border areas with ethnic 
minority communities (two areas of high sensitivity in Vietnam; see Chapter 4). As such, the 
implementation of PAR in Vietnam is only possible on a case-by-case basis, and by those with a 
sound understanding of local politics and working practices. 
As the result of the above, in Vietnam, if researchers do not understand local politics, they might 
inadvertently put participating villagers at risk of punishment by the government for challenging 
the power status quo (see Chapter 4). In this regard, PAR in an authoritarian country, such as 
Vietnam, can only bring changes if it conforms to certain norms and rules of existing power 
structures. Faced with these constraints, I worked with villagers to find potential areas of change 
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within existing structures that were favourable to them. As such, the question of whether this 
conforms to the general rhetoric of PAR can be countered by the question of whether it is better 
to initiate some changes that are possible within the current system or not to advocate any 
change at all. In this context, it is useful to reflect on the structural reformists’ position on co-
existence between civil society organisations (including grassroots organisations) and states in 
the development process (see Chapter 2). 
3.3. Case Study Approach 
Within the overall remit of PAR, this study adopted a case study approach, which is particularly 
suited to action research. By definition, a case study approach aims to explore a specific case (or 
phenomenon of some sort) occurring in a bounded context within its natural setting (Small, 1995 
cited in Esterberg, 2002; Punch, 2005). This helps researchers to understand the complexities of 
specific cases, while also confining research to those aspects relevant to the research problem 
(Stake, 1988 cited in Punch, 2005; Creswell, 2003). As a result, the use of a case study approach 
can help to make observations more focused. Hence, solutions proposed by action research 
conducted in a case study context become more specific and relevant for the researched. In 
addition, because the case study approach is an empirical inquiry, it can realise PAR’s aims of 
facilitating the participation of the researched in understanding problems faced in real-life 
contexts (Yin, 1984). 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to using the case study approach. Proponents argue 
that utilising case studies enables the compilation of detailed information on specific locations, 
which may reveal general structures or relations that can be used to generate or modify models 
or generalisations13 (e.g. Harvey, 1969 cited in Rice, 2003). At the same time, a common 
criticism levelled at the case study approach relates to the generalisability of results. Critics 
claim that the study of a small number of cases can offer no grounds for establishing generality 
of findings (Soy, 1997). Punch (2005), however, suggests that, depending on the purposes of a 
specific case study and how data from the case study are analysed, results can still be generalised 
in two ways: by conceptualising; or by developing propositions.  
                                                          
13  It is argued that, if evidence from a new case is contrary to an existing generalisation, a theory is not valid, at 
least in its general form, and the theory should be either discarded or modified (Tacconi et al., 2006). Researchers 
can do so within a reasonable timeframe at a reasonable cost, especially because case studies focus on a limited 
geographical range. 
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This study employed a collective case study strategy, whereby several cases were examined to 
explore research questions from different perspectives. Adopting a collective case study 
approach enables a focus on variation both within and across cases, which is an advantage over 
the instrumental case study strategy, whereby a particular case is examined to give insight into 
an issue or refine a theory (Punch, 2005). The decision to base this research on several case study 
sites enabled me to undertake multi-perspective analysis when looking at different types of 
grassroots organisation and exploring the voices and perspectives of different natural resource 
users in different socio-economic contexts. Thus, more lessons could be drawn about induced 
grassroots organisations and their participation in forest management based on a range of 
different contexts. As a result, the aim of improving the contribution of induced grassroots 
organisations to better forest management became more attainable. 
3.4. The Research Setting: Quang Tri Province  
This section introduces the research setting in Quang Tri province. Following ethical codes of 
practices (see Section 3.6), anonymous names are used for all participants and the case study 
sites.  
In Quang Tri province, Dakrong and Huong Hoa districts support 51% and 30% of the total 
forest area, respectively, and, between them, these districts contain 89% of the province’s rich 
forest (see Table 3.1). These are also two of the poorest districts in Quang Tri (see Appendix 6 
and 7). As a result, international donor funded projects on poverty reduction and forest 
management with components on increased participation of local resource users for sustainable 
forest management in Quang Tri were mostly present in these two districts. The forest cover and 
biological resources of these two districts are concentrated in two nature reserves (NR). In Bac 
Huong Hoa NR, within which Village A of Huong Lap commune (more information see 
Appendix 6) is located, 19 globally threatened animals occur, including Saola (Pseudoryx 
nghetinhensis), together with 21 globally threatened plants (BirdLife in Indochina, 2008). 
Similarly, in Dakrong NR, which Village B of Ba Long communem (more information see 
Appedix.6) borders, 33 species of plants and 28 species of mammals can be found that are 
included on the ‘Red List’ of Threatened Species in Vietnam because of the levels of threat they 
face (Dakrong Nature Reserve, 2005). Forests in Village C of Huong Tan commune (more 
information see Appedix 6) are classified as protection forests. 
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Table 3.1: Natural Forest Extent in Huong Hoa and Dakrong Districts and Quang Tri 
Province (in ha) 
Forest type Dakrong district 
(Village B) 
Huong Hoa 
district (Villages 
A and C) 
Quang Tri 
province 
Rich forest 14,412 2,068 18,552 
Average forest 35,501 26,466 64,945 
Poor forest 514 3,042 13,395 
Regenerating forest 17,283 5,690 33,770 
Limestone forest 25 2,569 2,594 
Total 67,735 39,835 133,256 
(Source: Quang Tri Forest Inventory and Planning Office, 2006) 
Quang Tri was selected as the setting for the field research after preliminary visits to several 
provinces during the visit in April 2007 for a number of reasons. Overall, I felt that if I 
conducted my research in Quang Tri, I would have more support from local government 
agencies and donor-funded projects, and potentially more opportunities to apply my research 
findings. Although Quang Tri’s forest cover and biodiversity are not so different from other parts 
of Vietnam, the impression I got at the time was that local authorities were keen to learn from 
their on-going efforts to delegate forest management to local people through induced forest-
based grassroots organisations in the province. This effectively helped me to establish myself in 
Quang Tri in terms of the necessary research permits and “social licences” to operate. 
The aforementioned reasons for selecting Quang Tri were further reinforced after a second visit 
to the province in September 2007 to narrow down sites and the scope of the research. During 
this visit, I spent two weeks speaking with local government officers at provincial, district and 
commune levels, and local people from seven different villages that had elements of community 
participation in forest management activities14. From these discussions, it emerged that local 
people were, in general, concerned with issues of forest allocation and protection, and the 
operations of different groups in (and benefits to their members arising from) forest management 
under different forms of forest devolution (see Chapter 5). These concerns prompted me to focus 
                                                          
14 In total, nine villages had elements of community participation in forest management at the time of the visit. Of 
the two villages that were not visited, in one case, the village was covered by a WWF initiative but project activities 
had not yet been initiated, in the other case, the village was very remote and access was too difficult. 
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my research from the general topic of participatory forest management (selected through national 
level consultation; as discussed earlier) to the specific topic of grassroots groups and their roles 
in forest management. 
During a third visit to Quang Tri in October 2007, through further discussions with INGO staff 
and government officers working in the seven visited villages with elements of community 
participation in forest management and formation of grassroots organisations, it came to light 
that that all these organisations had been established under donor-funded projects and, as such, 
were induced organisations. One of the reasons for this, according to the FPD in Quang Tri, was 
that, without outside financial support, these organisations could not have been set up, because 
the government budget made no provision for supporting such groups. Although the 
government-funded Programme 661 (see Chapter 4) was present in the province, it did not have 
funding or a mandate for establishing grassroots organisations for forest management. Rather, it 
contracted households individually on short-term forest protection contracts. These households 
essentially worked as labourers under the direct management of an officer from the relevant 
special-use forest or protection forest management board (in-depth interview with a FPD 
officer). In that regard, the government had not created grassroots organisations for forest 
management in Quang Tri, although they were closely involved in donor-funded induced 
grassroots organisations. For these reasons, I had no choice but to work with donor-funded 
groups. This reflected the fact that, as indicated in Chapter 4, the establishment of Vietnamese 
civil society organisations (CSOs) has generally been initiated with funding and technical 
support from international donors and INGOs.  
To compensate for the lack of grassroots organisations initiated by the government in these 
villages, I interviewed government offices and mass organisations in both Quang Tri and Hanoi 
to learn about their perspectives on grassroots participation at the village level (see Chapter 7). 
Where appropriate, I also investigated indigenous groupings in both the agriculture and forestry 
sectors (see Chapter 5), to understand existing locally led structures for NRM at the case study 
sites. The final selection of induced forest-based grassroots organisations was made based on a 
shortlist of potential case study sites, following such criteria as: potential for knowledge 
development; forest, socio-economic and cultural conditions; variety of different grassroots 
organisational structures; and distance and access to villages. Three case study sites (Villages A, 
B and C) were finally selected (see Map 3.1).  
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Map 3.1: Map of Quang Tri Province Showing the Location of the Research Sites 
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(Source: secondary data for the map obtained from Quang Tri FPD) 
3.5. Conducting the Research: Methodological Tools and Process  
Data collection proceeded in four stages, with stage one designed to get acquainted with the 
villages and villagers, stage two to deepen knowledge about the research sites by exploring 
trends and reasons for findings and observations at the first stage, stage three to share and cross-
check the research findings with the research communities, and stage four to locate the research 
findings within broader socio-political contexts, by engaging with research participants from 
donor agencies, VNGOs, INGOs and national government organisations. In turn, a variety of 
research tools were used in order to collect data, including: overt participant observation; PRA 
tools, such as seasonal calendars, transect walks and natural resource mapping exercises; and 
qualitative tools, such as focus-group discussions, SSI and in-depth interviews with households, 
members and leaders of grassroots groups, and government, donor and NGO staff. The 
application of these tools during different stages of the research is presented in Table 3.2. It is 
important to note that data collection in the three villages was carried out simultaneously, to 
enable me to compare and update issues for further investigation at each village and across three 
villages. This required me to travel frequently between the three research sites but made data 
collection responsive to the research reality, which helped me to identify areas of adjustment 
earlier on (see Appendix 7).  
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Table 3.2: Stages of Field Research and Tools 
Stage of research Village A Village B Village C 
Stage One 
1) Interview with village 
administrative leader (supported by 
SSI) 
1 male leader 1 male leader 1 male leader 
2) Natural Resource mapping 
(supported by SSI) with members of 
induced forest-based grassroots 
organisations with: 
4 (male) 
members 
5 (male) 
members  
5 (male) 
village elders 
3) Transect walks around the 
concerned village or agricultural 
fields (supported by SSI) with: 
a) a 3-woman 
group  
b) a 3-man 
group 
a) a 5-man 
group 
b) a 5-woman 
group  
a) a 4-man 
group 
b) a 6-woman 
group  
Stage Two 
1) Individual in-depth household 
interviews with: 
12 out of 19 
households in 
the village 
21 out of 54 
households in 
the village 
17 out of 67 
households in 
the village 
2) Focus group discussion with 
villagers (supported by SSI and 
seasonal calendar tools) represented 
by: 
a) 3 young men  
b) 4 mixed-age 
women 
a) 6 middle-
aged men  
b) 6 middle-
aged women 
a) 7 elderly 
men  
b) 6 mixed-
age women 
3) Individual in-depth interviews 
with induced forest-based grassroots 
groups’ management teams 
comprising: 
4 men 5 men 4 men 
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4) Transect walks/forest patrols with 
forest based grassroots groups 
(supported by SSI) with: 
a) a 3-man 
group 
a) a 5-man 
group  
a) a 4- man 
group 
Stage Three  
1) Focus group discussion with 
villagers (supported by SSI) 
represented by: 
a) 6 mixed-age 
women; 
b) 6 mixed-age 
men 
a) 6 middle-
aged men; 
b) 6 mixed-
age women 
a) 6 mixed-
age women; 
b) 5 young 
men 
Stage Four  
1) In-depth interviews with: a) 26 staff representing international donors, 
INGOs and VNGOs active in community forest 
management and civil society (13 women and 13 
men) 
b) 22 government officials at commune, district, 
province and central (Hanoi) levels (3 women 
and 19 men) 
 
3.5.1. Stage One  
The aim of this stage was to get acquainted with the villages and villagers at the study sites. The 
very first set of data was collected by asking local people to provide information on households 
and their properties in relation to forest resources around their villages. This was undertaken 
through in-depth interviews with village administrative heads using the SSI tool and natural 
resource mapping exercises (see Photo 3.1), the results of which were later clarified and checked 
during transect walks (see Photo 3.2). Throughout stage one (and during the whole subsequent 
research), I decided to conduct this study at village level on a household basis (with households 
of different status) and an individual basis (with different members of each household being 
approached, either individually or in groups). In doing so, I was able to specify factors 
influencing certain groups of households within each village, while not excluding women or 
disadvantaged groups within each village from my research. This was because, at the case study 
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sites, household heads (often represented by men) typically decide everything for their household 
members. 
For the village administrative leader interviews, using SSI with a set of topic areas (see section 2 
in Appendix 4), I aimed to establish a general understanding about the concerned village and 
identify issues to explore further during in-depth household interviews and focus group 
discussions with villagers at a later stage. SSI helped me to realise this objective because it 
combines the strengths of both structured and unstructured interviews. The former enables 
collection of comparable data, because questions are asked in almost the same way and in the 
same order. The latter opens up possibilities for informants to direct conversations, and to 
express opinions and ideas in their own words (Esterberg, 2002; Dunn, 2005). The use of SSI 
made this study more effective in several ways. In an exploratory study such as this, SSI helped 
me to approach the research questions more subjectively. In addition, at this stage of the 
research, when I had begun to explore the research sites in greater depth, SSI helped me to better 
understand and contextualise the initial findings derived from the first stage of research. Also, 
the utilisation of SSI meant that individual opinions and experiences regarding various issues 
related to forest degradation, deforestation and management could be investigated 
comprehensively, because participants could steer the interviews to reflect their world in their 
own way, something which would not have been possible with structured interviews (Dunn, 
2005). This flexibility was particularly important in the natural resources sector, where 
experiences in natural resource use vary among different groups in a society. For example, 
women are usually knowledgeable about issues immediately related to their village, while men 
often pay more attention to towns and surrounding resources (Cornwall, 1991; Welbourn, 1991). 
Common challenges encountered when using SSI include the establishment of relationships 
between interviewers and interviewees. A collection of opinions and insights cannot be achieved 
without a certain level of trust and mutual understanding in a cooperative relationship between 
the two sides (Esterberg, 2002; Dunn, 2005; Ruane, 2005). For this study, a well prepared 
information pack (which formed part of the process to seek and obtain consent; see Appendix 3), 
living within the researched communities, and understanding the country and its language were 
used as ways to find common ground for building a rapport between local people and myself. 
Furthermore, during an SSI, researchers have to formulate coherent questions on the spot. This 
requires good communication skills and a great deal of confidence. Any loss of confidence or 
concentration may lead to inaccurate questions or ambiguous wording (see Dunn, 2005). To 
minimise this, before conducting SSIs, I prepared some context-specific questions for each topic 
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area. These questions served as ‘fall-back’ cushions for situations when I found myself unable to 
formulate a question on the spot. Lastly, sensitive interviewing that yields rich information and 
broadens understanding about the researched topic is a skill that combines self-critical 
awareness, perceptive listening and careful observation (International Institute for Environment 
and Development, 1995). These qualities take time and effort to acquire and refine. For this 
study, the use of SSI was backed by my eight years of practical experience in working with rural 
communities, and knowledge of the socio-economic context for rural development and forest 
management in Vietnam. 
Photo 3.1: Natural Resources Mapping Exercise in Village A 
 
(Photograph taken by author in October 2008) 
In addition to SSI for in-depth interviews with village administrative leaders, resource mapping 
(see more in Appendix 4) was used because it allows researchers to learn about researched 
communities through the eyes of community members, who identify, locate and classify past and 
present resource occurrence, distribution, use, tenure and access, as well as to reveal the 
significance the participants attach to different resources (Rambaldi et al., 1998). Importantly, 
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the maps produced after local resources mapping can help the researcher to plan which parts of a 
village they should visit to learn about different aspects of the researched community (see Shah, 
1997). For this research, the resource mapping exercises were conducted to learn about the 
occurence, distribution, access, use of forest resources and forest patrol routes through the 
participation of induced forest grassroots groups who were the first contacts in the studied 
villages (see Photo 3.1). 
Undoubtedly, the biggest challenge to natural resources mapping at the case study sites was that 
all members of the induced forest-based grassroots groups were men. In order to overcome the 
potential bias of this, I usually tried to conduct transect walks15 with women-only groups, to 
learn more about natural resource use from a different point of view. As I lived in the village at 
least one week before I began the natural resources mapping, I also had more opportunities to 
learn about the villages through participant observation (to be discussed later this section) to 
expand my knowledge of these villages. As a result, it was possible for me to consider more 
diverse perspectives of natural resource usages at the research sites at this stage of the research.  
Once my initial stay in each village had helped me to become more accepted by local people, I 
started to expand my interaction beyond forest induced grassroots groups. I did so first by 
rotating my stay with different households within each village and took part in evening chats 
with different groups of villagers. Through transect walks I also joined in different village 
activities, such as agricultural production, and firewood and NTFP collection with different 
groups of men and women in each village to understand village conditions from different gender 
and social perspectives (see Photo 3.2). For this research, transect walks were also employed as a 
tool to further explore local people’s assessment of different variables related to forest use and 
management. The transect walks served another important purpose in that they enabled the 
development of a better understanding between local men and women and myself, which was an 
important step towards my integration into community life. One drawback to applying this tool 
was the fitness required to walk long distances in mountainous terrain found at the case study 
sites. For this reason, it took me some time to persuade local people (and myself) that I (a city 
person) could walk a long distance with them, because they worried that walking would be too 
hard for me. 
                                                          
15 Transect walks were conducted at both Stage One and Two. During the Stage Two transect walks were only for 
forest patrols with induced grassroots groups’ members. 
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Photo 3.2: Transect Walk with a Group of Women in Village C 
 
(Photograph taken by author in February 2008) 
Throughout the study, participant observation was used to support and complement the different 
research tools. This technique is well suited to PAR, in which researchers move between two 
thought positions: insiders who investigate research problems through the lens of the researched; 
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and outsiders who distance themselves from the researched to reflect on their social world from 
different viewpoints through their everyday routines (see Cook, 1997; Kemmis and McTaggart, 
2000). In this way, participant observation enables researchers to understand researched 
communities’ ways of living in a way that might not be available from other sources (Tellis, 
1997). This in turn enables a researcher to learn from, and with, the researched community, thus 
formulating actions with them in a participatory and practical manner. 
Participant observation can be either covert or overt, with each having its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Using covert participant observation, researchers can gain access to researched 
subjects more easily, especially if the research topic is sensitive. However, doing research 
without permission from the researched raises serious ethical issues. For this reason, I employed 
overt participant observation, beginning with seeking and obtaining consent from the research 
population (see Section 3.6 and Appendix 3). To record my observations, a daily field diary was 
kept for all case study sites, which formed part of the research database for later analysis 
(excepts from my field diary are presented in Appendix 5). 
Overt participant observation can involve a mixture of structured and unstructured observation 
(Punch, 2005). In the case of this study, the fieldwork was based on the research aim and 
objectives, so the types of data required had already been identified. Therefore, a mixture of 
structured and unstructured observation was used, to take advantage of aspects of unstructured 
observation, such as natural flow of interaction, and aspects of structured observation, such as 
enhanced comparability of observational data. To enhance the reliability, compatibility and 
objectivity of observational data, structured observations were restricted to known factors (such 
as what forest products were used by local people), leaving unknown factors (such as power 
relations involved in the harvest of those products) for unstructured observation. 
Carrying out participant observation requires thoughtful consideration of its challenges and 
limitations. Being alert to playing the dual roles of community member and researcher, to reduce 
the risk of too much participation at the cost of observation and vice versa, is a difficult task 
(Kearns, 2000). In addition, the researched might change their course of action, especially if they 
know that they are being observed (i.e. the observer effect), especially under overt observation. 
Holloway (1997) suggests that this effect can be reduced if researchers try to become part of the 
background of their studied social setting, i.e. becoming part of the researched community. This, 
in effect, inevitably requires a researcher to change some aspects of his or her identity to adapt to 
the local context (see Cook, 1997). Finally, information derived from participant observation 
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might be partial, in the sense that a researcher cannot observe everything at the same time: he or 
she has to choose what to observe (Esterberg, 2002). Therefore, findings from observation in this 
research were triangulated with other available sources of data, such as those collected from 
secondary sources, interviews and focus group discussions. 
This also highlights the issue of positionality, which I paid particular attention to in order to 
ensure the effectiveness of participant observation. In fact, as Crang (2003) pointed out, “critical 
reflexivity”16 (England, 1994: 82) is central to the question of positionality. Also, critical 
reflexivity is vital to balance both researchers’ voice or perspective, and a ‘community’ view 
(Pain and Francis, 2003). In this regard, critical reflection upon the positionalities of researchers 
becomes critical to ensure power-sharing in the research process. In my research, I was 
perceived by villagers as both an insider and an outsider. As an outsider, villagers shared their 
knowledge about past forest management practices, to help me understand and discuss with them 
about solutions for better forest management. As an insider (albeit only for a short time), 
villagers trusted me sufficiently to discuss sensitive matters, such as illegal logging by both the 
villagers themselves and local officers. Sometimes these two positions were interchangeable in 
the eyes of village participants. For example, as an outsider with an academic background, local 
people asked me to update them about laws and regulations, as well as experiences on 
community forestry outside their communities; this information was then elaborated and debated 
among us. In the latter capacity, I was also seen as an insider. In doing this, both parties shared 
knowledge to help develop a strategy for improving forest management at the grassroots level. 
In response to the aforementioned challenges, throughout the course of my fieldwork, I lived for 
about three months in each studied village in different households learning to become “the 
background” of my research sites. To begin with, I organised information-giving sessions in 
village meetings as part of the process for obtaining informed consent (see Section 3.6 and 
Appendix 3), to generate understanding and support from villagers for my research aims and 
objectives. When moving to a village, I initially stayed in the households of administrative or 
traditional leaders. As the research progressed and villagers came to know me better, I moved 
into households headed by different population groups, such as women, young people, holders of 
poor certificates and the disabled. In doing so, I tried to understand different socio-economic 
situations within the village and establish how these situations influenced the way people take 
part in collective actions. In addition, by living within different population groups within a 
                                                          
16 Reflexivity, as defined by England (1994), is a process of constant, self-conscious, scrutiny of the self as 
researcher and of the research process to analyse one’s own situation.  
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village, I was able to learn more about similarities and differences between myself and villagers, 
and among different population groups, which helped me reflect more critically on the different 
positions that I occupied. As a result, I was able to ensure fairer participation of different village 
participants, especially more disadvantaged ones (such as women in general and female heads of 
households in particular), in discussions on forest management. 
In addition, when living with villagers at the three case study sites, I made efforts to overcome 
the weaknesses and challenges of participant observation. From the outset, I always reminded 
myself to keep my hair and clothing style fairly neutral to local eyes, especially as I came from 
“privileged” Hanoi. All of this helped me to learn about behaviours more acceptable within their 
communities, which in turn strengthened my understanding of their perspectives on induced 
forest grassroots groups and forest management practices. Moreover, I continually and critically 
reflected on my roles and how my interactions with the research communities did not come at 
their expense. This was supported through undertaking a consent-seeking process (see Section 
3.6 and Appendix 3) before the research started, and conducting focus-group discussions with 
local communities at the end to share information (including findings) with the research 
communities (see Section 3.5.3). In doing so, as Dowling (2005) suggested, I was able to avoid 
an exploitative relationship with the local communities at my research sites.  
As discussed earlier, when participating in agricultural work with groups of women or forest 
transects with men, I was party to village gossip. This enabled me to discover aspects of village 
life that often take place ‘off-stage’, and helped me to integrate better into the community. For 
example, during the activity of re-planting sweet potatoes that had been destroyed by buffaloes 
in Village C, women revealed to me different power groups within the village and conflicts 
between different households. This, in turn, enabled me to moderate focus group discussions 
later on in the research to limit the dominance of certain village members (see Section 3.5.2). In 
the case of Villages A and B, I was able to integrate into village life while taking part in similar 
activities, such as forest patrolling or NTFP collection. Although they had their own language, 
the Van Kieu people often used it interchangeably with Vietnamese while I was present. 
Alternatively, one villager translated what they were talking about for me. Otherwise, I was also 
able to guess topics of discussion, because as a lot of Van Kieu vocabulary is borrowed from 
Vietnamese; I could then asked questions to fill in pieces of information I had missed. 
Communicating in Vietnamese was possible on these occasions because most Van Kieu people 
could speak Vietnamese to at least a basic level after years of interacting with Kinh people 
during and after the Second Indochina War (see Chapter 3). Moreover, in all villages, I also 
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attended different village activities, such as visiting sick community members, joining get-
togethers at different households or attending village meetings. These activities enabled me to 
bond with local people, which enabled me to be accepted as a part of their community. When 
opportunities arose, I also visited commune FPD stations to chat and eat with officers posted 
there to learn about the concerned village from a different angle. Through these activities, I tried 
to identify similarities and differences between myself and local participants, so that I could 
distinguish opportunities to become an insider or outsider when conducting the research.  
In spite of these efforts, I was still seen as a short-term insider in the view of village participants. 
In this regard, the perspectives that local people shared with me on various issues, especially 
ones relating to the research topic, may have been out of courtesy rather than a genuine reflection 
of their views. In this regard, when examining forest management to change it for the better, they 
may have tempered their views when I was present. For my research, I was able to mitigate this 
potential impact by taking part in various activities in the study villages, and triangulating 
different local views in informal contexts, such as during agricultural work with women or 
trekking through forest with men. In so doing, I was able to verify whether a position that a 
village participant put forward was shared or supported by his or her peers. At the same time, I 
could also check individually whether some perspectives on forest management could be 
stretched further. 
3.5.2. Stage Two 
The aim of this stage was to deepen knowledge about the research sites by exploring trends and 
explanations for findings and observations from Stage One. Investigations at this stage were 
carried out with the support of such tools as individual in-depth household interviews (hereafter 
referred to as household interviews) and focus group discussions. In the household interviews, 
SSI was used exclusively (see Photo 3.3) which had both advantages and disadvantages, as 
discussed in the previous section. In the focus group discussions, seasonal calendars and SSI 
were used to supplement the focus group technique. For the use of these tools, I developed a 
range of topic areas (see Appendix 4) to guide SSI while retaining flexibility for research 
participants to discuss issues that were of particular relevance to them. For individual 
households, interviews were often held separately with both husbands and wives. The decision to 
interview both spouses separately was based on the fact that husbands often took the lead in and 
monopolised interviews. Therefore, after interviewing husbands (or rarely both husband and 
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wives), I tried where possible to speak to the wives (often in the kitchen) after speaking to their 
husbands or talking with them in a group of women during a focus group discussion. 
Photo 3.3: Example of a Household Interview in Village B 
 
(Photograph taken by an FPD officer in March 2008) 
In addition to household interviews, two focus group discussions, supplemented by SSI and 
Seasonal Calendar tools, were also carried out in each of the three villages. In each case, these 
involved between three and seven households. Focus groups were used as a tool for exploring 
issues and challenges regarding forest management at the studied villages at this stage, and 
facilitating discussions of the preliminary results from Stage One with the researched 
communities. The ‘focus group method’, also known as ‘focused interview’, involves a small 
group of people discussing a topic or issue defined and facilitated by a researcher (see Cameron, 
2005). The use of focus group discussions was necessitated at Stage Two by a range of factors. 
As noted above, I often found that I was unable to interview both the husband and wife of a 
household effectively at the same time, because husbands monopolised most household 
interviews and wives often dealt with different tasks when they saw their husbands receive a 
guest (i.e. me). Also, both women and men were busy with different activities at different times, 
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so that in order to increase the number of research participants, it was more practical to meet 
groups of households in each of the studied villages. I decided to interview groups of households 
that were divided into women-only or men-only groups, to avoid domination by men and 
increase the diversity of viewpoints among a community that could be heard. To aid effective 
facilitation of discussions, each group comprised six people and took place in one of the 
participant’s homes (see Cameron, 2005). However, due to the small numbers of households (19 
in total) in Village A, I invited only 3 or 4 people to join each group.  
Using the focus group method poses several challenges. As with SSI, the method requires 
sensitivity, critical self awareness, perceptive listening and careful observation on the part of the 
researcher when facilitating the group. This helps to limit the domination of individual group 
members during discussions. In addition, focus group discussions, in general, also depend 
heavily on group dynamics, which in turn are shaped by individual interest in discussion topics. 
Furthermore, with a limited number of participants in each group, it is not always easy to decide 
who to include (Longhurst, 2003). For this study, one way to overcome the problem of group 
dynamics and the question of who to include was to develop a clear set of criteria for selecting 
group members which was supported by information on power groups within a concerned village 
gained during various interactions with villagers. The general rule applied to the selection of 
participants for focus group discussion at this stage (and the next) was that participants should 
share key characteristics, such as level of interest in forest management, socio-economic status 
within the community and gender.  
Alongside asking a range of questions closely aligned to the SSI topic areas for individual 
households, focus group discussions also involved constructing seasonal calendars (see Section 5 
of Appendix 4), which proved to be the most suitable participatory tool (as discussed in Section 
3.7). Constructing seasonal calendars helped to kick off focus group discussions with topics that 
everyone was familiar with, such as rice cultivation, firewood collection, NTFP harvesting, and 
timber extraction for house construction (see Section 5 of Appendix 4). This created an 
atmosphere of confidence among participants, which made it easier to proceed to the other topics 
of forest management in their village.  
During Stage Two, forest patrols and individual in-depth interviews were also conducted with 
members of induced forest grassroots groups in each village. SSI was used to support the in-
depth interviews; the list of topics used is presented in Appendix 4. The decision to interview 
induced grassroots group members and conduct forest patrols at this stage and not in Stage One 
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(when natural resource mapping was conducted with them) was made primarily because I 
wanted to gain basic information about their villages, existing and traditional forest 
management/use practices and division of power among different groups of villager. This, I 
thought, would be more informative in comparing and contrasting their perspectives on induced 
forest-based grassroots groups operating in their village.  
3.5.3. Stage Three  
In Stage Three of the research, preliminary analysis of all the data collected was undertaken and 
draft findings for each case study site were organised into tables and diagrams, displayed on A0-
sized paper, and fed back to and discussed with a group of villagers (through focus group 
discussions) at each of the study sites. This enabled local people to check the validity of the 
research findings and effectively contribute to the research results. Topics for group discussion at 
Stage Three are listed in Section 7 of Appendix 4. Apart from the advantages and disadvantages 
discussed in the previous section, the use of the focus group method at this stage had additional 
advantages. It helped to return the study results to the community and revealed whether the 
research participants interpreted the research findings in the same ways that I did. It also 
presented an opportunity for participants to discuss the implications of the findings for their 
lives. In the flow of discussion, the researched were able to share their perspectives and learn 
from each other how these could be taken forward.  
In order to facilitate group discussion at this stage of the research in Villages A and C (in which 
Vietnamese was not the first language), I hired interpreters to help group members feel more 
comfortable and confident discussing issues in their own language, while enabling me to follow 
their discussions. This proved to be very useful, because, as one group commented after a focus 
group discussion, although they could speak Vietnamese comfortably, their discussion would not 
have been as deep and thorough if it had not taken place in their first language. Also, interpreters 
were selected from other villages and from outside the forest sector, so that they could be neutral 
in translating the discussions of villagers. After the focus group discussions, a second 
independent interpreter was also hired to transcribe and translate the video recording of each 
focus group discussions with me. In this way, I hoped to improve the reliability of the 
information I got from the original interpreter.  
There were several reasons behind my use of interpreters for Stage Three only. First, at this stage 
of the research, the main aim of the focus groups was to let local people discuss with each other, 
and not only with me, the research findings and their implications to their lives. Therefore, to 
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avoid disrupting local people’s discussions, I thought interpreters could help me to follow their 
discussion while allowing free flow of discussion in participants’ native language and 
maintaining a relaxed atmosphere. At Stages One and Two, interpreters were not used because I 
wanted to maintain direct interactions with the research communities. This was possible because 
the inhabitants of Villages A and C could speak Vietnamese with sufficient fluency to participate 
in direct discussions with me17. After comparing the benefits of hiring translators that would, in 
principle, smooth communications between the interviewees and me, against the cost of losing 
direct interactions with interviewees and the risk of misinterpretation, I decided to conduct the 
interviews myself, in Vietnamese. During Stage Three, for the focus group discussions in 
Villages A and C, in spite of having interpreters present, villagers chose to speak in both 
Vietnamese and Van Kieu. 
In each of the three villages, two focus group discussions were organised at this stage, one for 
women and the other for men. The detailed topics for discussion (see Section 7 of Appendix 4) 
were decided after the individual household and focus group discussion during Stage Two. 
Information from the focus group discussions at this stage was recorded using both video 
recording and note taking, with the permission of the group members. Video recording was 
possible only after I had lived in each of the respective villages for some months, and thereby 
built trust and confidence among villagers and government officers. Also, villagers were more 
used to my presence in their community. Therefore, when I explained that I could not talk and 
write down their discussion at the same time, they were very sympathetic to me and allowed the 
use of a video camera. This was extremely helpful because I could not only keep track of who 
said what but also had more time to moderate the focus group’s discussion. I did not notice any 
reluctance or reticence among focus group due to the presence of the video camera, which I 
placed inconspicuously in a corner of the meeting room.  
With support from the aforementioned tools, discussion on the research findings became lively. 
In general, those who attended focus group discussion were not totally surprised by the findings 
because they had taken part in the research from the beginning. At the same time, on findings 
about how best to manage forests, there was a strong consensus in all villages about the need for 
people to manage forests themselves through some form of induced grassroots groups (with 
some modifications to existing structural and ownership arrangements). The most novel finding 
for them was mainly the legal aspects of making these groups part of community life. For 
                                                          
17 The inhabitants of Village B speak Vietnamese as their first language in any case 
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example, people in Village A and B were unaware of the local government’s inability to allocate 
forests to the village’s grassroots groups to manage because of their protected areas status. 
Meanwhile, in Village C, local people were taken aback when they learnt that benefit sharing 
stipulated by laws governing forest allocation extended to use of land and harvest of timber for 
sale.  
The most divisive issues with regard to the research findings included the money needed to 
support the groups’ existence. For example, in Villages A and C, insistence on outside funding 
was strong among male participants, while, in Village B, women were confident about being 
able to mobilise their own money, especially after their experience with self-organising for 
agricultural activities. The current role and participation of women in induced grassroots groups 
was also hotly debated, especially in Villages A and C. Although women in these two villages 
were keen on learning how they could take part more, men were reluctant to accept increased 
participation of women in induced grassroots groups, citing their cultural and habitual practices. 
Meanwhile, women in Village B tended to accept the dominance of men in forest-based groups, 
citing traditional labour division between men and women in the village. 
3.5.4. Stage Four 
In parallel with Stage Three of the research detailed above, I also began conducting a series of 
interviews, using SSI, with groups of stakeholders outside of the study villages. The participants 
comprised government officials in Quang Tri and Hanoi, and staff of V/INGOs and international 
donor agencies who either worked in Quang Tri or were active in forest governance and civil 
society development in Vietnam. The main aim of this stage was to place the research findings 
derived from the case study sites in their national and international contexts, so that a thorough 
analysis of the key factors shaping forest governance and the participation of grassroots 
organisations in forest management in these villages could be explored. 
To recruit interviewees, I used the ‘snowball’ sampling technique, which involved asking 
interviewees to suggest other people relevant to my research. This type of non-probability 
sampling was used because there was no available list detailing all the people and organisations 
working in the area of my research, nor was I able to create such a list in the time available (see 
de Vaus, 2002; Babbie, 2008). In addition, the snowball technique was appropriate for this stage 
of my research, because potential interviewees from this group of stakeholders were more 
difficult to locate and approach than those at the village level. Being introduced by somebody 
that the potential interviewee knew well enabled me to gain their trust and confidence more 
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quickly. This was especially important for participants from government organisations who are 
often reluctant to talk to anyone from outside their organisation without a personal introduction.  
The biggest disadvantage of the snowball sampling technique is that it can omit people who may 
be useful informants, because they are not connected to the researcher’s key contacts (Ruane, 
2005). For my study, this disadvantage was minimised by the fact that I often checked with 
different sources of information to find out who was working in civil society development and 
natural resource management. For example, the Vietnam Union of Friendship Organisations’ 
(VUFO’s) website on Peoples Participation Working Groups 
(http://www.ngocentre.org.vn/node/119) was used to identify and update all active and emerging 
organisations. Also, talking with different INGOs and VNGOs working in my research fields 
provided hints as to whom I might have missed out. A set of topics for interviewing this group of 
participants was prepared, as outlined in Sections 8 (for government staff) and 9 (for donors, 
INGOs and VNGOs) of Appendix 4.  
3.6. Ethical Considerations 
While this thesis has so far mainly focused on how research questions can be dealt with from 
technical perspectives, it is also important to see now how ethical considerations were addressed 
to make the research ethically sound18. Winter (1987) has outlined a number of principles as 
ethical considerations when conducting PAR (see Box 1). Following these principles, 
anonymous codes were used instead of names of places and people in this research. The case 
study sites were coded as A, B, C, while research participants were mentioned anonymously 
throughout the research. 
In addition to this list, at the selected case study sites in Quang Tri province, where there are 
many different ethnic groups, ethical considerations also had to include respect for the cultural 
diversity of the area. As such, I strove to present myself in a culturally sensitive way that did not 
offend local people and their customs. Furthermore, it was also essential that the study was 
carried out in ways appropriate to local contexts (including the cultural context, as discussed 
earlier), and at times convenient for local people (see Kindon, 2005). By so doing, I tried to 
minimise disruption to local communities’ daily lives caused by the study.  
 
                                                          
18 A research is ethical sound that strives to earn the respect and trust of both research participants and the public at 
large (see Ruane, 2005) 
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I was aided in my efforts to minimise disruption by the fact that I adopted participant observation 
as a research tool. By becoming an “insider” (to a certain degree; see Sections 3.5.1 and 3.7) to 
the communities I was studying, I was able to learn more about their lives and discover ways to 
adapt the study to the local context. For instance, research activities such as household 
interviews were conducted only in the evening, when people had finished their daily tasks, in 
order to be less disruptive. For activities, like resource mapping, that needed daylight (as 
electricity was a scarce resource), I compensated people in kind for their time, such as by 
providing lunch. For transect walks, I tried to integrate this activity around people’s daily 
activities and discussed with them on the way to their fields or to the forest or while working 
with them. 
To conduct ethically sound research, two additional ethical considerations, namely informed 
consent and information protection, must be borne in mind. Informed consent ensures that 
participants freely agree to participate in the study (Ruane, 2005). From my own experience of 
working in rural areas in Vietnam, people see donor-funded projects as opportunities for 
employment and income generation. As I was affiliated to such kinds of projects, efforts were 
made to ensure that participation in the study was not viewed in this way. The informed consent 
process also helped to manage local people’s expectations and gave them the fullest possible 
account of the study. The following paragraphs detail how this was done. 
Box 1: Ethical Considerations for PAR (Source: Winter, 1987) 
1. Make sure that the relevant persons, committees and authorities have been 
consulted, and that the principles guiding the work are accepted in advance 
by all. 
2. All participants must be allowed to influence the work, and the wishes of 
those who do not wish to participate must be respected. 
3. The development of the work must remain visible and open to suggestions 
from others. 
4. Permission must be obtained before making observations or examining 
documents produced for other purposes. 
5. Descriptions of others’ work and points of view must be negotiated with 
those concerned before being published. 
6. The researcher must accept responsibility for maintaining confidentiality. 
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The process for obtaining informed consent had to two stages. The consent-seeking stage 
entailed the explanation of the research objectives, participants’ roles and the way information 
would be used, and answering any questions that arose. A pack of information sheets was 
prepared (see Appendix 3), following guidance by Queen Mary, University of London’s 
Research Ethics Committee, and was translated into Vietnamese and read out in village meetings 
for this purpose. Once people understood clearly and were happy to take part in the research, the 
consent-obtaining stage would follow, using consent forms (see Appendix 3), which were also 
translated in Vietnamese. Consent was obtained in two ways. The direct way applied to 
participants from donor organisations, government agencies, NGOs and research institutes, who 
were familiar with written forms of communication. The indirect way involved participants from 
the studied villages who were illiterate and unfamiliar with written forms of communication. 
Once a person from this group agreed verbally to participate in the study, an eyewitness (usually 
the village administrative leader or a commune forester who could read and write Vietnamese) 
present at both the information-giving and consent-giving occasions was asked to sign an 
eyewitness form to certify that the study’s aim and objectives had been explained to the 
interviewee, and that they had agreed verbally to take part.  
Providing information about the study was the key to securing informed consent. At the 
beginning of the research, I visited places where potential participants lived (in the case of 
villagers) or e-mailed or telephoned them (in the case of government officials or staff of NGOs 
and donor agencies) to introduce the study and ask them if they were happy to take part in it (see 
below). For local people at the case study sites, the use of posters and leaflets to recruit people 
for the research was not very suitable, because local people were unfamiliar with written forms 
of communication. As a result, I attended village meetings to introduce the study and spoke with 
groups of potential participants. For the other groups of participants, I followed up e-mails and 
telephone calls with a visit in person to explain further about the proposed research. 
Once people had agreed to take part in the study, the question of confidentiality arose. In general, 
it is difficult to maintain confidentiality for participants when a study is conducted in a small 
community, because, for example, providing only a few details about a participant, such as age 
and gender, might be enough for others to guess who that person is (Esterberg, 2002). As such, I 
organised open discussions with potential participants about how I would use information from 
the research. As shown in all documents in the information pack for consent obtaining, this 
discussion formed an integral part of informed consent. Despite this difficulty, the study still 
aimed to protect the confidentiality of participants, and this was done in several ways. The 
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contents of interviews were kept confidential between the interviewee and me. Furthermore, 
records of raw data were kept and accessed only by me. In addition, to protect their identity and 
privacy, the names of all participants were changed; and the study villages were referred to 
anonymously as Villages A, B and C.  
3.7. Data Analysis 
Data analysis occurs at all stages of research, from the articulation of the research problem to the 
discussion of findings and their implications for theory and practice (Thorne, 2000; Cope, 2005; 
Sage Publications, 2007). For this research, data analysis by the researcher and village 
participants was often carried out on the spot during various discussions. For instance, my direct 
observations were made and fed into on-going discussions with village participants, which were 
then analysed at the scene by all involved, to deepen group or individual discussions. In this way, 
local people’s own explanations and comparisons of forest uses and rights were sometimes 
analysed and used spontaneously to draw on local contemporary knowledge on forest use and 
management. This then proceeded to the formulation of explanations by participants about the 
effects of these uses and rights on the performance of induced forest-based grassroots groups. 
The analytical strategy of my research evolved throughout it, as Miles and Huberman (1994) 
rightly argued it should. At the outset, I planned to revise continuously research questions. I first 
used broad research questions to develop more detailed sub-questions that could then be used to 
guide data collection. This was done when the upgrading document was developed, in 
preparation for my field research. The research sub-questions were then converted to areas of 
coverage or questions for interviews and document selection, which influenced the direction of 
analysis (see Miles and Huberman, 1994). Following this procedure, research topic areas for 
each group of participants (see Appendix 4) taking part in this study were developed. When 
access to study sites was granted, local needs were taken account of when determining whether 
particular research questions (and tools) were viable (such as those discussed in Section 3.7). As 
such, research questions needed to be revised again. In doing so, research questions, and thus the 
analytical strategy, became more responsive to realities. Throughout the research process, I also 
often brought a hard copy of the research questions, detailed sub-questions and research topic 
areas to different research gatherings to remind myself and research participants of them and 
thus make sure that data collection stayed on the right track. 
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Overall, this thesis employs grounded theory as the research analytical strategy. Grounded theory 
is a popular analytical strategy in qualitative research, founded on an iterative inductive and 
deductive cycle, where findings are allowed to emerge directly from data and are ultimately 
tested (grounded) against the real world (via the dataset) (Warburton, 2005). Grounded theory 
involves, at its heart, a set of strategies, tools and central principles that aid researchers in 
undertaking inductive, reflexive and rigorous analysis of data (Cope, 2009). As a set of 
principles, grounded theory advocates the emergence of theories from data, the need to avoid 
preconceptions, the need to be theoretically sensitised, the constant comparative method of data 
analysis, and an iterative research progression (see Ng and Hase, 2008). Following these 
principles helps researchers to produce new insights to research questions that are thoroughly 
‘grounded’ in the empirical findings (Cope, 2009). 
From among these principles, constant comparative analysis was chosen for the research, for 
several reasons. Constant comparative analysis focuses on the comparison of information from 
different sources (such as, in this case, resource mapping, transect walks, focus group 
discussions and secondary documents) to identify similarities, differences and patterns among 
different datasets. In this regard, information from different datasets is continuously held up for 
re-examination in the light of new understanding (Cope, 2009). This helped the continuous 
revision of research questions, as discussed earlier. Moreover, comparison allows researchers to 
be more confident in confirming trends or concepts they have identified in the data, but it also 
forces them to dig deeper to understand mismatches and divergences (Thorne, 2000). In doing 
so, researchers can conceptualise possible relations between different datasets. For this research, 
constant comparative analysis was undertaken in various forms, such as triangulation of different 
information collected from different sources (as discussed in the previous section). In addition, it 
was carried out when research findings were presented to different groups of village participants 
who had not taken part in the research until then (see Section 3.7). In doing so, existing 
information was checked for its validity from different sources of information at different 
research stages (see Section 3.3).  
To provide a medium for comparison, a research diary was constructed. In this diary, all 
information from different stages of the research was recorded. In constructing the diary, several 
analytical tools were used. First, contact summary forms (see Miles and Huberman, 1994) were 
used to construct questions that arose from interviews on a given day. Given that note taking was 
used in all interviews (to capture thoughts and impressions while they were fresh), reconstruction 
of interviews from hand-written notes was always done between interviews. After two 
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interviews, I usually stopped for 15 minutes to jot down key information and observations from 
the previous interviews into these forms. At lunchtime19, all interview notes from the morning 
were written down into my hardcopy field diary. Similarly, all notes from the afternoon were 
written up in full in the evening. Reviewing these notes, I answered these questions (that I made 
on the contact summary forms) briefly to develop an overall summary of the main points from 
the day of interviewing or working with participants    
Contact summary forms were also used to summarise the main points of video tapes that were 
transcribed as soon as possible after each focus group discussion on the overall findings of the 
research (at the Stage Three). As noted above, three interpreters living outside of all three case 
study sites were hired to translate recordings. The transcripts from these interpreters were later 
compared and combined with my own on-site observations to produce a more complete record of 
the focus group discussions. The same process as for the interview notes was then applied to 
develop an overall summary of the main points of local people’s perspectives20 or reactions on 
the findings and their implications for forest management by induced grassroots groups at the 
case study sites. All transcripts from recorded interviews and interview notes were written in 
Vietnamese for the convenience of analysing the information with village participants and 
government officers. 
Second, I also applied a technique called “Interim Case Summary” (see Excepts from Research 
Diary21 at Annex 4 for an example) proposed by Miles and Huberman (1994). This summary 
was written every time that I rotated between studied villages, or between villages and 
provincial/district towns, when different sets of participants took part in the research. In the 
summary, I reflected on the main concepts, themes, issues and questions that struck me during 
the period staying in villages, or working with other research participants in district or provincial 
towns, and wanted to follow-up. The summary provided a review of findings and served as an 
examination of whether findings were sufficiently supported. While writing this summary, I also 
reflected on existing codes or looked for new ones (see below), which helped me to stay focused 
and made necessary amendments to the research questions or methodologies, and mapped out 
research plans and activities for upcoming stages. In addition, I used this summary as a starting 
                                                          
19 Although I tried not to interview people in the daytime to avoid disturbance to their daily livelihood activities, 
most of interviews in Villages A and B took place in the daytime. This was because, between September 2007 and 
February 2008, unusually heavy rain and cold weather stopped people from working in their fields. Only in Village 
C did interviews take place predominantly in the evenings, between 7pm and 9pm.  
20 These perspectives came from a different set of village participants who had not been involved in the analysis of 
findings during Stages One and Two. 
21  Whenever possible (because of limited access to electricity) I transferred all information from the hardcopy diary 
into the electronic one stored in my personal computer. 
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point in various discussions with village participants during transect walks, focus group 
discussions or household interviews, which helped to triangulate the research findings. 
In parallel to writing the research diary, I also used coding, another important tool of grounded 
theory (Lee et al., 2007; Cope, 2009), to help with data analysis. The central goal of coding is to 
organise, categorise, and draw insights from data by identifying core themes that emerge 
inductively (Cope, 2009). In doing so, for this thesis, commonalities and differences in social 
construction of grassroots groups, power division, forms of local knowledge and practices in 
forest management could be pulled out for analysis (see Cope, 2009). To pull out codes at 
different research stages I conducted content analysis (see Cope, 2005) of my (hardcopy and 
electronic) research diaries to identify key terms, phrases or actions that local people used to 
describe or discuss forest management practices and grassroots groups. In this regard, coding is 
analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The content analysis was assisted by Microsoft Office 
OneNote 2007, in which the electronic version of research diary was kept. The programme 
allowed the use of search functions to identify similar texts or themes across the entire the 
research diary, which was categorised under names of the research activities, and dates and 
places when they took place. In using this software, I was able to retrieve information related to 
codes quickly and thoroughly. 
At the beginning, I used manifest messages (i.e. obvious messages) (Miles and Huberman, 1994) 
as codes for obvious themes or patterns that village participants directly stated in various 
activities at Stage One of the research. At this stage, I used contact summary forms as materials 
for coding. Later on, manifest messages were supplemented by coding based on latent messages 
(i.e. messages relating to the obvious ones) that appeared in discussions by research participants 
at the case study sites. For example, lack of benefit was a manifest massage that village 
participants used to explain their unwillingness to take part in forest patrols organised by induced 
forest-based groups. Latent messages on this issue, which emerged from further discussions with 
women participants during transect walks, revealed some related codes (such as division of 
labour and sources of income) that influenced priorities and perceptions of benefits among 
women participants. As a result, lack of benefits, division of labour and sources of income were 
among the codes used to guide data analysis on effectiveness of induced grassroots organisations 
in forest management at the case study sites.  
Using this coded system from an early stage of my research enabled me to check and compare 
datasets, identify new themes (if emerging) or drop unsuitable or unworkable codes from further 
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investigations. For example, before starting the research, I did not have any ideas about 
grassroots groups outside the forestry sector. However, village participants kept comparing 
forest-based groups with agriculture-based groups. As a result of content analysis to find suitable 
codes during Stage One of the research, coding and analysis on a “Seed Sowing Group” in 
Village A, a “Crop Protection Group” in Village B, and “Coffee and Rice Weeding Groups” in 
Village C were included in the thesis as the comparative foundation for forest-based groups (see 
Chapter 5). In doing so, I applied the technique of revising codes as the field research progressed 
(see Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
When revising codes, it was particularly challenging to decide which one to drop and which one 
to pursue further. To help with the decision, I often followed Lincoln and Guba (1985)’s 
extension coding practices, which encourage researchers to come back to materials coded earlier. 
In doing so, Lincoln and Guba suggest that researchers interrogate these materials from different 
angles with a new coded theme (either relevant or related to the code in question). As a result, 
researchers can determine whether the data are rich and reliable enough for their analysis, or 
whether time and cost permit the expansion of their dataset. Importantly, accepting new codes or 
dropping unworkable ones needs to be done with reference to the conceptual framework for the 
research and other codes, to ensure the overall cohesion of arguments for the research questions 
(see Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
In selecting codes, because of time constraints, I took the lead in reviewing both secondary and 
empirical sources to identify themes for coding. In doing so, I managed to maintain the 
consistency and integrity of coding (within the research timeframe) throughout the research 
process. Mindful of Moser and McIlwaine’s (2004) observation that, despite intentions to give 
voice to research participants by using participatory methodologies, data analysis often 
highlights the views of researchers over participants, this study engaged more closely with 
research participants in the data analysis. For example, once identified, codes would be then 
passed to participants to discuss in subsequent research activities to clarify the meanings of these 
codes and (if necessary) modify them to reflect realities at the research sites (see Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). In this effect, the research also applied analytic coding approach (see Cope, 
2005). The cycle was repeated until no new codes emerged from discussion (see Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985; Lee et al., 2007). 
The research also employed a Gender Analysis Framework (see Agarwal, 2001; DfID, 2002; 
SDC, 2003) to help with analyzing the gender gap in the decision making process for forest-
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based induced grassroots groups and in gaining access to forest resources. In gender analysis, I 
aimed at examining differences between men and women’s participation in forest management, 
especially their participation in grassroots groups at the case study sites. According to Moffat et 
al. (1991), a number of analytical tools can be used to help understand gender issues in 
development work, such as the sexual or gender division of labour, the types of labour between 
women and men, access to and control over resources and benefits, levels of participation 
between women and men, and factors influencing these differences. These are also tools that this 
research employed to assess gender influences in forest management practices at the case study 
sites. In this regard, specific questions on different aspects of gender analysis were incorporated 
in topic areas 4, 5 and 6 (see Appendix 4) at the various stages of the research.  
3.8. Conclusion 
Having critically analysed the research’s methodological framework, I tried to minimise negative 
aspects of qualitative methodologies at my research sites. Also, I consciously kept my critical 
reflexivity by maintaining continuous contact with research participants and encouraging local 
participation in data analysis. Importantly, ethical considerations were kept to the fore 
throughout the research process, to make sure that local people were not exploited in any sense 
when taking part in my research. At the same time, the greatest challenge I had to overcome 
when living with local people for an extended time in their environments was to witness the 
harsh reality of poverty and political and social exclusion facing the researched communities.   
My efforts at immersion into local contexts while maintaining critical reflexivity as a researcher 
improved the research findings in several ways. As local people were approached in their 
environments at times convenient to them, discussions with them were often open and relaxed. 
In this way, I hope that I was able to balance both my voice, and the voice of research 
participants throughout the research process. This also constitutes the research strategy, which 
concentrates on local people’s explanations and experience in forest management. As a result, 
through effective participation of local people, I also gained the trust and support of local 
communities to develop a set of practical and innovative suggestions for better forest 
management, which will be discussed in the remainder of the thesis.  
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Chapter 4: State-Society Relations in Vietnam 
4.1. Introduction 
Vietnam is widely acknowledged to be a ‘success story’ with regard to the economic 
development that has been achieved under its Đổi Mới (renovation) process (Dapice, 2003; 
World Bank in Vietnam, 2007). Remarkably, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an 
annual rate of 7.5% over the last decade, while the incidence of poverty fell from 58% in 1993 to 
20% in 2004 (Vietnam Academy of Social Studies, 2006; World Bank, 2008). About 35 million 
people moved above the poverty line during the Đổi Mới process (World Bank in Vietnam, 
2007). Together with poverty reduction, other MDGs also witnessed great achievements 
especially universal education, with 94% of children aged 6 enrolling in primary school, 90% for 
lower secondary and 63% for upper secondary in 2004  (World Bank, 2006). Interestingly, in a 
report on its progress towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 
Government of Vietnam attributed the country’s success to the development of a ‘special’ 
relationship between the state and people:  
“The motto “People know, people discuss, people do and people supervise” has 
been in the focal point [in the implementation of MDGs]. Infrastructure development 
in poor areas and socio-economic development objectives have been based on 
discussion, consultation, and choice by communities in villages and communes, 
resulting in consensus and cooperation in the implementation process.” (SRV, 2005: 
70). 
This chapter seeks to explore changing state-society relations in Vietnam within this context, so 
as to better understand the changing roles of local resource users and grassroots organisations in 
NRM. The chapter begins with an examination of how current political and legal frameworks 
structure the ways in which local people and their organisations participate in the development 
process. It then goes on to investigate relations between the state and ethnic minorities in the 
country, before focusing on forest devolution in Vietnam in the spheres of policy and 
implementation.   
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4.2. Political and Legal Frameworks for People’s Participation in 
Decision-Making in Vietnam  
To understand how local people can realise their rights and take part in the development process 
in Vietnam, it is important to understand the broader political and legal framework that regulates 
all political, economic and social activity in the country. After the establishment of the SRV in 
1945, the political and administrative structure of Vietnam has revolved around the CPV22 (see 
Figure 4.1), which continues to be the main driver of state-society relations. The status of the 
CPV as the only political party in the country is formalised by Article 4 of the 1992 Constitution 
(National Assembly Office, 1992), which identifies it as “the leading force of the state and 
society of Vietnam”. In this way, the CPV has the overall authority to regulate Vietnamese 
society. This is reflected in the fact that, while the National Assembly theoretically elects the 
President and Prime Minister, there is only ever one candidate for each post on the ballot and this 
candidate is selected by the CPV (Hayton, 2007). In turn, government positions, including those 
of prime minister, ministers and deputies, are selected from the National Assembly, which is 
essentially made up of key CPV members (Ingle et al., 2006). In addition, within each state 
organisation, there is a CPV cell that ultimately reports to the central CPV. This mechanism has 
enabled the CPV to permeate all aspects of life in Vietnam, as depicted in Figure 4.1.  
To further strengthen its grip on society, the CPV established the Vietnam Fatherland Front 
(VFF) to control citizens who are not members of the party or state organisations outlined in 
Figure 4.1, either because they do not work for the government or because they are not yet 
qualified to join the CPV. The VFF’s President and Vice-Presidents are members of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party. The VFF includes the Communist Party itself, alongside 
various state-controlled mass organisations (such as the Women’s Union, Youth Union, Farmers’ 
Union and Trade Union), and the Chamber of Industry and Commerce (which itself controls all 
associations active in the private sector). 
                                                          
22 At the central level, the CPV has a Central Committee as its ‘brain’. The Central Committee is elected by CPV 
representatives at the CPV Preliminary Meetings every five years to organise the implementation of the party’s 
master plans and policies, including those for Vietnam’s strategic development. To realise its responsibilities, the 
committee elects three powerful bodies, namely: (a) the Politburo, which is empowered to lead and supervise the 
implementation of the party’s master plans and policies; (b) the Central Party Secretariat, which is assigned to 
manage daily tasks for the party; and (c) the Central Attached Committees, such as the Committee on Propaganda 
and Education (Ban Tuyên Giáo in Vietnamese) and the Committee on People Mobilisation (Ban Dân Vận in 
Vietnamese) (see CPV, 2009). 
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(Source: Law on National Assembly Election Law (National Assembly Office, 1997), Laws on 
People’s Committee and People’s Council (National Assembly Office, 2002); Law on the 
Organisation of People’s Court (National Assembly Office, 2003a); McCarty, 2001; Embassy of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the UK, 2007; Government of Vietnam, 2007a).  
Legend:  
Red:  CPV organisations  
Yellow:  law-making body;  
Purple:  law-interpreting body;  
Green:  executive body; 
  line manager of 
  cooperative relationship 
  
The VFF is designed to be the avenue through which ‘the people’ participate in decision making 
processes under the leadership of the CPV (VFF, 2009). Through the various VFF member 
organisations, the state communicates with key groups of Vietnamese society to realise the 
principle “People know, People discuss, People do and People supervise”, which is echoed in all 
documents and policies of the CPV (Bach, 2003; Ingle et al., 2006, McElwee and Ha, 2006). 
This is because the VFF has a duty to “care and protect legitimate interests of its members and 
help them to practice their ownership [in all aspects of life] and supervise the state’s activities” 
(Article 9 of the 1992 Constitution; National Assembly Office, 1992). In this light, the director 
of Vietnam’s Institute of Development Studies, a government research institute, in an interview 
with The Youth Newspaper (2006), acclaimed the VFF as the largest civil society organisation in 
Vietnam.  
In this regard, the VFF has been an important element in state/party-society relations. The Party 
has used the mass organisations, under the umbrella of the VFF, to mobilise different sections of 
society (such as women, youth and farmers) in support of the political objectives of the Party, 
such as the struggle for national independence and unity (during the Second Indochina War23 in 
                                                          
23 The First Indochina War refers to the hostilities between the French and Vietnamese between 1946 and 1954. The 
Second Indochina War refers to the hostilities among the United States, North and South Vietnam, Cambodia and 
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the 1960s and 1970s) and the transition to a socialist-oriented market economy (beginning with 
the launch of the Đổi Mới process in 1986). During these periods, mass organisations mainly 
relayed party propaganda and operated in a very hierarchical relationship with the party 
(Vasavakul, 2003). However, under the influence of Đổi Mới, there have been moves to redefine 
the roles of the mass organisations. In their study, Dalton and Ong (2002) observed that there are 
increasing signs of independence and diversity of views within state-control mass organisations. 
My experience working on donor-funded development and environmental projects, in 
partnership with Women’s Union, Youth’s Union and Farmers’ Union, is that their role extends 
beyond dissemination of state propaganda to encompass service provision for their members and 
representation of them in discussions with government agencies. For example, the Women’s 
Union provides such services to its members as HIV prevention and education, and poverty 
reduction through micro-credit programmes and empowerment (Women’s Union, 2010), while 
the Farmers’ Union provides more technical support to farmers, such as legal advisory services, 
market information and assistance with filing complaints to relevant state organisations 
(Farmers’ Union, 2011). 
That said, there are several forces that drive decision making in the country. Different power 
camps within the CPV have emerged from the ongoing political decentralisation from central to 
provincial levels (Thayer, 2008). One of the most important recent political reforms has seen the 
National Assembly (i.e. Parliament) being empowered to hold the CPV to a certain level of 
accountability (see World Bank in Vietnam, 2007). For instance, the Parliament, in 1998, 
rejected land reform measures proposed by the CPV (McCargo, 2004). In the economic sphere, 
the CPV allows some provinces to deal directly with outside partners to attract more investment 
for development (Kerkvliet, 2003). As such, the powerful business sector increasingly demands a 
greater share in the policy process, especially as it created 90% of new jobs between 2000 and 
2005 (World Bank, 2007). In this light, it would appear that, over a period of time, the political 
climate in Vietnam has become more conducive to more meaningful and effective participation 
of citizens in decision-making processes (Dalton and Ong, 2002).  
In this regard, Kerkvliet (2003) suggested that the Đổi Mới process has made Vietnam more of a 
“dialogue state”, which believes that relaxing its control over society encourages its participation 
in addressing problems arising from Đổi Mới, such as rising inequality and the poverty gap 
between rural and urban areas (see Section 4.3). As a result, a clear commitment to building a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Laos during the period from 1961 to 1973 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1976), although 
hostilities did not end until April 1975 with the fall of the government of South Vietnam. 
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transparent society under the rule of law has been seen in Vietnam (World Bank, 2006). For 
example, people have more opportunities to get involved in the government master planning 
process than in the past. Since 2005, the most important document in terms of setting out the 
long-term socio-economic development strategy for the country, namely the Socio-Economic 
Development Plan, has been taken off the list of “top secrets” and shared with the general public, 
which is seen as one of the most significant steps towards opening up the governance process 
(Sabharwal and Than, 2005).  
In this context, the participation of civil society in the governance process is increasing. In the 
early 1990s, in evaluating whether “civil society” existed in the country, Marr (1994) concluded 
that Vietnam did not have a coherent space that could be called a civil society. However, some 
researchers (e.g. Bach, 2001; Kerkvliet, 2001; Dalton, et al., 2002; Sabharwal and Than, 2005; 
Norlund et al., 2006) believe that Đổi Mới has since opened up new opportunities for the 
development of civil society and its participation in the governance process. This is reflected in 
the 2000-2010 Socio-Economic Development Strategy and the recent 2006-2010 Socio-
Economic Development Plan, which set out a challenging role for civil society organisations in 
Vietnam. Broadly, this covers three areas of action: (i) enhancing the accountability of 
government at the provincial, district and commune levels through increasing democracy at the 
grassroots level; (ii) strengthening the voice of the poor in policy making and implementation 
through enhancing the participation of the poor in development planning, implementation and 
monitoring; and (iii) supporting service delivery for poverty elimination (Sabharwal and Than, 
2005).  
In a context where citizens have increasing opportunities to participate in the development 
process, the role of the rural population is especially appreciated. In fact, farmers have always 
played an important role in Vietnam’s political landscape. Historical accounts highlight their 
contribution to different revolutions throughout the history of Vietnam. An oft-quoted statement 
of Hồ Chí Minh, the founder of the CPV, highlights the importance of the rural population: 
“skilful in organising and leading, the farmer force will turn upside down heaven” (National 
Political Publisher, 1996: 185). In times of peace, all major changes or uprisings in Vietnam’s 
socio-political arena have originated in rural areas. For example, the first attempt to move 
towards a more market-oriented economy was Khoán 100, which began in 1981 when individual 
farmers or farming household groups were allocated land separately from cooperatives for rice 
cultivation (Kerkvliet, 1995; Marsh et al., 2007). 
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The importance given to the rural population by the CPV was illustrated by the way in which the 
Party dealt with unrest in Thai Binh province. The unrest originated in 1994, when villagers sent 
complaints about corrupt local officers, land disputes and high agricultural taxes through official 
channels (i.e., petitions and letters to their commune people’s committees). Receiving no 
adequate response and angered by increased corruption among local authorities, in May 1995 
about 10,000 villagers demonstrated on the street to express their dissatisfactions over how their 
complaints were dealt with. However, because their complaints were not adequately resolved, an 
escalated demonstration broke out in 1997 with use of tear gas by the police, and villagers 
throwing bricks and stones against government offices and equipments (Kerkvliet, 2001; Shanks 
et al., 2004; Luong, 2005; McElwee and Ha, 2006). In response to this incident, the government 
did not send the army to suppress the demonstrators. Instead but, instead, national officials came 
to the province and opened dialogues with the villagers to understand the nature of their 
grievances. As a result of the national involvement in solving the unrest, corrupt officers were 
disciplined, and violent protestors were punished (Luong, 2005).  
Although the struggles by farmers in Thai Binh over three years were marked by open 
confrontation with and challenge to the CPV and state apparatus (Luong, 2005), this happened 
only after local people had complained via official government channels and received no 
satisfactory answers. Also, the kind of struggle pursued by farmers in Thai Binh province is not 
widespread in Vietnam. More typically, according to Koh (2001), everyday form resistance, such 
as evasion, widespread non-enforcement and non-compliance, is observed in response to 
unfavourable policies made by Party-state leaders with insufficient consultation with people. 
Responding to these forms of resistance by citizens, the Party-state is forced to alter its policies, 
by either strengthening them or adapting them to make them more acceptable to people. This can 
be seen in the development after Thai Binh unrest, which sees a national legislative response 
swiftly follow. Decree 29/1998/ND-CP on grassroots democracy was introduced in 1998, to 
institutionalise the participation of local people in development activities at the commune level. 
This decree mandated considerable disclosure and consultation with local people by different 
administrative bodies in relation to commune socio-economic development plans, land-use plans 
and budgets, with the aim of improving local government accountability and transparency 
through increased participation of local people in checking and inspecting its performance 
(Shanks et al., 2004; Luong, 2005; McElwee and Ha, 2006; Norlund et al., 2006). This decree, at 
least on paper, has strengthened the voices of local populations in commune affairs and is an 
indication of changes in state-society relations at the local level.  
116 
 
Following the 1998 Grassroots Democracy Decree, a stream of new laws has been introduced to 
regulate the operations of grassroots organisations. In 2003, Prime Ministerial Decree 
88/2003/ND-CP (Government of Vietnam, 2003a), concerning the organisation, operation and 
management of associations, improved the legal status of grassroots organisations. Following 
this decree, grassroots organisations (operating as Hội in Vietnamese and association in English) 
were recognised as legal entities, which meant they could operate bank accounts and have their 
own stamps (Article 5). The 2003 Revised Cooperative Law (National Assembly Office, 2003b) 
eased the establishment of grassroots organisations yet further. The recognition of cooperatives 
(Hợp tác xã in Vietnamese) as voluntary and independent economic organisations (Article 1) 
builds a strong foundation for cooperatives to operate as grassroots organisations at village 
and/or commune level in the economic sphere. In comparison between the two laws it is much 
easier to set up cooperatives than associations (Hội in Vietnamese), because the former requires 
no prior approval by a sponsoring department for founding members, have no deadlines for 
calling a general meeting (Article 10) and have no requirement for an approved business plan 
(Articles 11 to 15). In this way, it is arguable that, in this communist country, the participation of 
civil society organisations is encouraged in the field of service delivery rather than the field of 
advocacy or policy discussion. This, in effect, makes the mainstream thinking about civil society 
organisations among Vietnam’s leadership similar to those of Western donors (McIlwaine, 
1998a, b; 2007).  
Most recently, the 2005 Revised Civil Code (National Assembly Office, 2005) further opened up 
legal (and hence operational) space for grassroots organisations, by recognising informal civilian 
organisations outside the state structure. Cooperative groups (Tổ hợp tác: Tổ means group [as 
opposed to Tổ chức, organisation], while hợp tác means cooperative), such as water user groups 
or forest protection groups, whose members cooperate with each other on an informal basis to 
address problems of common interests, can register with Commune People’s Committees 
directly, without the need to link to any mass organisation or technical department (Article 111). 
Under this law, for the first time, cooperative groups of informal characters and structures can 
obtain legal status if they complete a simple registration with the commune-level administrative 
government. The 2007 Decree on Cooperative Groups (Government of Vietnam, 2007b) 
elaborated the Civil Code further, to confirm the independence of cooperative groups, by 
allowing them to open a bank account and establish relations with other national and 
international organisations. Importantly, these groups are also eligible to receive support from 
government-sponsored socio-economic development programmes (Article 12), which was 
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previously reserved only for state-led associations and mass organisations. In comparison with 
the previous regulations, this decree is by far the most favourable for the development of 
grassroots organisations, and offers opportunities for informal, village-level groups to be 
independent, legalised and eligible to receive outside development assistance.  
The response by the CPV to rural unrest supports previous studies that indicate the CPV has 
been responsive to pressures from below (see White, 1983; Fforde, 1989; Malarney, 1997; 
Kerkvliet, 2001; Koh, 2001). This argument is put forward effectively by Malarney (1997) in his 
study on the political careers of village-level government officers in a village near Hanoi. In this 
study, Malarney found that villagers’ choice (basing on virtues) for their representative in local 
government out-weighed the candidate supported by the village Communist Party. In response, 
the party cell accepted the villagers’ choice, which Kerkvliet (1995) describes as “mass-
regarding” on the part of the CPV. The assertiveness of local villagers in sticking to their 
preference when electing local government officers and the CPV’s acceptance of their choice 
points, according to Malarney, to an important transformation in the relations between state and 
society in Vietnam. Accordingly, Vietnamese politics are not only dictated by the CPV but also 
determined by the people. However, Kerkvliet (2001) is also mindful that, while the state does 
respond to social pressure and resistance produced by policy failures, this response (as seen in 
Thai Binh unrest) may not necessarily be very quick. 
Nevertheless, the scope of influence that local people can exert in Vietnamese policy making is 
not clear. For example, the CPV still maintains strong control over grassroots organisations. 
According to Decree 77/2003/ND-CP (Government of Vietnam, 2003b) and Decree 
99/2005/ND-CP24 (Government of Vietnam, 2005), although the establishment of local groups is 
purportedly to enable local people and communes to monitor the performance of government 
officers, the leadership and management of these groups must still be placed under the direction 
of the local VFF (see Article 19 of Decree 77; and Articles 6 and 8 of Decree 99/2005/ND-CP). 
This requirement is in line with the country’s broader political structures (see Figure 4.1), where 
the leadership of the CPV is always emphasised, as following the statement explains:  
“the leadership of commune communist party cell and the management of commune 
administrative authority are compulsory conditions and key for the success of 
organisations active in community activities at village and commune levels” (Ho Chi 
Minh Political Academy, 2001: 16). 
                                                          
24 These decrees detail the procedures for establishing village groups, such as reconciliation groups (to resolve 
community or family disputes), security groups (to provide forces for any disorders), or People’s Inspection Boards 
(to check on public investments). 
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In addition, most people involved in development activities are reluctant to raise critical voices 
about the state and party’s leadership, preferring to focus on social concerns (Norlund et al., 
2003; Hannah, 2007; Thayer, 2009), or to support tacitly greater democratisation of the existing 
order, rather than dismantling or overthrowing that order (McCargo, 2004). This can be 
explained by the fact that, to survive, Vietnamese NGOs’ leaders are deeply aware of what they 
can and should say25 (see Norlund, 2007a). As such, the core activities of most civil society 
organisations, including mass organisations, in Vietnam are linked to poverty reduction, 
humanitarian relief, self-organisation and professional development; and little effort is directed 
towards advocacy (Norlund, 2007b). 
4.3. State and Ethnic Minority Relations in Vietnam  
Having examined state and society relations at the national scale, this section analyses these 
relations from the point of view of ethnic minorities. Vietnam has 54 ethnic groups (Sterling et 
al., 2006). The relations between the majority ethnic groups and the ethnic minorities, and 
between ethnic minority groups and the state, are relatively healthy in Vietnam, with different 
ethnic groups living side by side or even together within a single village (Shanks et al., 2004; 
World Bank, 2009). Each ethnic group in Vietnam has its own language, lifestyle and cultural 
heritage. Ethnic majorities are often defined as the Kinh and the Chinese, and ethnic minorities 
as the ethnic groups other than these (van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2002; 
Imain and Gaiha, 2007). The most dominant group is the Kinh (or Viet), concentrating in 
lowland areas and accounting for 85% of the total population (Baulch et al., 2002; Shanks et al., 
2004; Sterling et al., 2006; Imai and Gaiha, 2007). “Hoa” or Chinese is another relatively 
affluent group that also inhabits lowland and coastal areas. Meanwhile, ethnic minority groups 
often live in uplands, where most forests are (or used to be) located (Tran et al., 2005; Baulch et 
al., 2007). 
The residence of ethnic minorities in Vietnam is not, however, without problems. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the Đổi Mới process has brought economic development and contributed 
significantly to poverty reduction26 in Vietnam. However, ethnic minorities seem to be largely 
                                                          
25 This characteristic is also shared by Chinese NGOs, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
26 The poverty line in Vietnam is defined as the cost of a basket of goods allowing a daily intake of 2,100 calories 
per person per day (World Bank, 2007). Because a majority of the very poor are net buyers of rice, falling rice prices 
since 1996 have increased the amount of rice they can afford, thus helping to reduce the incidence of recorded 
poverty in Vietnam (UN Country Team Vietnam, 2005). However, recent economic difficulties (high inflation of 
27%, compared with 3% of 2004 (BBC News, 2007), and the global financial crisis) and adverse climatic conditions 
for agriculture in late 2007 and early 2008 in many provinces in Vietnam, have worsened poverty levels in Vietnam. 
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left in poverty, untouched and marginalised by economic development (Jacquemin and 
Bainbridge, 2005; United Nations Country Team Vietnam, 2005). Mountainous provinces, home 
of most ethnic minorities, account for nearly 70% of extremely poor households in the country, 
and this figure is expected to increase to more than 80% by 2010 (United Nations Country Team 
Vietnam, 2005). In 2006, Kinh and Chinese households experienced a poverty rate of only 10%, 
while the rate among other ethnic groups averaged 52% (World Bank, 2009). Apart from 
poverty, life expectancy, nutritional status, and other living standard measures remain stubbornly 
low among Vietnam’s ethnic minorities (Baulch et al., 2007). In 2004, only 4% and 19% of 
ethnic minority people, compared to 36% and 63% of the Kinh and Chinese had access to 
improved sanitation facilities and clean water, respectively. Even in regions considered remote, 
the Kinh majority group has improved its living standards remarkably, while minority groups 
still do poorly (Vietnam Academy of Social Studies, 2006).  
To help improve the living standards of ethnic minorities, the government of Vietnam enacted a 
large number of policies and programs specifically designed to tackle a wide range of socio-
economic issues related to ethnic minority development (Dang, 2010). By 1998, there were 21 
different national policies and projects aimed at driving development in ethnic minority and 
upland areas (Bonnin and Turner, 2012). Among the most far reaching are the Programme for 
Socio-Economic Development of Extremely Difficult Communes in Ethnic, Mountainous, 
Boundary and Remote Areas (Programme 135), and the Hunger Eradication and Poverty 
Reduction Programme (HEPR, or Programme 143). These two programmes support the 
expansion of infrastructure in remote areas, agricultural extension, provision of healthcare and 
education, so that ethnic minorities can access social services and market opportunities (Baulch 
et al., 2007). In terms of poverty reduction, these programmes aim to increase agricultural 
production and improve local food security through encouraging the use of high-yield wet rice 
varieties near springs in the uplands, as opposed to the use of dry rice and other types of staple 
food and vegetables in hilly terrain (Bonnin and Turner, 2012). 
The government of Vietnam’s development policies regarding ethnic minorities have been 
criticised for being premised on biases and inaccurate assumption and models (Baulch et al. 
2007). Critics observe that, ethnic minority people are often stereotyped negatively as backward 
and superstitious, with low capacity and low intellectual level (Jamieson et al., 1998; Asian 
Development Bank 2002, McElwee and Ha, 2006). Their agricultural practices and knowledge 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The World Bank (2008) recently estimated that about 50% of households in Vietnam have become worse off 
because of the high inflation rate. 
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(linked to swidden cultivation) are seen as a primitive and destructive. As a result, development 
programmes, like Programmes 135 and 143, seek to replace their complex, centuries-old farming 
systems and indigenous practices27 and knowledge, which are often adapted to their agro-
economic environments (Baulch et al., 2002). For instance, the introduction of high-yield rice 
varieties by these programmes can do more harm than good, if they pay little attention to local 
biodiversity or diversified livelihood strategies and agriculture (see Rambo, 2004; Fox et al., 
2009). This has effectively taken away ethnic minority groups’ opportunities for using their 
indigenous knowledge to help them be assertive and confident in improving their livelihoods, 
which effectively disempowers them in the contemporary development process. In addition, the 
implementation of the fixed cultivation and sedentarisation activities28 under Programme 135 
assimilates ethnic minority groups into mainstream culture of Kinh majority and breaks down 
their traditions and customs (McElwee, 2004a; Sowerwine, 2004; Writenet, 2006; Turner and 
Michaud, 2009). Ultimately, once it is accepted that the culture of one ethnic group is somehow 
more advanced than the cultures of others, there is less incentive to include the views of the latter 
in decision-making processes. In this regard, ethnic minority groups in Vietnam have little 
opportunities to participate in development programmes intended to help them, other than as 
passive recipients of support (Turner and Michaud, 2009). 
The Vietnamese education system also appears to be premised on Kinh lowland cultural norms 
(see van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Baulch et al., 2002). After reunification in 1975, 
Vietnamese became the only official language. Although more than 2,200 teachers are teaching 
and learning ethnic languages (SRV, 2005), there is still a lack of ethnic minority teachers and 
bilingual education for ethnic minorities (World Bank, 2009). At two of my research sites, the 
Kinh teachers could not speak the Van Kieu (ethnic minority) language, making primary 
education more challenging for Van Kieu children. In addition, the education system follows a 
national curriculum that, it has been argued, is largely irrelevant to the realities and needs of 
ethnic minority students (van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001). As such, opportunities for 
knowledge production by ethnic minority groups (thus their power in relations with the state) 
have been seriously reduced.  
                                                          
27 These practices are adapted to lower human population densities than found today – influx of lowlanders into the 
highlands and improved health care have pushed many agricultural systems from sustainability into destructive 
cycles (see de Konick, 1999.) 
28 The “Fixed Cultivation and Sedentarisation Programme” (FCSP) was established in 1968, with objectives of  
reducing poverty, promoting access to education, arresting forest destruction and promoting national security. After 
1990, the FCSP activities were integrated into a number of national programmes, including the first phase of 
Program 135. 
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In NRM, similar attitudes towards ethnic minorities can be seen. Explanations of the impact of 
agricultural activities upon forests often depict ethnic minorities as “not thoughtful to forest 
protection, preservation and development ....[and responsible for] uncontrolled exploitation of 
forest resources to respond to economic benefits without understanding about biological values 
of these resources” (Ngo, 2005:6). This accusation, seen through the lens of political ecology 
(see Chapter 2), might not have strong justification but often gains support from higher-level 
authorities (McElwee and Ha, 2006). Influenced by these views, policy makers do not often 
recognise the traditional land and forest-use rights of ethnic minority groups in the formal legal 
system (Nguyen and Le, 1999).  
In the view of the above evidence, the fact that many ethnic minorities live in remote and 
mountainous areas only partially explains their high poverty level. Biased policies and 
differences in endowments, characteristics (such as possessing less productive land, poor 
infrastructure and lower accessibility to the market, education and off-farm work) and returns to 
these are the main factors that differences in living standards and poverty levels between ethnic 
minorities and the Kinh and Chinese majorities (van de Walle and Gunewardana, 2001; World 
Bank, 2009). In this sense, although there is official interest in maintaining and developing 
cultural identities of ethnic minorities, such as dances, folklore and modes of dress, government 
policy is not universally supportive of ethnic minorities, leading to very limited participation in 
policy processes (Baulch et al., 2002). These factors are stoking dissatisfaction among ethnic 
minority groups, which led to the unrest in Central Highlands in the 2000s. 
In this context, protests have surfaced in the Central Highlands, the home of many ethnic 
minorities. Similar to the unrest in Thai Binh province, the demonstrations in the Central 
Highlands between 2001 and 2004, which involved thousands of people, were motivated by 
tensions over land rights and anger towards corruption among local government officers (Shanks 
et al., 2004; Writenet, 2006). The underlying causes for conflicts over land can be traced back to 
the government’s policies in the region. First, the flux of migrants to the region dramatically 
increased demand for land. The establishment of New Economic Zones, for example, was 
intended to bring 4 million people to the region during the period 1976 to 1980 (CPV, 2004). In 
addition, the suitability of the soil and climate of the Central Highlands for the cultivation of 
cash crops has also attracted many people to the region (Writenet, 2006). As a result of these 
factors, over the course of only 30 years, the population in Central Highland tripled (Writenet, 
2006). Under this pressure, land has become scare. According to a government survey, less than 
4% of migrant households coming to the Central Highlands received land from the state, 47% 
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purchased land privately from ethnic minority people, and 46% obtained land through clearing 
forest or claiming “unclaimed” forest land (Do in Writenet, 2006). This leads to a situation 
where the land distribution between migrants and indigenous people tilts towards the former. A 
study of one district in Gia Lai province in 1997, at the height of the coffee boom, found that 
ethnic minority people had average landholdings of 0.25 hectares per household, while 
newcomer lowlanders had between one and two hectares per household (Iagrai Project 
Management Board, 1997). This statistic seems to suggest that ethnic minority people, the 
original owners of the land, have been marginalised in the land-ownership landscape. Moreover, 
the nationalisation of natural resources, including land, that occurred after 1975 has taken away 
ethnic minority people’s traditional ownership of land and placed it under the management of 
either state farms (SFs) or state-own forestry enterprises (SFEs). In the Central Highlands, this 
process saw the establishment of 83 SFEs by 1988, managing 70% of the land area (Asian 
Development Bank, 2002). When many of these entities were dissolved because of their 
insufficiencies, land was not returned to the original owners (i.e. ethnic minority people) but to 
SFEs workers (i.e. lowland migrants in New Economic Zones). When ethnic minority people 
requested the return of their lands from SFEs and SFs, they have received only silence from local 
authorities (Tran, 2005). The refusal to return land to its original owners has become another 
source of distrust and frustration among ethnic minority groups.  
Apart from land issues, grievances over poverty also contributed to the outbreak of 
demonstrations among ethnic minority groups in the Central Highlands. For many years after 
Đổi Mới, ethnic minority people in the region stood out as some of the worst off in the country. 
In 1998, 91% of the Central Highland’s ethnic minority population lived in poverty, compared to 
73% of the minority population in the northern uplands (Poverty Task Force, 2002). From 1998 
to 2002, while every other group in Vietnam was reducing its poverty rates, the poverty rate 
among minorities in the Central Highlands actually rose (World Bank, 2003). In this regard, 
reduced land ownership or landlessness has diminished the livelihood prospects of many ethnic 
minority people in the Central Highlands, thus contributing to the frustrations of many who took 
part in the demonstrations of 2001 (Baulch et al., 2002; Writenet, 2006). 
In response to the unrest in Central Highlands, the government of Vietnam employed similar 
approaches to those used to resolve the unrest in Thai Binh province. Again, policy changes were 
introduced to address problems leading to the protests, confirming the claim that rural population 
has certain influence in politics in Vietnam. For example, Programme 135 was adjusted to 
include the provision of electricity, irrigation, television and telephones and reduction of 
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education fees to ethnic minorities in Dak Lak province (Shanks et al., 2004). Most importantly, 
recognising the seriousness of land rights in these protests, Decision 132/2002/QD-TTg on the 
“Allocation of farming and housing land for ethnic households in the Central Highlands” was 
passed in 2002 (WriteNet, 2006). Accordingly, land funds were created in each of the Central 
Highlands provinces, to be allocated to landless ethnic minorities under principles of equality, 
transparency and compatible with each ethnic groups’ customs (Article 3). This new policy 
highlights the willingness of the Party-state to make policies to address a problem once it appears 
to threaten the social order and Party legitimacy (Shanks et al., 2004).  
So far, I have attempted to analyse state and ethnic minority relations in Vietnam. In my view, 
the government’s approach to different ethnic minorities in Vietnam is also applicable to the Van 
Kieu minority group in Quang Tri province. As writing on the relationship between the state and 
Van Kieu people is still limited, the following quick introduction to the topic is mainly be based 
on my experience and fieldwork. In Vietnam, members of the Van Kieu ethnic minority reside in 
the Annamite Mountains (Truong Son in Vietnamese), mainly in Quang Tri, Hue and Quang 
Binh provinces. Their total population is around 40,000 in Vietnam (Luu, 2005), with other Van 
Kieu communities living in neighbouring areas of Laos. The relations between Van Kieu people 
and the Vietnamese government are generally positive. It is well known among Kinh people (of 
which I am one) that most Van Kieu people do not have any history of being rebellious towards 
the government, unlike some of other minority groups in the Central Highlands in 2001 (as 
discussed earlier) or during different wars in Vietnam (see Refworld and UNHCR, 2003). 
Instead, Van Kieu people have a reputation for loyalty to the government and for contributing 
their human and financial resources to help the Party during the Second Indochina War. 
According to Van Kieu people interviewed at my study sites in Quang Tri, during the war in the 
1960s and 1970s, CPV officers often contacted them to ask for help due to their strategic 
position along the demilitarised zone separating North and South Vietnam during the Second 
Indochina War. Accepting their plea, Van Kieu people were enlisted to smuggle food and 
medicines to SRV soldiers past security checkpoints set up by the government of South Vietnam 
government. Their contribution is recognised and highlighted in the various military history 
museums in Quang Tri. Furthermore, their loyalty to the Party-state has been demonstrated by 
their celebrated collective act of changing the family name of the entire ethnic group to “Ho”, 
after Ho Chi Minh, the founder of SRV. On this account, many Van Kieu people in villages in 
Quang Tri often proudly stated that Ho Chi Minh and the Party gave the family name to them. 
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4.4. Overview of Forest Devolution Policies in Vietnam 
Having examined state and society relations from legal, political and ethnical points of view in 
the last two sections, this section now critically discusses these relations in the realm of natural 
resource management. For a country of moderate size, Vietnam harbours a globally significant 
diversity of species, much of which is still being catalogued (Sterling et al., 2006). Sterling et al. 
(2006) report that, between 1992 and 2004, three turtles, 15 lizards, four snakes, 31 frogs and 
more than 45 fish were newly described in Vietnam, while thousands of species are still waiting 
to be discovered. In addition, several new species of mammals were discovered in the forests of 
the Annamite Mountains in the 1990s (see Chapter 1). 
Unfortunately, over the last 50 years or so, Vietnam’s forest heritage has been gravely 
undermined (de Koninck, 1999). Between 1943 and 1993, 50% of the natural forest in Vietnam 
disappeared (Morrison and Dubois, 1998). This loss accelerated between 1980 and the mid-
1990s (see Figure 4.2), when deforestation was encouraged to fuel economic development for 
the country (Jones, 1982; Sikor, 1997; Huynh, 1998; Sikor and Apel, 1998; Pham, 2000; Tran, 
2002a; Nguyen, 2006a). In fact, pressures for using the country’s forest resources to fuel 
continuously high rates of GDP growth increased since the early 1990s. As such, forest 
exploitation has often taken precedence over conservation (Collins, 1990; Sikor, 1997; de 
Koninck, 1999; Pham, 2000; Sunderlin and Huynh, 2005; World Bank, 2002b, 2005, 2006). 
The degradation of natural resources has arguably made the lives of many local people more 
difficult and worsened poverty in many areas. Research has shown that there is a negative 
correlation between forest cover and poverty in Vietnam (Poverty Task Force, 2002). 
Widespread deforestation has been accompanied by degradation of arable land, soil erosion, 
degradation of water catchments and diminished groundwater sources (Tordoff, 2002). 
According to Vo and Le (1994), by the early 1990s, as much as 40% of Vietnam’s land became 
barren as a result of deforestation. This has serious implications for a country where more than 
60% of the people depend on agriculture (DfID, 2007). Among the people worst affected by 
forest degradation and deforestation are the ethnic minorities, because they tend to be forest 
dependent (United Nations Country Team Vietnam, 2005; World Bank in Vietnam, 2007).  
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Figure 4.2: Changes in Forest Area in Vietnam from 1976 to 2004 
 
 (Source: Forest Protection Department - FPD and Nguyen et al. cited in Nguyen, 2006a)  
The rapid decline of forest resources and its associated impacts on poverty levels among local 
forest-dependent communities have highlighted problems with the state-dominated system of 
forest management of the 1950s to 1980s, in which little attention was paid to local people 
(Pham, 2000; Nguyen et al., 2008a). This situation originated from the radical land reforms that 
began in the late 1950s, and from the nationalisation of forest on slopes steeper than 25 degrees 
in the 1960s29. In that period, local residents were excluded from and seen as a major threat to 
the state’s forest management efforts. Indigenous norms and traditional structures governing 
forest management were either replaced by centrally led institutions or received limited 
recognition under new laws in both the northern and southern parts of the country after the 1950s 
and 1970s, respectively, which led to the disappearance of locally controlled forest management 
practices. To manage forest and forest land, the state established a system of SFEs and SFs from 
1954 onwards in the north (and from 1975 onwards in the south) (see Do, 2007). By early 1989, 
413 SFEs were managing (i.e. exploiting) 6.3 million hectares of forest land, equivalent to 
almost 70% of the total forest land in the country. Until the end of the 1980s, the state was 
generally the only official actor in NRM. In turn, this encouraged a perception among local 
people that they had no rights to forests, whose management was the responsibility of state-led 
                                                          
29 My study sites are in the former Republic of Vietnam, where land reform and nationalisation of forest did not 
commence until after the Second Indochina War in 1975. 
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forest protection units, such as the FPD (Poffenberger and Nguyen, 1997; Sikor, 1997; Sikor and 
Apel, 1998).   
In this context, forest resources were exhausted in many places. By 2006, nearly half of the SFEs 
were reported to have no more commercially viable timber reserves to exploit (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development – MARD, 2001a; Nguyen et al., 2001). Meanwhile, SFs 
failed to generate sustainable agriculture due to poor management and lack of incentives for 
farmers to work for cooperatives. This led to a situation where farmers cleared ever more forest 
to expand their agricultural fields and increase their food production (Castella and Do, 2002). In 
this regard, it was increasingly acknowledged among policy makers in the mid-1980s that 
centralized forest management through state-run institutions had failed to sustain productive 
forests and protect watersheds, and that the forestry sector, like other economic arenas, needed 
greater household involvement (Poffenberger and Nguyen, 1997; Pham, 2000; Nguyen, 2006a; 
Nguyen et al., 2008a). 
Consequently, since the late 1980s onwards, the central government of Vietnam has adopted 
devolution policies in NRM in general and the forestry sector in particular, which saw forest 
management authority being transferred from SFEs to households, villages and communes. For a 
start, the 1987 Land Law (National Assembly Office, 1988) allowed agricultural land to be 
allocated to farming households and organisations under 50-year lease arrangements, which 
signified the abandonment of collective land ownership in both the agriculture and forestry 
sectors. When the Land Law (National Assembly Office, 1993; Ravallion and van de Walle, 
2003) was revised again in 1993, transactions on agricultural land among individuals were 
permitted, for the first time since the establishment of the SRV. As such, rights to exchange, 
transfer, lease, mortgage and pass on land for inheritance under “Red Book”30 certificates were 
legalised. The 1993 revised Land Law signified a radical move by the government of Vietnam to 
further expand rights to individuals and devolve forest management authority to non-state actors 
(Sikor, 2001).  
The legal framework for the forest devolution process established by the 1987 and 1993 Land 
Laws was further elaborated by legislation specific to the forestry sector. Among the first moves 
were the 1991 Tropical Forestry Action Plan, and the 1991 Forest Protection and Development 
Law, which introduced a new framework for forest management by entrusting private 
households to replace SFEs in overseeing the forest (National Assembly Office, 1991; Sikor and 
                                                          
30 This is the term used in Vietnam to refer to the ownership certificate. 
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Apel, 1998; Hoang, 2009). In this spirit, the two biggest state-sponsored programmes for 
reforestation, Programmes 327 (or the “Greening the Barren Hills Programme”) and 661 (the 
“Five Million Hectare Reforestation Programme”)31 were formulated. Under these programmes, 
local households were contracted, together with state organisations, to protect areas of “special 
use” forests (i.e. protected areas) for the government in exchange for direct financial 
compensation, and promised private user rights to “production” and “protection” forests, such as 
the right to grow crops during the first years of forest re-growth and the right to collect forest 
products (McElwee, 2004b; Sowerwine, 2004; Sikor, 2006). Under the influences of these 
programmes, between 1993 and 1997, households, individuals, and communities received 
contracts to protect more than 1.9 million hectares, regenerate 224,000 hectares, and newly plant 
559,000 hectares of forests (Pham, 2000). 
Forest devolution accelerated in the 2000s with the recognition of communities (as opposed to 
individuals) as forest users by the revised Forest Protection and Development Law of 2004 
(National Assembly Office, 2004). For the first time, this law legalised village communities as 
forest land managers, together with households and individuals (Article 5). As such, forest and 
forest land could now be allocated to communities (Article 29), and communities could extract 
and use forest resources for commune consumption and agro-forestry production activities while 
also being eligible for financial and technical support from the government for forest protection 
and development (Article 30). This indicated a greater recognition of communities as 
indispensable participants in the forest governance process. Going one step further, in 2007, 
MARD (2007) issued Circular 38/2007/TT-BNN to allow production forests to be allocated to 
communities, which, in turn, enabled them to grow timber for trading. This has conferred legal 
recognition on de facto managers of forest resources, often in ethnic-minority-dominated areas, 
and involved them in the forest devolution process. In this regard, the recognition of 
communities and their forest user rights has removed the biggest obstacles to the development of 
community-based forest management in Vietnam (Sunderlin, 2006). 
                                                          
31 The programme 327 was officially launched by Government Decision 327-CT dated 15/9/1992, thus it is 
commonly referred to as ‘Programme 327’. Between 1993 and 1998, the government of Vietnam spent US$68 
million on this programme (Tran et al., 2005), mainly from state funds (Do et al., 2004). The programme 661 was 
approved by the National Assembly in 1997 and the Prime Minister instructed its implementation by Decision No. 
661/QD-TT dated 29/7/1998, thus it is commonly referred to as ‘Programme 661’. The programme has been 
implemented from 1998 until 2010, with the aim of afforesting barren lands in protection and special-use forests. 
Funds invested in this programme are expected to total US$256 million, comprising 64% from the state budget and 
36% from donors (de Jong et al., 2006). One of the objectives of the 661 Programme is to increase forest cover to 
43% of the national land area by 2010 (MARD, 2001b).  
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Under this new legal framework, a wider range of forest users has been included in the forest-
land allocation programme. The purpose of this programme is to allocate land to local people to 
encourage them to take part in forest management, in order to increase forest cover in the 
country (see Castella et al., 2006). At national level, forest land allocation (in exchange for forest 
protection contracts) is justified on the availability of land32 under the jurisdictional authority of 
MARD (Poffenberger and Nguyen, 1997). In Dak Lak province, where the forest land allocation 
programme is most advanced, management authority over large areas of forest land with 
standing forests has been transferred from SFEs to individual households, groups of households 
(since 1998) and whole villages (since 2000) (Nguyen, 2006b; Sikor and Nguyen, 2007; Nguyen 
et al., 2008b). In particular, local households in many villages in this province had been granted 
quite comprehensive rights over forests, including: property rights over forest land and forest 
resources; the right to convert 5% of the standing forest land to agricultural fields; and the right 
to exploit timber for sale and exclude others from access to forest land and resources on it. Also, 
local people were all granted ownership rights (i.e. Red Book certificates) that could be passed to 
others or used as collateral for mortgages (Sikor and Nguyen, 2007; Sikor and Tran, 2007).  
The National Forestry Strategy for the period 2006-2020 aims is to contribute to national poverty 
reduction goals by improving local resource users’ livelihoods and their participation in forest 
management and development. In this regard, communities, cooperatives and households have 
been given priority within the strategy to receive land and protection contracts for long-term 
protection, management and utilization of forests. In addition, the strategy also advises giving 
consideration to local customs and customary practices during the development of forest 
protection and development regulations (SRV, 2007). This indicates recognition of indigenous 
knowledge of local communities in forest policy. However, the participation of local resource 
users at the grassroots level, and thus the contribution of indigenous knowledge, to forest policy 
documents remains limited, because almost all members of the National Assembly (the key 
legislative body at the national level) are the leaders of social and political organizations from 
the district level and above, and the consultation period when citizens can raise their concern is 
often short, with only one or two weeks before the concerned regulations enter force (Hoang, 
2009).  
                                                          
32 19 million (or 89%) of the 33 million hectares that comprise Vietnam’s land area are legally classified as forest 
under MARD management, although only part of this area is actually vegetated with forest (Poffenberger and 
Nguyen, 1997). Therefore, a lot of forest land without forest has been used to promote forest devolution in the 
country.   
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In spite of some successes in forest devolution in Vietnam, such as enhancing traditional forest 
management practices, contributing to poverty reduction in some villages in Dak Lak province 
(see Nguyen et al., 2008a) and increasing natural forest cover in some upland provinces (Castella 
et al., 2006; Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2008), the overall assessment of the achievements of 
devolution policies in Vietnam is still limited. For example, under Programmes 327 and 661, 
local people still did not derive great benefits from their participation in forest management 
practices, because SFEs were still in charge, and able, therefore, to retain good forests while 
allocating degraded forest with limited economic potential to households (Tran, 2002a). Also, 
the focus of these two programmes gradually shifted away from poverty reduction and local 
people’s participation towards forest protection (de Jong et al., 2006). While Programme 327 
aimed at both reforestation and poverty reduction, through such activities as replanting and 
protecting forests, improving the utilisation of land, enhancing living standards of local people, 
and supporting fixed cultivation and sedentarisation (Tran et al., 2005), Programme 661 
primarily focused on afforesting barren lands in protection and special-use forests (de Jong et al., 
2006).  
Other studies of forest devolution policies in the country have also raised doubts over their 
effectiveness (Do, 2007; Sikor and Nguyen, 2007; Sikor and Tran, 2007). Sustainable forest 
management has not yet become a shared vision for all villagers living around the forests under 
the community forest management programmes. For example, in spite of the implementation of 
forest land allocation polices starting in 1994 in Son La province, which allocated land to 
individual households as incentives to participate in forest management and protection, 
expansion of agricultural fields into protected forests rose between 1993 and 1997 in the studied 
villages (Sikor, 2001). Illegal logging for short-term use or conversion to agriculture within 
allocated forest land was also seen in some villages in Hoa Binh (To and Sikor, 2006; Nguyen et 
al., 2008a) and Dak Lak provinces (Sikor and Nguyen, 2007; Nguyen et al., 2008b). In Hoa 
Binh, the forest allocation programme also created conflicts between different groups of local 
people and between local government and local resource users when it failed to take into account 
of de facto rights to forest resources (Do, 2007). 
These outcomes can be attributed to several factors. In Dak Lak, for example, there were 
conflicts over use of forest resources, which arose due to the exclusion of specific sections of the 
local population from the programme. For example, Kinh households, as well as villagers from 
surrounding villages who traditionally accessed forests for their daily use, were excluded from 
the programme on grounds of ethnicity (for Kinh households) and relative distance from forests 
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(for the surrounding villages) (Sikor and Nguyen, 2007). In fact, this situation highlights the gap 
between statutory laws and local customary practices. This situation also occurred in Hoa Binh 
province during process of forestland allocation (see Do, 2007). As such, forest land allocation 
programmes in both Dak Lak and Hoa Binh have not yet paid adequate attention to local 
dynamics of forest resource use (Do, 2007; Nguyen et al., 2008a). This is compounded by the 
fact that forest allocation programmes were often perceived by local people as being an external 
intervention, given that they did not acknowledge current and traditional use of forests or 
traditional institutional arrangements for forest management in the area (as in the case of Dak 
Lak; Sikor and Nguyen, 2007) and the participation of local people was exchanged for 
domination by local officials, their relatives and their friends (as in the case of Hoa Binh; 
Nguyen et al., 2008a). Meanwhile, in Son La province, the reason was that the incentives for 
local people proved insufficient to encourage them to protect forests. The land allocation and 
forest protection contracts did not improve upon the ways in which villagers already gained 
access to forestry land and resources. Instead, they had the potential to weaken their control over 
land already under their de facto ownership before the devolution began (Sikor, 2001). 
The previous discussion raises concerns about equity in forest allocation programmes. Research 
in 13 villages in Dak Lak province found that political connections were important in acquiring 
legal forest title and, therefore, legal rights to forest and its resources, which thereby excluded 
many poorer households without the necessary political connections from acquiring forests 
(Nguyen, 2006b). Moreover, unfair forest-land distribution was also evident as a result of 
unequal relations between state officials and local communities. Local government officers had 
priority over villagers to receive forest and forest land on the assumption that the officers were 
better equipped to manage these resources. Although this inequality might have led to better 
forest management (because government officers were more bound to state regulations to forgo 
immediate benefits, such as harvesting timber, in order to let forests re-grow), it came at the 
expense of depriving poorer households of opportunities to improve their livelihoods from 
allocated forest and forest land (Nguyen, 2006c). The pattern of forest allocation to government 
officials was repeated in Hoa Binh, where information about the forest land allocation 
programme was not properly disseminated to all households in each village. Instead, only 
commune and village officials and their relatives, who numbered among the richer households in 
the village, were informed of the programme and were able to apply for the land allocation on 
time. Other households in the village knew nothing about the programme until it was too late to 
apply (Nguyen et al., 2008a). These examples highlight the fact that, despite significant changes 
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in forest policies to increase local participation in forest management, government officials (i.e. 
government control) still dominate the management of forest resources, especially at the local 
level. 
In addition, benefits from allocated forests are often minimal. This is the gap between policy 
statement and reality. For example, the government has stated (in Prime Ministerial Decision No. 
178; issued in 2001 – MARD, 2003) that it is ready to give two-thirds or more of the total 
revenues from the sale of forest products, including timber, to households and individuals to 
whom forest land had been allocated, leased or contracted. However, where individual 
households or communities are allocated forest, the benefits that accrue to them are often low, 
either because the areas of forest land they are allocated are small, the condition of the allocated 
forest is poor (the best quality forests are almost universally retained under the ownership of 
state actors, such as SFEs) and/or their user rights are limited to, for example, collecting dry fuel 
wood and minor forest products (Sikor and Apel, 1998; Nguyen et al., 2001; Sunderlin and 
Huynh, 2005; Wundera et al., 2005; Sunderlin, 2006; Sikor and Tran, 2007; Nguyen et al., 
2008a; Nguyen et al., 2008b; see also Chapter 6). Often, configurations of forest land allocation 
programmes sometimes do not respond to local needs, for example, by prohibiting cultivation of 
sloping land in upland areas but not providing suitable livelihoods alternatives for sloping land 
cultivators, as in the case of the devolution programme in Bac Kan province (Castella et al., 
2006). That said, in some villages in Dak Lak and Hoa Binh provinces, where forest land 
allocation has taken place, the actual use of forest resources varies among villages. In some 
cases, local people are allowed to clear forest land for crop cultivation and extract timber to 
support their livelihood activities. In one village in Dak Lak in particular, net revenue from 
timber extraction in 2006 amounted to VND 283 million (approximately USD 19,000), 
representing a significant source of income for local people in the village. However, this village 
was the only case among the studied villages in Hoa Binh and Dak Lak where forest land 
allocation programmes actually contributed positively to poverty reduction. In this case, the role 
of the donor was vital in helping local people to realise their rights towards allocated forests and 
overcome administrative procedures to harvest forest products (Nguyen et al., 2008a). 
In regard to legal frameworks supporting the devolution of forest management authority to local 
people, meaningful changes for local empowerment remain few. The 2004 Revised Forest 
Protection and Development Law identifies communities as forest land users rather than forest 
owners (see Article 5), communities are not recognised under the 2005 Revised Civil Code as 
legal entities for civil transactions. In this case, communities’ rights to forest resources are 
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limited to ones of users but not owners. In the absence of legal articles recognizing communities 
as legal entities, government agencies have been seen to be reluctant to allocate forests to 
communities, as the government itself has admitted (SRV, 2007). This obviously places great 
obstacles in front of communities trying to operate as grassroots organisations in forest 
management. Moreover, different social groups have few opportunities to get involved in the 
policy formulation while decision making on benefit sharing and management planning is still 
highly centralized, and local forest recipients have to follow the instructions of state management 
agencies (Pham, 2000; SRV, 2005, Nguyen et al., 2008a, Hoang, 2009). As a result, local 
resource users do not have much room to contribute (in favour of their interests) to the 
formulation of national policies (Kurauchi et al., 2006; Coe, 2008). Also, experts’ knowledge 
(through involving mainly specialists and experts) dominates the use of scientific terms and 
concepts in the policy for forest devolution in Vietnam (Hoang, 2009).  
In summary, local resource users in Vietnam still play a limited role in devolution of forest 
management. This highlights the fact that, despite the existence of different policies that provide 
legal foundations for local people’s participation in decision-making processes, in practice a lot 
more needs to be done to turn these legal frameworks into meaningful action. In their research, 
Nguyen et al. (2008b) found that inflexible implementation of different legal documents on 
forest devolution at the village level in Thua Thien Hue and Dak Lak provinces has been a major 
obstacle to communities organising their forest management. In the context of Vietnam, where 
implementation of forest devolution is a process of transferring policy into practice by state 
organizations (Hoang, 2009), the lack of knowledge on and confidence in how to engage more 
effectively with local people on the part of government agencies responsible for forest allocation 
has constrained the implementation of devolution policies (Bach, 2001). 
4.5. Conclusion  
In reviewing the political and legal environments for the wider participation of citizens, 
including ethnic minorities, in Party-state affairs, it is important to acknowledge that, since the 
Đổi Mới process began in 1986, the Party and the state have become more open (albeit still 
limited) to discussions about creating more space for people’s participation and more responsive 
to concerns by ethnic minority people, and have begun seriously considering the participation of 
grassroots organisations in decision-making processes. That said, there are still a number of key 
challenges facing people to make use of the opportunities emerging from the Đổi Mới process. 
The political momentum for improved participation of the rural population, especially ethnic 
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minorities, in the governance process can be easily reversed, due to entrenched biases against the 
cultural practices of ethnic minorities, and a general lack of understanding about civil society 
organisations and their roles in development among both civil society organisations and policy 
makers in Vietnam. In the forestry sector, it is even more challenging to ensure effective 
participation of grassroots groups. The establishment of SFEs, cooperatives and administrative 
government down to commune levels since the end of the Second Indochina War in the South 
have radically demolished traditional norms, customs and structures for locally led forest 
management.  
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Chapter 5: Forests and People at the Case Study Sites 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter identifies the contextual foundations for the establishment and operation of 
grassroots organisations at the case study sites. To this end, the chapter examines the socio-
economic situation of three studied villages to identify factors influencing forest management at 
these sites. It also examines contemporary account of local relationships with forests, which 
include accounts of how forests were managed in the past, contemporary forest conditions, the 
economic significance of forest resources in local contemporary lives, and actual forest 
governance at three villages. The analysis aims to highlight the shift in the uses of forest 
resources, as well as the diversification (albeit vulnerability) of local livelihoods. Throughout, 
the chapter draws upon empirical material collected at the three case study sites.  
5.2. Socio-economic Situation of the Studied Villages  
Local people at the case studies sites are relatively new inhabitants of the forests that enclose 
them. Village A was established on its inhabitants’ initiative as recently as 2003. Individual 
households interviews with people in the village revealed that local people were motivated to 
settle there because of the potential of using the rich forests and forest land in the area, and the 
hope of better access to education and healthcare for their children. At their previous village 
location, which still harbours half the village’s population, there were no provisions for 
healthcare and education because of its remoteness. In addition, land shortage for young people 
loomed large. People in Village A recalled that all exploitable forest land was used up, leaving 
families with many children with little land for agriculture. Meanwhile, most people only settled 
in Villages B and C after the Second Indochina War in 1975. Household interviews with the 
Trưởng Làng (Village Chief) of Village B and former administrative leaders in Village C 
revealed that a total of only 20 households in Villages B and C actually lived in these villages 
prior to 1975. The other 133 households in these villages moved there from other areas (i.e. from 
elsewhere in Quang Tri province, from Quang Binh, Thua Thien-Hue and Da Nang provinces, 
and from Laos) to look for economic opportunities from 1975 onwards (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2).  
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Figure 5.1: Number of Households in Village B over the Period 1945-2008 
 
(Source: household interview with Trưởng Làng) 
Figure 5.2: Number of Households in Village C over the Period 1950-2007 
 
 
 
(Source: household interview with a former administrative leader) 
The Second Indochina War left lasting effects on these villages. During the war, to destroy the 
vital forest cover for the North Vietnamese Army along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the US military 
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engaged in heavy bombing, mine laying and spraying of defoliants in the Annamite Mountains, 
where the forests accessed by the inhabitants of Villages A, B and C are located. It is estimated 
that, between 1954 and 1975, about 11 million gallons of defoliants, including Agent Orange, 
were sprayed by the US Air Force over central Vietnam, including Quang Tri. In addition, 
Quang Tri was bombed at a density of 63 kg of munitions per square metre by US Navy Forces 
alone (Technology Centre for Bomb and Mines Disposal and Vietnam Veterans of America 
Foundation, 2005). As a result, forest cover was massively destroyed. Furthermore, soil fertility 
was significantly damaged as a result of bombing and, especially, herbicide spraying, which 
caused loss of tree cover and, thus, exposed the soil to unusual amounts of heat and rainfall. In 
addition, herbicides were absorbed into the soil and produced highly toxic conditions, which 
continue to prohibit the natural regeneration of vegetation (see Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 1976) as can be clearly seen at the research sites (see Photo 5.1).  
Photo 5.1: Land and Forest Conditions along a Transect Walk with Women in Village C 
 
(Photograph taken by author in February 2008) 
In this context, health issues are of great concern for people in the study villages. Miscarriages, 
birth defects and deaths of children under one year old were commonly reported in household 
and group interviews with women participants all three villages. One very hot day in June 2008, 
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when I conducted my field research in Village C, a bomb exploded on the top of a bare hill near 
the village. Fortunately, as it was lunchtime, no one worked on their plantation, so no human 
casualties were caused. However, one international expert on demining based in Quang Tri I met 
during my field work said in one in-depth interview that the demining efforts by the government 
so far in Quang Tri focused mainly in coastal and commercial land areas where opportunties for 
economic development were stronger. This left mountainous and difficult terrains for foreign-
funded projects. However, for these projects, a criterion for selecting sites in mountainous areas 
was the availability of road access for emergency evacuation of their staff, which left many 
areas, including the hills surrounding the three study villages, contaminated with unexploded 
ordnance. 
Poverty levels in the three villages were high. In Village A, 75% of households were officially 
certified as ‘poor’ (as reported by the male village administrative leader). My own field data 
collection showed that only two households (equivalent to 10% of the village population) had 
enough rice for their own annual consumption, which was largely due to their adoption of animal 
husbandry as their main livelihood activity. The remaining households in this village only had 
sufficient rice to subsist for six months. For the rest of the year, they lived on cassava, a food 
they did not prefer. One household I lived with could afford full lunches only by skipping 
breakfast and eating only a small amount of rice and cassava for dinner. This, according to my 
host, was a common meal plan for households in the village. Furthermore, the majority of 
households could only afford to eat some kind of meat on one occasion each year, which 
coincided with celebrations to mark the Vietnamese Lunar New Year. These factors inevitably 
damaged their livelihood assets, especially human capital, when they did not have enough to eat. 
In Village B, according to official estimates, only 7% of households were certified as ‘poor’ in 
2007 (in-depth interview with the village administrative leader). However, women in this village 
assessed their situation in a group discussion in the following words “the standard of living is 
going down here”.  The reason behind this statement was that the level of debt was very high 
among villagers as further discussion with the same group of women revealed: “in the past, we 
were poor but we were never in financial debt before because, when we needed some cash, we 
used to be able to supplement our income from the forest”. Debts were run up with both private 
lenders and state banks. All households in the village borrowed cash to purchase inputs for their 
bean cultivation (such as fertilizer) or animal husbandry (such as piglets and food supplements) 
or to cover daily expense when their next crops were not ready for sale, as household interviews 
revealed.  
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In Village C, 45% of households were officially certified as ‘poor’ (in-depth interview with the 
male village administrative leader). Although having a higher official poverty rate than Village 
B, people in Village C had more stable lives, in the sense that they had enough to eat and were 
not indebted. In an interview with the village administrative leader, it was revealed that people in 
Village C refused to take out loans to buy fertilizer for their wet rice and coffee fields because 
they were worried about becoming trapped in debt. A seasonal calendar developed by women in 
a women-only focus group discussion revealed that only 10 households in the village regularly 
lacked food for a month per year, while most of them reflected with confidence that “people in 
the village mostly don’t have to eat cassava now”.  
The official poverty classification at the case study sites was largely arbitrary. In the three 
studied villages, official data on the incidence of poverty were generated by the respective 
Commune People’s Committees, not on the basis of the real poverty situation but on that of how 
many percentage points of poverty reduction the local government wished to ‘achieve’ each 
year. This was done unilaterally, by the commune People’s Committee (CPC) assigning each 
village a quota of ‘poor’ households each year (in-depth interviews with village administrative 
leaders). This explains how Village B (inhabited by Kinh people) was more vulnerable although 
it had a lower incidence of poverty (according to official statistics) than Village C (inhabited by 
Van Kieu people). This was because gaining poor household status brought extra resources to 
support the households’ livelihoods. Households that were not officially certified as being poor 
did not have as much access to government-funded programmes, and were deemed as being a 
lower priority for donor-funded projects. 
At three studied villages, the relationship between Van Kieu people and local government was 
relatively positive. CPC and FPD officers often commented positively on Van Kieu people as 
honest. In the view of district and commune FPD officers, Van Kieu people in Village C were 
hard-working. “The villagers there are very good. They protect the forest very well. There has 
been no logging by villagers since the forest was placed under their protection in the mid 
1990s”. However, like elsewhere in Vietnam Van Kieu people was still blamed for forest 
destruction as a stenotype. 70% of participants in household interviews at the study site B of 
Kinh people blamed Van Kieu people living upland of Quang Tri province for soil erosion in 
their village because “they [i.e. the Van Kieu people] destroy forests in uplands of Quang Tri”. 
The blame of forest destruction for Van Kieu farmers in fact helped to distract attention away 
from the main causes of forest destruction, which some participants at the research sites 
attributed directly to the corrupt government officers supporting illegal logging in the province 
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(see section 5.3.4). This discrimination against Van Kieu communities did not help them 
confident in public life. In individual household and group interviews both Van Kieu men and 
women in villages A and C often expressed concerns of being assaulted if challenging outside 
forest users, a fact not be heard by Kinh people in Village B. 
5.3. Contemporary Local Relationships with Forests 
Having provided some introduction to the sites’ socio-economic contexts, the rest of the chapter 
is to focus on the analysis of local contemporary relationship with forests.. This is done through 
the investigation into the social memory of historical forest management to lay out comparative 
foundation for the assessment of contemporary forest conditions, the importance of forest 
resources in local livelihood, and actual forest governance at the three villages.  Taking in turn 
the next section focus on historical accounts on forest management by local people at the 
research sites. 
5.3.1. Social Memory of Historical Forest Management 
This section provides villagers’ accounts of how forests used to be managed at the study sites. In 
doing so, it aims to build a comparative foundation for villagers’ evaluation of contemporary 
local relationships with forests. The section begins with a discussion of Village B, which was 
distinct from the other two villages because it was peopled predominantly by the majority Kinh 
ethnic group. An interview with the Trưởng Làng, whose family had settled in the village before 
1945 and had memories of forest management during the French colonial era, illustrated the 
extent to which forest management practices had changed. He recounted in a household 
interview that, “before 1953, villagers had enjoyed access to forest resources, such that half of 
the total households in the village used to extract timber, while the remaining half harvested 
rattan and firewood for sale”. This highlighted the high level of dependence of local livelihoods 
on forest resources.  
At the time, forest was entrusted to the whole community (recalled the Trưởng Làng). Under the 
leadership of a Trưởng Làng, villagers would collectively decide how forests would be used in a 
village assembly, comprised of men from each household. At the time, timber exploitation took 
place only on a small scale, because, as the Trưởng Làng explained, “timber extraction was 
limited to only one or two logs per visit, as and when villagers needed some cash; otherwise, 
local people left forests untouched”. Crucially, in his view,  
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“villagers did not worry that others would take their share because there was no 
need to do so. Traders came only occasionally and the number of households was 
small compared to the abundant forest resources around them”.  
As their village was shielded from the outside world by the Ba Long River on one side and 
mountainous terrain on the others, unauthorised harvest by outsiders was not a problem for them. 
In that regard, “arrangements for forest use were made by the whole village, especially as the 
local authorities were often too far away to participate in decision making”, said the Trưởng 
Làng. 
A similar pattern of forest management practices was also evident in the Van Kieu communities 
of Villages A and C. Discussions with well respected elder members of Van Kieu communities 
in Quang Tri, revealed that Van Kieu villagers used to have strong autonomy over their village 
affairs. Each village was its own kingdom, with the ultimate power residing with the Già Làng 
(or (male) ‘Village Elder’), who was elected by villagers on the basis of his experience and 
knowledge which would contribute to a better life for the whole village (household interview 
with a male elder, Village C). As a kingdom norms, and customs for forest management prior to 
the establishment of the SRV in 1945 were traditionally set by the Già Làng. “In the past” 
recalled the Già Làng of Village A, “the Già Làng owned forests and forest land, and authorised 
the use of these resources to all villagers”. In doing so Già Làng held a very critical resource for 
the livelihoods of Van Kieu people. In deciding on the use of forests, the Già Làng consulted 
with the village assembly (consisting of male household heads) to decide how forests should be 
managed, recounted the Già Làng of Villages A and C.  
At the time, older residents in the two villages recalled, Van Kieu people practised only one 
livelihood activity that required the clearance of forest land, namely dry-rice cultivation. In their 
stories, they all said that they never experience a shortage of forest to clear for cultivatable land. 
In addition, at the time, they did not own money to buy things from outside. Instead, they 
collected everything they needed from forests, such as medicinal plants, fruits and vegetables for 
food, and tree bark for clothing. Also, they often went out in groups for hunting or set traps near 
their rice fields to get some meat.  
In the two Van Kieu villages, forests traditionally held both material and spiritual values, while, 
in the Kinh village, they did not. The Già Làng and the village assembly typically divided forest 
areas into three categories: sacred forests; cemetery forests; and forests for rice fields. No 
exploitation was allowed in the sacred forests because as the male elder in Village A said:  “any 
human presence (besides religious activities) was believed to cause disturbance to the ‘Forest 
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God’, which would badly influence socio-economic practices in the village.” As a result, only 
one small temple was erected in the sacred forests, to host village religious activities. Similarly, 
“no human activity was allowed in the cemetery forests, to avoid disturbing ghosts who could 
bring bad luck to villagers in term of unexpected illnesses or loss of properties and life“, 
explained a participant in a women-only focus-group discussion in Village A. In these ways, 
both sacred and cemetery forests were typically located away from human settlements, and left 
largely untouched from generation to generation. This perception of forests as sacred was not 
apparent in Village B, where, according to some elders in focus group discussions, because the 
village ancestors were fishermen who settled along Ba Long River and later adopted agricultural 
livelihoods, they did not place spiritual values on forests. As a result, in Village B and nearby 
villages, there was no forest-related spirit or god. Meanwhile,  
“forests for rice fields in Van Kieu communities comprised all forests located outside 
of sacred and cemetery forests, provided they were located away from springs (to 
protect water sources) and steep hillsides (to avoid landslides)”, said one male 
villager in Village A during a transect walk through forests around the village.  
According to the Già Làng of Village A and C, through the village assembly, the location and 
boundaries of each forest area were understood and agreed by all household heads. In addition,  
“although the forest was owned by the Già Làng, he fully devolved forest use to 
households, provided that villagers adhered to village regulations. For this reason, 
villagers could clear forests to obtain land for agriculture according to the principle 
of ‘first come, first served’”, said a woman in Village C while constructing a seasonal 
calendar.  
In this regard, user rights over forest land, including the rights to give the land away to, or trade 
it with, other villagers in need of land, were established and protected by norms and rules made 
by the village assembly (household interviews with male elders of Villages A and C). If there 
were any violations of village regulations, the Gìa Làng consulted with the village assembly to 
agree upon economic fines (household interview with a male villager from Village A). 
Additionally, “the Già Làng had ultimate enforcement power, including the right to expel 
villagers who disobeyed regulations”, said the Gìa Làng of Village A.  
Furthermore, in their stories of the past forest management, Van Kieu people often highlighted 
that the rights of a village to a specific area of forest were supported by enforcement power. In 
some cases, two or more villages could share sacred and/or cemetery forests, as revealed by 
visits to other Van Kieu villages outside the research sites. “If outsiders wanted to use forest 
resources belonging to a village, they had to seek approval from the Già Làng and pay a fee in 
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kind (such as a chicken or a pig) for such use” said a male villager from Village A during the 
natural resource mapping exercise.  
“In some complicated cases, if a solution could not be agreed upon among villages 
themselves over a dispute on forest resources, a well respected person from outside 
the concerned villages might be invited to give an independent verdict”, said an elder 
from Village A in an household interview.  
These types of enforcement power were further enabled by power to fine violators. In spite of 
there being no government presence at the time, according to the current administrative leader of 
Village A, “heavy economic fines enforced by and respect for the Già Làng” as the only visible 
power at the local level were strong deterrents to potential violators from within the village and 
in neighbouring villages. At the same time, the Già Làng could also mobilise the village militia 
if needed to protect village resources, said an elder in Village C in a household interview. In 
addition, attributes such as moral respect among villagers, ability to communicate with others 
and formal and informal authority within and outside a village for a Già Làng helped him to 
effectively settle disputes over forests resources with outsiders, continued the elder in Village C. 
Another aspect of traditional land use in the two villages of Van Kieu people that restricted 
forest exploitation to certain areas at certain times was the use of fallow periods, whereby  
“agricultural land required after forest clearance was used for six or seven years 
before being left fallow for three or four years. Villagers then cleared another area 
of forest for cultivation, and came back to the first plot to reuse the land after the 
fallow period”, said a woman in Village A during a seasonal calendar.  
By practicing a rotational cultivation system with fallow periods, “forest clearance for rice 
cultivation was often restricted to two slots for each household”, said one man in Village C 
during a transect walk. For this reason, explained the Già Làng of Village A, forest resources 
were more available in the past, with villagers having more fertile soil to grow their rice, as well 
as more medicinal plants and vegetables from the forest.  
In summary, local people, their past community forest management systems worked because 
their ancestors had full and clear property rights, and because there was less pressure to use the 
resources due to fewer villagers and fewer traders coming to their villages. In this regard, local 
people used their own knowledge to make decisions themselves about how to manage forests, 
especially how to settle disputes over forest use. As a result, they had more opportunities to 
develop their confidence and skills in managing forests. Whether these factors are still present at 
the case study sites under contemporary forest management is examined in Section 5.3.4. 
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5.3.2. Villagers’ Assessment of Contemporary Forest Conditions   
This section aims to establish a picture of the conditions of the forests that the study villages 
were assigned to protect. To this end, it draws on various sources of information. As secondary 
data on the condition of each village’s forests was not available, I did not try to undertake an 
objective assessment of forest conditions. Instead, I relied on assessments by research 
participants, cross-checked with my own observations, and photographs taken during different 
transect walks to judge forest conditions in these areas. According to the assessments by 
villagers, current trends in forest conditions at the three sites displayed a mix of improvements 
and degradation in forest resources compared with the quality of forests in and around the 
villages when people settled there following the Second Indochina War. In addition, the 
conditions of forests surrounding the three villages varied.  
Among the three study villages, forests near Village A were in the best condition, which may be 
partly explained by their status as a core zone of Bac Huong Hoa Nature Reserve (i.e. a protected 
area). These forests, according to interviews with government and international staff active in 
biodiversity monitoring in Quang Tri, were among the last remaining primary forests in the 
province that could potentially provide habitat for species endemic to the Annamite Mountains. 
During a transect walk with three men from the Village A in their mission to find palm leaves for 
roofing their houses, within half an hour’s walk from the village trees 40 cm and above in 
diameter (see Photo 5.2) could easily be found. Along the way, many types of NTFPs, such as 
palm leaves for construction of house roofs, leaves for making conical hats (lá nón in 
Vietnamese) and rattan for sale, were still abundant.  
However, men in this group also said that, five years ago, when they first moved in that area, 
there were many more big trees around their village. As such, rattans and other palms (both for 
making conical hats and roofs) had shade to grow under, as shown in Photo 5.2. However, 
increasing pressure was placed on this last primary forest in the province for timber, as an FPD 
staff member confided in one interview. Together with the forest, NTFPs were seen as about to 
disappear too. This was supported by a comment of one man taking part in the transect walk. 
According to him, three years ago, if he decided to change his house roof, he only needed to take 
a knife and walked to the forest to bring palm leaves home. Now he often had to look for the 
leaves for a whole day before deciding whether there were enough for him to make a new roof. 
This was because, according to him, when big trees where cut down, the palms were damaged or 
exposed to direct sunlight, which killed them too. 
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Photo 5.2: Close-up of Forest Assigned for Protection to the Induced Grassroots Group in 
Village A 
 
(Big tree surrounded by lá nón and rattan – Photograph taken by author in a transect walk with 
local men during a forest patrol mission in March 2008)  
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Photo 5.3: Close-up of Forest Assigned for Protection to the Induced Grassroots Group in 
Village B  
 
(Shrubs commonly found in forest assigned to Village B for protection – Photograph taken by 
author during a transect walk with an induced grassroots group in Village B in March 2008) 
In Village B, the forests that induced grassroots groups were assigned to patrol were in a poor 
condition but still categorised as special-use forest and located in the core zone of Dakrong 
Nature Reserve, said a FPD officer during a forest patrol with the induced grassroots group in the 
village. After trekking from the village for a whole morning, hardly any big trees could be found. 
Typically, trees had a diameter of 12 cm or below (see Photo 5.3). Lá nón and rattan, which local 
women collected for sale, were also found in small quantities. One member taking part in the 
transect walk who was also an ex-logger said that, “after many years of illegal logging [after the 
Second Indochina War], there had been no more big trees left in these forests since the 1990s”. 
Meanwhile two women in a women-only group who still seasonally harvested NTFPs 
complained during the development of Village B’s seasonal calendar that  
“it takes us more time to further in the forest to find lá nón. Ten years ago we spent 
only one morning to collect the same amount of lá nón that we have to spend a whole 
day for now”.  
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In this regard, interviewed villagers from Village B did not go to the forest sections that the 
government assigned them to protect if they needed resources. Instead, they often trekked deep 
into the forest in the core zone of the nature reserve, where the protection and management 
responsibilities solely rested on the FPD. 
In Village C, 102 hectares of forest were leased to the whole community under a 50-year 
agreement. According to local FPD staff, this forest was classified as protection forest and was 
not included in any protected area. During the walk with a group of male villagers on a mission 
to patrol the forest, some trees with diameters from 20 to 30 cm could be identified but no rattan 
or lá nón could be found in this forest, as all participants in the transect walk confirmed (see 
Photo 5.4). According to the men taking part in the transect walk and many other villagers 
interviewed later, these NTFPs had never grown in this forests (for reasons no one knew), even 
40 years ago.  
Photo 5.4: Close-up of Forest Leased to Village C (mainly shrubs and small trees) 
 
(Photograph taken by author during a transect walk with a group of local men in March 2008) 
Views on the quality of this forest were different by different groups of local people. According 
to the Già Làng of the village in a household interview, “in the 1950s these areas of forests used 
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to be the village’s dry rice fields”. Also, during the Second Indochina War, Village C lies next to 
Khe Sanh battlefield, the site of some of the fiercest firing, and within range of the artillery 
defending Ta Con airport from the North Vietnamese Army ambushed As a result, according to 
the Gìa Làng, the village and its surrounding forests were under continual fire and trees were 
destroyed en masse. In this regard, he thought, “these forests have naturally regenerated well 
and forest conditions have improved dramatically since these lands were taken out of cultivation 
for many years”. His assessment was shared by most of the villagers in household interviews 
when being asked whether they thought the condition of the leased forests was better or worse 
than before the end of the second Indochina war in 1975.  
However, regarding forests that survived after the Second Indochina War around their village 
(not the leased forests), in another transect walk on hills around this village, the village 
administrative leaders told me of his childhood memory and reflected on forest conditions then: 
“I was born in 1978. When I was a teenager, forests cover all over there (pointing 
towards hills bordering Lao). There was a lot of logging taking place those days. 
Kinh people from Tan Lien (a nearby village resided by Kinh migrants of New 
Economic Zone programme) brought saws with them. Within two or three years the 
logging finishes. After that no more forest there” 
 
5.3.3. Economic Significance of Forest Resources to Local Livelihoods  
This section assesses the economic importance of forest resources to local people’s livelihoods. 
In so doing, it aims to highlight shifts in forest resource use at the case study sites and the 
vulnerability of local livelihoods, which, in turn, places pressure on local forests. The analysis 
shows that local livelihoods diversified as early as the 1990s. Under their new livelihood 
strategies, forest resources became less important to local people, in comparison to the past, 
which reduced local appreciation for forests. This has become an important aspect of 
contemporary forest management. However, when faced with shocks (such as crop failure or 
extreme weather events), local people still turn to forests in the hope of earning cash to deal with 
the after-effects. 
In Village A, the majority of households were farmers, with dry rice being their main crop. 
Given the nature of dry rice cultivation (which is traditionally planted on land newly acquired 
from forest clearance or in rotational fields, and has a high dependence on rainfall thereafter), the 
pursuit of this livelihood was critically affected by the establishment of Bac Huong Hoa Nature 
Reserve, which effectively halted dry rice cultivation. In-depth households interviews revealed 
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that, prior to 2005, they were able to clear forests surrounding their village for dry rice 
cultivation, which was the main reason why the whole village moved to the area in 2003. 
However, this was disallowed after 2005, following the establishment of the nature reserve 
(interview with the Village Communist Party Secretary).  
As a result, people in Village A started to engage in animal husbandry, in particular raising cows, 
pigs and buffaloes, for which low-interest loans were available from government and donor-
funded development projects (See Table 5.1). That said, although 15 households in the village 
purchased buffaloes and cows with financial support from development projects, household 
interviews showed that only three households who had grazing land kept the cattle in the village 
and the rest sent theirs to other villages. Discussion during the construction of a seasonal 
calendar with a group of women in the village revealed that a major constraint to livestock 
raising was a lack of suitable grazing land, which highlighted the unsuitability of this livelihood 
option for people in this village. As such, it increased the vulnerability of local people, especially 
by encouraging them to take out loans to pursue these new livelihoods.  
Table 5.1: Sources of Income for Interviewed Households in Village A 
Rank (in order of 
contribution to 
household 
expenditure on food) 
Income source No. of households 
(out of 20) 
1 Dry rice cultivation for consumption 20 
2 War-time scrap metal collection for sale 13 
3 Grass collection to make brooms for sale 20 
4 Goat and pig raising for sale 3 
5 Wine making for sale 2 
6 Buffalo and cow owning 15 
7 Fish farming for consumption 1 
 
(Source: a women-only focus group discussion supported by the development of a seasonal 
calendar) 
To solve the problem of grazing land for cattle, one woman in the group said “villagers often 
send their cows or buffaloes to their relatives in other villages with the hope that when these 
animals can be sold, money can be shared between the actual owners and carers of these 
animals”. This practice was not without its own risks. Other women in the group revealed that, 
often, relatives were as poor as the residents of the village and would sell these animals to meet 
their own food requirements without returning any money to the actual owners. Restricted by 
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social norms proscribing arguments, especially with relatives, people in Village A accepted such 
losses from cattle raising and did not invest further in this activity. In this regard, under the 
influence of kinship, their livelihood assets were destroyed by shocks outside their villages. This 
highlighted the complexity of factors that created vulnerability for poor people. In addition, 
although a number of households were engaged in animal husbandry, it is worth noting that, due 
to a lack of veterinary and short-term financial support from development projects, only three 
households33 in the village still invested in this new livelihood activity. Factors such as lack of 
grazing land and veterinary services suggested how ill designed interventions for poverty 
reductions in this village were. At the same time, they stressed the high level of vulnerability that 
development projects created for local people. 
This effectively meant that the majority of the villagers were still dependent on shifting rice 
cultivation, even though new land for such cultivation was no longer available. In this regard, 
people in this village still depended heavily on forests for their livelihoods. For them forest 
clearance for rice cultivation was still important to secure their livelihood. In the words of a 
participant in a women-only focus group discussion in Village A: 
“if we don’t clear forests now, we will not have rice fields, and not have anything to 
eat. For us, no forest destruction means no food. We have to destroy forest, cutting 
trees down in order to have something to eat”.  
In this regard, livelihood diversification strategy in this village was not sustainable itself and did 
not contribute towards the more sustainable use of natural resources. 
In Village B, it was evident that livelihood practices had changed significantly and move away 
from forest-based activities over time. The period between 1975 and the 1980s, according to an 
ex-illegal logger in a household interview in Village B, saw “low priority given to agriculture-
based livelihoods”. This was because at the time, the man continued “the productivity of crops 
(dry rice cultivation) was very low while incomes from sale of timber and NTFPs were much 
higher”. As such, forest exploitation became a major source of livelihood activities in the 
village. In this regard, household interviews showed that 75% of the households interviewed 
were dependent upon illegal timber extraction, while the remaining 25% harvested NTFPs, such 
as rattan and Lá nón. At this time, income from harvesting forest products accounted for between 
80% and 90% of household income.  
                                                          
33 One of these household was well connected to commune government and received much more development aid 
from both government and donor-funded projects, while the other household received investment for their new 
livelihood activity from a son-in-law who was a ring leader for illegal logging in the village. The third household 
just recently bought a cow. 
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However, with stricter forest enforcement after the upgrading of Dakrong Protection Forest to a 
nature reserve (in whose buffer zone Village B was located), coupled with increased degradation 
of forest resources, income from forests had dramatically reduced (household interviews with 
former illegal loggers). Between 1995 and 1997, households reported that no large and good 
timber could be found. In fact, “there was almost no timber left at all” (male villager in a 
household interview), with the result that many households ceased extracting timber and NTFPs 
as their main livelihood (household interviews with both men and women). Thus, “more serious 
attention was paid to agriculture-based livelihoods”, said an ex-logger in a household interview.  
Therefore, from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, livelihoods transformed dramatically, said an 
ex-village administrative leader. A seasonal calendar with a group of women in the village 
showed that households started to grow more beans and peanuts, thereby gradually diversifying 
their livelihoods and moving away from illegal timber extraction. By January 2008, when the 
fieldwork was conducted, the economy of the interviewed households depended largely on 
agriculture (see Table 5.2). Cultivating beans and peanuts on a total area of 25 hectares was the 
largest source of income, which was practiced by all households in the village. Meanwhile, only 
2.7 hectares of land were suitable for growing one crop of wet rice per year, which was practised 
by 12 of the 53 households in the village. Furthermore, buffalo, cow and pig raising was 
practised by 13 out of 20 interviewed households (household interviews and group interviews).  
Table 5.2: Sources of Income for Interviewed Households in Village B 
Rank (in order of 
contribution to household 
expenditure on food) 
Income source No. of households 
1 Peanut and bean growing 56 (out of 57 households 
in the village) 
2 Animal husbandry (pig, 
buffalo and cow raising) 
13 (out of 20 interviewed 
households 
3 Forest plantation 28 (out of 57 but no 
income yet) 
4 Tofu making 1 (out of 57 households in 
the village) 
5 Illegal logging 1 (out of 57 households in 
the village) 
6 Illegal log transportation 1 (out of 57 households in 
the village) 
 
(Source: household interviews and focus group discussion supported by the development of 
seasonal calendar) 
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Nevertheless, diversified livelihood strategies of people in Village B showed a great deal of 
vulnerability. Due to a lack of veterinary services, pigs often died of diseases while cows and 
buffaloes farming suffered from lack of grazing fields due to unplanned cattle development. 
Meanwhile, with low productivity and small plots, rice cultivation only provided households 
with enough rice for one or two months after the harvest. In addition, growing beans and peanuts 
depended heavily on the use of fertilizers (because of low soil quality) that were purchased at 
high prices using loans. In this context, harsh weather conditions from October 2007 until April 
2008 destroyed most of their investments. Animals and plants died due to extreme and unusually 
dry then cold weather over the six-month period. People interviewed during those six months 
had no stock of seeds for the next crop, nor any savings to buy more piglets or cows. Traders 
also did not want to lend them money, and the government did not offer any immediate help. The 
situation emphasized similarities between people in Village A and B, in terms of how 
unsustainable and vulnerable their livelihood strategies were.  
This led to a situation where, although men and women in Village B did not usually depend on 
forests for their livelihoods, they still “turned to forests when our agricultural based livelihood 
activities failed” (household interview with a villager). In this regard, some households in this 
village reverted to illegal logging, as reported by an active illegal logger, who said that he “cut 
some logs [illegally] because my crops failed and my family is too big for the available 
agricultural land”. A similar pattern of forest exploitation was seen in Village A. Moreover, it 
was shared by people in the mountainous uplands of Dak Lak, Ha Tinh and Thua Thien Hue, 
where it was termed a ‘shock absorber’ (Völker and Waibel, 2010). As such, Völker and Waibel 
suggested that forest protection policies that were too restrictive may compromise the shock-
coping capacity of vulnerable households. Once again, this highlighted the ethical dimension of 
the relationship between forest protection and local livelihoods, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
In telling their stories of how livelihood activities had evolved in Village C, interviews with 
households in this village revealed that the majority of villagers had shifted away from dry rice 
cultivation (which, as noted above, depended upon the clearance of forests to acquire new fertile 
soil) during the early 1990s. This was the result of the re-demarcation of the village 
administrative boundary, which resulted in the transfer of large tracts of land to other villages, 
causing a shortage of agricultural land for shifting rice cultivation in Village C. In response to 
the shock, villagers began to exploit land around their village to diversify their livelihoods (see 
Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3: The Main Sources of Income for Households in Village C 
Rank (in order of 
contribution to 
household 
expenditure on food) 
Income source Number of 
households (out 
of 67 households 
in the village) 
1 Wet rice cultivation for consumption (total 
area in village: 30 ha) 
67 
2 Cow and buffalo raising for sale 49 
3 Coffee plantation for sale (total area in 
village: 25 ha) 
67 
4 War-time scrap metal collection for sale 8 
5 Forest protection contract payments for state-
owned protection forests 
6 
6 Fees from milling rice 1 
7 Fees from renting out tractors 4 
8 Wholesale of scrap metal  2 
9 Shop keeping 6 
10 Working on construction outside the village 3 
(Source: secondary data on village economy provided by village administrative leader, and 
primary data from women-only and men-only focus group discussion supported by the 
development of seasonal calendars) 
The construction of seasonal calendars with both men and women groups and statistics from the 
village administrative leader in Village C showed that all 67 households in the village had 
managed to have a share of the 25 ha of coffee and 30 ha of wet rice grown along the Khe Sanh 
River. The only caveat for the contribution of coffee and rice cultivation to the shock-absorption 
capacity of people in Village C was that productivity, thus their rice intake, varied among 
households, depending upon whether they had money to buy fertilizers. In this regard, the 
livelihood strategies of some of the inhabitants of Village C have a similar degree of 
vulnerability to those at the other case study sites. Nonetheless, as there were a lot of more hills 
with small shrubs suitable for livestock grazing around their village, local people in Village C 
had more opportunities than those in Villages A and B to raise cows and buffaloes. People in 
Village C also had more experience (since the 1980s) of raising cows and buffaloes. Hence, 
during the harsh weather period, only five animals died in Village C (compared to 20 in Village 
B; figures from village administrative leaders). According to an ex-administrative leader of 
Village C:  
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“with low-interest loans available from the government and donor-funded projects 
and experience of raising cattle from the early 1980s in the cooperative era, 49 
households raised cattle and seven raised buffaloes successfully, which provided 
substantial income for many households in this village”.  
In this regard, possession of cows and buffaloes was regarded as an indicator of wealth in this 
village, as confirmed by both men and women during household group interviews. 
The previous discussion incated that people in Village C depended the least on forests in their 
contemporary livelihoods strategies. Also, because they started to diversify their livelihoods long 
before (early 1990s) people in Village A (mid-2000s) and Village B (early 2000s) and had some 
experience on one of important livelihod activites (i.e. cattle raising), their new livelihoods 
became more established and stable, as shown by their ability to cope with the harsh weather 
period. However, for young couples in the village, illegal forest clearnance to acquire new land 
for either coffee or rice growing become more common practices. The statistic earlier only 
showed land ownership for established households. New households, recently separated from 
these established households, often did not have land. Speaking to a group of women on a 
transect walk revealed that the majority of people in the village did not object to forest clearance 
because they were sympathetic to young couples. The women also confirmed that those who 
managed to acquire a piece of land through (illegal) forest clearance were aware of and accepted 
the risk of losing their crop and investment anytime if the FPD took action against them. The 
livelihoods of this population group were, therefore, more vulnerable and unsustainable than 
others in Village C. 
Apart from the vulnerability mentioned above, discussions during the construction of seasonal 
calendars with local people showed that their livelihood strategies were not properly designed or 
resilient to shocks. For example, dry rice cultivation and bean and peanut growing needed water 
supply at the right time of the year in their life cycle (such as after sowing seeds). However, in 
Village A and B, no irrigation system or water sources were in place to assist their crops in case 
of water shortage. Instead, their crops depended entirely on natural rainfall. Development 
projects that support poverty reduction in these two villages did not have any activities to deal 
with this shortcoming in local livelihoods. With changes in weather patterns (e.g. little rainfall 
during the period of seed sowing in April 2008), crop production was severely affected.  
The livelihoods of people in Village C were less vulnerable than those of people in the other two 
villages. Still, they were not immune from shocks. For example, (unusual) constant raining 
during the harvesting period for coffee fruits in December 2007 (while I was in the village) 
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threatened the loss of a whole year of investment by the farmers. Focus group discussion with a 
group of women in Village C revealed that none of the families in the village had the necessary 
skills and technology to dry out the fruit, or knew of different channels to sell it quickly before it 
rotted. Buyers came to their village for the fruit when they pleased; there were no binding 
agreements between them and the farmers to protect the formers against the vagaries of weather. 
Similarly, their wet rice cultivation depended heavily on fertilizers that doubled in price within a 
year, as explained a CPC officer. Without high inputs of fertilizer, said an experienced farmer in 
the village during a household interview, rice production would not be enough to support his 
family needs. In this regard, in all three villages diversification in people’s livelihoods did not 
help them to move out of poverty or reduce their vulnerability.  
In analysing the significance of forest resources to local people’s lives, it emerged that women 
played an important role in livelihood activities at all three of the case study sites. Seasonal 
calendars developed by both men and women’s groups supported the fact that women were in 
charge of agricultural production and principally responsible for the production of rice for the 
family, while men only took part in rice cultivation if they desired to. While undertaking a 
transect walk through agricultural fields in Village B with a group of women during the weeding 
period, I also observed only one man working in the vast field belonging to the village; all the 
rest were women. When asked why there were no more men working in the field, the women in 
the group laughed and later, on the way back to the village, they pointed to a wine-drinking 
session in one household and said the men were there!  
With reduced workload (and income) from forests and without attention from donor-funded 
development projects for poverty reduction, men became unemployed and more vulnerable. 
Because men became freer, with less to do, they engaged in more wine-drinking sessions. During 
the period I spent at the three study villages, it was common to see men spending their free time 
drinking. This frustrated women in the villages, although one woman in Village B recognised 
that “there is not much for men to do around the house”. Looking for work was unsuccessful, as 
one young man in Village C revealed during a household interview:  
“I tried several times going for long trips to look for scrap metal in the forest. We 
trekked long distances deep into the forest but there was not much metal left to 
collect. At the same time, I also looked for timber. I saw several valuable trees. 
However, it was too far to bring them back to sell. I also looked for some seasonal 
jobs in nearby towns [Lao Bao and Khe Sanh]. The jobs I can do, such as 
construction work, are often occupied by people the contractors bring with them. In 
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the end, I decided to find things to do around the village. We clear the field only once 
per year. I don’t find much to do at home either”.       
That said, it is important to bear in mind that men and women’s participation in agricultural work 
does vary seasonally related to the tasks that need to be undertaken. Thus, in the opinion of many 
of the men and women I spoke to, heavy manual labour, such as ploughing and harvesting, 
needed the participation of both husband and wife but all other agricultural work such as 
weeding or pig raising was deemed the responsibility of women. In the meantime, men’s 
livelihood opportunities appeared to lie predominantly off farm, such as illegal timber cutting 
(Village B), looking for timber for household construction (Villages A and C) and looking for 
work on construction sites in towns (mainly Village C).  
Furthermore, unless women were critically ill, retirement from manual work for household food 
production was a privilege open only to men. This was reflected in the following story told by a 
woman in Village C during a transect walk:  
“When my son had his first child and need somebody to look after the baby (so his 
wife could come back to work soon after the birth), my husband decided that he 
would take the task and retired from farm work. In that way, he can rest more. In the 
past, my husband worked hard the whole day. So, did I. I am very tired now and 
want to retire from farm work too. However, I know that my husband will not let me 
do that. We need more people to work on our coffee and rice fields, you see. I have 
only one son and he doesn’t want to do farm work, so if I don’t try hard we will not 
have enough”. 
This story highlights the vulnerability of women in relation to men in these villages. Because 
women played a primary role in livelihoods in these villages, they often worked harder and 
longer than men whose jobs were seen elsewhere. In addition, as analysed earlier, new livelihood 
activities in the three villages concentrated in areas that women dominated. In this regard, when 
a household committed to a loan for a new livelihood activity, such as for buying inputs for 
animal husbandry or covering family daily expenses (discussed in Section 5.2), it was women 
who were held accountable for it. While developing a seasonal calendar, one woman in a focus 
group discussion in Village B said, with the agreement of the rest of the group, that “when it 
comes to loans, the wife of a household will be responsible for spending the money and returning 
it in full plus the interest to the lenders”. In this regard, it seemed that the responsibility for 
working and returning the money primarily rested on women’s shoulders. In the case of shocks, 
when the money could not be returned for some reason, women were chased by lenders. For 
example, another woman in the same discussion group in Village B said  
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“bean and peanut traders only give money to wives of the households because they 
were the one who harvest the crop and sell the crops to them. Therefore, when they 
want the money back they look for women who know all the related terms and 
conditions of the loan”.  
This is supported by the fact that, in Village C for example, although women did not have full 
decision-making power on spending money, as a common practice wives were entrusted to keep 
it all34. 
In summary, in comparison with the past usages of forest resources in stories told by elder 
villagers in all three villages, the significance of forest resources to local livelihoods has reduced 
significantly. This resulted from the fact that valuable forest resources (i.e. timber, rattan and lá 
nón) became much less abundant and different livelihood options arose. However, the shift 
towards non-forest livelihoods, and, thus, out of poverty was still highly fragile. In shock 
situations, such as crop failure, local people still turned to forests in search for food or to 
generate income to supplement their food intake (as in the case of Villages A and B). Also, forest 
clearance still took place to address shortage of agricultural land for young couples setting up 
new households (as in the case of Village C). In this regard, forests resources were still 
appreciated as shock absorbers in these villages. This suggests that livelihood diversification has 
not yet lifted pressures on forests. In addition, the diversification of livelihoods only focused on 
women. Men, on the other hand, became unemployed and more vulnerable, as forests no longer 
provided the main source of income, no rights to extract timber were granted, and looking for 
jobs in towns was not always successful. 
5.3.4. Actual Forest Governance at the Three Villages 
In this section I analyse actual forest governance taking place at the site. In doing so, I aim to 
contrast legal designations with actual activities in these villages. Despite of having formal 
governance structures in place for forest management, actual activities showed forests were used 
not following their legal designations35. In Villages A and B, the forests that local people were 
assigned to protect were under ‘Special Use Forest’ status. Meanwhile in Village C, forests 
under people’s management were under ‘Protection Forest’ status.  
                                                          
34 This information was the answer to the question “who keeps the money after harvesting coffee or selling cattle” in 
a women-only focus group discussion, which was later cross-checked with a men-only focus group in the same 
village. 
35 In this regard, discussion on the indigenous forest-based groups (accept the case of the group in Village B where 
illegal logging took place in the 1980s and 1990s) form part of this discussion on actual forest governance. 
However, to keep the thesis structure clear, I grouped discussion on indigenous groups together. 
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 Apart from the unstable shift of livelihood activities away from forests, changes in 
contemporary local people’s relationship with forests have also been seen in three studied 
villages in term of other current forest uses. In Village B in marked contrast to past practices, 
transect walks and interviews with villagers revealed a larger scale of forest use in comparison 
with that of the past. This trend can be traced back to the 1980s “when we cut trees government 
officers turned blind eyes in exchange for gifts” claimed the ex-illegal logger. Reflecting the 
faster pace at which forests were being cleared, a male illegal timber transporter said in a 
household interview that “if cutting and sawing of logs were previously done by hand, by 1983 
buffaloes were used to speed up the transportation of timber and power tools were used to 
increase logging volume”. In addition, “loggers cut down trees en masse, stockpiling logs to 
either transport for sale once a month or keep for future sale, which was in sharp contrast to the 
earlier practice of logging one or two logs”, said the Trưởng Làng of Village B a household 
interview. As such, he opined that  
“people then worked and ate only for the present, without any thought or calculation 
for the future. Villagers logged as much and as quickly as they could, because they 
were worried that, if they did not do so, somebody else would take their share”.  
Similar changes also took place within Village A, where forest clearance has steadily crept up 
steep hills and into water catchment areas in more recent times, which the Van Kieu 
communities traditionally did not do. In this village it was clearly evident during various transect 
walks that forest clearance for dry rice cultivation was avoided only in sacred and cemetery 
forests, which were on limestone with limited soil in any case. The practice of clearing forests on 
steep hillsides around Village A (see Photo 5.5) took place very soon after the village moved to 
this new location in 2003, driven by “the need to open up new agricultural land without 
consideration to soil running in the rainy season as respected in the past” (household interview 
with a village elder).  
In Village C, more forest exploitation took place far away from residential areas. This was 
because all forests close to the village were either poor (in case of forests leased to them being 
used to be rice field in the 1950s (see earlier)), destroyed during the Second Indochina War or 
exhausted by the operations of Huong Hoa SFE between 1978 to 1993 (in-depth interviews with 
the Già Làng and administrative leader of Village C). As a result, when needed timber for 
household construction, men in this village often travelled to other villages’ forests to cut needed 
timber. This was done, as in Village A, with little regard to whether or not such land was under 
forests that protected the soil on steep hills or water sources for villagers that forest belonged to. 
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All their attention was on whether “the timber was good for house construction or not” 
(household interview with a man in Village C). This point will be revisited in Chapter 6. 
Photo 5.5: Forest Clearance for Rice Fields on Steep Hillsides in Village A 
 
(Photograph taken by author in March 2008 during a transect walk with local people) 
Changes in relationships between local people and forests can also arguably be attributed to the 
lack of information and knowledge of impacts of deforestation on their livelihoods. Not many 
villagers seemed to think about the consequences of felling trees, such as to climate change, 
which may, in turn, influence their agricultural production. When explaining why their 
agricultural soil was so degraded especially since 1980s, only 8 out of 20 interviewed households 
in Village B linked declining soil quality with forest clearance. However, in the view of these 
eight villagers, clearance of forest immediately adjacent to the agricultural land in their village 
was to blame, not forest clearance in the water catchment by the villagers themselves over the 
previous two decades. In a similar way, only 6 out of 16 household heads interviewed in Village 
C saw the link between forest destruction in the catchment and altered flow regimes in the Khe 
Sanh River, which irrigated their rice fields (which used to support two crops per year but now 
only produce only one). Meanwhile none of interviewed people in Village A thought about the 
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link between forest destruction, the lack of actions from their side and damages to their 
livelihoods in the near future. In fact, if local people understand their situation (i.e. the long term 
impacts of forest loss to their lives, they are more likely to act to do something about it 
(Rowlands, 1997). This echoed different research results that Gibson and Becker (2000) and 
Matta, and Alavalapti (2006) stress the importance of updating local people on emerging issues, 
such as the ecosystem services provided by forests (e.g. watershed protection and climate 
mitigation), so that they are more likely to identify potential problems facing their communities, 
and thus to prepare and act accordingly.  
Moreover, observations and interviews during my field work showed local people became 
unfamiliar with the new forest management system established by the state. At the studied 
villages, many local resource users admitted being confused about the new forest management 
system. In the words of a man in a transect walk through the leased forests in Village C, “our 
people don’t understand anything about laws [to stop local people cutting trees]. In the past, we 
only knew about forest management rules established by the Già Làng [concerning the three 
forest categories mentioned in the previous section]”.  
In addition, forest management was not seen as villagers’ business any longer. For a group of 
men in Village C, anything to do with forests in the words of the team leader of a forest patrol 
group (during a men-only focus group discussion) was just because “the FPD says we must”. 
For Van Kieu people in Village A, “if we do not own forests, we could not exclude intruders” (a 
male elder in focus group discussions in Village A). As a result, in their daily interactions with 
forests they accepted that “we could not exclude outsiders who came to log illegally forests near 
us” (in-depth interview with village administrative leader), which was the main source of forest 
loss around their village (in-depth interviews with district and commune FPD officers). 
Arguably, the lack of information and knowledge of deforestation consequences and indifference 
toward forest management can be also attributed to villagers’ lack of shared understanding about 
the forests they lived within, which in itself is related to a lack of personal and/or spiritual links 
to forest at the research sites. As being relatively new inhabitants of the forests that enclosed 
them (see Section 5.1), for the majority of villagers in all three villages, the sense of place and 
attachment to forests around their new villages were not strong.  
More importantly, lack of knowledge about forest in general and the impacts to its destruction to 
local livelihoods largely caused by changes in traditional institution governing forests. Accepting 
that some forest destruction occurred during war time, the degradation of forests in and around 
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the studied villages was largely explained by local men and women as being the result of 
changing forest management practices. Across all three of the study sites, the government of 
Vietnam had established its control over the forests by designating them as Special Use or 
Protection Forests. For example, in interviews with a member of FPD staff and elderly members 
of Villages B and C, I learned that the forest allocated to Van Kieu people in Village C was 
under the management of Huong Hoa Forestry Enterprise as far back as 1978, and was handed 
over to the FPD in the 1990s. Similarly, the forests in and around Village B were continuously 
under the management of Dakrong Watershed Protection Management Board since the late 
1970s then Dakrong Protected Area Management Board since the mid 1990s. This led to the 
situation where local people had no economic incentives not to clear forests as they did not see 
any benefits in protecting them. This was reflected in the words of an ex-logger from Village B 
in a household interview  
“thinking back on what we did in the past, forest destruction was really caused by 
illegal logging. For many people here, forest belongs to the government and none 
gives us anything if we protect forests from illegal logging. As a result, we either join 
the illegal logging or turn blind eyes” 
In addition, different regulations created by local communities under the direction of the 
government, including hương ước (or ‘village rules’), quy ước bảo vệ rừng (or ‘village forest 
protection rules’) and quy ước làng văn hóa (or ‘rules for a cultural village’), which, together 
with comprehensive laws and regulations related to grassroots groups (see Chapter 4), provided a 
comprehensive code of conduct for local people, covering all aspects of their lives. As a result of 
these, at the studied villages, changes mentioned above made the Già Làng automatically ceased 
to be the “government” (in the words of an elder man from Village C, in a household interview), 
and “what he said was not respected by all villagers anymore” (in the words of the village 
administrative leader of Village A, in an in-depth interview) or  
“people do not take my [the Gìa Làng’s] advice when it comes to affairs that lie 
outside the traditional power of a traditional leader, such as conducting religious 
activities, allowing new residents into the village and disputes relating to traditional 
practices” as the Gìa Làng of Village A revealed in a household interview. 
This was a sharp difference with the prior SRV era when the village as a unit decided what and 
how to implement policies affecting village affairs (Dalton and Ong, 2002, and as discussed 
earlier this chapter). Indeed, the changes in traditional NRM institutions governing forest and 
forest land ownership, and the changes in forest management leadership structures, have 
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effectively weakened enthusiasm and care for forests by local resource users in Vietnam (see 
Gayfer and Shanks, 1991; Huynh et al., 2003; Nguyen et al., 2008a).  
This was especially worrying because when the responsibility for the sustainable use of forests 
had gradually fallen out of the hands of local resource users and subsumed under state-led 
institutions, emerged a common mentality of indifference to forest management among local 
people. There was a widespread feeling among villagers at the study sites that forest 
management was not their responsibility, but the government’s. This was illustrated by a 
statement of a man of Village B in a household interview “although recently we discuss the 
issues of deforestation and its effects on our life, we do not come up with solutions because we 
think that this is a task for government departments”. When responsibility for the sustainable use 
of forests has gradually fallen out of the hands of local resource users and been subsumed under 
state-led institutions, the indifference among local people at three case study villages towards the 
sustainable use of forests was observed as discussed earlier.  
In summary, contemporary local relationship with forests showed reduced concerns for 
sustainable use of forests at the case study sites under the influence of major demographic shifts 
and sudden replacement of the traditional system for governing forest resources after the Second 
Indochina War. These changes in the relationship with forests accelerated forest degradation and 
deforestation, which caused people to shift their attention further away from forest. This, 
arguably, increased the more exploitative relationship between local people and forest, especially 
when forest degradation and deforestation made forest in these areas less valuable to local 
livelihoods than they did in the past.  
5.4. Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter highlights the vulnerability of local people and forests at three case 
study sites. Poverty was still prevalent in these villages, with arbitrary official poverty 
classifications distorting poverty reduction efforts. In this context, livelihoods at the case study 
sites were characterised by their fragility. The dependence of the inhabitants of the three study 
villages on forest resources for their livelihoods has steadily reduced compared with the past, 
either due to restricted access to forest following the establishment of a nature reserve (Village 
A), being forced to abandon shifting cultivation due to a shortage of agricultural land after 
administrative re-demarcation (Village C) or experiencing a dramatic reduction in forest 
resources (Village B). At the same time, diversification of livelihoods away from exploitation of 
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forest resources was either not well adapted to local socio-economic and ecological conditions, 
or not resilient to shocks, which increased the vulnerability of both women and men at the study 
sites. In this situation when crop failure occurred, local people still turned to forests as their 
immediate option.  
That said, local communities’ relationships with forests have changed dramatically since the end 
of the Second Indochina War. Social memory of historical forest management depicted the 
traditional use of forest as small scale by smaller villages, placing less pressure on forest 
resources. Additionally, traditional communities enjoyed comprehensive power to make 
community forestry work, in terms of full and clear property rights to forest and forest land, with 
enforcement as well as rule-making powers. In contrast, contemporary forest management is 
characterized by a sharp contrast between the legal designation of forest and the actual activities 
taking place there, such as illegal logging in protected areas (Villages A and B) and land 
clearance in protection forest (Village C).  
163 
 
Chapter 6: Indigenous Grassroots Groups 
6.1. Introduction 
In the face of the changes in the relationship between local people and forests, particularly the 
reduced dependence of local livelihoods on forest resources and the indifference to protecting 
forests against illegal exploitation, it is important to understand how local people at the case 
study sites are motivated to work together (without government or donor support). This chapter 
identify the factors that influence indigenous grassroots groups’ formation, operation and 
outcomes. In doing so, the chapter explores how local people have come together in indigenous 
grassroots groups for both agriculture-based and forest-based activities. An understanding of the 
strengths and weaknesses of both aids the analysis of induced forest-based grassroots groups and 
builds a foundation for a strategy to work more effectively with grassroots organisations, which 
is explored in the rest of this thesis. 
6.2. Indigenous Agriculture-based Grassroots Groups 
To share the agricultural workload, indigenous grassroots groups have been established 
autonomously, without outside interference (i.e. from either government or international-donor-
funded interventions), at all three study sites. A “Seed-sowing Group” in Village A and a “Crop 
Protection Group” in Village B mobilised the whole village as participants (and are thus termed 
village-wide groups), while, in Village C, “Coffee and Rice Weeding Groups” of five to seven 
households (termed neighbourhood groups) were organised to help members with agricultural 
production. Both village-wide and neighbourhood groups were community-driven initiatives that 
responded to needs that local people believed could not be met without cooperation. As a female 
villager in Village A explained during a discussion to develop the village’s seasonal calendar, 
cooperation was essential, because  
“without it, we can’t sow our seeds in time for the rain. This is especially important 
for my family. My husband died some years ago and my daughters are still too young 
to provide strong labour”. 
From a structural perspective, these groups were informal and did not have any kind of elected 
leadership. Nonetheless, as a group of men from Village B said during the development of the 
village’s seasonal calendar, “we asked our village administrative leader to coordinate the 
collection of money from all villagers, in order to pay for labourers hired for crop protection”. 
In the other villages, no leadership was required. In Villages A and C, as a woman from Village 
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C explained during a transect walk through the village’s pastures, “once we had agreed verbally 
on how we would work together, every family involved provided sufficient labour to take part in 
the agreed activities”. Household interviews and focus group discussion with members of 
indigenous groups also revealed that the groups at all the study sites were established on a 
temporary basis, during seasons when cooperation was required for agricultural work, and 
tended to dissolve at the end of the season. As a result, these groups were inward-looking, 
without any legal status or external relations with either Vietnamese or international civil society 
organisations.  
A key motivation for local people to take part in these groups was the mutual benefits that 
emerged from cooperation. The main aim of these groups was to “help each other undertake 
collaborative agricultural tasks that all villagers saw as an urgent need” (household interview 
with a young male head of a household in Village A). The current literature highlights this as an 
important factor enabling the effective participation of grassroots groups in the development 
process (see Gibson and Becker, 2000; Brown et al., 2007). At the same time, for the village-
wide groups in Villages A and B, all households were able to work together, because group 
members were bound by a common belief in a highly beneficial outcome from their village-wide 
activities, such as sowing seeds in large fields in the short time span before the arrival of the first 
rains (claimed both women and men in focus groups in Village A) or protecting crops from 
trampling by 700 head of cattle (believed a group of women in the development of a seasonal 
calendar in Village B). By taking collective action, “we can, therefore, strengthen our food 
security in the face of harsh weather”, said a woman in Village A during a transect walk through 
the village’s agricultural fields, or “we share the workload to protect our crop from depredation 
by cattle”, discussed a group of men in Village B while developing a seasonal calendar.  
Although Village C contrasted with Villages A and B in the way in which people preferred to 
structure their groups (i.e. neighbourhood groups rather than village-wide groups), these 
neighbourhood groups were still bound by mutual benefits, which arose from helping one 
another to weed individual rice and coffee fields on a rotational basis (household interview with 
a neighbourhood group member from Village C). Village-wide participation was not strongly 
required in this village, because the statistic provided by the village administrative leader showed 
that the areas of wet rice and coffee land per household were reasonably small, averaging around 
0.4 ha for rice and 0.3 ha for coffee. As a result, problems of labour shortage could be addressed 
by smaller groups of households. In this context, “decisions about who to include in 
neighbourhood groups depended entirely upon how much the women in these households liked 
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each other” said a woman in Village C during a transect walk through the village’s pastures. In 
this regard, for these groups, a feeling of togetherness or shared interest was a strong binding 
factor.  
In all three villages, the positive attributes of the resource users (see Section 2.6), who agreed to 
share the short-term costs of cooperation, was a contributory factor to the success of collective 
actions. Household interviews showed that costs for these activities in Village A and C were 
only the labour that everyone agreed to contribute towards joint activities. This made the 
collective work affordable, especially in Village A, where the poverty rate was high. For Village 
B, seasonal calendar development with women showed that, to protect their crops from animal 
trampling, the village often contracted one or two villagers as watchmen for their crops. 
According to people in this village, at the beginning when seeds did not geminate, watchmen 
only needed to patrol the village’s fields twice per day - early in the morning, when the animals 
were released from their pens, and early evening, when they came back from their grazing hills. 
Later on, watchmen had to patrol more regularly to make sure that no animals came to the field 
to eat crops. The cost to hire the watchmen was met by contributions from all households, with 
the amount dependent on the size of each household’s field. Moreover, the fee was paid to the 
watchmen only when the crops had been harvested and sold. Interviewed household heads all 
confirmed that, with the sale of the crops, making a financial contribution toward the hired 
labour was affordable to them. 
Another important factor contributing to the success of these indigenous grassroots groups was 
time that made improvement after investments in the resource predictable and stable. Fieldwork 
showed that cooperation for agricultural activities did not often require a long time commitment. 
Typically, indigenous grassroots groups for agricultural activities lasted between one and six 
months in each village before self-dissolving. This was very important for people at the three 
villages because this would bring “less worries for things go wrong” (in the words of a man in a 
household interview in Village B). Also, many villagers in Village A said that, when they could 
see the results of their cooperation at the end of a short time period, they would “feel inspired 
and more committed” to finish it and “look forward to working with other again”. In the words 
of a woman in Village A, “when I can see the field seeded, I can move on to planning something, 
else for example collecting firewood”. For people in Village B, if the time committed to the 
protection of their crops was too long, they would have to pay the watchmen more. As such “our 
cooperation would become more expensive and we would not able to afford it”, said Village B’s 
administrative leader in a household interview. 
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Furthermore, studying agriculture-based indigenous groups at the case study sites showed that 
individual ownership over resources for agricultural production, placed under village-wide or 
group-based management, played an important role in sustaining cooperation year-after-year. In 
a household interview, a woman in Village B explained the importance of securing individual 
ownership for collective action as follows: 
“My husband and I have Red Book Certificates for two bean fields and a long-term 
contract for using land for another field. I know that when I take part in village-wide 
crop protection, my crops will be protected and production might increase. At the 
same time, I also know that the secure crops will be mine, so potential increases in 
the production on that field will bring food to my family. No one can come there and 
take away my crops. Therefore, I feel so confident in owning my land that I never 
question whether I should engage with other people to protect crops on it”.  
This significance of individual ownership for collective action was echoed in many of local 
people’s suggestions for improved forest management through the channel of induced grassroots 
groups, as seen in Chapter 7. 
However, people did not engage in collective action in every circumstance. Where the benefits 
from cooperation were not perceived as higher than the costs, the very same people who worked 
together for seed sowing (Village A) and protecting crops from cattle depredation (Village B) 
could not work together for rice harvesting (Village A) and protecting new forest plantations 
from cattle grazing (Village B). According to an in-depth interview with the Village Communist 
Party Secretary, in Village A, everyone worried that: 
“If we were to rotate our collective labour to each household in turn, as we do in 
seed sowing, then the last households in the rotation cycle might risk losing their 
crop to the rain that germinated all the rice seeds”.  
As a result, “people could not agree how best they benefited from helping each other in 
harvesting rice before heavy rain hits the village in the monsoon season”, said a woman during 
the development of the village’s seasonal calendar. Indeed, a lack of consensus on how to share 
benefits equally led to uncoordinated, individual efforts to save rice crops from heavy rain in 
Village A in February 2008, as witnessed during my stay in the village.  
In these instances, the possibility of improving the resource at an acceptable cost with reasonable 
benefits did not appear strong to local people. In this regard, individuals seeking their own gains 
were not persuaded that gain would come through a commitment with other individuals (as 
discussed in Section 2.6). The cost in this situation (in the calculation of local people) was the 
very high possibility of losing their whole crop to the heavy rain, especially for people at the end 
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of the rotational cycle. This was mirrored in discussions of coffee harvesting in Village C, during 
development of the village’s seasonal calendar. As one woman in this discussion said: 
“we can harvest coffee fruit only within a month. After that time, heavy rain will 
comes and destroy late harvested fruits. Therefore, within that month everyone wants 
to harvest the fruits as quick as possible. If we help each other like we do for 
weeding, those who last get help by others in the group will lose some if not all when 
the rain comes”.  
In this regard, people in Villages A and C did not see cooperation provide them with enough 
benefits. As a couple from Village C said in a household interview:  
“We didn’t want our family to take part in the neighbourhood group because, for us, 
the benefits of working together to harvest our fruit were the fruits safely harvested 
before the rain. However, no agreement was reached to provide households at the 
end of the rotational cycle with some buffer against the potential of losing out”.  
This was different in the case of Village B. When contracting the labourers to look after the 
crops from animal trampling, the village administrative leader said to me that the labourers were 
held accountable to individual households. If any household’s crops were damaged as the result 
of them neglecting their work, the labourers were responsible for compensating the household(s) 
concerned. In this regard, clear enforcement measures helped to engender trust among local 
people, which in turn encouraged them to act together. 
When costs were seen to exceed benefits, cooperation between villagers did not proceed. A 
woman in Village C said “if a household faces a labour shortage, the household leader often 
decides to hire additional labour to assist with coffee fruit harvesting”. This could be done only 
because, as my observations showed, coffee traders came to Village C to buy coffee every day 
and paid cash after each sale during the harvest period. Therefore, households could raise funds 
to cover the costs of hired labour without risking losing their coffee crop to heavy rains from not 
taking part in a collective action. Meanwhile, in Village A, as I witnessed when I was in the 
village during the 2007 rainy season, families with young children were affected most from lack 
of cooperation. One mother of four (all under seven years old) said to me she still had half of her 
rice soaked in water in the rice fields because she could not harvest it on time. 
With regard to protecting new forest plantations from cattle grazing, according to a statistic 
provided by a group of women developing a seasonal calendar, while all 54 households in 
Village B owned cattle, only 24 of them had forest plantations. The benefits for protecting the 
plantations were not perceived by all families in the village. At times, particularly when harsh 
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weather conditions and shrunken grazing fields resulted in a lack of food for cattle, a woman in 
the group said 
“Although the 24 households who had forest plantations tried to keep their cows and 
buffaloes away from the young trees in these plantations, the other 30 households 
without plantations were much keener on having their animals fed from these 
plantations”.  
Meanwhile, success in protecting the plantations could not be guaranteed without the 
participation of households with buffalo. This led to a win-lose situation. If cooperation took 
place, only the plantation households gained benefits. Households with buffalo worried about 
starving their animals to death, which would cost them their savings for many years. As a result, 
mutual trust was not reached between two groups of households. In addition, the two groups of 
households could not work together to solve this problem of inequity with respect to the 
economic costs and benefits arising from collaborative forest protection. Lack of collective 
action in this instance led to disputes among villagers and economic loss for people involved in 
forest plantation.  
Reflecting the domination of women in agricultural work in all three villages, the coordination of 
indigenous grassroots groups in the agricultural sector was led by women. This could also 
involve managing the labour of their husbands. For example, in Village C, when the need for 
households to provide labour (in return for help they had themselves received) was identified, a 
husband from Village C revealed in a household interview that “my wife tells me what to do 
when it comes to labour sharing with other households, especially when she need me to step in 
on her behalf”. Thus, even though men took part in these grassroots groups, they usually did not 
play an active role in their organisation or direction. In addition, as another male villager from 
the same village explained in a household interview “I am happy to accept my wife’s direction to 
provide labour because it enables me to avoid unwanted drinking sessions with idle men in the 
village!”  
Meanwhile, in Village B, focus group discussions with women showed that they took part in 
village meetings (i.e. the village assembly) in the village hall together with men to decide the 
cooperation mechanism to address crop trampling by cattle. Once cooperation had begun, 
women still sat together with men to decide who to hire to watch over the crops and to settle 
accounts with these persons. This was because, at the village level (which is the level at which 
cooperation is required) “men were traditionally recognised as being the representatives of their 
households although agricultural work was seen as women’s jobs”, said one woman from the 
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women-only focus group. This also reflected my observation that women in this village had 
much more equal opportunities to speak in village affairs. In responding whether they were 
consulted in decisions on how to spend their income, women in a women only focus group 
discussion in Village B said that they and their husbands decided major expenditure together, 
such as whether to buy a motorbike, a TV or more buffaloes. One woman in the group added “in 
my family I am the one who decided the purchase of our TV [a valuable possession for 
households in this village]”. 
Having discussed gender aspects in the work of these indigenous agriculture-based groups, this 
section now reflects on the issue of participation in these groups. The analysis above shows that 
deciding whether or not to work together in these indigenous agriculture-based groups, local 
people were free to make their decisions, using their own knowledge to justify their actions for 
their own benefits. In doing so they had great opportunities to debate among themselves to 
practise self-organising skills. In this regard, their participation in these organisations can be 
called self-motivation or citizen power (either following Pretty or Arnstein typology; see Chapter 
2). However, because these groups are inward looking in their structure, these skills have not got 
opportunities to be horned in the outside world. That is also the reason why this type of 
participation only existed in this sector36 at the case study sites.  
Moreover, self-motivation or citizen power in agricultural work did not change or influence 
either the distribution of development aid (which was biased and distorted) or the power status 
quo. In this regard, this discussion supports the argument of Pretty (1995) that participation does 
not necessarily lead to challenges against distribution of wealth and power (see Chapter 2). Also, 
because this type of participation was parcelled only in a very limited range of activities in 
agricultural sector, it became limited in its impact and influence. In addition, the government 
does not stop them from operating. This is because they do not pose threats to the government 
and Party’s power base. Instead, by working together they solved problems the Party-state might 
otherwise have to deal with. That is why they are left alone. This highlights the fact that the 
existence of indigenous agriculture-based grassroots groups at the case study sites supports one 
major argument of the structural reformists that, in any political framework of any regime, there 
exist opportunities for grassroots organisations to take part in the existing political systems to 
serve the interests of their members (see Chapter 2).  
                                                          
36  Self-motivation was never observed in induced forest-based grassroots groups at the case study sites (see later 
this chapter) 
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In summary, the three sites’ experiences of indigenous grassroots groups in the agricultural 
sector reveal the limitations of their power in mobilising local people’s participation in collective 
actions. Their experiences also highlight how heterogeneity in village interests hinders villagers’ 
ability to cooperate. In addition, the heterogeneity within villages A, B and C shed lights into 
power relations within these communities, which effectively supports the concern in the political 
ecology literature about the idealisation of rural communities as harmonious entities, which, if 
left alone, would naturally promote sustainable ecological and social development (Zimmerer, 
2000). As such, the above analysis of indigenous agriculture-based grassroots groups indicates 
the problems within communities, such as unaccountability, inequity and non-participation that, 
according to political ecologists, are inherent in local community structures (see Gray and 
Mosely, 2005). Following this line of argument, some political ecologists also warn of over-
simplification of internal power struggles within communities, in the sense that many 
development interventions overlook the fact that village social relations are based on conflict and 
competition (Balint and Mashinya, 2006).  
Furthermore, in all three villages, none of these groups was seen to be moderated by traditional 
(as opposed to administrative in Village B) leaders. Rather, villagers who had shared interests 
organised themselves for self-help, with varying levels of facilitation from their village 
administrative leaders. This fact highlights the declining influence of traditional leaders in 
village affairs compared with that of the past, as discussed in Section 5.3 in Chapter 5.  
6.3. Indigenous Natural-forest-based Grassroots Groups 
In the context of the changed relations with forests and changing forest management practices 
discussed above, indigenous grassroots groups existed in the forest sector in all three villages, 
often centred on illegal logging. This was because, from being the owners of forests prior to 
1945, local people had now become “thieves” in the word of one female villager from Village B, 
who illegal logging as “an act of a thief in the night” (household interview). In this regard, the 
findings from the three case study sites suggest that indigenous forest-based grassroots groups 
are not necessarily driven by the need to protect forests. A common feature for all three villages’ 
indigenous forest-based groups was that they were resistance strategies by local people to claim 
their rights to forests.  
In Village B, when agriculture-based livelihoods were not paid attention to in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, illegal timber extraction was a main livelihoods for local people as discussed in 
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Section 5.3.3 in Chapter 5) During that period, as a result of more difficult access and increased 
scarcity of good timber for illegal logging in the mid 1980s, the need for villagers to work 
together in groups to open roads to more distant logging sites became greater. By 1985, “we had 
several groups of five or six illegal loggers in this village, formed to help members to deal with 
the increased difficulty of accessing good timber”, said an ex-logger in a household interview. 
These groups were able to form and operate in the past (these groups ceased to exist in mid 
1990s when almost no good timber left for extraction), because like the Crop Protection Group, 
“we found that if we work together we can share the cost of opening the path to access timber. 
Also, we can cut timber together and increase the volume of extracted timber”, said the same 
man.  
Moreover, a group’s ‘ownership’ of a patch of forest was established once members of that 
group had opened road access to it (usually by hiring temporary labour), related the village 
administrative leader who was also an ex-logger. The group could then decide who was allowed 
to enter the patch of forest and use its access road (household interviews with ex-loggers). In this 
way, a group’s ownership over its claimed patch of forest, supported by de facto rights to forest, 
helped it to exclude unwanted competitors from the forest, thereby increasing the benefits (in 
terms of volume of timber that could be extracted illegally) to be gained from cooperation (in the 
form of pooling labour for timber extraction and sharing the costs of road construction). These 
groups thus became the preferred form of cooperation for forest management (albeit illegal) 
during the time when exploitable timber was still abundant. 
To support their group operations, illegal loggers in Village B, used their de facto rights to 
forests in supporting their activities. Although the forests where villagers from Village B 
engaged in illegal timber extraction were under the management of Dakrong Nature Reserve and 
outside the administrative boundary of their village, their de facto rights to these forests were 
accepted by the inhabitants of the villages these forests fell under administratively. This was 
because Village B and nearby villages used to belong to a single administrative unit under the 
French administrative system (household interview with the Trưởng Làng of Village B), and all 
used to have access to forests that were now placed under the management of the nature reserve 
management board and divided under different administrative units.  
Armed with their de facto rights, illegal loggers extracted forests the way they found fit. In the 
words of one ex-logger “although forests belong to nobody (because they are common property 
in the management of the state), everybody [among illegal loggers] knows who can log trees 
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where”. This effectively certified de facto rights to each patch of forests to each group of 
loggers.  With the aforementioned de facto rights, illegal loggers in Village B could realise 
access and withdrawal rights in the eyes of other villagers, as well as exclude people from 
outside of the former administrative unit from ‘their’ forests. “No outsiders were allowed to log 
forests in this area. Outsiders, if any, were hired as labourers only to support these groups to 
open roads or saw trees”, explained an ex-logger in a household interview. In so doing, they 
claimed back their traditionally used resources and defied de jure property rights imposed by the 
government.  
In this activity, loggers developed a mutual understanding of (illegal) rights of access and 
withdrawal. As the ex-logger continued, “everyone respects other people’s access to that specific 
patch of forest. As such, we never have any dispute over this”. This showed a high level of 
mutual agreement among illegal loggers about how to use (illegal) forest resources and a certain 
level of trust in one another. In this sense, the destruction of forests as result of illegal logging 
revealed both community cohesion to challenge the state ownership over forests (i.e. everyday 
form of resistance by local people) and a negative effect of the power struggle between the state 
and people, which has also been seen in countries outside Vietnam (see Chapter 2).  
Although the establishment of indigenous grassroots groups for illegal logging in Village B did 
not lead to sustainable forest management, lessons can be learnt from this form of cooperation.  
Like the indigenous agriculture-based groups, in the operation of these indigenous forest-based 
groups, it was important that people involved agreed to share the short-term cost. By associating 
with each other, illegal loggers found the illegal logging group a means to reduce the cost of 
extracting timber and protect their benefits. The right to each forest block was established only 
after a path to it was opened. In that regard, anyone could access a block of forest without a path. 
As a result, by sharing the cost of building a path, illegal loggers secured both their right to cut 
their forest (illegally) and an opportunity to reduce the cost of extracting the timber. In that 
regard, associating with others to share the cost of opening the path, illegal logging found the 
power to protect their benefits (see the discussion on associational ties of power in Chapter 2). 
Although this associational tie in illegal logging did not produce positive outcome to forest, the 
existence of the group showed the prevalence of cost and benefit calculations in deciding 
collective action as discussed in Section 2.6 in Chapter 2.      
In addition, securing widespread recognition (among local resource users) over rights to forests 
and agreed borders of the forest block were prerequisites for the existence of these groups, which 
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is also a finding from elsewhere, as discussed in Section 2.6 in Chapter 2. In this case, group-
based rights of access, withdrawal and exclusion (albeit unofficial) were sufficient to pull people 
together in collective action for forest exploitation. However, whether these rights will be 
enough to encourage people to work together in groups for sustainable forest management needs 
more investigation (see Chapters 7 and 9).  
Turning attention away from Village B, at the time of the fieldwork, indigenous grassroots 
groups for illegal logging were detected in Villages A and C. Their resistance strategy, via the 
practice of illegal logging with different techniques, helped local people acquire the timber they 
needed for house construction. Taking in turn, this section now discusses illegal logging by 
people in Village C. In contrast to Village B, illegal logging by this type of group in Village C 
was not geared towards income generation. As a woman said during a transect walk through the 
village pasture fields: 
“My husband and his friends often organise themselves in groups of five to search 
for good timber for house construction from forests belonging to nearby villages. 
The group goes out two or three weeks every year when forests are dry (because all 
work was done manually) until enough timber is collected (about 7 m3) for house 
construction. My husband has already been out for two weeks this time”.  
As in the case of Village B, the forests these groups exploited were used by their village before 
the adjustment of village administrative boundaries in the early 1990s. As such, group access to 
timber in other forests surrounding them was not challenged by local people although, in the 
eyes of the local FPD, it was illegal for them to log timber (even for their own consumption).  
A focus group discussion with men in Village C revealed that shared characteristics among 
group members were the key for this group to work as effectively as their wives’ group for 
weeding coffee and rice fields. However, in contrast to the groups formed for agricultural 
cooperation, this type of group lasted longer. This is because, in the context of province-wide 
forest degradation, searching for and transporting timber located one or two days’ walk away 
from the village took time, and often could also only take place in the dry season, once per year. 
Therefore, members of this group might require several years to collect sufficient timber to 
construct one house, said one man during the focus group discussion. 
My observations from living in Village C showed that, because persons who called for help from 
others (thus initiating the formation of the timber extraction group) had to have enough money to 
feed group members during the whole period of timber extraction (i.e. two or three weeks each 
year over a period of say three years), only households with relatively high economic status 
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could pursue this option. Those who attended the group but did not have resources to pay for 
others to come to help could receive help from group members in other activities as a member of 
a timber extraction group said in a household interview: 
“We extend our rotational support to members for activities other than timber 
extraction. We give a hand to group members who need help in any other heavy 
manual work, such as erecting foundations of a house, clearing a new plot for a 
coffee plantation or constructing a channel to a rice field”  
In doing so, all group members either poor or better off could still enjoy the benefit of collective 
action. Also, the indigenous forest-based group in Village C did not concentrate strictly on 
illegal logging. This made the group more like one operating across a broader spectrum of 
village life.  
Due to a lack of resources to sponsor collective action, groups for timber extraction were not 
present in Village A, where, for most households, finding enough food for every meal was a 
more urgent priority than house construction. Instead, if a household head in Village A had some 
money (but not enough) to cover the cost of timber cutting, he or she would use a different route 
to obtain timber for his or her house construction: making a deal with illegal loggers. 
Observations and interviews with both female and male-headed households during my stay in the 
village indicated that, according to these deals, illegal loggers hired for cutting timber (by motor 
saws) could be paid in kind by being allowed to cut an extra amount in the name of the 
household in need. Indeed, given that people in Village A were allowed by the local government 
to extract timber from Bac Huong Hoa Nature Reserve for house construction (said a FPD 
officer in an in-depth interview), this, in effect, provided illegal loggers with an excuse to cut 
timber without a logging permit. Engaging in such deals, explained two interviewed households 
in this village, was cheaper (i.e. more affordable) and quicker than group formation. In this 
regard, the need for cooperation among villagers was corrupted by the powerful economic drive 
of illegal logging in the area, which supported the argument of political ecologists.  
In view of the above, indigenous forest-based grassroots groups, despite not being revolutionary 
in the sense of the Marxism school of thought on grassroots organisations, provided local 
resource users with a locus for resistance and counter-hegemony to claim their share in forest 
resources. In this sense, local people in all three villages were more concerned about who among 
them (rather than the government who had de jure property rights) ‘owned’ (or had de facto 
property rights) which patches of forests.  
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6.4. Conclusion 
In analysing indigenous grassroots groups in agricultural and forestry sectors, several lessons can 
be drawn. In both sectors, calculation of costs and benefits emerging from a collective action 
played an important role in deciding whether the collective action could proceed. When the costs 
were perceived as being lower than the expected benefits, people made efforts to implement 
collective action. In areas where the costs of collective action were commonly perceived as 
higher than the predicted benefits, such as harvesting crops prior to the onset of the wet season or 
protecting new forest plantations, cooperation among villagers through indigenous grassroots 
groups was not even attempted. In addition, despite being relatively stronger in the agricultural 
sector, these indigenous grassroots groups were still fragile, being limited, as they were, to 
practical issues for instance protecting crops, sharing workloads for seed sowing and weeding, 
and illegal logging. Cooperation in these groups often lasted for short periods of time with 
prospects of benefits from cooperation being visualised clearly.  
In the forestry sector, de facto rights to forests influenced the operation of indigenous forest-
based grassroots groups. Due to these de facto rights, local people at the study sites could access 
forests that belonged administratively to different villages, thus managing to avoid conflicts over 
illegal timber exploitation and ensuring more effective cooperation in their illegal forest use. 
Also, the existence of indigenous grassroots groups for illegal timber extraction marked the 
resistance of local people against the domination of state forest ownership, while the existence of 
these groups in the agriculture sector served as a practice ground for self-organising. 
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Chapter 7: Induced-forest-based Grassroots Groups and 
Internal Influences 
7.1. Introduction 
According to Panayotou et al. (in Nguyen, 2001) and the analysis presented in Chapters 5 and 6, 
the past mismanagement (or rather absence of management) of tropical forests has its roots in 
prevailing institutional arrangements. In addition, although many countries with tropical forests 
have embarked on forest devolution policies by developing mechanisms for integrating the 
participation of rural populations (see Chapter 2), transferring power from the state or 
engendering meaningful participation of local people and communities is not yet prevalent 
(Agrawal, 2001b; Ribot, 2004).  
In response to these concerns, this chapter and the next investigate the roles played by induced 
forest-based grassroots groups in facilitating the participation of local resource users in forest 
management at the case study sites. Following the framework of Edmunds et al. (2003a) 
discussed in Chapter 2, this chapter explores internal factors that influence the operations of 
these groups, such as organisational structures, the relationship between existing local 
management practices and induced grassroots groups, and rights and responsibilities of induced 
forest-based grassroots groups. The chapter also analyses social equity within these groups. 
Analysis on the above mentioned aspects of induced forest-based grassroots groups builds 
foundations for the examination of local people’s and grassroots group members’ views on how 
these groups can be improved.  
7.2. Structures of Induced Forest-based Grassroots Groups: 
Characters of both Village and District-level Organisations 
This section analyses the structures of induced forest-based grassroots groups and the influences 
of these structures to the roles of these groups and the relationships between these groups and 
existing local management practices. In Quang Tri, at the time of conducting the research, 
between September 2007 and August 2008, there had been no allocation of forest land (as 
distinct from forest, which was widely allocated under short-term protection contracts) to local 
people. Rather, forest devolution was limited to establishment of induced forest-based grassroots 
groups and allocation of forest (but not forest land) to groups of households and villages. This 
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was reflected in the selection of the case study sites for this research, one of which had a forest 
allocation programme to the whole village supported by a forest patrol group and the other two 
had no forest allocation but had established forest protection groups.  
All induced forest-based grassroots groups were officially set up by the relevant CPC with 
varying level of control from the provincial (Village B) and district (Villages A and C) FPD. The 
intention, in each case, was for these groups to be village-level groups (said a BirdLife staff 
member in an in-depth interview). However, the actual implementation varied, which made them 
a hybrid between village and district-level organisations. This section analyses each group’s 
structural organisation and how this influences its functioning. 
As noted earlier, inducing grassroots groups to take part in government led forest management 
was a popular form of devolution in Quang Tri. In Villages A and B, Site Support Groups 
(SSGs) were induced by BirdLife International in 2004 while, in Village C, Forest Patrol Group 
were induced by UNDP in 2005, to encourage the participation of local people in the 
management of protected areas and protection forests, respectively. All groups exhibited 
characters of village and district-level organisations. This could be seen in two aspects. First, 
these groups operated at the village level and were not annexed into the government system. In 
addition, their organisational structures were similar to those of participatory committees (see 
Chapter 2). This made them more like village-level organisations. Second, because of lack of 
participation of villagers (which led to the non-functioning of general assemblies), only the 
executive committees (consisting mainly of commune and village government officials, project 
and district staff) survived and operated directly under the government agencies. This made them 
more district-level organisations.  
All of these groups were decreed by CPCs with the financial sponsorship of international donors. 
District (in Villages A and C) and provincial (in Village B) FPD and project staff sat on the 
executive committees and were the main decision makers for these groups. In this sense, the 
CPCs mainly served to rubberstamp decisions made by the two former actors (see Figures 7.1 
and 7.2). Other executive members of these groups (i.e. paid SSG patrol team members in 
Villages A and B, and forest protection team leaders and their village administrative leader in 
Village C) were implementers. The difference between the two executive committees in Figures 
7.1 and 7.2 is that project and FPD staff members sat directly on the executive committee and 
intervened in all activities of the SSGs. In Village C the project and FPD staff members issued 
178 
 
instructions and plans to the coordination team who implemented them with forest patrol team 
members. 
Figure 7.1: Organisational Structure of the SSGs in Villages A and B 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: primary data from interviews with paid SSG members and project staff) 
Members of the SSGs were mainly government or party officials at commune and village levels 
(in the case of the SSG in Village B), or at village level only (in the case of the SSG in Village 
A). These members were paid monthly by the projects to work for the SSGs. Also, similar to the 
model in China discussed in Chapter 2, the appointment of paid members (who were ostensibly 
management board members) was “subject to the approval of the CPC and concerned FPD 
units”, said the SSG patrol team leader in Village B. Apart from the paid members, there were no 
other official members of each SSG, although it was assumed, as explained by one of the project 
officers, that “it was the responsibility of the paid members from each group to mobilise the 
participation of the whole village towards the goal of biodiversity protection”. This responded to 
the philosophy behind SSGs, which is that they are composed of, and run by, local people, 
thereby empowering them to address environmental issues that affect their lives. There is an 
expectation that, as a result of this empowerment, community cohesion and awareness of 
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environmental issues will increase, and opportunities for civil society development will expand 
(BirdLife International, 2006). If this happened, SSGs should have had general assemblies. 
Figure 7.2: Organisational Structure of the Forest Patrol Group in Village C 
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(Source: primary data from in-depth interviews with group leaders and project staff) 
When SSGs were established in the Villages A and B in 2004, each was divided into two teams 
with five members each: a patrolling team responsible for biodiversity monitoring; and a 
communication team responsible for environmental awareness raising activities. The intended 
mission of the patrolling teams included reporting illegal logging to relevant authorities, thus 
contributing to forest protection, while the communication teams were intended to foster 
community relations and collective responsibility by organising regular village meetings to 
discuss environmental issues of relevance to local communities (BirdLife International, 2006). 
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Furthermore, the SSG patrolling team leaders also acted as focal points between the local 
government and project officers and the village as a whole. The groups were required to report 
on their activities, both to the project officers once a month, and to the CPC when requested. In 
turn, the project officers reported to the FPD as required, explained SSG team leaders in 
individual in-depth interviews. 
In Village C, UNDP ran a community forest management project. The goal of the project, as an 
in-depth interview with a UNDP staff member revealed, was “to find ways of applying the 
traditional practices of the Van Kieu minority group to forest management, in order to improve 
both forest management and local livelihoods”. One approach adopted for achieving this goal 
was to establish a village-level Forest Patrol Group to manage the leased forest areas that UNDP 
advocated the district government to hand over to Village C community. By advocating for the 
lease to be granted to the whole community (and thus ensuring common property rights, in 
accordance with the traditional forest management practices of Van Kieu people, as discussed in 
Chapter 5), it was believed that “the foundations had been laid for the whole village to work 
together on forest management”, as a UNDP staff member explained in an in-depth interview. In 
this regard, if successful, the devolution interventions, through the creation of the group to take 
part in forest management, should have supported existing local forest management practices and 
paid more attention to livelihoods while protecting forests. In theory, the philosophy of the 
UNDP initiative for forest devolution seemed to be more holistic than BirdLife’s, which focused 
primarily on forest monitoring and protection for biodiversity conservation (to be discussed 
further in Section 7.3). 
In terms of its organisational structure, it was assumed that the whole of Village C would serve 
as a grassroots organisation for forest protection, with all villagers as its members to form a 
general assembly, and the leaders of the four forest patrol groups plus the village administrative 
leader working as a coordination team37 (in-depth interview with a UNDP project staff member) 
(see Figure 7.2). Interaction and coordination with outside organisations, such as local 
government agencies and the UNDP project management team in Hanoi, was facilitated by the 
CPC, who then sent messages via the village administrative leader, who disseminated them to 
the coordination team and to villagers (see Figure 7.2). 
Having discussed the structures of induced forest-based grassroots groups, this section continues 
with an assessment of the relationship between these groups and existing local forest 
                                                          
37 The coordination team is part of executive committee for induced forest-based grassroots group in Village C. 
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management practices. Broadly speaking, these groups have created some positive relationships 
with local practices at the three research sites: The very presence of these groups raises the 
profile of grassroots participation among local government agencies. Indeed, the vision of 
increased participation of local resource users in NRM espoused by world leaders (see Section 
1.1 in Chapter 1) has actually been manifested in Quang Tri through donor-funded projects. 
Together with increased awareness of the need to involve grassroots populations in the 
development process, high-ranking local government officers in Quang Tri also acknowledge the 
values of indigenous forest institutions in forest management prior to the state’s involvement, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, which, by itself, is a move away from the widespread criticism of 
indigenous forest management practices in Vietnam (see Section 4.3 in Chapter 4). This 
appreciation is reflected in the comments of a senior FPD officer in an in-depth interview, who 
explained that,  
“in the past, when the role of traditional leaders was much more important, they had 
the ultimate right to allocate forest land for agricultural production to households 
and different power for enforcement. Therefore, forest protection by villagers was 
also much more effective” 
Among the induced groups created in the three villages, the SSG in Village B seemed to have 
been the most successful in terms of promoting coordination among different government 
agencies active in forest management. At the local level, in the words of one FPD commune 
station leader,  
“the formation of the SSG in Village B under the general direction of the provincial 
FPD brought commune, village administrative and FPD officers together for the first 
time to work collaboratively within the arena of forest protection”.  
Although composed entirely of government officers, the presence in the patrolling team of a 
vice-chairman of the CPC as the SSG leader, alongside the Village B administrative leader, also 
helped the SSG to send a strong message about the importance of forest conservation to the local 
community and the commune government as a whole. This also resulted in greater enthusiasm 
for forest protection among SSG members. For example, the SSG leader mentioned in an in-
depth interview that  
“I have become more serious about forest protection through working with the SSG, 
which, to be honest, I would not have otherwise done because I would have not 
understood the group’s mission and activities that well”.  
For other members of the SSG in Village B, increased understanding among group members 
encouraged them to take part in SSG activities. In the words of an SSG member, the “great 
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enjoyment from meeting each other to chat and socialise during each patrol of the forest” made 
him more enthusiastic about patrolling with the group (see Photo 7.1). The social contact that 
such groups offered was particularly important given that the stipend to serve as a member of the 
group (VND 150,000 or USD 10 per month) was, by itself, too small an incentive to retain 
members, said the same member in an in-depth interview. Although the sense of being together 
did not originate directly from concerns for better forest management, the cohesion within the 
group could be a good foundation if it sought in future to mobilise greater support from the wider 
community.  
Photo 7.1: Sharing Meals and Chatting during Forest Patrols were Enjoyable for SSG 
Members in Village B 
 
(Photograph taken by one SSG member in March 2008 during a forest patrol) 
In Village A, as a result of an organisational structure that saw only village-level government 
(current or retired) staff on the supposed management board, local people began to come to the 
group (albeit on a limited scale) to raise concerns about forest management issues. For example, 
in my time staying in the house of the SSG patrol team leader, I witnessed SSG members and 
villagers coming together informally to discuss about government policies on stopping forest 
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clearance for rice fields. During such informal discussions, villagers also asked the SSG 
members to convey to the government their request to allocate forests for them to manage as an 
economic alternative to clearing forest for agriculture. 
Villagers’ requests were actually aired by SSG members in several meetings between 
government and local people to discuss about illegal logging and forest protection in the area that 
I attended between January and March 2008. During meetings, villagers were usually quiet at 
first, and allowed government officers to have their say. However, later on in these meetings, 
SSG members cum the villagers’ representatives, such as the administrative village leader and 
the communist party secretary, started to openly challenge government policies by asking “how 
do we live now?” As such, they asked for more financial support to compensate for restricted 
access to forest land and forest resources. In the words of the village Communist Party Secretary, 
“the government has either to provide us with more money to improve our lives before we can 
protect the forest or to allocate forests to us to use and protect”. In airing villager’s concerns, 
SSG members in Village A acted as representatives for their people to ask for their benefits. 
However, coming to the SSG to talk about these issues must also be seen from the perspective 
that the SSG structure in this village incorporated both traditional and administrative leaders, 
who villagers often turned to in any case when they had concerns to raise. Regardless of this fact, 
the way people in Village A responded to unfavourable government policies highlighted a 
certain level of ‘confrontation’ (as discussed in Section 2.5 in Chapter 2) in their approach. 
Meanwhile, the coordination team in Village C also acted on behalf of people in the village when 
asking a district FPD representative for permission to use land under forest cover of the leased 
forests for agriculture (household interview with a retired village administrative leader). 
However, the same man continued, after the demand was rejected by the district FPD, “we never 
asked the team leaders to repeat our request again because it does not go anywhere”.  
This said, the creation of these groups also has its own problems. First of all, selecting SSG 
members from commune or village administrative personnel, similar to the approach employed 
in China (see Dachang and Edmunds, 2003), reinforced the dominant influence of the 
government in the affairs of the village. This was because, in the words of a village Women’s 
Union leader, “the Forest Protection Group [i.e. the SSG] only involves officers of the commune 
administrative branches and mass organisations. Because it doesn’t involve ordinary people, 
local people don’t know about the SSG’s existence and work.” In this regard, despite increased 
coordination among government agencies and cohesion among group members as the result of 
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SSG work in Village B, these positive changes, in fact, brought various arms of government 
together to strengthen their suppression of local forest extraction and continue to maintain power 
among government agencies and increase the control of the government over the forest, and thus 
over those who depended on it. As such, induced forest-based grassroots groups were not seen as 
part of local people’s communities but “local arms of the police, military and FDP”, as 
expressed by a male villager in Village A in a household interview. Viewing this local opinion 
from the power discussion, the local government and donor funded project teams have exercised 
their power to exclude local people from accessing forest.    
In addition, failing to mobilise wider participation of villagers meant that these groups lost their 
general assemblies, rendering the existence of these groups mere extensions of government 
organisations. For example, by the time I began to work in Village A in early November 2007 
and in Village B in early February 2008, the communication teams of the two SSGs had long 
since ceased to function. As a result, the formal structure of each SSG was, in fact, reduced to a 
few paid members, who did patrolling work. The collapse of the SSG communication teams 
effectively destroyed the venue for concerned community members to join in SSG work and map 
out collective action on how forest resources could be used, which marked the non-existence of 
general assemblies: the decision-making bodies of grassroots organisations (see Section 2.3.2). 
As such, these groups were not held accountable to local resource users: a point that was also 
raised by other research (see Chapter 2). In this regard, decision-making power about how forest 
resources were used had not been transferred to the local community. This point will be 
discussed in more detail below. In a similar line of argument, the absence of the communication 
teams was particularly damaging to empowerment of local people when one considers that the 
intended purpose of these teams was to “foster community relations and collective responsibility 
by organising regular village meetings to.... draw attention to any emerging issues that require a 
collective response by the community” (BirdLife, 2006:17). In the view of a staff member at 
BirdLife in an in-depth interview, this task was “more practical and realistic [for SSGs] than 
biodiversity monitoring”. 
Moreover, functioning general assemblies, thus the participation of the whole village in the 
decision-making process for forest management around their villages seemed not to be the focus 
of these groups. Although all groups’ creators assumed that the entirety of the respective villages 
would take part in the operation of induced grassroots group, there was no action from the 
projects to ensure this happened. Interviewing official members of these groups about the types 
of activities undertaken by the groups revealed that wider participation of non-paid people in 
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these groups’ action planning, reporting and even patrolling had never been considered. These 
tasks were mapped out by project teams in consultation with the FPD, said the SSG leader in 
Village A. Group members took instruction from project team members directly, said the SSG 
leader in Village B. Regarding village participation, “currently, under the instruction of a project 
team member, SSG members organise village meetings once or twice per year” said one SSG 
member. He continued that: 
“I find it very difficult to invite people to come to village meetings because we do not 
have much to offer. In the past, communication teams organised village meetings 
regularly. It was easier then because every villager received some money for their 
attendance. When the project decided not to pay for attendance, the village meetings 
were held less often. Gradually, it stopped.” 
Even when village meetings took place more regularly, “people were motivated to attend by the 
amount of money they received at these meeting rather than the content of these meetings”. That 
is why the payments stopped, explained a project officer in an in-depth interview. Aware of lack 
of local interest in these village meetings, caused by lack of substantial interest to attract people 
to attend (to be discussed later), the project team together with the FPD, decided to allow the 
communication teams in villages A and B to dissolve, said an FPD staff member. Without efforts 
to improve these meetings, the abandonment of the communication teams effectively disabled 
general assemblies, where local people made decisions on how these groups functioned.  
In its turn, without assemblies, the size of the SSGs was too small in comparison to the size of 
the forests they had to protect. In an in-depth interview, an FPD staff member said that, on 
average, each SSG member in Village B was mainly responsible for about 1,000 hectares of 
special use forests and their fellow SSG members in Village A were each officially responsible 
for more than 2,500 hectares. In addition, the small size of the induced forest-based grassroots 
groups limited the extent to which they were recognised as legitimate by the community. As 
Barrow and Murphree (2006) argued, legitimacy ensures power and authority for groups to 
exercise their leadership in concerned communities. As such, low recognition for and low 
participation in these groups among local people was seen at the case study sites (see the rest of 
this chapter). In this regard, following arguments set out in Chapter 2 and lessons from the field, 
future efforts to establish induced forest-based grassroots groups for forest management must 
ensure that the membership base of these groups is expanded to a size big enough to make 
available sufficient human resources to monitor forest usage and enforce rules established by 
these groups. This point will be incorporated in the suggested structure of induced forest – based 
grassroots groups in Chapter 8. 
186 
 
In summary, the structures of induced forest-based grassroots groups showed a strong level of 
control from the government over these groups. Despite not being annexed to the state system 
structurally, poor management and operations of these groups made them extensions of 
government bodies, especially in the sense that they took instructions from the government on all 
aspects of their operations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that, in spite of voicing local concerns on 
various occasions, the influence of these groups in the policy-making process was very low. As 
such, the intended goals these groups were set up for were not achieved. How these 
organisational structures influences the rights and responsibilities that these groups have are to 
be discussed next. 
7.3. Devolving Rights and Responsibilities to Induced Forest-based 
Grassroots Groups: the Dominance of the Technocratic Position  
In analysing induced forest-based grassroots groups at the case study sites, one major finding 
was that the operations of these groups indicated the prevalence of the technocratic position. This 
can be detected through the way in which induced forest-based grassroots groups were tasked 
such as undertaking forest patrols to stop illegal logging and monitor biodiversity as sufficient 
requirements for better forest management. In addition, support from the international donor-
funded projects mainly flowed to the FPD to improve its forest management capacity in areas 
such as enforcement and biodiversity monitoring. Moreover, although some attention to local 
livelihoods and local people’s participation in forest management was seen at the case study 
sites, the influence of induced forest-based grassroots groups on these aspects was too limited to 
remove these initiatives from the influence of the technocratic schools of thoughts. As a result, 
induced forest-based grassroots groups became primarily a tool of the government to stop local 
resource users, who were treated as the main culprits behind forest destruction in the area. This 
section critically investigates the application of the technocratic position from two angles of 
induced grassroots groups’ operations: work on technical issues of forest management; and 
livelihood support to local communities. 
First of all, the section examines the emphasis on technical issues in the responsibilities of these 
groups at the case study sites. The forests that the SSGs in Villages A and B were assigned to 
protect belong to two protected areas. Devolution of forest governance in these two villages, as 
discussed earlier, was facilitated mainly by donor funded projects implemented by BirdLife 
International. From the outset, SSG establishment was strongly influenced by the technocratic 
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position. SSGs were set up to monitor the status of, and threats to, forest biodiversity, and 
conduct awareness raising and education programmes in two protected areas (BirdLife, 2006). 
This influenced local people’s perception of the functions of these groups. In natural resource 
mapping and household interviews at Stages 1 and 2 of the research, local people used different 
terms to refer to the SSGs. In Vietnamese, SSGs were called Tổ bảo tồn (Conservation Group) 
by local people who were not SSG members. SSG members themselves used different names to 
refer to the SSGs, such as Nhóm tuần tra giám sát (Patrolling and Monitoring Group), Tổ tuần 
tra bảo tồn (Conservation Patrolling Team) and Nhóm bảo vệ bảo tồn (Conservation Protection 
Group). Despite the variation in names, the common perception among local resource users of 
the SSGs was conservation and patrolling. This was also factored in the investment for the SSGs.  
In all three villages, forest protection received much more funding and technical support from 
concerned donor-funded projects than social-related aspects of forest management such as 
capacity building and livelihood activities for local people. Forest patrolling was regularized, 
with more structured follow-up, supervision and linkages to local government. Interviews with 
FPD and project officers showed that, when they were established, SSGs received training on 
biodiversity monitoring and procedures dealing with illegal logging. In addition, in their 
organisational structure (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2), either an FPD or a project officer was 
allocated to monitor the implementation of forest patrolling, such as by checking patrol routes 
and reports. Similarly, when the commune FPD staff member for Village C came to the village, 
he often asked the village administrative leader responsible for coordinating forest patrol two 
questions: “has there been any forest clearance?” and “when did you last conduct a forest 
patrol?”   
The mentality of treating local people as the culprits responsible for forest destruction was also 
reflected in various internal SSG meetings I attended. Group members in both villages only 
discussed how to stop and arrest local people involved in extractive activities, and not how to 
encourage them to take part these groups or how the SSGs could benefit local communities. In 
turn, for villagers, the familiar, oft-repeated messages of the SSGs’ mission was (in the words of 
a man from Village A) to “stop local people clearing forests” and to “punish local people if they 
continue forest clearance”. In this regard, instead of empowering local people to address 
environmental issues affecting their lives, as embodied in their mission (see Section 7.2), these 
groups addressed the issues of forest clearance by coercion and punishment: reminiscent of the 
typical protected area approach in the 1950s and 1960s, when the technocratic position 
dominated. As a result, rather than supporting local communities to engage more actively with 
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forest management, the SSGs in Villages A and B, in effect, simply imposed the government’s 
agenda for protecting forests without considering local people’s needs. In that regard, although 
protecting forests may have had for good intentions (i.e. biodiversity conservation), the 
establishment of these SSGs only helped the local government to maintain their power in forest 
management and exclude local resource users from forests they traditionally accessed. This also 
highlighted the core dilemma of the concept of sustainable development (to be discussed in the 
following section) and the dominance of instrumental relational ties in dealing with forest 
management at the case study villages.  
Having examined how the operations of induced forest-based grassroots groups were influenced 
by the technocratic position in terms of their transferred responsibilities, this section build on this 
examination by assessing what rights were transferred to these groups so as to support 
livelihoods of local resource users. Under donor-funded projects in Village A and B, while forest 
ownership remained firmly in the hands of the government, forest-based grassroots groups were 
induced and local people were given more rights to forest resources in exchange for their 
participation in forest protection through the channels of these groups. In this light, FPD staff 
commonly acknowledged the need for local people to extract NTFPs, such as lá nón and rattan, 
from the core zones of protected areas (where they were found in greatest densities) to support 
their livelihoods. For Village C, a CFM model was theoretically in place through the lease of 
forests to the whole community for 50 years, following the advocacy of UNDP, which 
emphasised the transfer of rights of management of the whole forest to the village community. 
General expectations among interviewed villagers were to have (free) firewood for immediate 
use and timber for house construction in the future, in return for protecting the leased forest, as 
expressed by 13 out of 20 interviewed household heads. 
However, these rights did not turn into substantive income for villagers or opportunities to 
improve their livelihoods. For a start, the access to NTFPs in Villages A and B had no legal 
basis. According to an FPD staff member: 
“allowing local people to extract NTFPs in the core zones could not be made official 
because, under the current Forest Protection and Development Law, such extraction 
is illegal. As a result, we often turn a blind eye towards NTFP extraction inside the 
protected areas, so that local people can have some sort of additional support for 
their difficult life”.  
In addition, interviews and transect walks with people in all three villages revealed that quantity 
of NTFPs had reduced significantly in recent years, as in the case of some valuable NTFPs, like 
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rattan and lá nón, as discussed in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, an opportunity to protect these 
(diminished) resources for local resource users was missed when local governments decided to 
give the rights to extract NTFPs to a company without any discussion with local people. In an 
interview, Village B’s administrative leader revealed: 
“recently, in spite of our complaints a commercial company that hired labour from 
another province has been granted the right to extract rattan in the whole of Quang 
Tri [including forests assigned to Villages A and B to protect]. Many of us think that 
it is not fair when the government asks us to protect the forest but does not keep the 
rattan for us in exchange for our efforts”.  
Moreover, even when an attempt was made to make rights to NTFPs more supportive to 
livelihoods in Villages A and B, it was not done effectively. For example, when rattan planting 
under the forest canopy was promoted as a long-term livelihood alternative for people in these 
villages, the economic benefits were questionable. In Village B, benefits from the initiative were 
restricted to only five out of 54 households: a level of participation that one head of a certified-
poor household in Village B considered “too small in scale”. In addition, in both villages, under 
the best case scenario, it would be six years before this rattan could first be harvested for sale. 
However, a project staff member confided in an in-depth interview that he was himself was 
unsure “whether the rattan harvesting will provide any income at all, taking into account the 
rattan survival rate at the site and fluctuations in the market price for rattan nationally”. 
Meanwhile, for the next six years, people in both villages would not receive any direct benefits 
from protecting forests, as the administrative leader of Village A complained. In this light, the 
devolution of rights to NTFP extraction did not bring concrete and stable income to encourage 
local people to contribute their efforts to manage forests more sustainably.  
Lack of support to livelihoods activities was also missing from the operations of the forest patrol 
group in Village C. The benefits of managing leased forests in Village C were not clearly 
conferred on the community by the local authorities. For instance, Article 2 of the decision of 
Huong Hoa District’s People Committee, dated August 2006, confirming forest allocation and 
users’ rights to the community of Village C, states in very general terms that the community “is 
entitled to enjoy benefits from the allocated forest, as stated in the Forest Allocation Plan” but 
the plan itself makes no mention of any benefits. Moreover, villagers in different interviews were 
not aware that, under the Forest Management, Protection and Development Plan for the 
Allocated Forest for the Period 2006-2010, developed by the FPD and handed to the village 
administrative leader in 2006 for reference, they had to pay VND 100,000 (about USD 8) per 
cubic metre of timber if they wanted to harvest wood for house construction. This ran contrary to 
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people’s expectations, as discussed earlier. Also, even if their rights to NTFPs were recognised 
in the lease document, no valuable NTFPs, such as rattan or lá nón, for which there was high 
national and international market demand, were found in the leased forests in any case, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. If they needed these resources for their household use, they had to collect 
them from forests outside their village (see Photo 7.2). This showed that, for practical purposes, 
none of the types of property right identified by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) existed in regard to 
the leased forests, thus preventing any benefits or power being conferred to people in Village C 
under the forest allocation programme in Quang Tri. In this case, the common property regime 
became an empty concept in forest devolution, reducing CBNRM in Village C to a tool to attract 
donor funding rather than a means for empowerment. As such, no foundation was laid for the 
whole village to work together as the UNDP project intended. 
Photo 7.2: Van Kieu Woman Harvesting the Shoots of Rattan Plants from a Forest outside 
her Village to Make Soup for Her Family 
 
(Photograph taken by the author during a transect walk through pasture fields and old rice fields 
in December 2007) 
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In fact, limited support to local livelihoods prevailed not only in these villages but elsewhere in 
Quang Tri province where government-sponsored forestry programmes were implemented. For 
example, the 661 Programme on forest rehabilitation (the current largest) pays VND 100,000 
(equivalent of USD 7) per month per hectare of forest for a household in exchange for protecting 
special-use forest and protection forest on the government’s behalf. However, under this 
programme, only six out of 536 households in one commune were selected to take part, said a 
commune FPD officer in an in-depth interview. Even if a whole village is selected to protect 
forest in exchange for the money, in another commune, when it comes to income division, each 
household receives only VND 30,000 (equivalent of USD 2) annually, said a village 
administrative leader during a transect walk.  
Two other rights of access to forest products namely were firewood for cooking and heating, and 
timber for household construction were often used to encourage local people’s participation in 
these induced forest based grassroots groups. Regarding firewood, the development of seasonal 
calendars with women of the three studied villages suggested that only in Village C did women 
collect firewood from the forests they were assigned to protect under devolution policies. 
However, participants in a women-only focus group discussion in Village C reported that they 
often gathered firewood from forests located outside their own allocated forests because these 
were more conveniently located on the way to their fields. Meanwhile, the seasonal calendar 
developed by women from Village A revealed that they collected firewood from their rice fields 
after felling trees to prepare the land for sowing (see Photo 7.3). A group of women from Village 
B in a transect walk said that they collected dead branches and small trees from a hill located 
within a production forest managed by the CPC, and forests planted under the 327 Programme in 
the commune. These findings highlighted the limited direct benefits that local people received 
from the forests they were asked to protect through induced forest-based grassroots groups. 
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Photo 7.3: Firewood Collection outside the Protected Area in Village A 
 
(Photograph taken by author in February 2008 during a transect walk with a group of women 
through Village A’s rice fields). 
In regard to timber for house construction, it turned out to be unattractive for local people. In 
Villages A and B, although local people were permitted to cut timber from nearby nature 
reserves for house construction (as part of a government effort to eliminate poor quality housing 
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in the area), benefits from forest resource extraction were either undesirable or unobtainable. For 
example, in Village A, where timber housing was the preferred option of the locals, observations 
during my stay in the village showed that most people could not afford to cut timber from the 
forest, either because they did not have the necessary money to cover the cost of providing food 
for the group of villagers who would assist them with timber cutting or because upgrading their 
housing was not a priority compared with more immediate concerns, such as getting enough food 
to eat (see Chapter 5). Indeed, in the entire village, only three houses were constructed using 
timber, while the remaining households still lived in bamboo houses. Meanwhile, in Village B, a 
man said in an informal conversation during a transect walk with a group of men around his 
village that  
“people here preferred brick houses over timber houses, because they withstand 
harsh weather conditions better. In addition, a brick house shows better economic 
and social status of the owner in this community”.  
As a result, permission to cut timber for household construction was not perceived as important 
by villagers. Further, given that the permit did not give villagers the right to cut timber for sale, 
those who cut for sale were doing so illegally, in order to save enough money to construct brick 
housing. For people in Village C, it was out of question to get timber from the forest they were 
allocated because the forest quality was poor. One man during a transect walk in the leased 
forests said that “Although there are some big trees around 60-80 cm in diameter, they are not 
good timber species”. Another member added that “they are easily infected by termites and not 
good for cutting, so no one wants them for house construction”. 
In view of discussions in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, the induction of grassroots groups in the forest 
sector at the case study villages indicates the prevalence of the technocratic school of thought in 
the operations of these groups. This position can be traced back to several areas of operation of 
induced forest-based grassroots groups. For a start, the groups were geared towards forest 
protection, following the dual approach of improving local people’s capacity in forest patrolling 
and helping the FPD improve its management capacity to protect forests from local people’s 
destruction. Moreover, without much concern for addressing the dysfunction of general 
assemblies (and, in fact, no clear guidance or structures to mobilise wider support from the local 
community), collective action at the grassroots level was not seen by these groups (or their 
creators) as an important factor for achieving sustainable forest management in the area. This 
was seen for instance when no efforts were made to revive the SSG communication teams in 
villages A and B.  
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While doing these tasks, these groups left socio-economic aspects of forest management 
untouched. In this regard, support for local livelihoods, especially in the context of high poverty, 
did not received proper attention in the operation of these groups at the case study sites. This in 
effect excluded local resource users’ needs from forest management process and increased the 
vulnerability of their livelihoods especially when local people had insufficient access to forest 
resources due to the imposition of the government-led agenda for forest protection, which made 
the devolution at the study site the exclusive devolution.  
In this regard, it was not surprising that local people had no interests in these groups and the 
government-led forest management. For example, in Village C, local people acknowledged the 
groups’ existence but did not make any contact with them to change or influence local 
government’s policies. Instead, local villagers “assented to government requests for 
participation in forest patrols or forest protection but they took no action to implement their 
commitments”, complained a commune FDP staff during an in-depth interview. This was how 
the community responded to an unfavourable policy, by a strategy that showed some 
characteristics of ‘evasion’ (See Section 2.5). 
7.4. Participation, Gender and Power in Induced Forest-based 
Grassroots Groups 
In this section I will discuss issues of participation, gender inequality and power in induced 
forest-based grassroots groups. In doing so, I aim to shed light onto normative factors 
influencing roles of these groups. Regarding gender, all three induced forest-based grassroots 
groups did not have positive patterns of representation of women. The establishment of induced 
forest-based grassroots groups reinforced the male-dominated pattern of power relations in forest 
management at the research sites and the inclusion of women’s views was not part of the induced 
forest-based grassroots groups’ approach to forest management. In fact, there was no female 
representative on either of the SSGs in Villages A and B or on the coordination team for the 
forest patrol group in Village C. All people involved in the SSG initiative treated my question 
“why don’t I see any women in your group?” as a joke unworthy of a response, because it was 
obvious to them that forest management had nothing to do with women, because, traditionally, 
forest management tasks were seen as men’s jobs, as discussed in Chapter 5. This gender 
division of labour was also seen India, where men are considered responsible for forest 
governance (Nuggehalli and Prokopy, 2009). 
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Male-dominated power relations happened partly because, at the case study sites, forest 
management was instilled into all local people’s minds as being “patrolling forests to stop illegal 
logging”, as expressed in the words of a woman from Village C during a transect walk (see also 
Section 6.3), an area reserved for men. As a result, participants in a men-only focus group 
discussion in Village A cried “how can women patrol the forest?”, “they don’t know where to 
go!” and “they can’t walk very far!” However, in a women-only focus group discussion, women 
in this village were very frustrated that many men who were not physically strong were selected 
to take part in the SSG. In the words of one woman participant “these men can’t walk as much as 
we can because they are older”. However, despite being frustrated by gender inequality, none of 
these women in the same women-only focus group took any action to change this. This partly 
resulted from the internalised oppression process that saw women being so used to be excluded 
from decision making process. Eventually they came to accept that they had no power and it was 
not their business (but men’s) to decode forest management practices (see Rowlands, 1995). This 
internalised oppression was discussed further in the following. 
Moreover, segregation of public space is also dictated by norms, making it unrespectable for 
women to take part certain activities held in public space (Agarwal, 2000, 2001; Nuggehalli and 
Prokopy, 2009).  For the case studied sites, one SSG member from Village B reported that it was 
“too complicated when going on patrol in a mixed sex group of men and women, because, 
traditionally, men and women outside the family have to avoid staying together in a small group 
in the same place”. For that reason, individual interviews with SSG members in Village B show 
that all members were much happier without a female participant in their group. In the words of 
one member: 
“My wife will not be happy for me to work with the group if any woman were there. 
Also, the work is not really suitable for women. We go on patrols or have meetings at 
odd hours whenever most or all of us at home. Women cannot keep up with these 
commitments because they have to look after the house and children”.  
Indeed, this gender norm at the case study and the process of internalised oppression stopped any 
women from coming forward to confront how SSGs had ignored their roles and participation. 
This echoed Nuggehalli and Prokopy (2009)’s finding that, in many countries, prevailing norms 
present obstacles to participation in resource management efforts. As for me, although I worked 
with these men day or night at anytime that we could meet, I was not under the same pressures as 
local women. This is because I was seen, in this case, as an outsider, to which the village norm 
did not apply. Hence no women in the village felt offended if I met their husband in person. That 
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was my finding from various specific discussions with women in the case study villages on the 
issue of whether they minded if I worked with their husbands. Clearing this issue also helped to 
prevent any misunderstanding with women in these villages. In this regard, I had advantages of 
being an outsider to conduct this research.  
At the same time, following feminist scholars, the scale of analysis on this issue was expanded to 
the household to deepen the understanding of households as heterogeneous and inharmonious 
groups of people (Kabeer, 1991). In addition, it is held to be the case that personal and household 
attributes possessed by women can constrain their participation in community organizations 
(Nuggehalli and Prokopy, 2009). For the Van Kieu households of Villages A and C, marital 
relations within a household did not help women to engage in activities outside of the family. My 
observations of Van Kieu families during the time I stayed in these villages revealed that women 
and men rarely talked to one another: they co-habited but rarely discussed matters between 
themselves. At one extreme, men seemed not to see the need to discuss issues with their wives 
because, as one man from Village C claimed in a men-only focus group’s discussion, “women 
are not educated”. When village meetings were chosen as a means of communicating an issue, 
women had little opportunity to learn about that issue because they did not attend and their 
husbands did not want to talk to them (as one woman from Village A said in a focus group 
discussion). As such, many Van Kieu women appeared reluctant to discuss village issues with 
their husbands, because, as a woman from Village C related, “asking my husband what he is 
doing is nosy”, and as another woman from Village A explained, it had become a habit to view 
discussions in village meetings as men’s business. This highlighted the internalised oppression 
process that women in these villages faced in forest management. Even if women enquired as to 
their husband’s business, like the wife of Village A’s communist party secretary, they could 
expect to be met with the response “why do you want to know?” Within Van Kieu households, it 
had become common practice for both husbands and wives to answer their spouse’s question 
“what did you discuss in the village meeting today?” with a simple “I don’t know”, said one 
woman from Village A in a focus group’s discussion. This constrained sources of information 
that wives could access especially when an important channel of communication within a village 
was village meetings where men were often able or invited to attend. 
In these contexts of unfavourable conditions for women to speak up, donor-funded projects in 
Villages A and C reinforced the exclusion of women from forest management. Although women 
were active in NTFP collection and travelled long distances in and out forests during their 
agricultural work, none of these projects made a meaningful attempt to engage in discussion with 
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women about forest management at the research sites. Instead, the projects selected the village 
meetings (without any modification to ensure women’s participation) as the primary mechanism 
for communicating with the whole village, as well as the main decision-making body. 
Traditionally, however, these meetings were a venue for men, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Therefore, it was not surprising that women were never consulted about NRM, in general, or the 
establishment of induced forest-based grassroots groups in particular. One widow in Village A 
said in a women-only focus group discussion that 
 “I am never informed of meetings relating to forest management activities. If there is 
anything that I need to know, my neighbours will inform me. Meanwhile, I am 
informed of all meetings related to other issues”.  
In addition, in explaining the non-representation of women in induced forest-based grassroots 
groups, from women’s perspectives, a key factor prohibiting their active participation in induced 
forest-based grassroots groups for forest management was the low importance they attached to 
the activities performed by these groups. In this case, women selected self-exclusion (see 
Cornwall, 2008). Discussions with women in the three villages revealed that they chose not to 
take part in induced forest-based grassroots groups for several reasons. First of all, they were 
often very busy with domestic duties and could not spare time to engage in community work and 
attending meetings (see Nuggehalli and Prokopy, 2009). For both Van Kieu and Kinh women in 
all three villages, forest patrols (which they perceived forest management to consist of) were 
seen as an imposition on their already busy lives, as one woman from Village B said during the 
development of a seasonal calendar. Given that women were charged with the responsibility of 
doing much of the agricultural work associated with the provision of food for the whole family, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, “now only men still have sufficient free time to take part in different 
activities organised by projects for forest management”, said a woman who took part in the 
development of a seasonal calendar in Village B. As a result of being overloaded with 
agricultural and household work, which is often emphasized in feminist scholars (see Sharp et 
al., 2003), women like a participant in a women-only focus group in Village C, reported that “I 
opted not to take part in forest management activities because, otherwise, I would be over-
stretched”.  
Regarding tangible benefits (i.e. the opportunity costs of taking part (i.e. increasing their 
workload) versus the benefits of so doing (i.e. income or livelihood improvements)), all 
participants in women-only focus group discussions in the three villages agreed that taking part 
in forest protection activities did not contribute substantive income to the household economy. In 
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all three study sites induced forest-based grassroots groups rarely provided or engaged with 
livelihood improvements (as discussed in Section 6.3), so taking part in activities organised by 
these groups did not bring “any more food to my family”, said one woman from Village C, when 
they “have so many other things to do within a day”, said another woman from Village B. Thus, 
in accordance with their family’s (gendered) division of labour, women continued to spend time 
on jobs that brought home food, while men attended forest-related meetings and activities. In 
addition, women at these case studies often agreed that men should take part in forest 
management. In the words of one woman in Village B in a women-only focus group discussion 
“we [women] are good at agricultural work and men are more knowledgeable on forestry. We 
want to stick to what we know best”. This echoed one of Nuggehalli and Prokopy’s (2009) 
research finding that saw women declining to participate in participatory activities they viewed 
as going against traditionally defined roles. In addition, as Rowlands (1997) and Sharp et al. 
(2003) rightly argued that only when the critique of current gender relations and the realisation 
of the limitations that women placed on themselves came from the women themselves, can 
development processes effectively challenge the relations of patriarchal domination and achieve 
empowerment of women.  
Because the impacts these groups brought to their respective communities were low, the self-
exclusion of women from these groups did not increase their vulnerability or level of poverty 
among women. That said, lack of control over forest resources that were required for household 
consumption such as NTFPs might still have great impact to whole household welfare. In the 
case of Nicaragua, women’s lack of control over forest stops them from improving food security 
and nutrition for their families (Mauro and Pallas, 2009). One direct impact of women being 
excluded from induced forest-based grassroots groups at the study sites was the loss of 
opportunities to earn extra income for their families especially when donor-funded projects paid 
for SSG membership. This was reflected in the words of one woman in Village A, who said that 
“it is not fair that these men in the SSG have monthly stipends to support their families despite 
being less able than me to walk a long distance in the forest”. Moreover, being excluded from 
these groups, women did not have opportunities to air their views on how forest management 
should go beyond forest patrols (as women raised with me in various discussions that are 
discussed in the following chapter), and how incentives, such as access to grazing fields for 
cattle (areas of great need in their daily lives), might have been used as incentives in return for 
forest patrols. As such, the internalised oppression of women and self-exclusion of women from 
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these groups did not help women to explore different livelihood options that their families might 
have been able to access in exchange for collective action for sustainable forest management. 
Having discussed gender aspects in induced forest-based grassroots groups at the case study 
sites, this section now reflects on the issue of participation of local resource users in these 
groups, as well as in wider decision-making processes. In general, the participation of local 
people in the establishment process for these groups was very limited, so an opportunity to share 
information and help local people understand the philosophy behind the formation of these 
groups was missed. Indeed, at all three case study sites, the establishment process was truncated, 
and consultations with local villagers were inadequate, insofar as discussions between villagers 
and outside project staff and government officers tended to be procedural rather than 
empowering. For instance, one participant taking part in natural resource mapping exercise in 
Village A revealed that, during the establishment of the SSG in the village,  
“there was only one meeting to inform [male] villagers of the decision to establish 
the group. At the end of the meeting, villagers were asked to appoint five members 
who could read and write Vietnamese to take part in training the following day at the 
commune headquarters”.  
As such, the criteria for membership excluded disadvantaged people (i.e. the illiterate in the 
village, especially young people). In doing so, the project did not pay much attention to local 
conditions (highlighting a deficiency in local contexts on the part of the project team when 
implementing devolution policies), as was unfolded by a woman from Village A during a 
transect walk: 
“all SSG group members in this village were selected because they could read and 
write Vietnamese. Young (and able) men and women in our village were unable to 
join the SSG, because they could not read and write Vietnamese. This is because 
young people who grew up in the village did not have access to schooling in our old 
village until a school opened in the village in 2005”. 
The consultation process for the establishment of induced forest-based grassroots groups was 
similar or worse in Villages B and C. For example, interviews with project and CPC officers 
regarding the establishment of SSGs in Village B revealed that project team members held a 
meeting with the CPC to introduce the project and put forward the requirements to establish a 
group of local people (i.e. an SSG). As soon as the CPC was happy with the aims of the project 
and what was involved, it decided that “it was better that the SSGs were staffed by CPC officers 
and mass organisation representatives”, said an SSG member in an individual interview. As a 
result, it issued a letter to appoint SSG members from among its own commune officers and the 
200 
 
relevant village administrative leaders, said the SSG leader in an in-depth interview. In this 
regard, local people (who were meant to be there to promote local participation in forest 
management) were bypassed in the formation of the project team. This point will be revisited in 
Chapter 7.  
In this context, local people in Village B did not have an opportunity of being informed about the 
SSG. In the words of a man from this village, “like many other villagers, I learnt of the existence 
of the group by asking around when I saw some people walking around in uniform”. In the view 
of a Women’s Union leader in Village B, expressed during an in-depth interview, “local people 
don’t know about the SSG’s existence and work because the Forest Protection Group [i.e. the 
SSG] only involves officers of the commune administrative branches and mass organisations”. In 
this regard, the way SSG was set up in Village B could be called manipulation (see Section 2.2.3 
in Chapter 2). For SSG members in Village B, their participation in the group was functional, 
and was viewed as an extension of their other official duties, as all SSG members confirmed in 
individual in-depth interviews. Indeed, for two members of the SSG in Village B, whose terms 
on the village/commune administration began when the project had already been running for a 
year, their participation in the SSG became compulsory as one of them said “I was nominated as 
a member before I was even aware of the SSG’s existence”.  
Meanwhile, in Village C, the consultation for the lease of the forest to the whole village was also 
limited to a single village meeting. However, only a few villagers were able to attend the 
meeting because of the inconvenient timing when a lot of villagers had gone to work on their 
fields. (This happened because CPC officers and the project team turned up unannounced and 
asked the village administrative leader to call for the meeting on the same day). In spite of this 
fact, the meeting still took place, establishing four forest patrol teams and selecting four team 
leaders (in-depth interview with village administrative leader). The participation of local people 
in the project in this case was sacrificed for the convenience of the outsiders. In this regard, the 
actual purpose of the projects gathering local people in village meetings (in case of Villages A 
and C) was simply to inform local people of what had been decided and ask them to implement 
the decision. This constitutes tokenism in Arnstein’s typology of participation (see Section 2.2.3 
in Chapter 2). 
Either from the perspective of recipients of participation initiatives (following Arnstein’s 
typology) or from the perspective of project implementers (following Pretty’s – see Section 2.2.3 
in Chapter 2), the type of participation seen at the three case study villages was predominantly 
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manipulation. From the outset, participation of local people in these donor-funded projects that 
ostensibly aimed to invite local participation in forest management was not used as a process for 
them either to increase their capacity or rights to development. For project teams and local 
governments, participation of local people in the planning process was in a passive form, where 
they were only told about what had been decided. In this regard, participation at the study sites 
was a pretence in the project documents to attract funding from international donors. In this 
regard, local people were excluded from decision-making processes that directly influenced their 
lives (such as Village A not knowing of the establishment of the nature reserve, Village B not 
being consulted in decisions to grant a company the right to extract NTFPs, and Village C not 
being invited to participate in demarcating the leased forest). As a result, although protecting 
forests may have been for good intentions (e.g. biodiversity conservation), the establishment of 
these induced forest-based grassroots groups only helped the local government to impose its 
agenda for protecting forests without considering local people’s needs.  
Regarding participation of local resource users in the wider decision-making process, for the 
government of Vietnam, the motivation for greater participation of local people in the 
development process is two-fold. On the one hand, the government sees the need to increase 
local participation in the development process to stabilise the country and make use of different 
forces to tackle deforestation, as evidenced by their introduction of different laws and policies, as 
discussed in Chapter 4. On the other hand, strengthening grassroots participation in forest 
governance in reality was used as an excuse for transferring the costs of managing unproductive 
forests to villagers. Arguably, this could be detected in several aspects of devolution policies 
seen at the three study villages. When forest resources were poor and no use of forest land was 
allowed, such as in the case of Village C’s leased forest, transferring users’ rights over the forest 
to the local community was tantamount to transferring the cost of protecting and regenerating 
forest to the rural poor without any opportunity costs to the state, in terms of lost income from 
logging or other forms of exploitation. At the same time, asking for greater participation of 
people in forest patrolling in the more valuable (timber-rich) forests around Villages A and B, 
which remained under the tight control of the government in the form of protected areas, did not 
require the government to cede any additional power to local populations. Instead, it simply 
reduced the cost to the government of patrolling areas of forest in remote locations where they 
could not easily patrol on their own due to lack of staff and resources. In a focus group 
discussion with women from Village C, a statement from one participant showed clearly the how 
local people saw this cost transference: “villagers do forest protection only for the FPD. When 
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the FPD has harvested all the timber from the forest, we don’t have to protect that forest 
anymore because the FPD doesn’t need us then”.  
The process of transferring the cost of forest management had its toll on people’s benefits. The 
above statement of the villager from Village C reflected the fact that participation was not used 
to stress the importance of those invited to actively take part in forest protection. In this regard, 
the vision of post-colonial scholars to recover the lost historical and contemporary voices of the 
marginalised, the oppressed and the dominated, through a radical reconstruction of history and 
knowledge production (McEwan, 2008) became distant. In this regard, the right to development 
as the establishment of induced forest-based embodied did not exist and the goal to create aware 
citizens who became more assertive in claiming their rights and holding the government 
accountable was not reached. For this specific instance, induced forest-based grassroots groups 
did not provide local people with a platform to deliberate their wishes and need.  
As a result of the aforementioned trends, induced forest-based grassroots groups at the study 
sites had little power in planning or decision-making processes. Information collected during the 
patrols by the SSGs in Villages A and B was not incorporated into the knowledge base for 
biodiversity conservation planning by the FPD. The common understanding among SSG 
members in Village B was that “the information we gathered while patrolling was for the CPC 
and FPD to use” (in-depth interview an SSG member responsible for writing the group’s 
reports). As such, SSG members were only implementers. “Once this information had been 
submitted to the CPC and FPD, it is up to them to make use of it”, added the leader of the SSG. 
Furthermore, in the opinions of two BirdLife project staff members and a member of FPD staff, 
“the quality of the information collected during patrols was not high enough to be used to inform 
conservation planning anyway”. 
As a result, although this information was processed by the project officers, utilising a useful 
Excel spreadsheet, it did not feed into any FPD plans or activities, confided project and FPD 
staff responsible for the SSGs. Consequently, the SSG’s work to collect information related to 
biodiversity monitoring while they patrolled the forests became not a means to an end but, rather, 
an end in itself. Given that there were no other channels through which the SSGs could share or 
use their information, such as at village meetings or regular meetings with concerned authorities, 
the contribution the SSGs made to monitoring and protecting forest biodiversity did not extend 
beyond patrolling itself (with all the associated limitations discussed later). In this sense, 
BirdLife, when establishing the SSGs, seemed only to envisage them as raw data collectors. 
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Interviews with BirdLife’s field staff and its partners revealed that the INGO implemented no 
strategy to equip SSG members with either the technical knowledge or the institutional capacity 
required to process the raw data and, thereby, turn them into a tool for SSGs to engage more 
effectively with the community, FPD and CPC in forest policy planning.  
In this regard, knowledge production for forest management at the study sites is strongly 
controlled by powerful government at the case study sites, which has been intensified by low 
level of participation of local resource users in decision-making processes. To explain further 
this fact, various theoretical perspectives are to be employed. From the view of post-
development and post-colonial scholars, the construction of knowledge is influenced by the 
power of actors who can assert their knowledge over others (Sanderson and Kindon, 2004). As 
having knowledge is having power (Said in McEwan, 2008), the exclusion of local knowledge in 
the forest planning and management process deprived local people an opportunities to raise their 
voices and practising their power in decision making process. One direct negative influence to 
their livelihoods was that when their voices were not heard, improved living standards for the 
poor became very distant (see Thoms, 2008).  
Moreover, in the view of current enthusiasm for local people being a solution to hegemonic 
development (see Chapter 1), local people need to have their knowledge recognised in decision-
making processes. At the same time, post-development scholars realise that relinquishing power 
over knowledge production is a difficult and slow process, requiring changes to long-held 
worldviews on the poor and their capacity, and well-established institutional mechanisms for 
state control over different aspects of society (Sanderson and Kindon, 2004; Jakimow, 2008). In 
addition, at the case study sites, the prevalence of technocratic position in forest management 
showed the shyness of the Western donors to push for change in favour of local knowledge 
production. This has impeded the meaningful participation and confidence of local resource 
users in decision making process. This echoed a statement by a female household head during 
the development of Village A’s seasonal calendar, that “in agricultural work we know what is 
involved and what needs to be done but in current forest-based activities we don’t”.  As a result, 
local people’s ability to protect their livelihoods in the face of advancement of conservation 
agendas by the government and international donors was weakened. This was illustrated by the 
attitude of forest patrol team leaders in Village C, who, in the words of one of them (during a 
men-only group interview), “patrol and protect forests because the FPD say we must”. 
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Remarkably, the SSG in Village A had no voice in forest planning that directly influenced the 
livelihoods of people there. For example, the plan to establish Bac Huong Hoa Nature Reserve 
that annexed forests in and around the Village A was initiated as early as 2003 (in-depth 
interview with a BirdLife staff member). However, throughout 2004, BirdLife and Quang Tri 
FPD, the creators of the SSG, did not even inform SSG members or the wider population of 
Village A about the plan. Only in 2005, after more than one year in existence, did the SSG find 
out of the plan, as one SSG member reported in an in-depth interview:  
“We did not know about the plan for the nature reserve establishment at all until 
2005 when the district FPD officers came to the village to ask us to stop forest 
clearance for dry rice cultivation as one of rules of the nature reserve”. 
This reality showed how little the SSG in Village A was taken seriously by makers of forest 
policy. 
Furthermore, in Village C, no villagers played a meaningful part in the process of allocating 
forests to the community to manage for the next 50 years, which was supposed to be a process of 
empowerment for local people by letting them develop codes of conduct for forest conservation 
and use a traditional institution (i.e. an assembly of the whole village) to decide how forests 
should be managed. These aims were not achieved, because neither of these things actually 
happened. In a focus group discussion held with male heads of households in the village, even 
the village administrative leader confessed to knowing nothing about participatory forest 
demarcation, resource assessment or resource-use planning, all of which are required for forest 
allocation to communities under the guidelines for community forest management prepared by 
MARD (2006). An in-depth interview, the FPD staff member in charge of the technical work for 
forest allocation in Village C revealed that all of the work of forest demarcation, resource 
assessment and resource use planning was carried out by the district FPD, as a consultancy 
contracted by the UNDP project. This took away the opportunities of local people to understand 
what rights and responsibility the forest lease entailed. This situation also happened in Nepal, 
under JFM, when the micro-plan (the local-level forest management plan) was cut short by being 
outsourced to professional NGOs, individuals or researchers on a contractual basis (Bhattacharya 
et al., 2010). As a result, voices of local resource users in Village C were not taken into account 
with regard to how forests were managed and used, leading to misperceptions about what 
benefits they could expect to receive and neglect of the duties they were supposed to perform. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on technical aspects over livelihoods in the operation of induced 
forest-based grassroots groups also highlights the dominance of instrumental relational ties (see 
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Section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2) between the local government and donor funded projects on one side 
and local people on the other. Although these groups were supposed to strengthen local 
communities’ participation in forest governance (i.e. the promotion of associational ties among 
villagers), local government used its power to turn these groups into its tool to fortify its control 
over forest and people dependent on it in. In doing this, indigenous knowledge and institutions 
governing forest management in these study sites were totally ignored. For instance, although the 
philosophy behind the leased forest in Village C was to integrate government-led forest 
management with traditional Van Kieu forest management practices (as discussed in Section 
7.3), the Già Làng of the village was not included in the coordination team or anywhere else in 
the initiative, as interviews with various participants involved in the UNDP project revealed. 
This, in fact, raised concerns about the veracity of both the government and UNDP’s intentions 
for restoring traditional forest management knowledge and institutions, (assuming that the role of 
Gìa Làng in the traditional system was prominent, as discussed in Chapter 5).  
In its turn, following political ecologists’ point of views, the prevalence of technocratic position 
in forest management at the case study sites can be further explained. This could be done by 
examining how environmental issues are defined, prioritised and addressed through prevailing 
modes of environmental management; for example how powerful actors construct environmental 
problems as a means to attain tighter control over resources (Bryant, 1992; Bryant and Bailey, 
1997; Gregory, 2001). In this line of argument, the prevalence of the technocratic position in 
forest management at the study sites showed the capacity of the local government to make choice 
for local resource users in forest governance process. In this effect, the local government’s power 
is strongly determined by its capacities to push for the application of the technocratic position in 
forest governance although local people did not want this to happen (see Fisher, 2000; Allen, 
2003a; Kabeer, 2005).  
At the case study sites, local people’s capacities to influence unfavourable government policies 
are expressed in their attempts to contest the monopoly of the government over forest resources. 
For example, villagers used different resistance strategies to challenge the imposition of forest 
protection and thus lack of benefits to local people, such as illegal logging by indigenous forest-
based grassroots groups in villages A and B, and neglect of forest patrolling by the forest patrol 
group in Village C. However, the capacity of the government was much greater than that of local 
people in imposing its policies. This position was well illustrated by a view shared by a CPC 
officer from Village C in an in-depth interview. According to this officer, the attention given to 
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forest protection was necessary, so “we have to force people to patrol forests around the village 
[Village C] because the forests are for them to use in future”.  
Following discussion with the same officer the phrase “have to force” was further explored. 
“have to force” meant that local government used its power as immanent, i.e. the capacity to 
punish any wrongdoings that local people committed (see Allen, 2003a), to impose its agenda on 
local people. From this point of view, power cannot be separated from its effects, and it makes 
its presence felt through the sets of relations and circumstances local people find themselves in, 
not through any force imposed by a distant, authoritative centre. In this regard, immanent power 
was conceived inseparable from what it could do punish. When seeing power as a capacity, the 
local government at the case study sites hold power but may or may not choose to show it. Yet, it 
was still widely regarded by local people as being powerful (see Allen, 2003a). This, in the 
Vietnamese context, was guaranteed by the Party-state’s monopoly position in the country’s 
political scene. This immanent power was felt among local people when they saw SSGs as local 
army, police and FPD to stop their access to forest (see Section 7.2). Recognising the existence 
of immanent power improves understanding of vulnerability of the less powerful. In that way, it 
helps explain why disadvantaged groups within communities, like women and the poor, do not 
want to speak up against elites or government agencies in biased benefit sharing in development 
aids at the case study sites (see Section 8.2), because of concerns of losing other opportunities, 
such as employment or short-term loans, outside development aid frameworks, which these 
actors provide.  
In this regard, power is thought to work through indirect techniques of self-regulation, which 
make it difficult for individuals to behave in any other way (i.e. they conform or adjust to the 
rules imposed on them; see Allen, 2003b). However, this concept of power as immanent seems 
to assume that it is a natural occurrence, without intentions of certain actors. In doing so, this 
concept downplays the subjectivity of the nature of power (originating from the socio-economic 
contexts that define the perception of power by different actors) and its use (see Miller and 
Cummins, 1992; Allen, 2003a). In this regard, this approach to power analysis should be used in 
conjunction with the one that considers power as a capacity (as discussed earlier), to reduce the 
risk of simplifying power analysis to exclude connections to detailed spacing and timing of 
activities and patterns of behaviour (see Allen, 2003b).  
Having no power over how to use or manage forest resources, such as rights to exclude the 
commercial company from exploiting rattan in forests they were asked to protect (Village B), or 
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rights to be consulted on the establishment of the protected area right in their land (Village A), or 
rights to be part of the process on demarcating the leased forest (Village C), reduced the 
livelihood options of the rural poor in these villages and contributed to their vulnerability as 
discussed in Chapter 5. This effectively highlights the disparity between the rhetorical goals of 
donor-funded projects in creating grassroots groups in forest sector and the reality of 
implementation. 
7.5. Local Perspectives on Improving the Participation of Induced 
Grassroots Groups 
Having discussed structures, rights and responsibilities of induced forest-based grassroots 
groups, and their power in forest governance, this section identifies local people’s views on how 
to improve these groups. To approach the question of how to identify meaningful changes that 
could lead to more effective participation of induced grassroots groups in forest management, I 
first asked local people to reflect on opportunities for improving forest management and the 
structure and operations of grassroots groups. This began during the household interviews and 
focus group discussions with villagers during Stage 2 of the research (see Chapter 3). 
Participants’ responses were then analysed and further discussed in focus groups held separately 
for men and women in each of the three villages during Stage 3. The key issues that arose from 
these discussions revolved around the different kinds of ownership of forests and mechanisms 
for managing forests.  
Taking these in turn, there were clear gender differences regarding the ways in which forest 
management could be improved. For women, there were differences in whether they would even 
take part in forest management if, in the future, forest management by induced grassroots groups 
continued to be limited to forest patrolling and controlling illegal logging. The women who took 
part in the focus group discussion in Village A expressed a willingness to take part in forest 
patrols, either with men or in their own group. One of the reasons they wanted to do this was to 
make a point to the men in their village that, as one of them said, “I am as human as you and 
stronger than you [men]”. Her opinion, which the group agreed with, was expressed in a context 
where older (and physically weaker) men in the village were being rewarded financially for 
being SSG members, despite the fact that, according to one woman, “they are all too old to trek 
long distances during forest patrols”. However, women in this group also acknowledged that, 
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because they were already busy with agricultural and domestic jobs, it was difficult for them to 
take on another task, like forest patrolling. 
In contrast to the opinions expressed by women during focus group discussions in Village A, for 
women in Villages B and C, if, in the future, forest management by induced grassroots groups 
continued to be limited to forest patrolling and controlling illegal logging, they would prefer not 
to participate, even if they were assured benefits from these activities. To a large extent this 
could be attributed to prevailing gender roles and responsibilities as discussed in Chapters 5 and 
6. For instance, one participant of a women-only focus group in Village B commented that “I 
want to take part in forest management in the area of forest tending; I don’t want to take part in 
forest patrolling because this is a job for men”. These comments were further explained by a 
woman from Village C, who said in a women-only focus group that “I don’t think that I am able 
to take part in forest management [i.e. forest patrolling] because, if I saw men cutting forests 
illegally, I would not dare to stop them”. Another reason for women’s reluctance to participate in 
forest patrolling was cited by a woman from Village B, who explained that, “here, we [women] 
are more active in agriculture and animal husbandry, because we know more about agriculture. 
Forestry work is for men and they know more about it”. As a result, in most households, women 
agreed that men should join collective activities for forest management if it involved forest 
patrols and monitoring illegal logging. This is the evidence of internalised oppression with 
women being so used to be excluded from forest management activities and think men are better 
than them in doing work on forest. However, it is important to consider this preference in the 
context of workload women already have in their daily life as discussed in chapter 5 and 6. As 
such, any attempt to encourage women’s participation needs to consider women’s perspectives 
and priorities. 
The general unwillingness of women to engage in forest management (if it were limited to the 
activities described above) has significant implications. For a start, women comprise a large 
section of the rural population at the research sites and, crucially, come into daily contact with 
forests as they go about their everyday lives. For example, women work in and around the forest 
when they go to work in their rice fields or collect NTFPs. As such, they come into contact with 
forests in different contexts than men. Arguably, if forest management continues to focus only 
on technical aspects, as discussed in Section 7.3, women are likely to exclude themselves from 
forest management. Their (mostly self-) exclusion from induced forest grassroots groups has 
adverse implications for full grassroots participation, which could, in turn, facilitate effective 
forest management.  
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Meanwhile, among the men at the three research sites, forest patrolling by itself, without 
adequate financial compensation for the labour they put in, was not attractive enough to 
encourage them to take part in forest management activities. Thus, many of the interviewed 
villagers saw the work by the SSGs or the coordination team for the forest protection group as 
being someone else’s responsibility. Rather than simply patrolling the forest, they wanted to 
expand the scope of forest management schemes to include forest land allocation, so as to 
increase their livelihood opportunities. In the view of a male villager from Village A, which was 
widely shared across the three villages: 
“In this village, forest patrols are not enough. Forest management should include 
some livelihood alternatives for us. The only [acceptable] livelihood alternative to 
being allowed to clear forests for dry rice cultivation is for the government to 
allocate forests [i.e. natural forests in the protected areas] for us to manage so that 
we can nurture and harvest forest resources like timber and rattan to sell in the 
future.”  
When analysing future forest management options, local people emphasised the inclusion of 
livelihood opportunities, which was a signal against the technocratic position in forest 
management. In the context of high levels of poverty at the three case study villages, it was 
unsurprising that local people expected to gain more from forest management activities that the 
state and donor funded projects initiated. By failing to incorporate local livelihood concerns into 
their interventions, induced grassroots groups failed to facilitate people’s participation in the 
forest management process (as discussed in Section 7.4). To prevent this from happening and 
make forest devolution a meaningful means of local empowerment, devolved forest management 
must consider local livelihoods in its activities. The importance of this issue for future forest 
management was stressed by a woman from Village C during a women-only focus group 
discussion: 
“Forest protection can’t work without income or livelihood improvement! If I have 
no compensation or have to wait for 10 years before timber harvest for sale might be 
allowed (if at all), I may become old and hungry before the benefits come to me. If I 
do not have money now to buy food, my children can’t wait either”.  
This opinion of local people was in fact a condemnation to the use of the technocratic approach 
to forest management in their areas. In fact, the demand of local people for the inclusion of 
livelihood activities in forest management efforts is widely acknowledged in development 
discourses as a key factor enabling successful NRM (see Gambill, 1999; Thakadu, 2005). 
Addressing this local concern for livelihood improvement is likely to reverse the common 
observation about forest policy in Vietnam that current incentives for sustainable use of forest 
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resources have not encouraged local communities towards more sustainable forest management, 
because lack of food and income still drive many people to extract them at unsustainable levels 
(Tran et al., 2005). 
With regard to forest ownership and its importance to the functioning of induced grassroots 
groups, a variety of perspectives were again evident. In Villages A and B, where forests were 
under state control and not allocated to local people to manage, most participants identified 
individual ownership of forest and forest land as one of the most important factors contributing 
to effective self-organisation for forest management. In Village A, the majority of the men and 
all of the women who participated in two separate, single-gender focus group discussions argued 
that, if ownership of forests was put into individual hands, forest management would be more 
effective. The rationale for preferring individual ownership of forest and forest land was 
explained by a participant of a women-only focus group in Village A as follows:  
“If forests are placed under my ownership, no one can enter. This is the norm here.... 
With individual ownership, if anyone enters my forest without my consent, I have 
grounds to exclude that person and ask a fine from him or her. As a result, they are 
scared and dare not destroy my forest”.  
With this suggestion, the participant argued for rights of access and exclusion, as described in 
Chapter 2. The views and arguments in favour of individual ownership in Village A were also 
shared by the majority of interviewed households in Village B, where 14 out of 21 interviewed 
household representatives preferred individual ownership of forests, three wanted ownership by 
household groups, and four did not have a strong opinion.  
Meanwhile, most of the people interviewed in Village C shared the viewpoint of people in 
Villages A and B about private ownership over forests as a precondition for them to take an 
active part in induced grassroots groups to manage forests together and avoid free-riding in 
collective forest management. Thus, a male villager from Village C said during a transect walk 
that:  
“Had the FPD allocated forests to individual households with clear benefit 
packages, benefits and responsibilities from the allocated forests would have been 
linked directly to each household. As a result, no one would have been able to pass 
their responsibilities to others, and the forests would have been better managed”. 
This view echoed discussion on benefit sharing in Section 2.6. Fellow female villagers supported 
this view. For instance, a participant in a women-only group summarised the participants’ views 
211 
 
when she said that “individual ownership of forest by each household must be secured. This will 
increase the responsibility of each household over the protection of their own forests.” 
 Notwithstanding this, the reasons for preferring private ownership of forests in these villages lay 
with local people’s belief in its advantages. Emphasising the advantages of individual ownership 
of forests, participants in a men-only focus group in Village A stressed that this would encourage 
households to protect forests more wholeheartedly because the benefits they gained from 
harvesting forest resources, and the contribution these made to their livelihoods, would be linked 
more directly to their own protection efforts. This echoes the arguments of influences of both 
attributes of the resource users and those of the resource itself to the cost and benefit people 
receive from collective action, as discussed in Section 2.6 in Chapter 2. 
Meanwhile, in Village C, where 102 hectares of forest had been leased to the village to manage 
for 50 years, without much enthusiasm from villagers (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6), their 
previous experience of forced collective forest management with few benefits under the UNDP 
project led to a consensus that community ownership was not a practical means of empowering 
induced grassroots groups and encouraging wider participation of local people in the forest 
management process. In the words of a participant in a men-only focus group:  
“Collective ownership means public property. No one cares what happens to it. 
Similarly, when the government allocated forests to our community as a whole, it did 
so without anyone having to commit to anything to protect it.”  
Another participant in the same group added that:  
“Collective ownership of forest in this village is associated with unprofitability, 
because benefits from forests do not exist. As people already have a lot of things to 
do, collective ownership of forest without accruing benefits simply doesn’t appeal to 
them.” 
The preference of people in these two villages for individual ownership of forests goes contrary 
to traditional forest management practices, which were based on community ownership (see 
Chapter 5). This inconsistency stood out during the field research People gave various responses 
to the question “why do you prefer individual over community ownership, taking into account 
your past forest management?” In Village B, the Trưởng Làng explained that community 
ownership of forests had been possible in the past partly because “we had fewer people living in 
the village and fewer traders coming to ask for forest products then. Now we have many more 
people living here and roads bring more people from outside to our village”. This was also the 
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case for two other villages, where roads to their villages were given priority under the national 
135 Programme, said the respective CPC chairmen.  
In Village A, where people accepted that the system of Già Làng leadership had been confined to 
the past, for example by appointing village administrative leaders (see Chapter 5), it was 
recognized that restoring the past system of community ownership of forests in the current 
political context was impossible. “Past forest management mainly involved people from one 
village or people we knew, so the authority of the Già Làng could be respected”, said the Già 
Làng of Village A. Nowadays, villagers knew that the context for forest management had 
become much more complex that in the past: 
“People are coming to log forests from every direction: from Laos; from nearby 
villages; from Quang Binh province; from inside the village when outsiders marry 
women in the village; and by border army, district and commune officers” (said one 
man from Village A). 
In addition, their bitter experience of collective ownership of production assets under the 
agricultural cooperatives under SRV regime after the Second Indochina War did not give them 
confidence in community forest management in the context of present day. Stories told by 
women and men in Villages B and C of collective ownership of land and collective production 
process in agriculture under their village’s cooperatives showed dissatisfaction and disapproval 
of the collective ownership system. In the words of an ex-village administrative leader from 
Village C:  
“Cows and buffaloes belonged to the cooperative. We were given points for looking 
after them regardless of whether they were well-fed or looked after or not. When 
cows were sold, the money was distributed equally to all households in the village.”  
Similar stories about timber extraction and benefit distribution from timber sales were also told 
by families in Village B. This mode of collective production and benefit sharing created a lot of 
dissatisfaction among villagers, which has also been detected in many other cooperatives 
elsewhere in the country (see Kirkliet, 1995; Marsh et al., 2007). The ex-village administrative 
leader of Village C said “I remember not being happy with that system because many people 
were lazy but still got the same amount of food as hard-working ones”. In the view of the above, 
their experiences of different types of ownership regimes narrowed down their preference to 
individual ownership. 
Reflecting on the recommendations made by local people, I critically analysed the feasibility of 
each. As such, it is worth stressing that forests at the case study sites are designated for special 
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use and protection, such that (following existing forest laws and regulations) ownership is likely 
to remain with the state. Therefore, the demand for ownership may be more usefully translated 
into different property rights (which are further discussed in Chapter 9). For example, the state 
retains the right of alienation, while, for certain categories of forest, right of management can be 
shared between local people and the state, and rights of access, withdraw and exclusion can be 
devolved to local people, individually or collectively. In putting the right of alienation in the 
hands of the state, one might expect that private ownership by community members would not 
be an option, thus the possibility of taking land out of the protected forests for greater gains such 
as for cultivation or building projects could be discounted (see Barsimantov et al., 2011). In this 
regard, opportunities for both conservation and development might be balanced.  
In spite of widespread enthusiasm for individual ownership of forest at all three sites, there were 
also some divergent views. Some villagers argued that private ownership might not work. For 
instance, during a men-only focus group discussion, a participant from Village A raised a 
concern that “forest protection cannot be implemented well under individual ownership, because 
some households might protect their forest but destroy forests that were not theirs”. Focus group 
discussions with other male villagers from Village A, as well as women from Village C, revealed 
that some participants felt that forests should be owned by groups of households. According to 
them, group ownership would bind households together more strongly, especially in the face of 
exploitation by outsiders, so that they could mobilise their strengths as a group to protect their 
forests. This suggestion was supported by three other villagers in household interviews in 
Village B, one of whom explained that:  
“If forests were allocated to people to protect, they should be allocated to groups of 
three or four households. This would make forest management easier because one 
household acting alone would not able to do it. Allocation of forests to the whole 
village, on the other hand, would be geographically too large to manage”.  
While support for individual ownership of forests was prevalent in all three villages, it is 
important to note that most participants recognised the need for a continuum between individual 
ownership of forests and the overall structure of village-wide management efforts. Collective 
management (thôn quản lý chung in Vietnamese) efforts were often emphasised in relation to 
effective management of individually owned forests. In Village A, focus group participants 
argued that, after individual user rights over forests were secured, households could be organised 
into groups for joint management of these forests, thereby addressing concerns that individual 
households would act unilaterally or selfishly.  
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Local preference for village-wide management efforts was explained by local people on several 
grounds. People compared future forest management where they and their groups were managers 
with their indigenous agriculture-based groups. Both women and men in focus group discussions 
in Village A made similar points to the woman who said that “like our seed sowing, if you do it 
on your own, you seem never finish your task”. A man developed a similar view and concluded 
that “if you work with a group of households like a Seed Sowing Group, forest patrolling and 
tending tasks will be shared and finished quicker”. Apart from sharing workloads, in the view of 
men and women from Village A who participated in household interviews, the formation of 
grassroots groups in the forest sector was also essential for strengthening their community in the 
face of outside encroachment: one of their main concerns for future forest management. This was 
also the main point encouraging people towards collective management efforts in Village B and 
C. In the words of a participant in a women-only focus group in Village B, “when working in 
groups, members act like a house’s frame and pillars, which need to lean on and support each 
other to survive”. As such, in their calculation, working together in a group of households after 
securing individual ownership of forest would help them to reduce the opportunity cost of losing 
their forest resources to intruders, which made the prospects of forest management more 
predictable and profitable. As such, their benefits from forest management were more likely to 
increase. For example, as one woman from Village C said:  
“If I don’t work with others to manage my forest, I can work on it only on my own. 
Thinking of the size of a forest, it would take me days and days to tend the forest. 
Worst, in cases of intrusion, I would not be as strong as two or three together. Or, I 
even could not detect all intrusions because I could not patrol as often as two or 
three of us together. In these situations, forest resources from my forest are more 
likely to be taken without me being able to stop this from happening.”  
This preference for private over common property rights was quite different from mainstream 
thinking by proponents of CBNRM. As discussed in Chapter 2, under CBNRM, forest ownership 
is typically entrusted to the whole community, with the expectation that the community will 
build up its strength to work together. The participants’ suggestion of combining individual 
ownership with collective (i.e. community-wide) management efforts might suggest a way 
forward for institutional arrangements for induced forest-based grassroots organisations. Also, 
this suggestion brings about a solution to the situation where communities do not have legal 
status to take part in civil transactions, thus not being able to represent whole village effectively, 
as is the case in Vietnam (see Chapter 4).  
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Interestingly, for practical reasons of patrolling or tending forests, all participants in the focus 
group discussions at the three study sites pointed out the necessity for membership of groups to 
be based upon the proximity of members’ forest areas to one another. These people argued that 
having their forests close by would save time on forest patrols and make sharing the workload of 
tending the forest or (in future) harvesting forest products easier. Current arrangements for the 
formation of induced grassroots groups did not take this factor into account. For example, in 
Village C, the criterion used to group households into forest protection groups was whether their 
houses were near each other or not, whereas, for Villages A and B, the criteria were members’ 
ability to read and write Vietnamese and/or their status as commune or village government 
officers. Justifying the need for the proximity of members’ forest areas to one another, the 
village administrative leader in an in-depth interview said: 
“It would be better if the leased forest in this village could be divided into different 
blocks using natural milestones, such as streams and hill ranges. Then people who 
live near these blocks of forests could be grouped into a same group for forest 
protection and tending. In doing so, people can more easily call on each other and 
take action if forest violation is detected”. 
While people agreed about the importance of forming groups to work together to manage forests 
after individual ownership was secured, there was some debate about the organisational structure 
that such groups should have, as well as about who should coordinate them. All respondents at 
the three study sites agreed that households should be organised into groups with group leaders 
elected by household members. The key criteria for group leaders, agreed on by participants 
during the focus group discussions, were being respected by fellow community members and 
having the ability to persuade others. If they elected their own leaders, group members would be 
more likely to respect them and take their orders seriously, said some participants from Villages 
B and C in women-only focus groups.  
However, there were sharp differences between Village B on the one hand and Villages A and C 
on the other over how these household groups should then be managed. People in Village B 
wanted group leaders to coordinate tasks, on the basis that they could use their credibility as 
elected leaders to mobilise inter-group actions or intra-group consensus when this was required. 
For them, the key to the success of forest grassroots groups lay in investing responsibility in 
group leaders and members rather than the village administrative leader. Also, they argued that, 
by not involving the village administrative leader in intra- and inter-group coordination, overlap 
of responsibilities between the group leaders and the village administrative leader could be 
avoided. The preference for a villager with credibility rather than village administrative leader to 
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take up the important task in Village B could be attributed to the biased distribution of 
development aid (see Section 8.2) facilitated by the village administrative leader. Although the 
leader acted mainly on the instructions of the CPC, his acceptance of different government 
“gifts” discredited him in the eyes of his peer villagers. Attending village meetings on various 
occasions, I witnessed chaos in the proceedings because no one followed the village 
administrative leader’s facilitation. Speaking to a woman after one meeting, I learnt that there 
was a rumour among villagers that they wished to change their leader in the forthcoming election 
in late 2008.  
Despite having different opinions to those in Villages A and C regarding the preferred role of the 
village administrative leader, people in Village B shared the opinion of those in the other two 
villages on the importance of the village administrative leader as their key representative in 
negotiating external relations. There was general agreement in Village B that, while group 
leaders were responsible for managing and coordinating cooperation among groups, their 
responsibilities should be limited to within their village. For the groups’ external relations, 
people in Village B wanted the village administrative leader to represent the interests of the 
whole village. This preference revealed the recognition, by the local community, of the state’s 
presence, highlighting again its dominance in the state-society relationship at the study sites. 
Household interviews revealed that most participants, as expressed in the words of one 
participant, expected the “group leader (in consultation with group members) to mobilise the 
participation of the village administrative leader to represent all groups (i.e. the whole village) 
in dealing with the commune or higher levels of government”. In doing so, the village 
administrative head in Village B was expected to liaise with local government agencies to 
mobilise their support in dealing with forest crimes (i.e. enforcement), which was a key concern 
for many local people if they were to become more active in forest management.   
In contrast, people in Villages A and C preferred to put group leaders under the coordination and 
management of the village administrative leaders, who would ensure coordination among groups 
in these villages. Placing groups, and group leaders, under the management of the village 
administrative leader could, as a participant in a men-only focus group in Village A discussed, 
“achieve unity of the entire village towards forest protection”. To avoid overlapping 
responsibilities between group leaders and the village administrative leader, participants in men-
only focus groups in Villages A and C also discussed clarifying the roles of these leaders. 
Accordingly, in both villages, the roles of group leaders were proposed to be limited to 
coordinating labour sharing, while those of village administrative leaders were proposed to be 
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establishing village rules regulating the working mechanisms for these groups and coordinating 
cooperation between groups. In summarising the roles that different actors would play if forests 
were managed by local villagers, a participant in the men-only focus group in Village A said:  
“Each household would be responsible for implementing forest protection around the 
forests they owned. Groups of households would be for individual households to 
gather together to share work. Group leaders would be responsible for knowing how 
many hectares of forest each household managed, and for coordinating labour 
sharing. The village assembly, under the leadership of the village administrative 
leader, would provide regulations for groups and households”. 
The preference in Villages A and C for administrative leaders to play a greater role in induced 
forest-based grassroots groups can be explained in two ways. First, in both villages, Van Kieu 
men and women were able to associate administrative leaders with the traditional leaders whom 
they had replaced (a link that was not as fresh in the memories of the Kinh inhabitants of Village 
B, as revealed in an in-depth interview with the administrative head of this village). Second, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, Van Kieu people in these villages accepted the fact that the time when 
their traditional leaders decided every aspect of life in their villages had passed. This was 
reflected in the way that the Già Làng was consulted in the traditional areas of village affairs, as 
discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. As a result, under the influence of traditional norms and customs, 
the inhabitants of these villages rallied around the village administrative leaders instead. By 
suggesting that their administrative leaders play an important role in coordinating village efforts 
for forest management, in response to questions about their preferred organisational structures 
for forest management (see Topic Area 4.2.8 for semi-structured interviews in Stage 2 in 
Appendix 4), choices made by Van Kieu people in Villages A and C reflected the power shift 
away from traditional leaders and towards government-approved village administrative leaders, 
which also reflected the adaption of the Van Kieu people’s traditional system for governing 
village affairs in the new political context after 1975.  
All in all, the fact that village administrative leaders were preferred over traditional leaders for 
coordinating the management of grassroots groups in Villages A and C, and for representing the 
village in external affairs in Village B, reflected a recognition on the part of local people of how 
the current political system worked, as well as their (grudging) respect for administrative leaders 
(i.e. the state). In fact, the (relative) trust of local people in their administrative leaders rested on 
the fact that “we [villagers] can vote out or topple down any village leader who is deemed not to 
serve village-wide interests”, a man from Village B said confidently. Also, in the study villages, 
the gap between the administrative leaders and their fellow villagers, in terms of wealth and 
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political connections, was not large. The administrative leaders in these villages, although getting 
more benefits from the government to compensate for their workload and low government 
salary, as my experience living there showed, were among the (uncertified) poor households who 
also had to face similar issues as those of their fellow villagers, such as struggling to have 
enough food for their families. As a result, they were seen by villagers as people similar to 
themselves.  
With their knowledge and experience on relations with the state, local people reserved a key role 
for local government to play, in order for locally led forest management to run smoothly. 
Interestingly, in their discussions, all women-only focus groups stressed the importance of local 
government in setting clear boundaries for forests, if one wanted to see people taking part in 
forest management, as emphasised elsewhere outside of Vietnam (see Section 2.6 in Chapter 2). 
By ensuring clear boundaries for forest, villagers believed, “the benefits that group members 
gain from protecting the forests will be enhanced because the risk of their forest resources being 
taken by others as a result of boundary disputes would be reduced (in the words of a woman in a 
focus group discussion). Meanwhile, for increasing benefits and reducing costs from the forests 
that they would manage, men-only focus groups tended to be more concerned about forest 
grassroots groups being legally recognised by the local government and being able to exclude 
outsiders from their allocated forests. These concerns should be addressed by devolving different 
property rights to individual households, grassroots groups and or the whole community, which 
will be further elaborated in Chapter 9.  
It is critically important to bear in mind that most of the interviewed villagers generally only 
wanted to involve local government in two areas: dealing with forest violations; and creating 
favourable regulations for the groups to function. This concern reflected the fact that 
enforcement power and rule-making authority are held strongly in the hands of state agencies, 
such as the FPD and CPC. For example, 17 out of 21 villagers in household interviews in Village 
B wanted to have a government institution, such as the CPC or FPD, help the groups enforce 
forest regulations, deal with violations and provide forest-related technical advice. Yet, for 
others, like a man from Village B, because of a lack of property rights to natural forests, the role 
of local government in the group should include not only creating an enabling environment for 
household groups but also the daily management of these groups.. However, he made a very 
clear distinction that:  
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“Once clear arrangements for property rights were made for natural forests, the 
need for local government in these groups’ daily management should be reduced. 
Gradually, the CPC would not be required to guide these groups because we would 
do it ourselves.”  
The above discussion indicates that local people knew very well their limits in the current 
political system that although the concept of “rule of law” has been promoted by the CPV since 
1994 (Nguyen and Le, 2006), people understand that different opinions are tolerated only in so 
far as they do not threaten the CPV's monopoly on power (Dixon, 2004). In this regard, the way 
in which local people requested the participation of the government agencies in enforcement 
tasks showed that they realised that the power of enforcement and rule-making would not be 
devolved to communities in the near future. Recognising this fact, for both local men and women 
at the three case study sites, the local government played a very important role in ensuring an 
‘illegal-logger-free’ environment, and thereby helping to make participation in induced 
grassroots groups for forest management worthwhile. It also indicates that, at the grassroots 
level, people tried to move around their available space and formulate strategies for negotiating 
with the government. 
Regarding communication channels for grassroots groups’ formation, there was some discussion 
among focus group participants that meetings of the whole village should be the venue for 
discussing issues related to the formation of grassroots groups. For example, a man from Village 
B highlighted the necessity of “declaring clearly the requirements, objectives and activities of 
the groups, so that all villagers who wish to join can make up their mind to do so from an 
informed position”. A caveat was raised by female participants in a women-only focus group in 
Village A that the people involved must also inform women of such meetings in advance, so that 
they could re-arrange their workload so as to be able to attend them. In addition, from my 
experience working in these villages, it was also important to hold separate, women-only village 
meetings, so that they could deliberate before or after the whole-village meeting. By so doing, 
there would be less chance of the decision-making process being dominated by men. 
Overall, in comparison with agriculture-based grassroots groups, the formation and operation of 
induced forest-based groups was more challenging. Local villagers attributed this to the fact that 
protection and tending of forests required at least six years before timber or NTFP stocks could 
be restored to levels allowing extraction. That meant that, in comparison with agriculture-based 
activities, the investment time was longer and, thus, the risks of losing forest stocks were greater. 
During that time, cooperation for protecting forest needed to be strong. This was different from 
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agriculture-based cooperation, which required only up to six months before the benefits of their 
cooperation could be observed. This was, in the words of a man from Village B in a focus group 
discussion: 
“My greatest concern especially if my village was allocated forest but my 
neighbouring villages weren’t. When my forest regenerates after some years, people 
from nearby will target it. In that case, the longer time I have to wait for the harvest, 
the greater the risks of losing part of my resources”. 
In the opinion of many villagers in all three villages, as well expressed in the words of a women 
in a women-only focus group in Village B, this required “strong commitment and effort, not only 
from everyone in their own villages but also from surrounding villages that had access to these 
forests, their immediate CPC and the commune FPD”.  
 In addition, once forests were allocated:  
“Forest management, especially protection, is a lifetime’s job. Not like pig farming, 
you might take a break as long as you wish after you sell all pigs to traders. Even 
with pigs in their pigsty, you still can rest assured that the pigs are kept safe with 
gates and locks. You can’t use these to protect forests. You also can’t have break 
from forest protection. If you do, intruders might come to your forests” (a woman 
from Village C in a women-only focus group).  
Because the time required for cooperation in forest management was longer and the risks of 
losing the benefits of their cooperation were greater, it was much more difficult to convince 
people to work on this. As a result, without firm safeguards, such as appropriate arrangements 
for enforcement measures, and access and withdraw rights, local resource users would not likely 
be interested in forest management.  
In summary, for more effective participation of induced grassroots groups in forest management, 
local people displayed a deep understanding of the need to go beyond the issue of ownership to 
cover such issues as defining clear group structure and leadership, and group relations with local 
government. In a broader sense, local people’s aspirations for the forest management with their 
greater participation must, first and foremost, be supported by a clear policy environment to 
enable successful operation of induced grassroots groups. However, one element missing from 
local people’s analysis for their active participation in forest management was how they could 
network with wider non-state actors. This might result from the fact that the participation in the 
development process by local people, in general, and induced forest-based grassroots groups, in 
particular, remains a new idea in Quang Tri (as discussed in Chapter 7), as elsewhere in Vietnam 
(as analysed in Chapter 4). In addition, local people’s contact with outsiders supporting current 
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initiatives in their village was mainly mediated by state organisations. For example, outside 
organisations advocating for increased people participation in forest devolution did not directly 
contact with local people (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2). Instead, they contacted mainly the FPD and 
CPC for planning and advocacy issues while paid group members (in the case of the SSGs in 
Villages A and B) or administrative leaders (in the case of the Forest Protection Groups in 
Village C) were contacted for implementing activities that had been agreed in advance with state 
agencies. As a result, suggestions for working with INGOs, VNGOs or other grassroots groups 
outside these villages were not forthcoming. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that suggestions by local people for improving the 
performance of induced grassroots groups and increasing their participation in forest 
management tended to focus on the implementation rather than the planning or decision-making 
aspects of forest management. This highlighted the importance of capacity building for local 
people in these areas. This is an important issue because, for the most part, local people will have 
to do things for themselves to help them out of difficulties, particularly those in remote areas 
where outside support is limited (Thomas-Slayter, 1994). In this regard, it is critical that at least 
some members of these groups should have substantive knowledge, prior experience in 
organising activities, organisational skills in dealing with those issues, and ability to measure 
their own performance (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Cortner and Moote, 1999; Barrow et al., 
2000; Gibson and Becker, 2000; Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003; Barsimantov et al., 2011). In 
doing so, it is more likely that induced forest-based grassroots groups will become facilitators for 
local people to take part in decision-making processes that influence their livelihoods. As such, 
their livelihood strategies will become more resilient when more understanding and information 
from transforming structures and processes can be fed in. Suggestions for improving the 
performance of induced forest-based grassroots groups will be discussed further in Chapter 9. 
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7.6. SSG Members’ Perspectives on Improvement of their Groups 
The discussion now moves on to consider the means by which SSG members38 believed the 
functioning of induced-forest based grassroots groups could be improved (the detailed topics for 
interviews with group members can be found in Section 6 of Appendix 4). Analysis of these 
interviews reveals that the issue of financial resources dominated discussions regarding 
improvements to SSGs in general and the functioning of induced grassroots groups. All five 
members of the SSG in Village B listed continued funding from outside (projects) as their 
primary concern for the group’s sustainability, while three out of four SSG members in Village 
A mentioned outside funding as their second or third concern for their group’s future. In the 
words of a SSG member from Village B, in an in-depth interview, “for the group’s future, we 
have to think about funding for group activities. Otherwise, the group will cease operating when 
funding from the project runs out”.  
This was quite the opposite of villagers’ views, which covered a wider range of issues, such as 
forest ownership, organisational structures for forest management and enforcement powers for 
better grassroots groups but not financial matters, as discussed in Section 7.5. The difference 
might result from the fact that SSG members often concentrated their work on forest patrolling 
and biodiversity monitoring: tasks that were covered by donor-funded projects. In addition, upon 
completion of these tasks, they had to write reports to the project teams in which they outlined 
their patrol routes and listed species of conservation importance (or people and their activities) 
they saw on the way. These aspects of reporting were quite narrowly focused and did not 
encourage members to think out of the box and investigate social aspects of forest management. 
In its turn, this reflected the direct impact of the technocratic position on SSG members.  
During discussions about the optimal organisational structure for induced grassroots groups, in-
depth interviews with three SSG members from Village B revealed satisfaction with the status 
quo. Regarding the relations between SSGs and local government, they viewed the links between 
the SSG and the commune government as being much more essential than perceived by ordinary 
villagers. For example, SSG members in Village B defined the SSG as a branch of the CPC, or, 
more precisely in their words, as an “arm”, a “helper” or an “extended body”, to implement the 
CPC’s policies at the village level. In this light, the structure of these groups was framed around 
                                                          
38 Given that the induced forest protection groups in Village C incorporated the whole village in their membership, 
the views of their members have already been discussed in the section above. For Villages A and B, the discussion 
in this section concentrated on the views of formal (active) SSG members, who received payments under the 
BirdLife-implemented projects.  
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the existing government structure and explained in terms of “sharing the workload for the CPC 
and FPD to stop illegal logging in the area” (individual in-depth interview with an SSG 
member). In this regard, SSGs had become district-level organisations, losing their original goal 
of being villagers’ voice and space for empowerment.  
The reason for the above-mentioned choice of the optimal organisational structure by SSG 
members can be explored from three angles. First, the fact that eight out of nine members in the 
two groups were drawn from village and commune government showed their unavoidable 
preference to link SSGs to the government structure. Second, as their main concern for the 
survival of these groups beyond the projects’ lifetimes was the monthly stipends they received, 
without being attached to a government body, the funding required would be not stable and long 
term. In the words of the SSG leader in Village B, “without government covering the operational 
cost of the SSGs (because they are effective in helping the CPC and FPD stop illegal use of the 
forests), it would be unlikely for us to continue to spend our time with the group”. Third, from 
their own patrolling experience, both groups recognised the importance of having official status 
in order to stop violators. From this experience, they were all aware of the need for the groups to 
be linked to the government in certain ways in order to be effective. This awareness is discussed 
in more detail below.   
According to the SSG members, working under the CPC was advantageous as it guaranteed legal 
status and political authority to work with both the community and relevant government 
departments. For example, one member’s opinion that was shared broadly with others in the SSG 
of Village B was that, “with the participation of the police officer cum CPC Vice President as 
our SSG team leader, forest patrols are more effective and sufficient to stop illegal forest users, 
due to better cooperation with related state agencies”. However, in this case, it was obvious that 
the SSGs had to base their enforcement power on the presence of government officers, without 
whom all of the enforcement work carried out in the name of these groups was ineffective. 
Indeed, in my own experience of forest patrols that involved these individuals, the SSG in 
Village B had much more confidence in actively chasing and challenging illegal forest users. 
This was credited to the participation of the team leader. In the words of one SSG member in 
Village B:  
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“Without the team leader, when encountering a forest crime, the SSG can, in 
principle, only ask violators for their names and place of residence and report the 
case (either immediately or at a later stage) to the FPD for action. However, due to 
the length of forest patrols and the long distance from the village to the commune 
FPD station, violators are frequently long gone before FPD staff can come to arrest 
them. Therefore, our group cannot do much without our team leader especially when 
encountering a forest crime”. 
Similar concerns were evident among SSG members in Village A, where illegal logging by 
outsiders with the support of corrupt government officials was rampant, and support to the group 
to stop illegal logging was minimal, as discussed in Chapter 6. In fact, this topic was hotly 
debated in all meetings I had with SSG members in this village, either collectively or 
individually. As a result, members of the SSG in Village A appreciated a close link to local 
government. In interviews, all of them stressed that the performance of their group depended 
crucially upon the CPC’s support. As an SSG member from Village A put it, “for the group to 
work effectively, it has to gain support from the government”. More critically, in the opinion of 
one SSG member, the support from the local government had to be comprehensive, such that 
“without local government prosecuting corrupt staff and improving coordination of responsible 
government bodies with SSG members, there was nothing we can do to stop illegal logging and, 
thus, improve the performance of the group”.  
In view of the above, from their own experiences, it was not surprise for SSG members to prefer 
to be part of the government structure, because, in the words of an SSG member from Village B, 
“the authority of the SSG in the current format without belonging to the government system is 
not as strong as that of the village administrative leader, who can mobilise forces and has the 
authority to deal with developments in the village”. 
Moreover, for the SSG in the Village B, the need for better communication with villagers was 
critical to encouraging them to participate in the groups’ work, thus improving the overall 
performance of the SSG. Providing local people with more information on the importance of 
forest protection and potential impacts of deforestation to local livelihoods could, in the opinion 
of the SSG members, help the group gain stronger community support for forest management. In 
this regard, four out of five SSG members in Village B identified awareness raising as an 
important area for improvement. The team leader in Village B’s SSG stressed the need for 
“content improvement and use of visual aids, to make such activities more interesting in the 
future”. Moreover, in the view of one SSG member in Village B, “if local people were not given 
a stipend to attend awareness-raising activities [as had been done in the past], the number of 
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people turning up at such events would be low”. This said, my own experience of working on 
conservation awareness with local communities suggests that improving the content and visual 
aids are more effective means of ensuring the participation of local people than a stipend.  
However, none of the members of these SSGs raised the need for participation of their fellow 
villagers in the groups’ planning and decision making. This might stem from the widely held 
assumption that these were tasks for BirdLife, the CPC and FPD (as discussed in Chapter 6). 
Because the members themselves were not involved in their groups’ planning and decision 
making, it is understandable that they did not see the need for their fellow villagers to take part. 
The critique here is that, if the line of improvement suggested by SSG members was pursued, 
without wider participation by villagers, there would be few opportunities to incorporate local 
people’s needs into the SSGs’ work, and it would be questionable whether the groups would be 
able to gain the trust and cooperation from local people necessary for better forest management. 
When discussing the shortcomings of SSGs in dealing with forest crimes, as discussed earlier in 
this section, two SSG members from Village B commented on the need to re-organise the group 
to improve its legal status in forest management as one measure to improve its effectiveness. In 
the words of one of the two, “this could be done by the SSG members being granted the power to 
arrest forest violators they came across on patrol”. This was also the wish of all SSG members 
in Village A. Group members in Village A elaborated on their desired enforcement power in 
various interactions with me. For them, the power they required included the ability to stop and 
check vehicles transporting timber from forests near their village. In addition, this power had to 
be supplemented by cooperation from the local government and FPD, who must “come [to the 
scene of forest crime] when they are informed about illegal logging cases” (individual in-depth 
interview with a SSG member in Village A). As an SSG member in Village A pointed out, 
without such power and support, “illegal logging is so complicated that, to be very frank, the 
group can’t do anything about it. We can’t protect the forest. We need the government to help.” 
This discussion highlighted the need for the right of exclusion to be supported by enforcement 
power, either delegated to grassroots groups or ensured by responsible government agencies. 
This point will be discussed further in Chapter 8. 
In summary, although SSG members’ analysis of potential areas for improvement was 
commendable, their suggestions about how grassroots groups could be improved were very 
limited, in comparison with those of their fellow villagers. Members’ views on the improvements 
of SSGs and its activities (i.e. forest management) reflected mainstream thinking about forest 
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management in Quang Tri, which mostly concentrated on technical aspects of forest 
management (i.e. the technocratic position). Improvements of the groups’ organisational 
structure suggested by SSG members only concentrated on increasing their enforcement power. 
Although their peer villagers also saw the importance of enforcement and the necessity in linking 
to government agencies to increase their ability to protect the forests, their views on this matter 
were quite different. Villagers approached the issue of enforcement power to ensure better 
protection for their harvests from forests. In that regard, while the SSG members aimed to have 
the power as an end, their peer villagers aimed to have it as a means to improve their livelihoods. 
Similarly, suggestions by SSG members for improved communication with wider communities 
concerned (one-way) information dissemination on the importance of forest protection. 
Villagers, on the other hand, saw enhanced communication with government agencies as an 
opportunity to improve the legitimacy of their access to forests, especially in the absence of 
property rights, which again was ultimately linked to their livelihoods.  
The last area of concern for SSG members was to secure sufficient funds to sustain their 
activities. In contrast to the practices of indigenous groups, SSG members did not identify 
funding opportunities from their own communities. Cost for operations of indigenous grassroots 
groups were covered by members of these groups. Local people contributed money (in kind or in 
cash) to ensure the implementation of their cooperation, when presented with the possibility of 
getting more benefits in a more predictable and stable fashion. In this regard, when discussing 
about the improvement of induced forest-based grassroots groups, villagers tended to be more 
concerned about factors that ensured the occurrence of this possibility, such as clear boundaries, 
enforcement roles and ownership arrangements for the allocated forests, as discussed in the 
previous section. In that regard, money for operational cost of induced forest-based grassroots 
groups did not appear to concern local people. SSG members, on the other hand, seemed to 
worry more about whether they had money to cooperate. This might result from the fact that 
SSG members were paid to do what they were doing from international donor-funded projects, 
so they became anxious about the cessation of outside funding. 
That said, not every SSG member thought the same. One participant from each SSG in Villages 
A and B linked debates about the potential improvement of the SSGs to improved livelihood 
opportunities for local people. In the view of the SSG member from Village B, in addition to 
financial support for the group, “it is important to work out a suitable livelihood option, such as 
what crops to grow, so that local people don’t need to extract forest resources illegally for their 
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income”. Similarly, the SSG member from Village A also requested a clear link between forest 
protection and livelihood alternatives for people in his village because: 
 “Without support from the government and projects to provide alternative 
livelihoods, asking the group [i.e. the SSG] to protect forests by stopping local 
people from clearing forest land that they need for rice cultivation is impossible. 
People here have no other resources for alternative livelihoods but rice fields”.  
In providing livelihood options, these two members believed that local people would be more 
willing to stop forest extraction, as promoted by the SSG.  
 7.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that, under the influence of the technocratic position, formation, 
operations and outcomes of the induced forest-based grassroots groups focused on technical 
aspects of forest management. This left issues of local resource users’ livelihoods, the 
importance of local people’s participation in decision-making processes and social equity far 
behind. The failures of these induced forest-based grassroots groups in facilitating local people’s 
participation in forest governance were not because the aim of inducing them was wrong. Rather, 
the approach these groups used to encourage people’s participation was not suitable to the local 
contexts. As a result, the participation of villagers in these groups was limited to activities that 
were undertaken in the interests of the local government, such as forest patrols, which carried a 
strong implication of compulsion. As such, for local people, these induced groups became a 
burden rather than channels of exchanging information or communication among themselves for 
collective benefits. In broader terms, the minor roles played by induced forest-based grassroots 
groups in forest devolution at the case study sites were also attributed in part by the strong desire 
of the Party-state to control the rural population, and the lack of strategic and effective support 
from international donors and INGOs.  
Despite their current ineffectiveness, there are strong practical and ethical reasons why induced 
forest-based grassroots groups should be encouraged. As illustrated in Chapters 2 and 5 and this 
chapter there is evidence that local people can and do come together to improve their life when 
they have incentives to do so. As local people repeatedly and explicitly expressed when 
discussing how to improve these groups, without consideration of local livelihoods, ownership of 
forests and enforcement issues at the research sites, the idea of participating in induced 
grassroots groups to play a greater part in forest management did not appeal to them. Local 
people believed that, once these issues were addressed, their authority to protect forest resources, 
228 
 
and the benefits they received from it, could be enhanced. As a result, improvements in the 
performance of induced grassroots groups in the forest management could be made. As such, the 
development of induced forest-based grassroots groups could be expected to encourage local 
people to self-organise and build their confidence in engaging with the powerful state of 
Vietnam. Left on their own, there is evidence that local people are divided (whether intentionally 
or unintentionally) by different policies, and allow corruption and poverty to destroy their living 
environment: the forests.  
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Chapter 8: Induced Grassroots Organisations and External 
Influences  
8.1. Introduction  
Given that the government is still hesitant about accepting the role of civil society organisations 
in policy debate (as opposed to service delivery), the support of the government’s external 
development partners (i.e. donors and INGOs) has been an important factor in supporting the 
growth of civil society organisations in Vietnam (Shanks et al., 2004). From the perspective of 
donors, the induction of grassroots groups is driven by concerns about the level of participation 
of people in governance processes, which prompts international donors and INGOs active in 
Vietnam to push the boundaries for civil society’s participation in Vietnam’s development 
activities (Fritzen, 2003; McElwee and Ha, 2006).  
Deeping the analysis of the roles and factors influencing the formation, operations and outcomes 
of induced forest-based grassroots groups at the study sites, this chapter investigates the 
influence of the Party-state and international donors and INGOs to these groups. To this end, the 
chapter begins with an analysis of the different techniques that the Party-state uses to control 
grassroots groups, before moving on to assessments of the influence of international donors and 
INGOs on grassroots groups in Vietnam.  
8.2. The Party-state’s Influence to Grassroots Organisations  
This section examines influences of the Party-state to grassroots organisations in general and 
induced forest-based ones in particular. It also investigates the perspectives of government 
officers about helping these organisations perform better in the forest governance process.  
8.2.1. The Party-state’s Views on and Control over Grassroots Groups 
The Party-state recognises that it is in its interests to increase people’s participation in the 
development process and many in the Party and government did not want to return to the level of 
control exercised during and shortly after the Second Indochina War (Hannah, 2007). This has 
been seen in the government’s efforts to define roles for civil society organisations in the 
development of the 2006-2010 Social Economic Development Plan (SEDP) (Sabharwal and 
Than, 2005). As discussed in Chapters 4, the Party-state recognised that Đổi Mới had released 
opportunities for civil society to develop in Vietnam through passing new laws to regulate their 
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operations. The importance of grassroots groups was clearly perceived among CPV members. As 
a representative from a provincial CPV organisation explained in an in-depth interview:  
“In reality, the need for self-organising and networking among grassroots people 
and their organisations in general is huge. If we [i.e. the Party] do not see the need 
and mobilise people in a certain form of organisations, others such as non-party 
hostile forces will do”.  
His position was also reflected in a statement by a representative from a national CPV 
organisation who said, in an in-depth interview, that “the CPV understands that the development 
of civil society in Vietnam is an unavoidable trend”. In this person’s view, the Party’s 
acknowledgement of this trend was evidenced by the permission given to foreign-funded 
projects to induce grassroots organisations to participate in the development process in Vietnam.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the ‘participatory authoritarian’ approach evident in Vietnam, which 
is associated with a growing level of dialogue between the Party-state and wider society, has 
meant that the government has been more responsive to demands from the rural population, 
especially in the aftermath of the recent civil unrest by ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands 
of Vietnam over forest and forest land issues39 and in Thai Binh province over land and 
corruption issues in the early 2000s. For example, a member of FPD staff, when asked “why 
don’t you stop [Van Kieu] villagers cutting timber for house construction without permission 
from the FPD”, replied that:  
“We do not want to be in the same situation as the Central Highlands, where ethnic 
minority people rioted and attacked government offices to show their anger about 
losing access to forest land and forest resources. Therefore, I prefer to let them cut 
one tree and hope that they will protect the rest of the forest”.  
Given this recognition, at the national level the Party was reported to be reconsidering its 
position on how to engage more effectively with people at the grassroots level. This should be 
seen in the broader approach by the Party to civil society organisations, of which grassroots 
organisations are a part. In this regard, in interviews with representatives of national CPV 
organisations, their views on civil society were often explored to understand the approaches 
adopted towards grassroots organisations at the provincial level. In this light, an in-depth 
interview with an officer from the national CPV organisation revealed that, in the future, “People 
Organisations [the Party’s term for civil society organisations] would play increasingly 
significant roles and would be independent from the state”. This said, when discussing the 
potential roles civil society organisations, in general, and grassroots groups, in particular, would 
                                                          
39 For more information about causes of, and government reactions to, this unrest see Refworld and UNHCR (2003). 
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play in policy processes in Vietnam, interviews with Party officials revealed that service delivery 
is the area in which the CPV is most willing to experiment. Therefore, in the view of interviewed 
Party officials, service delivery should be the main area in which grassroots organisations will be 
deployed in Vietnam for at least the next five years or so. It is not surprising that this is the 
position adopted by an authoritarian state, because service provision tends to be less 
controversial and challenging to the dominant position of the Party. 
However, interviewed CPV representatives also emphasized that the Party’s position on civil 
society was still unclear, as further evidenced by the 10-year discussion on the Law on 
Association40, the absence of a strategy for civil society development, and the lack of 
management approaches to emerging civil society organisations. Indeed, in the opinion of 
another Party representative from a CPV-sponsored magazine, “the issue of civil society is still 
very sensitive. With the current economic difficulties, it is not a priority for the Party to sort out 
its relationship with civil society organisations.” For grassroots organisations (induced or not), 
this meant that no new channels or new experiments on working with rural population were 
allowed outside the state-led system. 
However, at its core, the CPV’s promotion of increased participation of citizens in the policy 
process is largely symbolic. Under the current political and legal framework, space for citizens in 
criticising the practicality and suitability of government and CPV policies is still very limited, 
making the task (for civil society organisations as discussed earlier this section) of holding the 
state accountable unrealistic. This can be seen clearly in the policy known in Vietnamese as phản 
biện xã hội (which translates literally as “social criticism”). According to this policy, the ability 
to practice phản biện xã hội, which was permitted publically for the first time only in 2002, is 
limited to one state/party-sponsored association called the Vietnam Union of Science and 
Technology Associations (VUSTA), a CPV-sponsored umbrella organisation for all VNGOs 
active in the fields of science and technology (Government of Vietnam, 2002). Even then, hardly 
any National Assembly, government or party members use VUSTA for this friendly criticism 
function, as complained the late leader of VUSTA in an interview with the British Boardcasting 
Corporation (BBC) (see BBC News, 2008). In addition, the ability to use this friendly criticism 
function was further restricted when, on 24 July 2009, Prime Ministerial Decree 97/2009/QD-
                                                          
40 This law has been discussed for 10 years through 11 drafts, which illustrates the Party’s indecisiveness over what 
constitutes civil society and what activities civil society organisations should be involved in (McElwee and Ha, 
2006). If passed, this law would provide a comprehensive legal framework for the establishment and operation of 
non-state organisations. In addition, it would also clearly set out the Party’s positions towards the roles and 
responsibility of civil society in the policy development process. 
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TTg (Government of Vietnam, 2009) required that anyone having any phản biện (i.e. criticism) 
of the directions, intentions and policies of the party and the state, must communicate it through 
relevant offices of the party and state. In particular, it was no longer permitted to air criticisms in 
the name of a science and technology association: the form taken by most Vietnamese NGOs 
(Article 2, Decree 97/2009/QĐ-TTg). This regulation, in effect, disables the freedom of 
expression through a channel of one’s choice and reinforces the overall authority of the party 
over society. 
This can be seen clearly in the suspension of two newspapers, and warnings to two others, in 
October 2006, because of their reporting about the country's new bank notes in spite of 
government instructions to stop (Hayton, 2006). In this regard, any attempt to raise the issue of 
pluralism or multi-partyism is perceived as a direct challenge to the CPV’s sole leadership, and 
the party exhibits a zero-tolerance stance towards such debates. This position is clearly evident 
among top leaders. In an interview with BBC in 2006, the leader of the national VFF, Mr Pham 
The Duyet said firmly that “Vietnam can’t have pluralism and multi-partyism. This is a matter of 
principle” (BBC News, 2006a). As a result, any political opposition is strictly banned. The 
Minister of Police stated at the CPV’s 10th National Congress in 2006 that the CPV will “not 
allow any opposition political parties to form” (BBC News, 2006b).  
In this regard, concerns about risks emerging from engaging with these organisations remained 
strong. A Party officer at a national CPC institution pointed out that, at the moment: 
“The Party’s position on how to engage with civil society is still strongly influenced 
by fears of civil unrest initiated by civil society organisations, as witnessed 
regionally in Indonesia and Thailand, as well as further afield. In particular, the 
Party has a strong concern regarding the politicisation of civil society.” 
In addition, the Grassroots Democracy Decree has brought little actual change to the lives of 
rural people (Nguyen and Ho, 2001; Tran, 2002b). The participation of villagers in policy 
processes is treated as a means not as an end. One example can be found in the 2007 Grassroots 
Democracy Ordinance (National Assembly Office, 2007): the updated version of the 1998 
Grassroots Democracy Decree. Although the ordinance authorises people to make decisions 
directly on local issues, such as their financial contributions towards public services at the 
grassroots level (Article 10), it does not do so with respect to more important issues, such as 
land-use planning or the commune socio-economic development plan. For these issues, local 
people can only air their views (Article 19), and the commune government can opt to ignore 
them if it can give a reason for doing so (Article 21).  
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At the grassroots level, lack of commitments for the implementation of the Grassroots 
Democracy Decree from different Party-state institutions do not encourage or provide people 
with a proper tool for preventing issues, such as biased distribution of development aid, from 
happening. In these villages, knowledge of the existence of the decree and its importance in 
empowering local people was limited to the Communist Party secretaries. In Villages A and B, 
both secretaries had received training on this subject. However, the entire concept of democracy 
outlined in the decree was reduced to simple statements reflected in the perspectives of the Party 
secretaries of Villages A and B’s that “if you have anything to complain about, do so to your 
CPC” (Village A) and “grassroots democracy means that local people are allowed to discuss 
government policies so that they support these policies more” (Village B). For Village C, where 
there is no Communist Party cell, none of the village officers had any idea about the Grassroots 
Democracy Decree (in-depth interview with the village administrative leader).  
Meanwhile, the provincial Department of Planning and Investment officer responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of grassroots democracy in the area of public investment at the 
village level said that, since the implementation of a government decree on people’s monitoring 
on public investment in 2005, it did not receive any six-monthly reports (as required by the 
decree on people’s monitoring on public investment) from commune inspection boards. “The 
responsible people from the Ministry of Planning and Investment had never asked me to report 
on public investment at the grassroots level either”, continued the officer.  
Such a lack of enthusiasm among government agencies for the implementation of the Grassroots 
Democracy Decree and inadequate knowledge by the party and administrative leaders at the 
village level did not provide communities with proper knowledge and tools to self-organise. As a 
result, villagers at the case study sites were not aware of their rights to monitor local 
government’s performance in resource distribution. Therefore, an opportunity to avoid the envy, 
mistrust and suspicion regarding unfair distribution of development aid (as discussed earlier this 
section) and enhance their ability to work together was missed.  
Under the influence of the above mentioned viewpoints, induced forest-based grassroots groups 
were staffed by and put under the supervision of government officials at different administrative 
levels (as discussed in Section 7.2). For the Party organisations, all international organisations 
wishing to work with grassroots groups had to do so through state-approved intermediaries, 
namely mass organisations, as explained a representative from the provincial VFF, in an in-depth 
interview:  
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“Whenever any foreign-funded programmes or projects want to set up self-managing 
groups [the Party’s term for grassroots groups] for residents in villages, the 
respective Fatherland Front Working Group, consisting of presidents or vice-
presidents of the Fatherland Front, Women’s Union, Youth Union, Farmers’ Union 
and Veterans’ Union, will introduce its members to cooperate with these 
programmes”. 
Through this process, these Party institutions can establish themselves as leverage to constrain 
any unwanted opinions or actions, which is an expression of instrumental power (as discussed in 
Section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2). Lack of this strategy (i.e. the insertion of Party officers into 
grassroots organisations) was seen as a causal factor in the Party “losing control of the rural 
population and handing it over control of the rural population to hostile forces as the lesson in 
the Central Highland teaches us”, said a provincial VFF officer. This revelation highlighted the 
intention of the Party-state in controlling the rural population, which questioned how the 
Vietnamese state could embark upon the “participatory authoritarian” or “soft authoritarian-
corporatist” approach that is associated with a growing level of dialogue between the Party-state 
and wider society and the promise of a very gradual increase in pluralism in Vietnam (Dixon, 
2004: 25). 
To keep rural population under control, none of the induced forest-based grassroots groups at the 
case study sites received much trust and support from their local governments. In the stage of 
infancy of these groups at the case study sites and their limited rights and responsibility (as 
discussed in Section 6.3), lack of trust from local government did not help induced forest-based 
grassroots groups develop. Interviews with the CPC chairmen covering the three villages 
revealed that two of these chairmen believed local people would undermine successful project 
implementation because of their assumed limited knowledge and skills. This reflects Zingerli’s 
(2004) observation elsewhere in Vietnam that many government and party officers held 
paternalistic views, seeing local people as lacking the necessary education and understanding to 
implement important policies. This led to the situation in Village C, where:  
“Many CPC officers do all the jobs for villagers, so that the projects achieve their 
objectives. This leads to a situation where, when projects finish, villagers are left 
unaware of the new knowledge that was meant to help them get out of poverty” 
explained a CPC officer implementing UNDP project in Village C. 
Apart from giving little support to induced forest-based grassroots groups, at the local level, one 
approach that local government used to maintain its control over these groups was bribery! My 
experience living within the case study communities showed that, in all three villages, village 
leaders (both traditional and administrative) became too closely associated with the 
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government’s unfair system of resource allocation. It has become an unwritten policy in the local 
government system for commune and village administrative and traditional leaders to reap the 
benefits of development programmes first and foremost. “Government salaries for their staff are 
often so low while the workload was so great”, said one village administrative leader in an in-
depth interview. To solve this problem, the government uses development programme funding 
intended for the poor and disadvantaged to compensate for the low stipends and heavy 
workloads associated with local government work. This was revealed in an in-depth interview 
with the SSG leader for Village B cum CPC vice-president:  
“With little stipends from the BirdLife project and the amount of work we are 
committed to doing as government officers, it is hard to motivate group members. On 
behalf of the group, I suggested in a CPC meeting last week that for us to continue to 
work for the SSG when the project finishes, the CPC needs to create favourable 
conditions for us to improve our livelihoods. This can be done when development 
projects are approved, SSG members should be given priority to receive development 
aid first. CPC already agreed with this proposition”.  
Manifestations of this unwritten policy were detected in all three villages. In Village A, 
observations made during three months living in the village revealed that the whole village 
leadership received support from the government at least once, such as a new house roof (for the 
Già Làng) or cattle (for the Trưởng làng and the communist party secretary), while the poorest 
households remained on the waiting list. In Village B, the administrative leader’s household 
received a cornucopia of development aid not enjoyed by every villager, such as a model garden 
from the Finnish Rural Development Programme, a rattan plantation from the BirdLife project, 
and a clean toilet from an Oxfam sanitation programme. Similarly, in Village C, the 
administrative and traditional leaders were awarded the most desirable labour contracts for forest 
patrolling with a state-led Protection Forest Board. The Village A commune FPD staff, who 
solicited the contracts, said in an in-depth interview that in doing so he wanted to “use this 
benefit to encourage the village leadership to be loyal to the FPD and give more efforts in 
protecting forests leased to the village”. 
Local people clearly understood this unfair system of allocating development aid. For example, 
households in Village B were more likely to be recognised as poor (and, thereby, receive the 
associated benefits) if they were popular and well connected through kinship ties. As a male 
villager put it in a household interview “here, if your family branch is big, you will achieve 
poverty status” (i.e. because your relatives would vote for you). Also, households were more 
likely to be classified as poor if they were well connected to the government. In this regard, a 
236 
 
disabled man from Village B, in a household interview, said in frustration that “here, whatever 
the projects are, they go again and again into the hands of commune or village officers, their 
relatives or their friends”. Many women in this village shared the view of one woman in a 
household interview, who argued that “if a project has 10 units [of resources to support poor 
local people], government officers will take seven and all ordinary villagers must share the 
remaining three units”. 
Bias in distributing development assistance was seen not only in Village B. The level of 
development assistance given to local people to support their attempts to move out of poverty 
was strongly influenced by many factors not linked to poverty. In spite of being the poorest 
among the three studied villages, Village A was quite isolated from mainstream development aid 
flows. Observations made during my fieldwork in the village showed that the site had not been 
‘bombarded’ by financial support from the different development programmes that poured into 
Quang Tri over the last ten years. Only the BirdLife project was there on a long-term basis, while 
other development projects came as one-off activities, such as giving some trees or cattle, even 
though the village ‘ticked all the boxes’ for external funding support present in Quang Tri: it was 
accessible by road; it had an ethnic minority population; and the population was predominantly 
poor. The main reason for this was that  
“When we came to conduct baseline studies in Village A, we were recommended by 
the CPC that the village leadership have weaker capacity to implement development 
activities than other villages with the same socio-economic conditions” said one 
project officer from a development INGO in an in-depth interview.  
As a result, the officer continued: 
“If projects were implemented there, without capacity of the village leadership to 
implement the project, its activities could not be completed as they were designed. 
Therefore, we had to choose other villages where activities could be implemented as 
they were planned”.  
Meanwhile, Villages B and C had a greater number of long-term projects41. These villages, with 
a green light from their CPCs, had become favoured places for development aid in their 
communes. In the case of Village C, their preferred status was due to “easy access, and ethnic-
minority status” but, most importantly, because “the village administrative leader is an able 
implementer” (in-depth interview with provincial FPD staff who mediated the allocation of 
projects to Village C). For Village B, a location “central to the commune, close to and easily 
accessible from the office of the CPC, and able leadership” were the reasons for the village 
                                                          
41 Village B had one conservation and three development projects; Village C had three development projects. 
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being a popular focus for development aid in the commune (in-depth interview with a 
representative from the CPC covering Village B). In this regard, when projects were being 
implemented, the CPC could easily direct and check on the implementation, continued the CPC 
staff member.  
In view of the above, the participation of village leadership in the development process at the 
study sites is for material incentives. By immersing village leadership into its unfair benefit-
sharing systems, the government has singled out the village leaders from the rest of the village 
population, binding them strongly to itself by ‘gifts’. This strategy might allow the central 
government to break ties and affinity, which Kirkliet (1995) and Koh (2001) observed that 
village and commune cadres often reserved for villagers.  As such, the village leaders are less 
likely to be critical of government policy and more likely to loyal to the Party-state than to their 
peer villagers. In this regard, the vulnerability of the poor (i.e. via decreased cohesion and trust 
in one another in their fight against poverty) is exacerbated by the use of participation for 
material incentives. 
Biased poverty classifications and corrupt allocation of project resources deeply divided the 
community of Village B. Unfair distribution of limited resources for poverty reduction created a 
situation that the aforementioned woman in an household interview described thus: “the villagers 
fight with each other over the three units [of resources remaining after seven units had been 
divided among government officers] to get themselves a little bit. This is infuriating”. Indeed, 
participants commented that the inhabitants of Village B had little empathy for each other. One 
poverty-stricken widow, commenting upon the intra-village ‘competition’ to be classified as 
‘poor’, reflected bitterly that: “my fellow villagers make me so ashamed to be poor”. Not 
surprisingly, those villagers who had secured poor household status suffered from envy and 
distrust among villagers who did not received any development aid. This was admitted in the 
words of one woman of a certified poor household in an in-depth interview that “I do not find it 
easy living among my village fellows because of the high level of envy among non-certified poor 
households in this village”.   
In analysing these aspects of village life, the heterogeneousness within villages A, B, C was 
revealed to highlight power relations within these communities. In that regard, the political 
ecology literature raises concerns about the idealisation of rural communities as harmonious 
entities, which, if left alone, would naturally promote sustainable ecological and social 
development (Zimmerer, 2000). As such, political ecologists point out the problems within 
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communities, such as unaccountability, inequity and non-participation that are inherent in local 
community structures governing natural resources (see Gray and Mosely, 2005). Following this 
line of argument, some political ecologists also warn of over-simplification of internal power 
struggles within communities, in the sense that many development interventions overlook the 
fact that village social relations are based on conflict and competition (Balint and Mashinya, 
2006).  
In view of the above, political ecology open up opportunities for thorough investigations of 
heterogeneousness within communities and its impacts on collective action. It was unsurprising, 
therefore, that many people in Village B, were suspicious of and withdrew from active 
engagement with other villagers. In that regard, opportunities for people to come together, for 
instance under the umbrella of the SSG, became more unrealistic. For example, the village’s 
Trưởng Làng commented that “people act more individually now”. This meant that, instead of 
engaging with the wider village community, people retreated into their family units to mobilise 
internal efforts and resources to help themselves. The comment of one woman from Village B 
unfolded this as follows:  
“I contribute money towards charity work such as visiting sick people or people with 
difficulties whenever asked because I don’t want to be thought of as a selfish person. 
However, I do not physically take part in these activities. You eat what you produce. 
You can’t expect help from anyone outside your family”.  
When these communities were divided, local people could not readily act together, which put 
local government in a better position to exert control over them. When biased distribution of 
development became a norm in local life, following Kabeer (2005), it could be arguable that this 
norm may either deny the existence of inequalities of power between local people and the Party-
state, or accept inequalities in development process. As a result, local people at the study sites 
were likely to accept, and even collude with the Party-state especially if challenging this either 
did not appear possible or carries heavy personal and social costs. This echoed in a common 
remark made by local people in various interviews that development aid was seen as a free gift 
one should be grateful to have regardless of how it was distributed.  
In summary, of all measures employed by the Party/State to control the rural population at the 
case study sites, bribery and unfair distribution of benefits appeared to work best, which was 
compounded by the inadequate implementation of the Grassroots Democracy Decree in these 
villages. Lack of trust among local people and between them and local government meant that 
people could not take part in government-led initiatives, such as the creation of forest-based 
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grassroots groups. Moreover, these techniques by Party-state for controlling rural population 
suggest the importance of choosing right mechanism to work within the system while using 
suitable leverage to support grassroots organisations in Vietnam.  
8.2.2. Views of Government Officers on Working with Grassroots Groups 
Having analysed different influences that the Party-state had on grassroots groups at the study 
sites, this section turns attentions to views of government officers about helping these 
organisations perform better in the forest governance process. This was achieved through 
interviews with representatives from local administrative government, mass organisations and 
the CPV (the list of topic areas for interviews with this group of participants can be found in 
Section 8 of Appendix 4). The decision to group all of these people under the same category is a 
reflection of the inextricable linkages among them under the current political set up in Vietnam. 
In this regard, when asked about what should be done to improve the participation of grassroots 
organisations in the development process in Vietnam, most Party officials concentrated on what 
positions the Party had on civil society organisations and under which channels these 
organisations should operate. The findings from these interviews, therefore, did not show 
directly how induced grassroots organisations could be improved. Instead, they suggested a 
general approach to working with these organisations in Vietnam, providing that the 
aforementioned positions and concerns were taken into account. Nevertheless, these suggestions 
were among the most feasible in terms of how induced grassroots should relate to the Party-state 
when performing at the grassroots level, taking into account, as these findings suggested, the 
prevailing political and institutional landscape in Vietnam.  
For administrative officers, interviews showed that, in principle, they were aware of the 
importance of grassroots populations for the achievement of their administrative duties. 
However, their positions were strongly influenced by the technocratic approach to forest 
management. Even though local people were considered as stakeholders, all the FPD staff 
members I interviewed strongly believed that it was their (and not the local people’s) job to 
manage forests. As one commune FPD staff member said: 
“Although the support of local people is important to achieve our goal, they can’t 
manage forests on their own because they don’t have technical knowledge about 
forest management. Also, when they need some cash they will turn to forest to cut 
trees or hunt animals. We [the FPD] can’t leave them alone with forests”.  
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Therefore, local people were still seen as culprits in forest destruction who needed to be 
controlled. In this regard, local participation was seen as a means to more effective forest 
management (i.e. to facilitate the achievement of forest management goals) rather than as an end 
in itself (i.e. to empower local resource users to be effective owners of the forest management 
process). This reflected common practice that rural people were only informed about agricultural 
and forest land allocation decisions but not invited to take part in the process of decision-making 
and implementation (Gomiero et al., 2000; McElwee, 2004), as seen in the case of the leasing of 
forests in Village C or the establishment of the nature reserve in Village A (see Chapter 6). Most 
FPD staff members in Quang Tri were still comfortable with the idea of them being in charge of 
all forest management practices in the province. In accordance with such sentiments, and in 
contrast to the views of local people regarding the ownership of forests (see above), the general 
view among government officials was that the state was the rightful owner of forests. This was 
view was reflected in the following statement by a provincial FPD staff member: “Forest must 
be owned by the state. If we lost this title, we could not ask local people to do things in the 
correct direction”. The above evidence shows how deeply the technocratic position has 
penetrated the state system for forest management in Vietnam. Even at the commune level, 
officers were quite firm about their approach to controlling local people, so that they could not 
destroy forests. 
Those government officials who were able to entertain the notion of some form of forest 
devolution to local people suggested several ways to improve the performance of induced 
grassroots groups (albeit for FPD-owned forests). According to a high-ranking FPD officer:  
“Villagers can form self-managing groups, which can be registered with the FPD. 
This helps improve the legal status of these groups and foster stronger links with 
enforcement authorities [i.e. the FPD] who can help them deal with encroachment by 
outsiders... To improve the benefits that these groups can offer to villagers, they can 
apply for ‘franchised’ rights to exploit rattan, medicinal herbs or bamboo, within 
clearly delineated patches of forest within protected areas at certain times of the 
year. We [the FPD] will ensure these ‘franchised’ harvesting rights for villagers, 
while, in return, villagers will have to initiate forest patrolling and make 
commitments not to hunt wildlife and log forests inside the allocated forests”.  
Under this scenario, forests within protected areas would remain in the hands of the government 
but grassroots groups would have an agreement with government agencies to share benefits from 
these areas. From the FPD officer’s suggestions, it was clear that he wanted to give local people 
rights of access and withdrawal, while reserving rights of management, exclusion and alienation 
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for the FPD. This could also fit well with local people’s suggestions about improved forest 
management with their active participation (see Section 7.5). 
If it worked, this model could be an acceptable compromise in the current political and 
administrative structures for forest management in Vietnam (particularly for forests of high 
biodiversity or ecosystem service values, such as protected areas and protection forests). Under 
such an arrangement, grassroots groups would also have the opportunity to build their skills and 
confidence in working with the government. Also, the advantage of this was that local people 
could access forests to support their livelihoods in exchange for their efforts in forest protection. 
This would be valuable in remote areas, where non-forest livelihood alternatives and government 
investments in livelihood improvements were limited. In addition, this option could temporarily 
address the current deadlock of livelihood and forest conservation in current policies in 
Vietnam42.  
Yet, one hurdle, which was identified by another FPD representative present at the above 
interview, was that: 
“The FPD could not commit to ‘franchised’ rights on paper because, at the research 
sites, forest areas that were valuable for such extraction lay within protected area 
core zones. According to national protected area legislation no exploitation was 
allowed in these areas. Therefore, sharing of resources with grassroots groups could 
only be practised informally, without a legal basis”. 
The disadvantage here was that these rights could be withdrawn at any time; for example, if there 
was a change in leadership within the FPD or if the provincial leaders no longer wanted to turn a 
blind eye towards resource extraction. Consequently, under this model, grassroots groups would 
still be in a vulnerable position, unless the provincial leadership could be induced to provide 
political support. 
There was also some discussion about the role that mass organisations and local government 
could play in the management of grassroots groups. In the same interview with the senior FPD 
officer, there was a clear expression that “forest self-managing groups [the term used by CPV 
and government officials for grassroots organisations] should be set up independently from the 
                                                          
42 Under the current Forest Protection and Development Law (National Assembly’s Office, 2004), special-use and 
protection forests are not for exploitation, while under the Vietnam Forestry Development Strategy 2006-2010 
production forests “are not permitted for harvesting but being zoned for conservation to create supply sources after 
2010” (SRV, 2007: 18). While, in the long term, this policy for forest conservation can benefit local people when 
forests and their ecological systems are restored, in the short term of 5 to 10 years, forest-dependent communities 
will be negatively affected if forest access is increasingly limited without livelihood alternatives being effectively 
addressed. 
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systems of mass organisations”. By attaching the groups to the FPD, as discussed earlier, he 
believed that more effective operations could be achieved, especially as his organisation was in 
charge of forest protection and management in most areas of Quang Tri. He argued that “if 
groups were placed under mass organisations or the CPC, those who wanted to work with these 
groups would have to work through an intermediary before being able to reach the grassroots 
population”. This said, he still viewed mass organisations and the CPC as playing important 
roles, with the former “encouraging people to take part in these groups”, and the latter 
“requiring a local government official (i.e. village administrator or forestry officer) to take part 
in these groups to monitor and manage them”. Therefore, in principle, his suggestions ensured 
the continued involvement of different administrative and political institutions at the village 
level, which determines that all organisations in Vietnam, including grassroots groups, conform 
to the Party line, as discussed in Chapter 4 and earlier in this section. 
From the perspective of village-level mass organisations, there is no need to put grassroots 
groups under any specific mass organisations. In an in-depth interview, the leader of village 
Women’s Union in Village B expressed the view that: 
“When a self-managing group [tổ tự quản – in Vietnamese, in her words] is set up 
with its members covering women, men, young or old, it effectively includes 
representatives of the Women’s Union (for women), Farmers’ Union (for men) and 
Youth Union (for young people). In that regard, all members of mass organisations 
are already present within a self-managing group. Therefore, if it was placed under 
the leadership and management of any particular mass organisation, the others 
might not be happy. In addition, if involving all mass organisations in leading and 
managing grassroots groups, there will result in a situation where too many cooks 
spoilt the broth”.  
In this regard, structurally, in the view of the village’s Women Union leader, grassroots groups 
should be independent from all mass organisations. In addition, for this participant, the available 
funding and legal status that mass organisations could offer did not play an important role in 
deciding the integration of grassroots groups into the mass organisations’ organisational 
structure. She explained: 
“If a self-managing group (as it should be) was set up in response to the needs of 
villagers, villagers can contribute to its operating costs as villagers do with Crop 
Protection Group in my village. It was much more important that each household in 
the village was equally represented in the self-managing group than whether it was 
linked to mass organisations”. 
In summary, from interviews with Party and government officers from various levels, it became 
evident that the issue of increased grassroots participation had been discussed and considered by 
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them although exact positions and policies have not worked out yet. The very presence of 
induced forest-based grassroots groups with their intended missions also reveals an attempt by 
the communist state to integrate its agenda into international agendas to encourage local 
participation in different aspects of forest policy making. This gives efforts to create grassroots 
groups in forest devolution process a stronger political foundation for existence. 
8.3. International Influences and Perspectives on Working with 
Grassroots Organisations in Vietnam  
This section aims to explore level of influence that international donors and INGOs can exert to 
grassroots organisations in Vietnam. In addition, it investigates the views of international donors, 
I/VNGOs active in Quang Tri and Hanoi on the matter of increasing the participation of local 
people in the development process, in general, and of local resource users in forest management, 
in particular. Interview topics with this set of participants can be found in Section 9 of Appendix 
4. 
At the macro level, encouragement from international donors for greater participation by 
communities and people at the grassroots level in Vietnam comes via regular dialogue with the 
government (Norlund et al., 2003). Through these dialogues, international donors like the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have pressed for greater participation of civil 
society organisations in decision-making processes. They have done so by placing conditions, 
including enabling civil society participation in the state’s socio-economic development planning 
process, in exchange for new or renewed lending (Hannah, 2007). At the operational level, the 
UNDP and the World Bank, through partnerships with local counterparts, have the explicit aim 
of supporting Vietnamese civil society (Thayer, 2009). As such, the People's Participation 
Working Group (PPWG) was established in 1999, under the auspices of these two organisations, 
with the overall goal of promoting people’s participation in the development and poverty 
reduction process in Vietnam.  
However, the Vietnamese Party-state has a strong position in dialogues with its international 
counterparts, so that the latter cannot impose what they want on the former. Most international 
donors entered into bilateral relations with the country in the 1990s43, when the reform process 
                                                          
43After the 1991 Paris Agreements that saw Vietnamese troops withdraw from Cambodia, Vietnam established 
diplomatic and economic relations with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as with most of 
the countries of Western Europe and Northeast Asia. China re-established full diplomatic ties with Vietnam in 1991. 
Vietnam also normalised relations with the United States in 1995, which was followed by the lifting of the 
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had already shown initial success. In this success, because the CPV remains in charge of 
outlining Vietnam’s strategic development and formalising policies for the future (Ingle et al., 
2006), the achievements in economic development and poverty reduction over the last decade 
have always been credited to the party, thus increasing the legitimacy of the Vietnamese state 
and the leadership of the CPV within the country as well as in dialogues with donors. This 
implies that foreign aid was not an initial driving force for the reform and its economic success 
but rather the policies implemented in 1986 by the CPV under the Đổi Mới process (Forsberg 
and Kokko, 2007). In this regard, the government of Vietnam has always been in a strong 
position vis-à-vis its relations with international donors. Moreover, Vietnam is classified as an 
‘average’ aid recipient country. In the early 2000s, annual Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) commitments only accounted between 4% and 6% of Vietnam’s GDP (Jacquemin and 
Bainbridge, 2005; SRV, 2005; World Bank in Vietnam, 2007). As a result, its dependence on 
foreign aid is not great, which leads to a situation where the government can forgo ODA if it 
finds donor demands unreasonable. In this regard, international donors and INGOs have to 
behave in a way that is acceptable to the government (Pedersen, 2001).  
The opportunities for donors and INGOs to work freely with Vietnamese civil society 
organisations in general and grassroots groups in particular were further constrained by the 
administrative procedures. Donor agencies, as well as INGOs, are critically dependent upon the 
Vietnamese state, which grants work permits as well as imposes penalties, such as limiting 
quotas for foreign staff and making the visa process for consultants more cumbersome 
(Pedersen, 2001). This was explained by a comment from an INGO representative in an in-depth 
interview, who pointed out that: 
“INGOs and donors had to get permission from the government to operate in 
Vietnam, which effectively meant that, if we say something the government doesn’t 
want to hear, we are not allowed to work here. In that situation, INGOs and donors 
in support of grassroots organisations would be limited to where and when the 
government wants us to be”.  
This highlighted the effectiveness of administrative procedures at constraining efforts by donors 
and INGOs to work with Vietnamese CSOs. Interviews with 26 staff members of VNGOs, 
INGOs and international donors active in Quang Tri or Hanoi on civil society development and 
forest governance showed similar concerns.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
American veto on multilateral loans to the country. As a result, Vietnam became a member of the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank (Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010; US 
Department of State, 2010). 
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Moreover, Norlund et al. (2006) argue that INGOs have never been very critical of government 
policy in Vietnam, partly due to the legacy of the Second Indochina War, when most INGOs 
were supportive of the regime of North Vietnam but also because experience has taught them 
that they are able to gain the confidence of Vietnamese authorities, and thus increase their 
influence, by cooperating with them (Pedersen, 2001). 
In that context, although they are influential, international donors and INGOs cannot ignore the 
government of Vietnam when pushing their own agenda to promote the participation of non-state 
participants in the development process. Therefore:  
“In Vietnam, unlike in other countries, it is not possible to ‘buy’ reform. Donors have 
had to adopt an unusually flexible approach and engage with the government based 
on sound analytical work and constructive policy dialogue” (Alcaide and Sanz-
Ramos, 2007: 3). 
As a result, given the sensitivity of the government of Vietnam to creating more favourable 
space for people’s participation in policy-making processes (see Chapter 4 and the previous 
section 8.2.1), it is perhaps understandable that policy-oriented programmes between donors and 
the government of Vietnam are mainly implemented in the least controversial areas of economic 
policy, such as infrastructure development, anti-corruption measures, and banking, 
administrative and legal reform to help Vietnam integrate into the global economy. The 
promotion of civil society organisations in policy dialogues is not a priority area (Pedersen, 
2001; Jacquemin and Bainbridge, 2005). 
Overall, discussions with seven participants from donor organisations in Vietnam revealed a 
general lack of strategies, and therefore funding, to support focussed work on the development of 
grassroots organisations in Vietnam in general and in the forest sector in particular. Lack of 
strategies was widely accepted among staff members of donor organisations. According to a 
representative from a UNDP programme on governance:  
“Donor agencies cannot do much to develop or strengthen the participation of civil 
society organisations at either national or grassroots levels in Vietnam’s policy 
making process without the willingness of the government. We don’t have a strategy 
because we didn’t have the opportunity to work on that issue [people’s participation] 
until recently, when the government became more willing to talk and take actions”. 
The response of one donor organisation representative from the Netherlands was typical, when 
she argued that, while:  
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“Our government has a general policy to encourage wider participation of local 
resource users in the forest governance process through its development cooperation 
programmes globally, my office in Hanoi does not have a specific strategy, nor a 
separate funding line to support the implementation of the policy on increased 
participation of local people in Vietnam”. 
Another representative from a German donor organisation also reiterated the same point, when 
she argued that “the recent political climate in the country did not allow independent civil society 
organisations (including grassroots organisations) to exist”. As such, she described the efforts 
of her organisation as “being constrained by the political set-up in Vietnam, where there are not 
many independent organisations approaching us, or for us to approach, for support”. In regard 
to increased people’s participation in policy making, donors have had to wait for opportunities to 
intervene, which partly explains why, over the last two decades, no international donor or INGO 
has had concrete strategies, dedicated resources or personnel to concentrate on this topic 
(Sabharwal and Than 2005). 
In response to lack of independent Vietnamese civil society organisation, donors often enlisted 
INGOs in their interventions. This approach was commonly seen in Vietnam. INGOs also 
included the promotion of civil society in their mission statements in order to attract funding 
from their governments for overseas activities in Vietnam (Thayer, 2009). As such, many INGOs 
were “sent” by international donors (through financial support) to mediate the incorporation of 
grassroots views into the development of the Country Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 
(CPRGS) in the late 1990s and the 2006-2010 SEDP in the early 2000s, with the aim of 
demonstrating to the government the positive link between increased local participation and 
improved economic development for rural people (Jacquemin and Bainbridge, 2005; McElwee 
and Ha, 2006; World Bank, 2006, 2007). This was a significant achievement by donors and 
INGOs, because they contributed to the opening up of the socio-economic planning process to 
the general public, given that socio-economic development plans were previously treated as ‘top 
secret’ and circulated only within limited government departments (Sabharwal and Than, 2005). 
The inclusion of INGOs in development interventions was articulated clearly by a Netherland 
donor staff member in an in-depth interview that:  
“We often fund INGOs from my country to work with Vietnamese NGOs to improve 
people’s participation, while supporting small-scale activities run by Vietnamese 
NGOs as and when such opportunities arise. However, we do not have any direct 
interaction or activities with grassroots groups in Vietnam”. 
In the forest sector, the implementation of CFM in Vietnam was made possible partly by 
encouragement and financing from multi and bilateral institutions and international NGOs 
247 
 
(Sunderlin, 2006). International donors committed more than USD 200 million between 2006 
and 2010 to support the implementation of the 2006-2020 National Forest Strategy (Vietnam 
News, 2005; Forest Sector Support Programme [FSSP], 2008a). By setting up a working 
principle that encourages the participation of a wide range of local resource users in the NRM 
process, international donors and INGOs have generated valuable experience and evidence to 
share with the government, especially in regard to the way government officers interact with the 
local population (FSSP, 2008b). 
At the same time, lack of commitments and priorities was also mentioned by an interviewed 
World Bank staff member:  
“Supporting civil society organisations to take a greater part in the development 
process in Vietnam is one small part of the whole organisation’s activities, so our 
work [on civil society] doesn’t have great priority for funding. Anyway, we are a 
lending organisation, so our focus is not only about civil society development”. 
 From donor and I/VNGO perspectives, working with and improving the capacity of grassroots 
organisations in the development process in Vietnam also presents a challenge because: 
“Firstly, every donor organisation has its own agenda, interests and approach to the 
matter. Secondly, lack of capacity among civil society organisations in Vietnam does 
not provide international donors and INGOs with many partners to work with in the 
country. Thirdly, existing Vietnamese civil society organisations’ personnel are still 
strongly linked to the government, while the government itself is still suspicious of 
CSOs and does not want to fully consult them” (in-depth interview with UNDP 
representative working on the Governance Cluster). 
Moreover, international donors active in Vietnam are influenced by the neoliberal position on the 
roll-back of the state in development aid. Since the mid-1990s, states have been rehabilitated as 
the main vehicles for delivering development while civil society was expected to be consulted in 
state-led policy processes and development programmes (Howell et al., 2006; Connolly, 2007; 
Smith, 2007). This can be seen in the aid-alignment initiative proposed in the Paris Declaration 
in 2005 by leaders from major donor countries. Implicit in this aid-alignment policy is that all 
international assistance (including assistance to civil society) should go through recipient 
governments and be a part of a unified aid programme set by government within a single and 
coherent framework of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Good intentions in 
transferring development aid into state-led programmes include the reduction of bureaucratic and 
administrative cost, and the avoidance of duplication of funding to the same areas or recipient 
departments. Excepting the fact that the track record of actual consultation is not encouraging 
(civil society’s input into PRSPs has often remained cosmetic; see Eberlei, 2007; INTRAC, 
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2009), the alignment agenda has put civil society back at the mercy of governments, especially 
if, as is often the case (as discussed later), states do not have genuine policies or intentions to 
engage with civilians, especially ones at very grassroots levels. 
In the context of lack of strategies by international donors and INGOs and the restricted space to 
work with local civil society organisation in Vietnam, efforts by international donors and INGOs 
for greater participation of people in development process in Vietnam remained limited At the 
national level, public consultation for the 2006-2010 SEDP, initiated under the sponsorship of 
international donors led by the World Bank, did not help CSOs to take part actively in the 
decision-making process. The World Bank (2007) claimed that the approach to poverty reduction 
in the SEDP went beyond targeted assistance to tackle budget allocation norms and sectoral 
priorities, as a direct result of the consultation process with various stakeholders within the 
country. However, a government officer at the Ministry of Planning and Investment, responsible 
for the consultation process pointed out in an in-depth interview that: 
“Items for consultation in the SEDP are very technical for local people to contribute 
ideas to. Even government officials at provincial and district levels find it difficult. 
Therefore, comments from them to the government are not of a good quality, and are 
thus not used for the final document of the SEDP. ...In fact, we held the consultations 
with various stakeholders to get their comments for the SEDP because the donors 
wanted us to do it and we wanted to keep them happy”.  
As such, encouraging wider participation of grassroots stakeholders, including villagers, in the 
policy-making process became procedural rather than empowering. The participation of CSOs in 
this case was that of an embellishment to the relationship between the government and 
international organisations. 
At the grassroots level, grassroots groups created under the auspice of international donors did 
not have much substantive influence to the decision-making process. In reviewing local 
development groups supported by international donors and INGOs in 15 projects in Vietnam, 
Fritzen (2003) found that no local groups exhibited the potential to exist beyond the project 
cycle. Furthermore, their influence on policy beyond their projects’ geographical coverage was 
also limited. As a result, the aim of encouraging such grassroots groups to take part in the 
decision making process was hardly achieved (Fritzen, 2003). At the case study sites, even 
though induced forest-based grassroots groups were established by internationally funded 
projects aimed at empowering grassroots populations in the forest devolution process, little 
support was forthcoming from these projects to assist induced grassroots groups to develop as 
self-sufficient organisations. Participating in forest patrols with group members, as well as living 
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in each of the study villages, revealed that members of induced grassroots groups did not have 
sufficient ‘on-the-job’ coaching and hands-on support to enable them to mobilise wider 
participation of the local community or deal with instances of illegal logging or negotiating with 
businesses or governments to make their participation in forest management more conducive to 
the improvement of their life.  
Lack of support from the organisations that set these groups up was evidenced by a statement by 
one project officer, who said that “in my Terms of Reference to work with BirdLife, patrolling 
with the SSG is not a compulsory task. I can choose to join SSG patrolling only when I wish to”. 
Meanwhile, in Village B, until 2008, none of the BirdLife senior staff seemed to be aware of the 
fact that the SSG’s patrol routes did not cover hotspots of illegal logging. This was simply 
because, according to one of them (in an in-depth interview), “our staff, during the establishment 
process in 2003, when the patrolling routes were established, never joined any patrols 
undertaken by the group”. As forest patrolling was the main task that the SSG members, project 
officers and local government partners seemed to latch onto, without continuous support from 
the project team for even that task, it was unsurprising that forest patrolling gradually reduced or 
had little impact (see above). 
In dealing with such a complicated issue as illegal logging, external support for the SSG in 
Village A, where illegal logging was rampant, was extremely limited. When informed about 
illegal logging incidents, BirdLife took no action. One SSG member said in frustration in an in-
depth interview that: 
 “I tried twice to report illegal logging to FPD and project team as requested. Once 
time I had to walk for one hour and second time I hired a motorbike driver to get to 
FPD office. I also reported to the BirdLife project staff four days later as instructed. 
However, no FPD officer was sent to assess the situation and there was no reaction 
from BirdLife”.  
Further, an interview with BirdLife staff revealed that the organisation did not provide any 
guidance to the field staff on how to deal with these cases when reported. The field project 
officer said in an in-depth interview that he reported the illegal logging to the head office in 
Hanoi. However, he received no guidance. The silence was perceived in his words as “no one 
wants to touch this issue”. In this regard, the failure of BirdLife to act on the SSG’s report of 
illegal logging could be seen as an institutional and operational failure on the part of the INGO to 
support the SSG to speak out against this politicized issue and implement one of the main tasks it 
was set up for.  
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Apart from the illegal logging issue, when setting up the SSG in Village B, BirdLife had to 
compromise on SSG requirements for members to be villagers. In fact, they were under huge 
pressure from the local government to take only local officers into the group. In the story of one 
staff member from BirdLife: 
“When coming to discuss the issue of establishing the SSG with the CPC covering 
Village B, we tried to persuade them to have only villagers in the groups. However, 
the CPC chairman was very stubborn in insisting on having commune and village 
officers only in the group. The FPD did not want to conflict with the CPC and 
persuaded us to follow the CPC’s suggestion. For us, we also knew that we couldn’t 
go against the CPC and FPD. In the end, the SSG for Village B was staffed by 
village and commune officers”. 
In this regard, INGOs had to compromise their goals to please the government. Arguably, this 
move might be influenced by the calculation that the main task of the SSG was forest patrolling. 
With the legal system at the time, grassroots groups did not have legal status and enforcement 
power that ensured the successful implementation of its task without strong involvement of the 
government. In this regard, the technocratic position once again held its ground, which gave 
priority to technical aspects of forest management rather than the importance of people’s 
participation and their needs in forest management. 
In Village C, there was even less external support for community forest management. 
Discussions during the natural resource mapping exercise with the coordination team of the 
Forest Patrol Group revealed that none of them had received any training in community forest 
management, for example its meaning and application in other places or their legal rights under 
this type of forest management. As a result, no one in this community knew of the different 
rights that community forest management conferred, according to both legal documents and 
actual experience in other provinces. In a focus group discussion, when I illustrated in pictures 
how community forest management in the Central Highlands was implemented, local people 
were surprised at how people in other parts of the country could participate in and gain from 
forest management, such as participatory forest demarcation, measurement of trees for harvest, 
and sale of timber and NTFPs.  
Lack of support from donor-funded project frustrated many local people, which reduced their 
motivation to work for the groups. For example, the SSG members in Village A revealed in 
individual in-depth interviews that, after receiving no support or feedback from the project team 
(as discussed earlier), “since then, we gave up on reporting illegal logging incidents”. This, in 
turn, a SSG member (in an in-depth interview) argued, undermined the credibility of the SSG in 
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the eyes of local people “Now people in the village see outsiders being able to log forests 
[because no one stops them], villagers do not listen to what the SSG says and do not support us 
in forest protection activities”. As forest patrolling was the main task the SSGs were set up to 
perform, without continuous support from the project team for even that task, group members 
revealed in individual interviews that they did not perceive their participation in the group as 
being important. Rather, they did so because of orders from the CPC (in the case of Village B) or 
for the monthly stipend, which contributed to their household income (in the case of Village A). 
In Village C, the objective of the community forest management scheme to boost local 
ownership of the forest governance process, thereby increasing local people’s voice in forest 
management, was not achieved. In answering questions about their motivation to take part in the 
Forest Patrol Group, 14 out of 16 villagers in household interviews reported that they 
participated in forest patrolling and protection simply because everyone else in their village did. 
A typical explanation was given by a man in an forest patrol mission through the forest, who said 
that “I just go anywhere other villagers go; therefore, when they clean up or patrol forests, I join 
them”, while another man reported that “I take part in forest patrolling when my team leader 
calls upon me; I don’t want to go but have to because it is my turn to do so”. In these two 
accounts, the sense of being together and the sense of duty rather than the sense of local 
ownership was a driving force for attending these groups. In this regard, it was unsurprising that, 
for people in Village C, the formation of the Forest Patrol Group and the granting of forest 
ownership for 50 years did not turn into an appreciation of the opportunity to play more active 
roles in the forest management process. Instead, community forest management was widely 
perceived as a burden for the whole village, especially when the lease of the forest, from the 
perspective of local people, entailed nothing but responsibilities for forest protection (see above). 
In the words of one man during the forest patrolling: 
“I had to cancel my visit to the town market today to sell my brooms because the 
village leader asked me to join the patrolling. I don’t like to do the patrolling at all 
because it doesn’t bring me any money to buy my food. I do this as a favour to the 
village leader really”. 
.In summary, despite being an important source of encouragement for Vietnamese civil society 
to take part in development process, support from international donors and INGOs for induced 
forest-based grassroots groups at the case study sites was limited. As a result, donor-funded 
projects at the case study sites did not provide the members of induced forest-based groups with 
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opportunities to comprehend the potential of these groups for facilitating local participation in 
the governance process. Instead, they followed suit the government agenda. 
Having analysed the influence of international donors and INGOs on Vietnamese civil society 
organisations, this section now turns its attention to perspectives of these stakeholders on how to 
work effectively with grassroots organisations in the country. Being aware of pros and cons 
working in Vietnam, when discussing how to improve the performance of induced grassroots 
organisations in the development process in Vietnam, most participants of this research from this 
group of stakeholders paid considerable attention to how induced grassroots groups could stay 
inside the current political system and exert influence from within. In this regard, almost all 
current efforts by international donors and INGOs to support Vietnamese civil society take place 
within the state structure.  
The philosophy of working within the Vietnamese political systems was common among 
participants of this study. One example is the Chia Se (or ‘Sharing’) Programme, funded by the 
Swedish government, which aims to “empower local communities to pursue their own 
development priorities.......practising transparency and accountability at all levels of public 
decision making” (ORGUT, 2009). This vision is realised at the grassroots level through the state 
system, as noted by a senior officer at the Chia Se Programme in an in-depth interview:  
“The programme expects to achieve its aims [to help communities become a 
counterweight to the government] within the state network. For example, we invite 
Communist Party secretaries at the village-level to become team leaders of 
Community Inspection Groups” [tasked with overseeing and inspecting local 
government expenditure; see Chapter 4].  
This was the way that, from his point of view, his organisation could promote the participation of 
grassroots groups, and thus gradually help them to grow.  
The perspective of being inside the system to bring in changes from within was strongly shared 
by a UNDP staff member44, who said in an in-depth interview that, in the current transitional 
period towards a more participatory policy-making process in Vietnam, in order to help 
grassroots organisations, “it was necessary to work within the Vietnamese government system”. 
This required immersion into the system of mass organisations that should be seen as a part of 
civil society. Otherwise, as she rightly said, “you would be out of the game”. In view of 
discussion in Chapter 8, international organisations could not work in Vietnam anyway, if they 
                                                          
44 Her programme’s mission was to support activities by non-governmental and community-based organisations for 
the conservation of biodiversity, prevention of land degradation and generation of sustainable livelihoods. 
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went against rules set by the Party-state. This mirrors the debate regarding semi-civil society in 
China, where immersion into the state structure was seen as crucial for the survival of Chinese 
civil society organisations (see Baogang, 2003). As such, according to her, it was more important 
to think about how international organisations used their leverages (such as participatory 
approaches) to encourage local communities’ participation in policy discussion and planning. In 
that regard, when being within the Party-state system, one should:  
“Apply an approach that considers carefully communities’ needs to show the 
government partners the need and the mode of involving people. In doing so, 
international organisations can encourage changes in the behaviour of their 
government partners, so that grassroots organisations might enjoy a better enabling 
environment to realise their potential” (in-depth interview with UNDP staff 
member).  
Broader research reflects the importance of working within the Party system, as well as 
accepting mass organisations as part of civil society in Vietnam. Hannah’s (2007) research on 
VNGOs highlights that the focus of studies on civil society organisations in Vietnam should be 
on the “civil society process” (i.e. the activities and functions that organisations carry out) rather 
than the specific form of the organisations themselves, and that working to support VNGOs 
needs to be done within the state structure (e.g. Hannah, 2007; Norlund, 2007a).  
Importantly, however, interviews with the same representatives also recognised the key 
drawbacks inherent in strategies of working within the Party-state structure to improve the 
effectiveness of induced grassroots organisations. In the case of the Chia Se Programme, 
transparency and accountability of the inspection groups was compromised by the fact that they 
were not independent from the bodies they inspected. “As such, efforts to help civilians to 
become a counterweight to the commune government had little success”, said one staff member 
of the Chia Se Programme in Quang Tri in an in-depth interview. This highlighted the fact that 
the approach and the leverage international organisations that chose to influence the state from 
inside might not help them to stand out in the Party-state system and provide help to grassroots 
populations. Although international organisations do not have much option but to work within 
the existing structure, they have choice of who to work with and what leverages they can use to 
achieve their goal of supporting wider participation of citizen in decision-making process in 
Vietnam. 
So far, this chapter has analysed the influences and viewpoints of the Party-state, international 
donors and INGOs. While efforts were made to interview representatives of VNGOs, it quickly 
became apparent that there were, in fact, no VNGOs active on forest governance at the research 
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sites. This was partly because working in the forest sector is challenging, given the prevalence of 
illegal logging, and the vested interests of corrupt government and army officers, according to 
one representative from an INGO working in Quang Tri. Also, as discussed earlier in this chapter 
and in Chapter 4, VNGOs were more active in service delivery projects. As a result, he 
continued, providing support for grassroots organisations working in the forest sector would 
require VNGOs to demand policy reform, as well as to stand firm in the face of government 
pressure. This, according to representatives of VNGOs working in other sectors outside Quang 
Tri, was not possible at the moment because of a lack of confidence and capacity, and concerns 
about their own safety. As a result, it was not possible to investigate the role that VNGOs could 
play in supporting the development of grassroots organisations in the forest sector at the case 
study sites. 
8.4. Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter highlights the strong level of control from the Party-state towards 
grassroots population, which sets a boundary for what international donors and INGOs can do in 
Vietnam to promote the greater participation of local people and their organisations in decision 
making process. Of all measures employed by the Party/State to control the rural population at 
the case study sites, bribery and unfair distribution of benefits appeared to work best to separate 
local cohesion. Meanwhile, while remaining within the existing political system, international 
donors and INGOs influences in the operations of grassroots organisations remained limited. 
Both tight control of the government and lack of support from donors and INGOs did not help 
induced forest-based grassroots groups at the study sites to become a voice for local resource 
users.  
In the current context, where the Party and government have begun to discuss how to engage 
with civil society organisations, in general, and grassroots ones, in particular, there are both 
opportunities and challenges to improve the roles played by induced grassroots groups. 
Furthermore, given that involving more actors in decision making is a costly and time-
consuming process, working with induced grassroots groups should be seen as a long-term 
investment by all stakeholders involved. The most challenging task, perhaps, is to find a way to 
allow the Party and government to participate in the operations of grassroots groups while 
ensuring institutional and structural space for these groups to realise their potential to support 
local people and contribute to more sustainable forest management. The last chapter of this thesis 
outlines a new approach that could potentially address this challenge. 
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Chapter 9: Summary and Conclusion 
This study investigates the roles played by induced forest-based grassroots organisations in the 
management of natural forest in Quang Tri province, Vietnam. In so doing, it aims to contribute 
to improved understanding of the roles of these organisations in forest devolution, and the ways 
in which a framework can be created for them to play a meaningful part in the management of 
natural forests in authoritarian political systems, like the one in Vietnam. More specifically, the 
analysis addresses three research objectives and associated propositions at household and village 
levels: 
(1) To investigate the contextual foundations for the establishment of induced forest-based 
grassroots organisations in the forest sector. 
(2) To critically evaluate the roles played by induced forest-based grassroots organisations and 
factors influencing them. 
 (3) To identify mechanisms by which induced forest-based grassroots organisations can be 
strengthened. 
These objectives respond to concerns of Vietnam’s policy makers and international donors about 
the particpation of local people and grassroots organisations in the development process. 
Therefore, the study also has some implications for these groups of stakeholders on how to help 
increase the participation of induced forest-based grassroots organisations in forest governance 
within the Vietnamese context.  
Major studies about local resource users and their motivations to take part in NRM focus on key 
variables conducive to self-organisation of user groups in resource management, such as physical 
and technical attributes of resources, characteristics of user groups, and attributes of institutional 
arrangements, with certain normative conditions, such as empowerment, participation and 
equity, or have tried to view it as a way to improve institutional efficiency for the purpose of 
service delivery. Within this literature on self-organisation, there is a common assumption that 
local autonomy is essential to the success of collective action. In this regard, local people require 
autonomy to organise collective action for forest management in order that they can govern their 
own affairs, with government actors keeping their distance. Due to this assumption of the need 
for autonomy on the part of local people for effective collective action for NRM, the influences 
of external actors on the organisation of user groups have been neglected in the literature. 
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Recently, however, there has been widespread induction of grassroots organisation by outside 
agencies, within the context of devolution processes, with the aim of inceasing the participation 
of local resource users in decision making. In this regard, influences from these agencies on the 
way these organisations operate are unavoidable. This challenges the common premise of local 
autonomy as a precondition for effective collective action. Moreover, in studies on NRM 
devolution policies, community property rights are often seen as a potential option for NRM. 
What is missing from these studies is that they do not bring to light how different types of 
property rights can be mixed and arranged through the channel of induced grassroots 
organisations, so that induced grassroots organisations can take advantage of these different 
property rights to improve local people’s benefits, and thus their meaningful participation in 
these organisations and decision-making processes. In countries like Vietnam, where full 
property rights cannot be conferred on citizens or their groups, the use of each or combined 
property rights might provide suitable incentives for local people to rally their efforts around 
induced grassroots organisations to manage forest sustainably.  
Using materials collected from three villages in Quang Tri, where forest devolution took place in 
the form of inducing forest-based grassroots organisations, the analyses have produced the 
following findings, which might contribute to further understanding of the role of induced 
grassroots organisations in NRM. 
The local contexts within which grassroots organisations were induced were characterised by the 
high level of vulnerability of local people who were relatively new to the areas as a result of 
constant up-rooting during the war years. Poverty was still prevalent in these villages, while 
biased distribution of development aid was common. In this context, the dependence of the 
inhabitants of the three study villages on forest resources for their livelihoods had steadily 
reduced compared with the past. However, diversification of livelihoods away from exploitation 
of forest resources was either not well adapted to local socio-economic and ecological 
conditions, or not resilient to shocks.  
That said, local communities’ relationships with forests have changed dramatically since the end 
of the Second Indochina War, with the disapearance of local institutions governing forests. 
Meanwhile, state-led insitutions for forest maangement were strongly contested. In this context, 
contemporary forest management was characterized by a sharp contrast between the legal 
designation of forest and the actual activities taking place there, such as illegal logging in 
protected areas (Villages A and B) and land clearance in protection forest (Village C). As such, it 
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can be argued that, over a period of time, local people’s interests in forest management in 
general and collective action for sustainable forest management in particular have been reduced.  
Against this backdrop, pre-existing indigenous grassroots groups for agricultural production and 
illegal logging were present at the case study sites. The work of these groups was limited to 
practical tasks for short periods of time, when the benefits of working together outweighed its 
costs. In cases when negotiation and compromise were requried to organise collective action, 
local people often failed. Meanwhile, the existence of indigenous forest-based grassroots groups 
for illegal timber extraction indicated the resistance of local people against the domination of 
state forest ownership. 
In each village, women played a leading role in agricultural production, while men were more 
active in forest-related activities. In this regard, with reduced work opportunities (and thus 
income) from forests due to reduced forest quality, and the focus of livelihood diversification on 
women’s area of works (i.e. agriculture), men were made increasingly unemployed at the study 
sites. 
Regarding the roles played by induced forest-based grassroots groups in forest management, 
evidence showed that they were dominated by the technocratic school of thought, which is 
contrast to the current trend in tackling massive destruction of forest worldwide. Although CFM 
was promoted at the study sites, the nature of forest management practices was dominated by the 
protected area approach. From the outset, the structures of induced forest-based grassroots 
groups showed more characteristics of district-level organisations, although these groups were 
intended as village-level ones. This extended the enforcement power of the government over 
forests and strengthened the belief that local resource users were culprits of deforestation and 
needed to be controlled. This was particularly profound when the intended decision-making parts 
of these groups – the general assemblies – were out of action, which left each group with only 
forest patrol team whose mission was to punish forest violations. In addition, the dysfunctional 
general assembilies left induced forest-based grassroots groups with only members from local 
government or Party cells. With these members, the induced forest-based grassroots groups only 
took instructions from the government and project teams, they were not held accountable to local 
resource users, and they did not play a role in empowerment of local people. 
Rights and responsibilities transferred to these groups also reflected the dominance of the 
technocratic position, which does not attach the importance of local livelihoods and grassroots 
organisations in forest management. Although rights of access to and withdrawal of NTFPs were 
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granted to local people, they did not turn into a substantial contribution to local livelihoods, 
because either the local government also granted these rights to a commercial company, the 
forest did not contain valuable NTFPs, or NTFPs were not sufficiently abundant to incentivize 
forest protection. In fact, support to local livelihoods was negligible in all three villages. Instead, 
these groups undertook forest patrols, monitored biodiversity and stopped illegal logging/forest 
clearance in forest management as sufficient to guarantee better forest conditions. In addition, 
support mainly flowed to the FPD, to increase its capacity as a forest management agency, such 
as in the areas of law enforcement and biodiversity monitoring. In this regard, forest 
management practices at the study sites also suggest that the paradigm shift away from state-
centred control towards approaches in which local people play more active roles in forest 
management has not yet taken place in Vietnam. Instead, people living within or near special-use 
forests and protection forests at the case study sites were excluded from the forest governance 
process, thereby making sustainable forest management a near-impossible task, as widely 
acknowledged around the world. This effectively brought back the bad memory and failures of 
forest management under the influence of the technocratic approaches in the 1960s and 1970s.  
Regarding issues of participation, gender inequality and power in induced forest-based 
grassroots groups, the study aims to shed light onto normative factors conditioning the social 
equity that these groups generated. In regard to gender, all three induced forest-based grassroots 
groups did not have positive patterns of representation of women. The establishment of induced 
forest-based grassroots groups reinforced the male-dominated pattern of power relations in forest 
management at the research sites. In regard to participation of local people into the foreign-
funded projects, the participation process mainly showed the characteristic of manipulation, with 
the prevalence of instrumental relational ties between the state and local resource users.  
As for macro-level issues influencing whether these groups could have a role in facilitating 
people’s participation in decision-making processes, the environments under which the induced 
grassroots groups operated at the three study sites were not favourable to their development. For 
example, the government’s biased resource-allocation system undermined cohesion and harmony 
among villagers, and isolated their village leaders from the rest of the community, while support 
to the empowerment process and trust of local people were low. At the same time, the 
government also pushed hard for the inclusion of Party organisations among grassroots 
organisations, in an attempt to keep them under control. In this context, international donors and 
INGOs, despite being an important source of encouragement for the creation of these groups, did 
not provide them with sufficient support and left them alone struggling with task they were set 
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up for. As a result, dissatisfaction and disillusion toward the goals of these groups became 
common among villagers, making it difficult for them to mobilise local participation in their 
activities.  
The above findings on the roles played by induced forest-based grassroots organisations support 
the observation made in Chapter 2 that, in theory, grassroots organisations are not given priority 
in decision-making processes. Instead, induced forest-based grassroots groups were primarily 
used by the government to strengthen their control over forest resources, stop local resource 
users from accessing them, and transfer the cost of managing degraded forests to local people. 
Therefore, induced forest-based grassroots groups at the three study sites only had decorative 
roles in the policy-making process, leaving the goals of restoring traditional forest management 
practices and empowering local people remote. As a result, the implementation of forest 
devolution policies through the induction of grassroots groups has not achieved its aim of 
transferring some of the power for decision-making on forest management to local resource 
users. 
In investigating the perspectives of different stakeholders on how to work with induced forest-
based groups, the study found that local people in general wanted forest management to move 
out of the technocratic box, while participants from the government still wanted to maintain the 
technocratic approach. For these groups to work, local people saw the improvement of 
livelhhoods as an integal part of technical improvements, such as enforcement power, clear 
boundaries for forests and property rights arrangements. Meanwhile, local government was more 
keen on strengthening these groups so they could strengthen its enforcement power. Macro-level 
stakeholders, such as Party officers and international donors, approached the question of 
improvement of these groups differently. Participants from the Party seemed to pay more 
attention to how these groups should be positioned within the existing political system. In the 
prevailing (challenging) economic climate, it was not a priority for the Party to figure out what 
roles civil society, in general, should play in the development process. Therefore, the safe 
approach to working with grassroots groups was to send people from the Party to join them to 
keep a close eye on them. For the international donors, the question of how to work with these 
groups was dominated by the imperative of maintaining permission to work in Vietnam. For that, 
they needed to ensure that their work did not raise questions about the Party’s ultimate position 
within the country. Within this context, donors and INGOs tried to work with State-sponsored 
partners to show them benefits of working with grassroots organsiatons, so that changes in the 
attitute of these partners might lead to better environments for induced grassroots organisations 
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to operate in. This approach might be useful for involving local resource users in mainstream 
policy making and practising their collective decision-making power gradually in the prevailing 
state-controlled context. 
With regard to the discourse in the current literature, the empirical findings from this study may 
contribute to the following areas of knowledge and, perhaps, improve the understanding of the 
respective problems.  
The study provides empirical evidence of how induced forest-based grassroots groups could play 
greater roles in facilitating local participation in the management of natural forest. Partly, this 
could be achieved through the way property rights to forests under protected areas and protection 
forests are arranged under the management of induced grassroots groups. Accordingly, property 
rights to forest should be devolved separately (not as a whole bundle) to different units of user 
groups, to make use of different rights and allow room for balancing conservation goals (of 
biodiversity and ecosystem service) with income generation needs (for local people affected by 
forest protection). This is important for countries like Vietnam, where full property rights to 
forest cannot be transferred to local resource users.  
In this regard, rights of access to and withdrawal from a block of forest should be handed to local 
people on an individual household basis not a community basis, because this will create clearer 
incentives for individual households to take part in forest management. This is in contrast to 
ideal arrangements for CBNRM promoted the current literature, which often sees communal 
ownership being promoted as the option for community participation in NRM, as highlighted in 
Chapter 2.  
Regarding the right of management of forests within protected areas and protection forests, it is 
important for this right to be shared between the responsible government authority (e.g. the 
protected area management board) and the induced grassroots organisation. By using village-
wide induced grassroots organisations not individual households or groups of households, it is 
expected that coordination and cooperation among individual households who enjoy individual 
rights of access and withdrawal to a block of forest can be promoted. This approach would 
minimise the shortcomings of individual ownership, such as uncoordinated and individual efforts 
against outside encroachment. In addition, by sharing rights of management of forest resources, 
management plans and, in particular, regulations on extraction of forest products must be 
negotiated between local people and the responsible government authority. Although rights of 
management of forests are shared with an induced grassroots organisation, flexibility is needed 
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when dividing organisation-based and household group-based tasks. For example, for forest 
patrolling or tending, the management rights should be devolved to household groups to enable 
labour sharing, while decisions on how to use forests (i.e. sharing benefits from forests) should 
be decided collectively in the village assembly, to ensure fairness among different household 
groups.  
At the same time, the right of exclusion should also be shared between the government and local 
resource users. This right should be granted to local people on a household basis, and then 
pooled among households in the same household group45, especially during forest patrolling and 
tending missions, to ensure timely interventions if violations are spotted. To this end, it is 
important to grant sufficient enforcement powers to these household groups to make the shared 
right of exclusion work. In the context of an authoritarian country, where enforcement powers 
are often retained by the state, it is necessary to negotiate with the local government to devolve 
certain powers of enforcement, such as the power to arrest poachers on the spot, to individual 
households or groups of households. 
Although rights of management and exclusion should be shared between the local community 
and the government, the right of alienation must be reserved for the latter. In the case of 
protected areas and protection forests, state ownership is the norm. In this regard, in the medium 
term at least, expecting the government to devolve the right of alienation for these types of 
forests to local people is unrealistic. This is also a trade-off that is necessary, in an authoritarian 
country, to satisfy the state’s requirement for its control over critical resources of the economy 
while advocating for devolution of the aforementioned rights. Also, if the different rights related 
to forest were devolved separately, in the way outlined above, a balance between forest 
conservation led by governments and livelihood improvements for local people is more likely to 
be achieved. 
For the organisational structure of induced grassroots groups, it is also important to take into 
account de facto access to forests in the aforementioned institutional arrangements for property 
rights to forests to decide who should be part of these groups. As seen at the case study sites, de 
facto access can enable rights of extraction and exclusion. In this regard, if the interests of people 
from different villages who enjoy de facto access to a forest area are not taken into account, the 
legitimacy of the induced grassroots organisation’s rights over the forest will be greatly 
                                                          
45 Households form groups based on their proximity to the forests they manage. These household groups are part of 
induced grassroots groups. 
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undermined, and, thus, the benefits villagers receive from it will diminish Also, efforts to protect 
forests by one induced grassroots organisation might be challenged by people from another 
village who receive no benefits from forests they have de facto access to. As a result, 
organisation formation should be determined by who actually accesses the forest in question, 
rather than simply by administrative boundaries. If using existing administrative boundaries to 
establish organisations, inter-village coordination teams should be used to ensure discussion on 
and fair distribution of benefits between villages, and promote cooperation among them. 
An improved organisational structure for induced grassroots groups is suggested in Figure 9.1. 
Importantly, membership of the general assembly must be extended to two (not one) 
representatives (i.e. one man and one woman) per family (not per household). Families should be 
the basis for representation instead of households because it is common, in rural areas in 
developing countries, for more than one family to be registered under a single household. 
Following this approach, women in general and young men from extended families residing in 
same household with the older generation would have more opportunities to take part in village-
wide discussions. Furthermore, members of a household group within village-wide (or multi-
village-wide, in cases where multiple villages are involved in management of the same forest 
area) induced grassroots organisations should be responsible for forest areas located relatively 
close to one another, to facilitate labour sharing for forest protection among members. 
The executive committee should be placed under the supervision of the village assembly. In that 
regard, decisions of the executive committee should be final only after having been endorsed by 
the village assembly through village meetings. It is important for village meetings to be 
organised in such a way that both women and men can attend and have their voices heard. For 
this reason, it is recommended that separate meetings be organised for women, so that suitable 
meeting times can be organised to fit in with their agricultural and domestic commitments. In 
addition, it might be easier for women in communities with pronounced gender inequality to 
raise concerns in their peer-environment. The concerns raised in these meetings could then be 
presented by a female representative during the village assembly (i.e. meeting of the whole 
village with two representatives from each family). 
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In order to communicate with higher government agencies and outside supporters, like NGOs, an 
advisory board should be set up for each induced grassroots organisation, in addition to the 
executive committee, with seats reserved for local government representatives, concerned NGOs, 
one member of executive committee and interested ordinary villagers of the induced grassroots 
organisation. In addition, until such time as enforcement power is granted to the induced 
grassroots organisation, the participation of local government agencies on the advisory 
committee will be vital for mobilising official support for the induced grassroots organisation to 
protect the benefits villagers receive from the forests they manage. 
The reason for separating executive and advisory committees is to create a space in which 
villagers can deliberate before engaging in discussions with local government or other outside 
agencies. This arrangement also reflects a key finding of this research, that most of the 
interviewed villagers generally only wanted to involve local government in two areas: dealing 
with forest violations; and creating an enabling environment for the groups to function in.  
In addition to providing insights on how the structural and institutional arrangements for induced 
grassroots groups can be improved, this study also offer contributions to how PAR can be 
conducted in Vietnam and more broadly within the confines of an authoritarian political system 
and international donor projects. The outcome of PAR is strongly influenced by whether 
permission can be gained from gatekeepers, which, in turn, is influenced by the level of trust 
gained from these keepers and the contacts researchers have to establish themselves in the field. 
This process could stop both researchers and potential participants from freely “choosing” each 
other. To mitigate the impacts of these limitations, researchers need to spend extra time 
explaining to potential participants (using dedicated consensus-building sessions) that they do 
not have to participate in the research if they do not wish to. Furthermore, because the concept 
and aim of PAR are generally not in line with the orthodoxy of authoritarian political systems, 
which protect the power of those in power, using PAR is possible only if both researchers and 
participants understand how far they can push for change. In this regard, PAR in an authoritarian 
country, such as Vietnam, can only bring change if it conforms to certain norms and rules of 
existing power structures. The binding trust and contact mentioned above stop researchers from 
“provoking” change that is undesirable to gatekeepers, thus the government. In this regard, PAR 
is more able to challenge the normative production of knowledge by including excluded 
perspectives and engaging those most affected by the research in the research process, which, in 
turn, produces changes possible within the existing political system. 
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From a policy-oriented point of view, the findings from this study have the following 
implications. While forest conservation is not, in itself, problematic, a too-heavy focus on the 
issue shifts most resources away from the pressing livelihood concerns of local people and their 
participation in policy dialogues, as the research findings showed. Therefore, together with new 
structural and institutional arrangements for induced grassroots groups mentioned earlier, to 
mobilise people to participate in the forest management process, and thus create levers for 
producing favourable changes to local lives, it is important to link forest management with 
livelihood activities. Ideally, any livelihood support to the community should address the 
opportunity cost of forest management. This typically has two components: the opportunity cost 
of time not spent doing other things by patrol group members (for which cash compensation is 
entirely appropriate, albeit not the only option); and the opportunity cost for the village as a 
whole of no longer being able to cut timber or clear forest for farmland (for which a village-wide 
benefit, such as a micro-credit scheme or an annual payment into a village development fund 
would be appropriate). It is important for poverty reduction and forest management efforts to be 
channelled through a single management entity (i.e. the executive of induced grassroots 
organisations or other existing structures in concerned villages). This would not only avoid 
overlaps caused by too many organisations active in the same field but also help villagers to 
strengthen their capacity and confidence in using their own organisations to protect their rights 
and carry out their responsibilities.  
Critically, the findings of this research suggest that paying members to participate in the 
activities of induced grassroots organisations (in isolation from a benefit package for the whole 
community) is not the most sustainable approach. This clearly created envy among villagers at 
the case study sites. Instead, financial support should be given to the organisations as a whole 
and or used towards something that brings benefits to all their members. In that way, donor 
funding could be used to secure the legitimacy of the groups themselves in the eyes of local 
people. Hence, motivation to take part in collective forest management for local people would be 
greater.  
The research findings indicate that forest degradation and putting forests resources in protected 
areas and protection forests has made men ‘jobless’, especially because livelihood alternatives 
often focus more heavily on women’s productive roles, such as animal husbandry and 
agriculture, than on traditional tasks for men, such as timber extraction, hunting and other forest-
based activities. Therefore, men typically have more time to take part in new initiatives aimed at 
increasing people’s participation in forest management. This highlights the need for initiatives 
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that encourage both men and women to take part in forest management to coordinate within the 
broader remit of poverty reduction, especially creating more opportunities for men to take on 
more responsibility for livelihood alternatives. 
Arrangements for monitoring and reporting on the success of donor-funded projects, including 
key performance indicators for forest conservation or poverty reduction objectives, should be 
linked to the performance of induced (or indigenous) grassroots groups or organisations 
supporting the implementation of these projects. In doing so, the development of induced 
grassroots groups or organisations is less likely to be marginalised in such projects. As a result, 
local participation through induced grassroots organisations is more likely to being 
systematically mainstreamed into the forest management process, and, hence, when projects end, 
their impacts might stay with beneficiary communities. 
Moreover, working within the current political framework in Vietnam, donors cannot choose 
whether to work inside and outside the current political system but they can choose who to work 
with and use different levers to encourage more meaningful participation for local people. In that 
regard, they should be more able to encourage changes favourable to the development of induced 
grassroots organisation.  
In conclusion, induced grassroots organisations do not work in the way of states, by issuing legal 
ordinances, or in the way of donors, by providing financial support to increase people’s 
participation in the devolution process. Instead, initiatives to induce grassroots organisations, as 
an approach to increasing local people’s participation in forest management, are more likely to 
work by repositioning the relationship between the state and local communities through more 
practical and meaningful arrangements for induced grassroots organisations to take part in 
decision making. In this way, attention to local power relations, including the negotiation of 
rights to forest resources and pre-existing arrangements of power and resource sharing, may help 
reduce the frequent failures of current initiatives to establish induced grassroots groups in the 
forest management. I hope results from this study will shed some light on the roles played by 
induced forest-based grassroots organisations in forest devolution, concrete factors influencing 
their roles as well as the ways in which a framework can be created for them to play a 
meaningful part in decision-making processes in authoritarian political systems.  
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Appendix 1: Research Participants 
At the studied villages 
1. Villagers in Village A, B, C in Quang Tri 
2. Village Administrative Leaders 
3. Traditional Village Leaders 
Donor organisations 
1. European Commission in Vietnam 
2. German Development Organisation (DED) in Vietnam  
3. Swedish Environmental Fund in Vietnam 
4. The Embassy of the Netherlands in Vietnam 
5. The Embassy of Finland in Vietnam 
6. The World Bank in Vietnam  
7. United Nations Development Programme in Vietnam 
NGOs 
1. Advancement of Community Empowerment and Partnership – ACEP  (a VNGO) 
2. BirdLife International (INGO) 
3. Centre for People and Nature Reconciliation (PANATRE – a VNGO) 
4. CARE (INGO) 
5. Education for Nature Vietnam – ENV (a VNGO) 
6. Mines Advisory Group - MAG (a humanitarian INGO) 
7. Oxfam Great Britain (a development INGO) 
8. ORGUT (International Consultancy Company) 
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9. Oxfam Hong Kong (INGO) 
10. People and Nature Reconciliation – PANATURE (a VNGO) 
11. Quang Tri Rural Development Programme (funded by the Finnish Government) 
12. Tropenbos International (an INGO based in Central Vietnam) 
13. The Centre for Sustainable Rural Development - SDR (a VNGO) 
14. The Song Da Forestry Project (International Funded Project) 
15. The Netherlands Development Organisation – SNV (an INGO) 
16. WWF Greater Mekong Vietnam Country Programme (an INGO) 
Vietnamese government organisations 
1. Department of Agricultural Rural Development in Quang Tri 
2. Department of Planning and Investment in Quang Tri 
3. Department for Internal Affairs in Quang Tri 
4. Forest Protection Department in Quang Tri 
5. Forest Watershed Management Board in Quang Tri 
6. Commune and District People’s Committees in Quang Tri 
7. Communist Party of Vietnam’s People’s Mobilisation Committee in Quang Tri 
8. Vietnam Fatherland Front in Quang Tri 
9. Women’s Union in Quang Tri and Hanoi 
10. Youth’s Union at the study sites in Quang Tri 
11. Farmers’ Union at the study sites in Quang Tri 
12. Communist Party of Vietnam’s Propaganda and Education Magazine in Hanoi 
13. Communist Party of Vietnam’s External Affairs Committee in Hanoi 
14. Ministry of Planning and Investment  
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15. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development  
Appendix 2: Grassroots Organisations outside of the State 
System 
In devolution policies, some types of organisations outside of the state system have been created 
to take part in forest devolution. In the case of Village Forest Associations (VFAs) that are often 
created in international funded projects to manage forest concessions, the organisation has a 
three-tier structure. Apart from the general assembly and executive committee, there is a policy 
committee under the general assembly responsible for recommending different policies for the 
general assembly to adopt. In some cases, inter-village forest association committees are created, 
comprising a cluster of VFAs from neighbouring villages to coordinate forest management and 
facilitate conflict resolution (see more GTZ and MRC, 2006). In this way, they are similar to the 
Federation of Community Forestry Users that represents CFUGs in Nepal.  
Successes of VFAs have been seen in several areas. In their work, GTZ and MRC (2006) in the 
Mekong Basin, and Cuny et al. (2007) and Cronkleton et al. (2008) in Guatemala highlighted the 
necessity of establishing VFAs to facilitate the co-management of forests in close cooperation 
with district and provincial authorities. This also helps improve the relationship between 
government and the local community, bringing substantive socio-economic development within 
the village and generating substantial income for many families (Cuny et al., 2007). Also, many 
VFAs have expanded their activities beyond securing subsistence needs from forests for their 
members. In Kenya, VFAs increasingly engage in policy dialogues through such activities as 
lobbying and negotiating with the government, conflict management and fundraising (Ongugo et 
al., 2008). Similarly, in Guatemala, the Association of Forest Communities of the Petén 
(ACOFOP) has been successful in promoting the interests of indigenous people in legal and 
political arenas, for instance through winning forest concessions within some protected areas for 
their member communities (Cronkleton et al., 2008). More importantly, these associations have 
initiated systems and principles of equity to improve the standard and quality of life, especially 
for disadvantaged groups of their serving communities (Ongugo et al. 2008; Cronkleton et al., 
2008).  
Another common type of organisations outside of the state system is village-level corporate 
organisations, such as corporations, trusts, conservancies or communal property associations (see 
Campbell and Shackleton, 2001; Shackleton et al., 2002: Campbell et al., 2003). These 
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organisations are formed by all residents or rights holders within a designated area (sometimes 
spanning several villages). They elect their own management committees and are governed by 
legally recognised constitutions. Also, they have the authority to make rules, approve 
developments, enter into partnership with the private sector, receive revenues and decide on 
benefit allocations (Campbell and Shackleton, 2001). Since the foundation and legitimacy of 
these organisations are derived from the community itself, interference by the state is less 
pervasive than under other arrangements (McCusker, 2002). In this regard, local government has 
no official role in these organisations. Instead, local elected representatives often assist in the 
formation of these organisations, as a means of developing their constituencies (Campbell and 
Shackleton, 2001). 
It is often assumed that organisations operating outside the state system are less influenced by 
the state’s deliberations, and thus can provide local people with more opportunities to use their 
traditional knowledge and practices to support their work (Weber et al., 2000). This assumption 
echoes the liberal position on grassroots organisations. This boosts local resource users’ 
confidence and self-esteem, because indigenous knowledge is thought to be often based on 
communities’ long historical experience (Parrotta and Agnoletti, 2007). As a result, decisions on 
forest management are more likely to be responsive to local contexts.  
However, being separate from the state and supported by indigenous institutions does not 
necessarily mean that grassroots organisations outside of the state system have more power in 
deciding what to do in NRM. For example, with corporate organisations, such as Communal 
Property Associations in South Africa (see McCusker, 2002), or in the case of conservancies in 
Botswana (see Campbell and Shackleton, 2001), the state still retains its ultimate authority 
through administrative tools, such as setting quotas for hunting within conservancies or issuing 
directives to confiscate all money generated by corporate organisations. This defies the 
assumption of liberalism of separation between state and grassroots organisations to help the 
later become more independent, and can have negative impacts on local interests. 
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Appendix 3: Ethical Issues 
1. Information Package for Consent Seeking 
1.1. Reference Number for Consent Approval for the Research by Queen Mary University of 
London 
Ref: REC Protocol Number. QMULREC 2007/33 
1.2. Information Sheet Disseminated through Verbal Communication 
 INFORMATION SHEET 
Sustainable Forest Management and Induced Grassroots Organisations in Vietnam 
I would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project (please see 
the attached presentation titled “Sustainable Forest Management and Grassroots 
Organisations in Vietnam”). You should only participate if you want to; choosing not to 
take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to 
take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not 
clear or if you would like more information. If you do decide to take part, please let me 
know directly or via Mr. A or Mrs. B (to be confirmed) in your village.  
Details of study  
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will 
be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you 
decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. 
A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not change any 
benefits you receive in your village.  
In the event of you suffering any adverse effects as a consequence of your participation 
in this study, you will be compensated through Queen Mary University of London’s ‘No 
Fault Compensation Scheme’. 
Continued in the presentation entitled “Sustainable forest management and grassroots 
organisations in Vietnam” 
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1.3. Information Disseminated through Emails to Donor and NGO Staff  
 Re: Participation in a PhD research on Sustainable Forest Management and Induced 
Grassroots Organisations in Vietnam 
Dear….. , 
My name is Binh Thi Tran. I am currently in the second year of my PhD research at 
Queen Mary University of London, and will be undertaking field research in Vietnam 
between September 2007 and September 2008.  
The focus of my research is to investigate the roles of induced grassroots organisations 
in sustainable forest management in Vietnam. It is in this regard that I would like to 
talk to you or any other person in your organisation about your organisation’s role in 
this field in Vietnam.  
I would be grateful if you would contact me at b.t.tran@qmul.ac.uk to arrange a 
suitable time and place.  
Yours sincerely, 
 
Binh Thi Tran 
PhD Student, 
Department of Geography 
Queen Mary University of London 
Mile End Road, London E1 4NS  
Mobile: +44(0)7804 127256 (in UK) 
Mobile: +84 945752310 (in Vietnam) 
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1.4. Consent Form for Seeking Approval to Use Information from Interviews 
 For the study Titled: Sustainable Forest Management and Induced Grassroots 
Organisations in Vietnam 
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee Ref: QMREC 2007/33 
 
Investigator’s Statement:  
• Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. The person organizing the 
research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  
• Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and the 
presentation titled “Sustainable Forest Management and Grassroots 
Organisations in Vietnam” and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
• If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or the presentation 
titled “Sustainable Forest Management and Grassroots Organisations in 
Vietnam” or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before 
you decide whether to join in.  
• You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any time.  
I, Binh Thi Tran, confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and 
expected outcomes of the proposed research to the informant.  
Signed:…………………………………………………..Date:……………………… 
Participant’s Statement:  
• I understand that if I decide at any other time during the research that I no 
longer wish to participate in this project, I can notify the researcher involved and be 
withdrawn from it immediately.  
• I consent to the processing information from this interview for the purposes of 
this research study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly 
confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 
1998.  
I ___________________________________________ agree that the research project 
named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the 
study. I have read both the notes written above and the Information Sheet about the 
project, and understand what the research study involves.  
Signed:…………………………………………………..Date:……………………… 
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1.5. Eyewitness Form for Certifying Participants’ Approval for Using Information from 
Interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Example of Consent Obtained during the Field Research  
For the study Titled: Sustainable Forest Management and Induced Grassroots 
Organisations in Vietnam 
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee Ref: QMULREC 2007/33 
Investigator’s Statement: 
• Thank you for agreeing to be my eyewitness for this research. The person organizing the 
research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part.  
• Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and the presentation 
titled “Sustainable Forest Management and Grassroots Organisations in Vietnam” and/or 
listened to an explanation about the research. 
• If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or the presentation titled 
“Sustainable Forest Management and Grassroots Organisations in Vietnam” or 
explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to 
be an eyewitness.  
• You will be given a copy of this Eyewitness Form to keep and refer to at any time.  
I, Binh Thi Tran, confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and expected 
outcomes of the proposed research to the informant or a group of informants with the 
presentation of the eyewitness.  
Signed:…………………………………………………..Date:……………………… 
Eyewitness’s Statement:  
• I confirm that Ms Binh Thi Tran has explained to informants named below that they can 
decide at any other time during the research that they no longer wish to participate in this 
project, they can notify her and be withdrawn from it immediately. (Name of People taking part 
into this consent seeking session is attached) 
• I confirm that all informants consent to the processing information from their interview 
with Ms Binh for the purposes of this research study. They understand that such information will 
be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data 
Protection Act 1998.  
I ___________________________________________ agree that the research project named 
above has been explained with my presentation to informants to their satisfaction and I certify 
that the informant(s) agree to participate in the study and agree for the information to be 
processed for the purpose of this research. They have read and been explained both the notes 
written above and the Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research 
study involves.  
Signed:…………………………………………………..Date:……………………… 
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2.1. Consent obtained through email 
----- Original Message ----- 
Date: Friday, July 11, 2008 9:23 am  
Subject: Re: ethical considerations 
Sure go ahead. 
Best  
----- Original Message ----- 
From: Binh Thi Tran <b.t.tran@qmul.ac.uk>  
Date: Thursday, July 10, 2008 11:23 am  
Subject: Re: ethical considerations  
Thank you for your time meeting me yesterday. 
Following my university regulations, I need to ask permission from interviewees to use 
information provided by them. The meeting with you, as I orally explained to you, is one of 
those interviews that I will use for my thesis.  
Now could you please confirm by reply to this email that I can use information from the talk 
with you towards my thesis writing up and related research paper? According to my university 
ethical consideration, all interviewees will be coded to be anonymous. The information stays 
only between interviewee (you) and researcher (me). I will apply this rule too.  
If you have any questions about that, please let me know.  
Many thanks,  
Binh  
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2.2. Consent obtained by Witness Form (in Vietnamese) 
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Appendix 4: Research Tools 
Tools for Stage 1 
1. Natural Resource Mapping Exercises 
Resource mapping was used in this study with members of grassroots groups, to map out forest 
resources and patrol routes at each case study site. Resource mapping is a method for collating 
and plotting information on the occurrence, distribution, access and use of resources within the 
economic and cultural domain of a specific community (Rambaldi et al., 1998).  
Topic areas 1 
See Topic area 2 
2. In-depth Interviews with Village Leaders 
The topic areas below were used to help identify issues to explore further during in-depth 
interviews with villagers at a later stage.  
Topic areas 2 
• Total households in the village. 
• Village history. 
• Different sections of the population (women, men, young and elderly) and their roles in 
village affairs (and how/why these roles come to be). 
• Economic activities in the village and village dependence on forest resources. 
• Difficult times in the village (shortage of food, harsh climate, etc.). 
• Village’s customs and traditions (norms and procedures within and between households; 
and patterns for decision making regarding agricultural activities, for choosing land for 
settlement and agriculture, traditional festivals, for conflict settlements and helping each 
other in difficult times). 
• How these customs and traditions are reflected in or integrated or combined with the 
official administration system. 
• Are there any changes in these customs and traditions? Why? 
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3. Transect Walks 
A transect walk is simply a walk or a series of walks, which takes the investigators through 
different areas of a village and allows them to see a range of conditions across these areas. The 
walk rarely follows a straight line but more often zigzags through, so that it forces investigators 
to go to more remote parts of a village than would otherwise be visited (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1992). Also, each transect walk in each village was designed in such a way that it 
enabled me to walk together with local people through different parts of their communities, in 
order to check that different types of households and local environments had been included on 
the village resource map (see Commonwealth Secretariat, 1992). Moreover, seeing the case 
study sites in their ‘real’ contexts made it easier for me to discuss with local people about forest 
management practices at each village. 
Topic area 3 
See Topic Area 2 and 4 
Tools for Stage 2 
4. Household Interviews  
Procedure 
Importantly, SSIs can give participants an opportunity to reflect on their experiences, which can 
potentially empower them. In addition, participants can have more opportunity to find out about 
the research project than they would if they were simply being observed or if they were 
completing a questionnaire. As a result, they are likely to become more engaged in later stages of 
the research. In addition, face-to-face verbal exchanges during interviews allow researchers to 
consider changing their research questions to reflect realities at the research sites. 
After introducing myself and my research project, using information from the consent-seeking 
and information-obtaining pack (which was required also to obtain consent), SSI took place.  
Topic areas 4 
General household information 
: 
• Number of people in the household. 
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• Household’s whereabouts and livelihoods during the Second Indochina War.  
• Household history in the village. 
• Food availability for the household for: this month; next three months; all year. 
• Difficult period(s) for the household. 
• Labour division in the household 
Household’s dependence on forest resources: 
• Household livelihoods: activities, income sources, expenditures. 
• Any changes in household’s livelihood strategy for the last 5 and 10 years. 
• House construction: when and who helps to obtain materials. 
• Any new agricultural field? Where and any permission required? 
• Current land use and forest resource access. 
Changes in forest cover and resources: 
• Comparison of forest cover around village and fields before and after the war. 
• When changes in forest cover took place and why. 
Effects of forest cover changes on local life: 
• Changes in agricultural productivity, frequency of sunny and rainy days. 
• Changes in water supply from springs around their village. 
• Changes in availability of timber for house construction, NTFP and firewood collection. 
Reasons for forest cover changes: 
• War.  
• Outsiders’ harvesting of forest resources and scale of harvest. 
• Agricultural expansion. 
• Others. 
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Forest management practices in the village: 
• Steps and procedures involved in forest clearance for rice fields. 
• Current and past logging activities in the village 
• Timber trading (both legal and illegal) in the village. 
• Need for timber for household construction in the next five years. 
• Need for new rice fields or forest-based livelihood activities. 
• In comparison with other villages, how different it is the village’s forest clearance for rice 
field, harvest of NTFPs and timber for household construction 
• How have forest resources been used differently in the past and at the present? 
Decision making process in the village in the area of forest management: 
• Who (women or men and their social-political positions) influences the extraction and 
protection of forest resources in the village? 
• Who (women or men and their social-political positions) decides where to choose 
different types of forests for local people’s uses? 
• Who (women or men and their social-political positions) makes decisions on timber 
harvest for house construction? 
• Who (women or men and their social-political positions) decides when forest clearance 
for rice field or timber extraction must stop? 
• Who (women or men and their social-political positions) regulates and decides how 
NTFPs are harvested? 
Induced groups in the village 
See the topic area 6 
5. Focus Group Discussion supported by SSI and Seasonal Calendar Tools 
Procedure  
Essentially, seasonal calendars depict the main activities, problems, and opportunities throughout 
the annual cycle in diagrammatic form (Theis and Grandy, 1991). Seasonal calendars were 
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chosen as the primary tool for facilitating focus discussion at Stage Two, because they can help 
to initiate informal discussion about the temporal dimensions of the various activities, problems 
and opportunities that occur at different times of the year, and which have an effect on people’s 
lives and activities (Conroy, 2002). In addition, seasonal calendars can be used to show when 
different forest resources are used, and how forest-based activities fit in (temporally) with other 
livelihood activities. As such, discussion of forest management at these sites was much more 
easily approached from discussions about daily livelihood activities through a seasonal calendar.  
The following seasonal calendar was used to initiate information exchange within group 
members, through establishing a seasonal timetable: 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Weather             
Types of 
housework 
and gender 
division 
            
Agricultural 
activities 
and gender 
role 
            
Income and 
expenses 
            
Food 
shortages 
            
Collections 
of forest 
products 
and by 
whom?  
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Topic areas 5 (supplementary to focus discussion)  
• Differences between 1990s and now (2007) with respect to activities involved in rice 
cultivation, firewood collection, NTFPs collection and harvesting of timber for house 
construction (exact type of activities to compare depending on the discussion on the 
making of seasonal timetable). 
• Differences in weather conditions between the 1990s and now; and their influence on 
livelihood activities. 
• About induced groups (use the topic area 6) 
• Suggestions for better forest management in the village (such as who should manage 
forests and under what mechanisms?). 
6. Individual In-depth Interviews with Supposed – to – be Management Board Members of 
Induced Forest-based Grassroots Group in Each Village  
Procedure  
After introducing myself and research project using information from the consent seeking and 
information-obtaining pack, I undertook SSIs with all formal, active members of each grassroots 
groups. 
Topic areas 6 
Establishment process: 
• Year of establishment and establishment process 
• Organisations providing working permit for the group. 
Operation: 
• Definition of the group. 
• Areas of the group’s activities. 
• Members’ knowledge about the group’s functions and responsibilities; and the necessity 
for the establishment of the group. 
• Members’ knowledge about their own roles within the group. 
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• Topics for discussion in village meetings organised by the groups. 
• Who (women or men and their social-political positions) attends these meetings? 
• Who (women or men and their social-political positions) attends these meetings chairs 
these meetings? 
• Group’s decision-making process for daily tasks, work plan and future strategies. 
Group’s impacts: 
• Achievements, especially in helping people in the village. 
• Who (women or men) benefits from these achievements? 
• Support from villagers to the group’s activities. 
• Differences in forest management before and after the group’s establishment? 
• Assessment of the group’s performance: good, average, not good (explain the 
assessment). 
• Assessment on the necessity to set up the group. 
Group and the link with traditional and/ or existing customs and practices: 
• Traditional customs and practices in forest demarcation, resource use and protection. 
• Potential areas for bringing traditions into current forest management policies. 
• How the group should have functioned under traditional customs and practices. 
Group’s link to local government: 
• Existence of networking and cooperation between the group and different levels of local 
government. 
• Information exchange between groups and concerned government bodies. 
• Type of support from the local government. 
Group and gender equality: 
• Channels through which the group communicates with the wider village. 
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• The participation of women in the group. 
• Key factors influence gender relations and equality in forest management and other areas 
in the village life 
Group and challenges: 
• Group’s strengths and weaknesses. 
• Constraints for the group to function effectively. 
• Sustainability, independence and accountability of the group. 
• Support for the group’s from outside and inside the village. 
Group’s future: 
• The group’s direction/strategy for future. 
• Under whose management should the group be and with whom should the group 
associate, to improve its effectiveness? 
• Any more suggestions for the group to work more effectively? 
Tools for Stage 3  
7. Focus Group Discussion on the Research 
Procedure  
After introducing myself and research project using information from the consent-seeking and 
information-obtaining pack, which was also to obtain either verbal or written consent, discussion 
with the focus groups began. Interactions among members of the group are key to this method, 
making it different from interviewing methods where interactions are between interviewer and 
interviewees. With the focus group method, researchers can understand specific issues from 
multiple angles. Unlike in a one-to-one interview, where interviewees are free to express their 
opinion without being challenged by others and the information presented is more personal, 
discussion using the focus group method tends to generate more collective knowledge, whereby 
group members exchange ideas and challenge or agree with other participants opinions (Bedford 
and Burgess, 2001). Therefore, the research results are more multi-dimensional and reflective of 
complex local contexts. 
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In general, for men-only groups, focus group participants comprised people who were active and 
interested in forest management practices in their villages. In Village C, all members of the men-
only group were young (married) men, because they were the household heads who were active 
in current discussions with the local government about forest management while their fathers had 
withdrawn from collective village affairs. In Villages A and B, all members of the men-only 
group were middle-aged men because, in these two villages, older people were still in charge of, 
and took part in, forest management, while young men were viewed as dependents of their 
families. For the women-only groups in the three villages, participants were both young and 
middle-aged, in charge of their households’ agricultural production and forest resource 
collection. From my experience living in the studied villages, regardless of their age, women 
worked well together. As a result, the focus groups comprised of a mixture of ages.  
Agenda for Each Site 
a. Welcoming comments (2 minutes). 
b. Introduction to the interpreter (for Villages A and C) and why she is here. 
c. Briefing about the research and ethical considerations (10 minutes). 
d. Presentation of research findings (30 minutes). 
e. Discussion topics (2 hours). 
f. Summarising and closing comments (mentioning about next steps of the research 
findings and writing-up) (10 minutes). 
Topic areas 7 
In Village A: 
a. Does the forest protection group in the village help protect forests better? Why?  
b. What should the group have done differently? How should it have been organised 
differently? 
c. What would be the best approach to forest management in this village? Whole village or 
individual households? Or grassroots groups? 
d. What ensure the sustainability of any form of forest management that you prefer (benefits 
from and ownership of forests and management structure)?  
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e. What do you see as the roles of yourselves, government agencies and projects in making 
the village’s grassroots group function better in forest management?  
f. Why do many groups set up for forest management fail while your group set up for seed 
sowing works without any external support?  
g. Is there a different way to manage forests other than by setting up groups?  
h. Should the group be integrated within existing organisations like the Women’s Union, 
Farmers’ Union or Youth Union to gain legitimacy and or funding support from the 
government? Or should the group remain outside these organisations? 
In Village B: 
a. Is the establishment of the group in the village a good thing or not? Why?  
b. What would be the best approach to forest management in this village? Whole village or 
individual households? Or grassroots groups 
c. What ensures the sustainability of any form of forest management that you prefer?  
d. What do you see as the roles of yourself, government agencies and projects in making the 
village’s grassroots group function better in forest management?  
e. Why do many groups set up for forest management and poverty reduction fail while your 
group set up for field protection works without any external support? 
f. Is there a different way to manage forests other than by setting up groups?  
g. Should the group be integrated within existing organisations like the Women’s Union, 
Farmers’ Union or Youth Union to gain legitimacy and or funding support from the 
government? Or should the group remain outside these organisations?  
In Village C: 
a. Discussion about government-established community forest management procedures to 
see any discrepancy between policy and reality of implementation. 
b. What do you gain from forest management under the forest allocation scheme in the 
village? Anything with forest land user’s right? Harvests from the forests?  
c. Does the forest protection group in the village help protect forests better? Why?  
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d. If in the next 10 years (out of 50 years tenancy) the forests in the village become more 
mature, are you interested in forest management by yourself? Why? 
e. If yes, what should you and your village do to manage the forest in that case? Do you 
want to manage forests on your own, in household groups or as a village as a whole? 
f. What ensures the sustainability of any form of forest management that you prefer 
(benefits from and ownership of forests and management structure)?  
g. What do you see as the roles of yourself; government agencies and projects in making the 
village’s grassroots group function better in forest management? 
h. Why do many groups set up for forest management fail while your group set up for 
labour sharing in rice fields works without any external support? 
i. Is there a different way to manage forests other than setting up groups? 
j. Should the group be integrated within existing organisations like the Women’s Union, 
Farmers’ Union or Youth Union to gain legitimacy and or funding support from the 
government? Or should the group remain outside these organisations? 
Tools for Stage 4 
8. In-depth Interviews with Government Offices Including Mass Organisations 
Procedure 
Although detailed questions were developed in the field, informed by the findings of Stages One 
and Two, each government participant needed specific follow-up questions, which only emerged 
during the interview. As a result, the topic areas were not defined too narrowly, which provided a 
structure for the SSI while also giving me more flexibility to follow emerging issues and 
maintain a continuous flow of discussion during the interviews. For this group of participants in 
Quang Tri, I usually got my contacts from Hanoi to introduce me to relevant people in Quang 
Tri. For stakeholders in Hanoi, I used my widespread contacts from the time I was working in 
Vietnam to introduce me to different state organisations.  
After introducing myself and my research project using information from the consent-seeking 
and information-obtaining pack (which was also used to obtain consent), I used SSI to explore 
the following topic areas. 
Topic areas 8 
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About the case study site(s) (only for those familiar with the site(s)): 
• History of the site(s). 
• Population groups at the site(s). 
• Socio-economic situations at the site(s). 
• Difficult periods at the site(s) and government policies to respond to them. 
Nature of forest management activities in the area (at village, commune, district or provincial 
levels): 
• Roles and responsibilities of the organisations/agencies at the site. 
• Organisational structure and decision-making process in areas involving villagers. 
• The organisation policies or orientation towards forest management and/or poverty 
reduction and people’s participation.  
• Challenges/constraints in implementing policies that encourage people’s participation. 
• Organisational cooperation with other government agencies and/or NGOs in supporting 
people and their organisations at the village level. 
 About grassroots organisations: 
• Working definition(s) of grassroots groups within your organisation. 
• Knowledge of and support given to grassroots groups. 
• Assessment of the group’s operations, its strengths and weaknesses, and suitability to the 
local context. 
• Perceptions among the organisation (and other concerned agencies in the area) about the 
need for the group, and its structures, operations and effectiveness. 
• Suggestions to improve grassroots groups. 
9. In-depth Interviews with V/INGOs and International Donors 
For participants from V/INGOs and international donors active in Hanoi and Quang Tri with 
regard to civil society development, especially of grassroots groups involved in forest 
management, I had the advantage of having worked with many of those organisations in the past, 
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either directly or indirectly, so I was able to access this group more quickly and easily than 
government officials. 
After introducing myself and my research project using information from the consent-seeking 
and information-obtaining pack (which was also used to obtain consent), I used SSI to explore 
the following topic areas. 
Topic Areas 9 
• Working definition(s) of grassroots organisations within your organisation. 
• Strategies and policies toward civil society/grassroots organisations development in 
Vietnam. 
• Activities, projects to implement these policies. 
• Opportunities and challenges for implementing these policies. 
• Self-assessment of influences/impacts (of agency’s policies/activities) to support 
grassroots organisations/groups in Vietnam. 
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Appendix 5: Excepts from Research Diary 
11 October 2007: Obtaining an Introduction Letter for Visiting a Village 
It had rained for more than one week in Quang Tri. After 2 hours driving motorbike, I arrived at 
Huong Hoa FPD office whose head gave me a guide to one commune of interest for my 
research. It took another half an hour to go to the Commune People Committee office where I 
needed to be introduced to the vice chairman of the CPC before approval letter to work in the 
commune was given. A “test” started with questions about my knowledge about computer, 
internet and viruses. The vice-chairman is young, and keen on using a computer for his work. 
This test lasted until lunch time. Then I went for lunch with the vice chairman and FPD officer 
and continued our discussions about the methodology of in research in general. Again this is 
interesting to the Vice-president because he is attending an in-service training course on 
Business Administration that required him to use different research tools for conducting his 
dissertation. It was interesting, though, to talk with him.  
Finally, after lunch, I have a chance to talk to him about my research and the need to work in one 
village in the commune of his responsibility to try to understand the forest allocation programme 
to local communities there. The FPD officer and the CPC vice chairman insisted to help me to 
call for a village-wide meeting, so that I can collect all information I need in one meeting! Their 
intention is good. I need to explain again why I don’t need the village meeting yet and why I 
need to meet individual villagers. This takes the whole afternoon. At last, by 5pm we all agree 
that I can meet villagers on my own when I need to. After handing a permission/introduction 
letter to village administrative leader, the vice-chairman introduced me to mass organisations’ 
representatives who were active in the commune I intended to visit.  
10 November 2007: Some Observations on Gender Relations 
Domestic violence is quite common at the research sites. Van Kieu women are the main 
providers of labour to support their family’s income while their husbands do not have to do 
anything if they choose so. It is women’s responsibility to work in rice fields, the main source of 
food. This requires tremendous physical fitness to climb up hills to work and bring harvests back 
home, while they can usually have only two meals of mainly starch food (rice or cassava) per 
day. Van Kieu women, especially when they are around their mid-30s, smoke to suppress their 
tiredness and hunger while working around the house or in hill rice fields. Men’s responsibility 
is, in theory, to look for jobs off-farm to earn extra cash to buy rice to cover food shortages in the 
months before harvesting, pay the bills for children’s schools and provide protein intake for 
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whole family. However, when men get some money, they usually keep it for themselves to buy 
alcohol and eat out with their male friends. This is particularly common among young men. 
Middle-aged men sometimes take part more in rice cultivation with women but again only when 
they like to do so. 
Unequal treatment towards women is a common occurrence. Many women I met have been 
kicked out of their husbands’ house after so many years working for free for their in-law’s 
households. The reason for a man to kick his wife out is that he likes another woman, who is 
usually younger and more attractive than his wife. When a woman leaves her in-law’s 
household, she usually is accompanied by at least four children, because their husbands don’t 
want these children. Women who were “discharged” by their husbands have to find a household 
to take them in. Usually this is their own father’s house. If their brothers or father agree to take 
them and their children, they can come back to their childhood home. If they have no brothers 
and their father has passed away, they can live in the house of their uncles. When coming back to 
either of these houses, they have to work as hard as ever to earn food for themselves and their 
children. Sometimes a man can be interested in marrying a divorced woman, she can be 
remarried but her children live with her brother or father. I met one man who, in his early 40s 
and healthy (in my view), married a divorced women in her early 30s so that she could do the 
field work that he was too weak to do (so he claimed). Women do all this hard work because 
they think it is their jobs and, for most of them, they do not want to complain or take any action 
to change their husbands’ attitude because they are usually worried that, if their husbands are not 
happy with them, they will look for another women. 
26th October 2007 - Interim Case Summary (i.e. initial findings for 
further exploration) – except  
1. Local people seem to diversify their livelihoods away from forest resource (see note on 
Pa Tầng Nhóm phụ nữ). More better-off households had their income outside forests. 
However these are households that received more support from donor-funded or 
government-funded projects. For the last 2-3 years local people said that NTFPs become 
rarer and rarer. There is also a sense of voluntarily not coming to forests to extract forest 
resources because of resource degradation, increased government enforcement (fine and 
patrolling against local violators).  
2. Local people think that timber extraction by SFEs and war- time bombings were the main 
causes of forest destruction in their areas (see note on Võ Phần).  
3. SSG members are mainly commune and village officers, which has both advantages and 
disadvantages. Many people see this as a way to sustain the groups after the funding 
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finishes because these members will continue their responsibilities with SSGs with 
financial support from CPC’s budget. The question arise from this situation is that 
whether it is necessary to establish these groups. It may be better to strengthen the 
capacity of public administration at the commune level.  
  
12 March 2008: Summary of Viewpoints about SSGs’ Performance 
and Improvements for the Future 
Village B 
SSG 
member 
On the scale of good, average and 
bad, the SSG can be ranked as good 
the members are wholehearted and 
work hard during forest patrols. 
To improve the group’s 
effectiveness, more funding is 
required for equipment, food for 
patrols and monthly stipends. 
To continue the group’s work, 
funding from projects is required, 
especially because the group’s work 
is long-term.  
SSG 
member 
On the scale of good, average and 
bad, the SSG can be ranked between 
good and average because if it is 
good, forest patrol must take place 
regularly. However, forest patrol is 
not totally done carefully. For 
example, when it rains, checking and 
destroying traps during forest patrol 
is often skipped because of laziness.  
In the future, the group should be 
maintained to support the CPC and 
FPD. In addition, for increased 
effectiveness of the group, projects 
should ensure: 
a) increased stipend for group 
members to do forest patrol, better 
equipment, more training on 
biological assessment, and health 
insurance for members;  
b) that awareness raising is done 
more regularly. Money should be 
given to organise this activity, for 
example for visual aids and giving 
people money to attend meetings 
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SSG 
member 
On the scale of good, average and 
bad, the SSG can be ranked as good, 
because it is achieving about 80% of 
its objectives, and helping to reduce 
forest crimes significantly. The 
group is not achieving 100% mainly 
because forest patrols are conducted 
only once per month instead of three 
times. In addition, the group’s 
performance is not as good as those 
of the village administrative head 
due to lack of legal recognition of 
their role in forest management. 
To improve the effectiveness of the 
group, more equipment should be 
given. In addition, it is very 
important to work out suitable 
livelihood options for local people, 
so that they don’t need to enter the 
forest to extract forest resources 
illegally. Furthermore, if the group 
is given power to deal with forest 
violation, forest patrols would 
become more comprehensive 
because, at the moment, group 
members can only see and report 
forest crimes for other agencies to 
address. 
SSG 
leader 
On the scale of good, average and 
bad, the SSG can be ranked as good 
because it has contributed greatly to 
stopping forest crimes (i.e. illegal 
logging and hunting) 
For better performance of the group 
in future, the following are needed: 
a) increased stipend for members; 
b) more equipment; 
c) improved content of awareness 
raising activities and more funding 
for visual aids. 
d) continued training for group 
members in biological assessment 
SSG 
member 
On the scale of good, average and 
bad, the SSG can be ranked between 
good and average because, to be 
good, a group should conduct forest 
patrols 5 or 6 times per month to 
really have an impact on stopping 
forest crimes 
To improve the group’s 
effectiveness, more patrols are 
required. To that end, increased 
stipends and legal recognition for 
the group to deal with forest crime 
on the spot should be secured 
 
Village A 
SSG 
leader 
The group’s impacts are still limited. 
Illegal logging is still taking place 
because the group only has few 
members with a low stipend 
 
For the group to work better: 
a) it must work more closely with 
local government, because the Già 
Làng doesn’t have much influence 
now to stop illegal logging; 
b) the stipend for group members 
must be increased 
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SSG 
member 
The group’s effectiveness is low, 
because illegal logging still happens 
and group members can’t stop it 
For the group to work more 
effectively it must have: 
a) power to stop outside loggers and 
hunters; 
b) stronger and more 
comprehensive support from the 
CPC and FPD; e.g. when the group 
reports illegal logging, the FPD 
must send staff to deal with the 
reported incident; 
c) an increased stipend 
SSG 
member 
The group’s effectiveness in forest 
protection is still limited. People 
illegally log forests without the 
group being able to stop them. The 
group’s work is still general, not 
specific  
For the group to work more 
effectively, it must:  
a) be designed in such a way that it 
specifically addresses local needs 
and concerns for both livelihoods 
and forest protection; 
b) have power to stop outsiders 
from exploiting forests; 
c) have an increased stipend 
SSG 
member 
The group’s effectiveness in forest 
protection is low. Illegal logging 
takes place on a large scale but group 
members do little to stop this. This is 
because illegal loggers come from 
every direction, including from Laos, 
from other surrounding villages, and 
from Quang Binh province. In 
addition, staff from different 
government agencies are also illegal 
timber traders 
For the group to work more 
effectively, it needs: 
a) better control over outsiders’ 
illegal logging; 
b) stronger support from 
government agencies to stop illegal 
logging  
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Appendix 6: Socio-economic Conditions at the Research 
Sites 
Huong Hoa district, housing Villages A and C, has 19 communes and two towns: Khe Sanh, the 
district capital; and Lao Bao, the busiest border crossing between Laos and Vietnam. The 
population of Huong Hoa district totals approximately 47,000 people, of whom 60% belong to 
the Van Kieu ethnic minority group (Oxfam GB, 2008). Dakrong district, harbouring Village B, 
is located in the south-west of Quang Tri province. It has 14 communes with a total population 
of 34,604 people, of which 80% belong to the Van Kieu ethnic minority group (Quang Tri Rural 
Development Programme, 2006). Poverty levels in these two districts are the highest in the 
province (Quang Tri Statistics Office, 2004), with an average annual household income of 
US$110, compared to the provincial average of US$320 (Oxfam GB, 2008). Rice is the key 
agricultural crop in Quang Tri. However, with its dry and hot climate and with only 30% of the 
agricultural land in the province being irrigated, agricultural productivity is generally low 
(Poverty Task Force, 2003).  
Within Dakrong and Huong Hoa districts, the communes covering the three study villages have 
diverse socio-economic and cultural characteristics. In Huong Hoa district, Huong Lap commune 
(covering Village A) is characterised by high limestone hills with limited agricultural land. 
Access to this commune was often blocked by landslides in the rainy season, between May and 
September. In 2004, the total population of the commune was 1,235 people, all of whom 
belonged to the Van Kieu ethnic minority (Quang Tri Statistics Office, 2004). Rice cultivation is 
the preferred staple of people in the area. However, due to low rice productivity, cassava is a 
common substitute for many households (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Agricultural Production in Huong Lap Commune 
Type of crop Arable land 
(ha) 
Productivity 
(tonnes/ha) 
Production 
(tonnes/year) 
Wet rice  51 2.0 102 
Dry rice 50 0.9 45 
Cassava 120 20.0 2,400 
Maize 20 0.8 16 
Sweet potato, beans and 
vegetables 
110 Unknown 140 (value in 
rice-tonnes) 
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(Source: Huong Lap CPC, 2007) 
Also in Huong Hoa district, Huong Tan commune, covering Village C, is located in the centre of 
the district. The commune’s population in 2006 was 466 households with 2,624 people, of whom 
67% belonged to the Van Kieu ethnic minority. Huong Tan is 10 km away from Khe Sanh town. 
Access to the commune is fairly good, with a well established road network to its villages. The 
commune is characterised by low hills with soil suitable for coffee cultivation, which occupies 
the largest area of arable land, followed by wet rice and cassava (see Table 2). Among the 
communes covering the three study villages, Huong Tan has the most fertile agricultural land 
and the most diverse crops. 
Table 2: Agricultural Production in Huong Tan Commune 
Type of crop Arable land 
(ha) 
Productivity 
(tonnes/ha) 
Production 
(tonnes/year) 
Coffee 199 1.5 299 
Wet rice 131 1.0 131 
Cassava 119 19.4 2,309 
Dry rice 65 0.6 39 
Maize 23 0.3 7 
Fruit (mainly bananas) 14 Unknown Unknown 
Vegetables 7 0.6 4 
Beans 6 Unknown Unknown 
Black Pepper 4 Unknown Unknown 
Others 18 Unknown Unknown 
(Source: Huong Tan CPC, 2006) 
Ba Long commune, encompassing Village B, is located in the north-east of Dakrong district. In 
2005, a surfaced road linking the commune with the district capital was opened, greatly 
increasing access to the commune during the rainy season. In 2007, the commune had a total 
population of 2,778 people, of which all but 184 belonged to the Van Kieu ethnic group (Ba 
Long CPC, 2008). The commune’s topography is characterised by steep hills and low mountains. 
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As a result, it has limited land suitable for permanent agriculture. Among agricultural crops, 
beans and peanuts are the main crops (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Agricultural Production in Ba Long Commune in 2007 
Type of crops Arable land 
(ha) 
Productivity 
(tonnes/ha) 
Production 
(tonnes/year) 
Peanuts 202 0.2 40 
Green beans 154 0.1 15 
Red beans 59 0.6 35 
Maize 52 0.4 21 
Wet rice 42 0.4 17 
Cassava 18 Unknown Unknown 
Sweet potato 11 Unknown Unknown 
Vegetables 4 Unknown Unknown 
(Source: Ba Long CPC, 2008) 
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Appendix 7: Issues Arising from the Field 
Working at the case study sites presented a number of challenges that I did not anticipate when 
preparing for the fieldwork. These can be divided into four broad areas: methodological; ethical; 
health and safety; and emotional. 
Regarding the methodology, some adjustments were necessary once I had commenced my 
fieldwork. First of all, for Stage One my original plan was to conduct a questionnaire survey to 
collect basic information about the selected villages and local men and women. However, after 
selecting a research sample and size, a trial with five households in Village C showed 
questionnaires to be an unsuitable tool for various reasons. For a start, I found that the 
respondents felt as if they were sitting for a test where they had to make sure that their answers 
did not contradict government policy in any way. As such, the interviewees did not pay much 
attention to whether their answers reflected their true feelings or situation. Furthermore, as I had 
to record the answers of the respondents and keep my eyes on the questionnaires, I was unable to 
maintain eye contact with respondents and build a rapport with them, with the result that the 
atmosphere was rather tense. Since the questionnaire consisted of structured, close-ended 
questions, there was also little room for flexibility. Given that little was known about grassroots 
organisation’s roles and participation in forest management at the research sites, I felt that this 
tool was too rigid to allow me to adapt to an unknown local context.  
My original plan was also to record household interviews and focus group discussions, so as to 
enable me to concentrate on interactive conversations with participants. However, it proved 
impossible to do this without arousing the suspicions of villagers. This was because, in rural 
Vietnam, people were not used to tape recording for research purposes – indeed tape recording 
was associated with official interviews with government employees. This made participants 
worried about voicing ‘wrong’ or ‘incorrect’ opinions. For this reason, tape-recording in certain 
situations would have made interviews very formal, thus limiting the openness of the 
conversations. Also, government officials were very suspicious about outsiders disseminating 
unapproved information. As such, if I had insisted on using a tape-recorder at the beginning of 
the research process, I ran the risk of having my work permit revoked. For those reasons, tape 
recording was not used during household interviews, although video recording was used for 
focus group’s discussions (see above), which took place later, in Stage Three, after I had built 
trust among villagers and government officials.  
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Further, my initial plan was to use wealth ranking and social ranking exercises to support focus 
group discussion during Stage Two to help participants to discuss and take part in the research 
more naturally. However, wealth ranking exercises failed to provide much useful data, because 
most participants thought that their co-villagers were all in the same wealth status and did not 
have enough to eat. As a result, local people thought that wealth ranking was not suitable and 
were reluctant to participate in the activity, resulting in a rather stiff atmosphere in later 
discussions about other issues of forest management. Similarly, a social ranking exercise was 
also tried in a village outside of the studied sites. However, the exercise took so long to complete 
(nearly one day), because of the level of detail required, that it left too little time for discussions 
about other issues. Moreover, it was unfair, in an area with high levels of poverty, to ask local 
people to take time off their daily work or stay up late at night to do this exercise. In addition, 
this exercise involved a lot of repetition, such as in relation to households’ living conditions, 
number of members and accommodation, which participants found boring. 
Moreover, I had planned to live in each village for three months, finishing research activities in 
one village before moving on to the next. However, I found that, if I did that, I risked losing the 
enthusiasm that I had generated around my research among villagers and government officers at 
various sites through the information-giving sessions I held at the beginning of my fieldwork. 
Also, I found that different case study sites had different busy periods depending on types of 
livelihoods activities. As a result, the decision to move among the sites enabled me to make the 
best use of my time while also minimising the disturbance caused to people during periods of 
peak activity (i.e. harvests and weeding). Furthermore, conducting research at three case study 
sites simultaneously helped me to identify differences and similarities more quickly, which I 
could then explore in depth. It also helped to ensure that research was consistent across the three 
sites, thereby preventing gaps from emerging in the data. 
The second set of issues arising from the field research was ethical considerations. Although the 
process of acquiring ethics approval from Queen Mary, University of London is set out in 
Section 3.6 and Appendix 3, I want to reflect here on issues that arose during and after the 
research. Staying in extremely poor households, I found that people gave me the best food and 
accommodation they could, even if this was beyond their means. Although I bought food to 
contribute to my hosts’ daily meals, I still felt guilty because people always gave more food to 
me than to other family members, including their children, because I was their guest. To distance 
myself from the development projects that I was affiliated to by avoiding any direct financial 
donations to help with basic daily requirements of my friendly hosts was hard. On the one hand, 
I wanted to help disadvantaged people and children, at least to ease their immediate worries 
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about food. On the other hand, I did not want to influence my research findings if people 
changed their opinions just to make me feel happy. This is an example of the application of 
critical reflexivity, which goes beyond the official university ethical guidelines to help ensure the 
integrity of data sources. That was why, in the end, I decided to contribute only food to my hosts 
during the time I worked in Quang Tri. When I finished all my data collection there and moved 
to Hanoi, I came back occasionally to visit my hosts and other villagers of my research sites, to 
help link poor households with disabled members to charity groups or other livelihood 
improvement initiatives. 
The third set of issues arising from the field research was health and safety concerns that I did 
not expect to encounter when planning the research. The reality proved different. In all three 
villages, there were health risks associated with drinking water, which was contaminated with 
toxic chemicals sprayed during the Second Indochina War. Living with local people but not 
drinking the water they offered was considered as an offence. So, I had to sip a little bit every 
time I was offered some, and later drink bottled water, which local people thought of as a luxury 
for city persons. However, I could not compromise on this matter and drink water straight from 
the spring as local people did.  
In addition, in Village A, where illegal logging by outsiders was rampant, investigating forest 
management issues on my own was a safety concern. On one occasion, I encountered illegal 
loggers while participating in a forest patrol. Reporting the incident to the forest protection 
station made my return to the research site even more dangerous. Fortunately, the encounter 
happened near the end of the research, when I needed to conduct only one more focus group 
discussion in that village. Thus, I halted the research in the village for one month to monitor 
developments about the incident, and only returned for two hours in the company of a commune 
forest protection officer to complete the focus group.  
More taxing than all of the above were the emotional challenges I had to deal with during the 
period of field research at the three case study sites. Although I was familiar with Vietnamese 
rural areas, from my previous work experience with different development projects across the 
country, I was unprepared for conditions in Quang Tri’s villages. The level of poverty hit me 
hard because I had never before lived and worked in such physically hard conditions where lack 
of food, clean water and sufficient accommodation in cold weather were so prominent. Sharing 
these physical hardships with the local people made me feel sad and frustrated, because, unlike 
me, these friendly and hardworking people had little choice but to live under these conditions for 
many more years to come. In addition, because my research sites were affected by Agent Orange 
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and other defoliants used during the Second Indochina War, and Van Kieu ethnic minority 
people are among the poorest in Vietnam, seeing children with serious birth defects and hearing 
stories of child mortality as result of a lack of sufficient resources for childcare were part of my 
daily interactions with local communities. As such, keeping a clear distinction between my role 
as a researcher and my personal feelings for the people I was living among required constant and 
explicit attention and self reflection. 
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